The Ethics of Care - Essay Example

Ethics: A Review of the Literature The general position associated with the ethics of care is that in regards to justice, and “the care perspective conceives morale to be a matter of creating and maintaining relationships in which agents respond to the perceived needs of others.” (p.229). Although there are both significant differences and similarities in regards to the focus between justice and care, Carol Gilligan’s point of view is strong on the focus that people have tendencies to adopt a personal and specific opinion and perspective on topics, and that people also tend to think that there is only one right or better way to think about moral problems; “for example, the same figure can be seen as a square or a diamond, depending on its orientation in relation to a surrounding frame…a bird-watcher and a rabbit-keeper are likely to see the duck-rabbit figure in different ways, yet this difference does not imply that one way is better or a higher form of perceptual organization.” (p.229). Gilligan is imperative on the thinking that the conception of the moral domain is comprised of at least two moral orientations, and that these orientations raise new questions about observed differences in moral judgment and the disappointments to which they give rise. Factors such as the necessary distinction between differences in developmental stage and differences in orientation are strong issues in her discussion, and it is stated pronouncedly that her research on moral orientation derives from an observation which was made in the course of studying the relationship between moral judgment and action. Gilligan also speaks strongly about the issue of abortion, explaining that the language of the public abortion debate reveals a specific and significant justice perspective. “Whether the abortion dilemma is cast as a conflict of rights or in terms of respect for human life, the claims of the fetus and of the pregnant woman are balanced or placed in opposition.” (p.233) Gilligan uses various studies in her research and writing, in order to show the relation between the ethics of care and the issue of justice. One study of particular importance in this case is the one which two medical students were cast to each report a decision not to turn in someone who has violated the school rules against drinking, and who “cast their decision in different terms. One student constructs the decision as a net of mercy, a decision to override justice in light of the fact that the violator has shown ‘the proper degrees of contrition.’” (p.234). This study was used as an example to show one of the most important distinctions between care as understood or construed within a justice framework and care as a framework or a perspective on moral decision. The result of the study was that “The medical student’s decision not to turn in the proctor for drinking reflects a judgment that turning him in is not the best way to respond to the drinking problem, itself seen as a sign of detachment or lack of concern.” (p.234). Overall, Gilligan’s opinion and interest is that of the correlation and importance between the issues of the ethics of care and that of justice, as well as the similarities, differences, and end results involved in the entirety. She uses the studies as examples to “illustrate two-cross cutting perspectives that do not negate one another but focus attention on different dimensions of the situation, creating a sense of ambiguity around the question of what is the problem to be solved.” (p.235). Nel Nodding’s general opinion on the subject of the ethics of care is largely in regards to that of obligation. She uses a quote in the context of Neitzache from Christian love and Eros to roughly make her basic point: “There is something so ambiguous and suggestive about the word love, something that speaks to memory and hope, that even the lowest intelligence and the coldest heart still feel something of the glimmer of this word. The cleverest woman and the most vulgar man recall the relatively least selfish moments of their whole life, even if Eros has taken only a low flight with them.” (p.245). Nodding’s uses forms of sympathy and empathy in regards to the issue of the ethics of care, as well as the factor of obligation; to which one of her most significant remarks is that “There are moments for all of us when we care quite naturally. We just … guishable (end of page 245, start of 246) (p.245-246). Nodding’s arguments consist significantly of questions such as ‘must I’ and ‘should I’, suggesting that ‘I must’ arises directly and prior to consideration of what it is that one might do. This is made distinguishable from ‘I want’ and the ‘I ought’. Nodding’s feels that the most intimate situations of care “are, thus, natural.” (p.247). A strong opinion is argued that it seems preferable to place an ethical ideal above principle as a guide to moral action. Also, that our “obligation is limited and delimited by revolution. We are never free, in the human domain, to abandon our preparedness to care; but practically, if we are meeting those in our inner circles adequately as ones-caring and receiving those linked to our inner circles by formal chains of relation, we shall limit the calls upon our obligation quite naturally.” (p.249). Claudia Card’s primary opinion deals with her introductory question: “Can an ethic of care without justice unable us adequately to resist evil?” (p.255). Card quotes Gilligan and Nodding’s various times, attempting to justify their reasoning and put forth more strongly her own personal view. Hers raises the most questions out of the three opinions, and the issue of relationships, what these relationships mean, and the correlation they have with the ethics of care is made broad throughout her works. The matter as to which relationships that link us to strangers count as ethically significant, as well as formal relationships are kinds of relationships as opposed to particular relationships is brought up, to which Card orientates that “The examples suggest institutionally defined relationships, such as marriages and the relationships defined by educational institutions. However, if ‘formal’ relationships are institutionally defined, we need justice to evaluate them.” (p.258). Although there are certainly numerous and significant differences of opinion among the three, the main and most primary similarity in regards to the ethics of care is that of justice. The notion of justice, how it must be portrayed and thus carried out; all of these are of great relevance and importance in each author’s writings. Sartre, Ross and McNaughton provide different perspectives on what might be a common issue – which is primarily moral choice. Sartre is primarily focused on the issue of ethics – both moral and other – and with that of values and judgment. “But how is the value of a feeling determined?” (p.262).The main opinion here is that the feelings one forms are the result of the acts which one performs, and also that in one sense choice is possible, but that what is not possible is not to choose. In other words, choice is undeniable, and although not necessarily determinable, is an unquestionable factor. Ross has a more opinionated view on what makes acts right, and the correlations and interrelations within this issue. As he states in his introductory sentence, “When a plain man fulfills a promise because he thinks he ought to do so, it seems clear that he does so with no thought of its total consequences, still less with any opinion that these are likely to be the best possible.” (p.265). The theory of utilitarianism is as well brought into this writing, which is explained by the writer as being used to simplify unduly our relations to our fellows. “It says, in effect, that the only morally significant relation in which my neighbors stand to me is that of being possible beneficiaries by my nation.” (p.265). The difference between ‘duty proper’ and ‘actual duty’ is also brought into play, with it being said that the way to tell this difference is dependant on all the morally significant kinds it is an instance of. In McNaughton’s case, Aristotle defines virtue as not a feeling, or a capacity, but rather as a state. “…neither virtues nor vices are feelings…virtues are not capacities either: for we are neither called good nor called bad in so far as we are simply capable of feelings…If, then, the virtues are neither feelings nor capacities, the remaining possibility is that they are states.” (p.185). Aristotle argues strongly that both the good and the happiness of elements is self-sufficient, and as is the basis that virtue seeks the mean relative to us. In this is explained how each science produces its product well, by focusing on what is intermediate, therefore making the product conform to whatever that may be. Read More