Separation of Powers Exists within the British Political System - Essay Example

To what extent can it be argued that a Seperation of Powers exists within the British Political system? The uniqueness of the British political system is its association with the Crown, on whose behalf most powers are exercised. It is notable that unlike others entities the Crown is not subject to legal regulation due to the sense of dignity it evokes. Also, the prerogatives of the crown include the “power to conduct foreign relations, to conclude treaties that are binding in international law, and prerogatives of mercy and pardon (Shell 1994, p.301). This is in addition to the Crown’s extensive residual common law powers and its status as a legal personality. The latter privilege allows it to acquire and dispose of land, etc., the way ordinary individuals can. In contrast to this, the powers of local authorities are very much subject to statutes and regulations. In this sense, the executive powers of the local government is limited and constrained when compared with the powers of the Crown. “The power to order and reorganize the civil service derives either from the royal prerogative or the normal powers of a body recognized by law to enter into employment relations. It is detailed by Orders in Council, but these leave much leeway to ministers. It is this `flexible friend that has been used to establish Executive Agencies in the civil service and various other innovations over the years. All of this without the need for recourse to Parliament or law.” (Oliver 1994, p.641) The executive powers of the ministers, though loosely regulated, nevertheless provide them with “powers to make contracts for the supply of goods and services to departments and the public” (Shell 1994, p.301). The last fifty years had seen moves to implement more statutory controls over the executive branch. This is because the older methods of control were inappropriate and irrelevant to the modern times. Some examples include, reduction of powers of local authorities in favor of school governors and teachers; enhancement of responsibilities of hospital managers and general practitioners within the framework of the National Health Service. Both these cases suggest a move toward decentralization of executive powers. (Oliver 1994, p.639) The independence of the judicial power was solidly established in England by the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89. Ever since, one of the implicit conditions of this outcome was that the judges should take care not to encroach on the legitimate spheres of discretion of the sovereign political authorities, Crown and Parliament. The legal control of the government is aided by the Supreme Court Act, which is concerned with the application of the courts’ inherent common law powers (Shell 1994, p.303). The last 20 years had seen institutions with adjudicatory functions impinging more and more on spheres of political and administrative discretion in Britain. However, these spheres remain functionally distinct. Of late, judges in Britain appear to embrace roles “which in reality bring them into very close association with the executive power and with issues of often controversial public policy as well as exposing them to the pressures exerted by the public at large”. (Oliver 1994, p.641) During the course of the last two decades a drive towards the process of delegating responsibility to executive agencies was carried out. It resulted in removal of ministers and their administrative staffs from day-to-day provision of services. Another recent development is the narrowing of ministerial discretions in certain sensitive areas relating to the freedom and rights of the individual, especially education and mental health services. This further serves as evidence to the case of separation of executive powers from the rest. There is also a narrowing of the powers of the legislators the last few decades. It also brings with it lesser political accountability on the part of the legislators. On the contrary, Britain’s adoption of welfare state policies means that officials have discretionary powers about entitlements to the social rights (Johnson 1998, p.152). This is the result of a gradual process since the Second World War, by which decisions of government and of civil servants have been placed under a greater degree of legal regulation than ever before. “In recent years, however, these once familiar political attitudes towards the judicial power have been rendered largely obsolete simply as a result of the steady growth in judicial activism, the increasing propensity in society to take issues to a court for resolution, and the willingness of ministers and Parliament to tolerate more checks to their discretion than would have been regarded as acceptable 30 or 40 years ago.” (Johnson 1998, p.150) The overall rise in judicial arbitrations is more an indication of a shift in public attitudes and expectations of the office bearers in the government. It also means that the society is less willing to trust people holding power and their competence, at all levels of government. Perhaps more significant is the diminished powers of the local government, whose prerogatives are being transferred to appointees, which does not auger well for a democracy. Thus, the separation of powers between the executive, judicial and legislative branches of the British government is fairly distributed and demarcated. What are the arguments for and against Britain adopting a form of Proportional Representation for eneral Elections throughout the United Kingdom? The supporters of Proportional Representation for General Elections claim that it is fairer to ethnic, religious and racial minorities compared to other systems. This is generally true. Studies conducted on continental European democracies support this view. Another advantage of this system is that it gives incentives for runners-up in elections, who traditionally ended up at the wrong end of a zero-sum game. In this regard it provides a fairer playing field compared to Majority and Plurality systems of elections. Several factors contribute towards making Proportional Representation a better alternative when electoral competition takes place under majority rule than when it does under plurality. Firstly, the voter is empowered to vote strategically, which is not always possible in other alternative systems. It is supported by the fact that, “In top-two majority runoff elections with three or more candidates, voters always face incentives to vote strategically, but that as a practical matter voters under runoff rules do not vote strategically very often, because it requires more complex information, and yet that there are situations when strategic voting in top-two runoffs seems a plausible bet”. (Blais, Dobrzynska, and Indridason 2005, p.185) In contrast, under plurality rule strategic voting requires relatively little information, that is, the voter only has to determine which two parties have the most support. Under the majority run-off, the voter must in addition form expectations about the identity of the third runner-up, and also about how the voters of the unsuccessful candidates will split their votes between the front-runners. In todays world of extensive polling these may not seem prohibitive requirements. However, in these contemporary times, it is safe to assume that far more guess-work is required. Also, it gives the voters more choices. Voters are empowered to make their votes count and strategize their voting. Proportional Representation system eliminates the current first-past-the-post system, where winner-takes-all situation exists. In any multi-party system of democracy, Proportional Representation is more suitable. It is worth noting that baring a few exceptions, most democracies are multiparty systems involving two rounds of elections – the second being a run-off election. (Blais, Dobrzynska, and Indridason 2005, p.185) On the other hand, some analysts think that Proportional Representation makes the voting process very complicated and allows the formation of coalition governments. There are studies showing greater cases of governmental corruption in countries where coalition governments are in power. Also, parties within the coalition tend to compete among themselves instead of concentrating on the welfare of their electorate. Another disadvantage is that parties tend not to take controversial positions so as to garner most votes. This results in parties not standing for any firm principles. So the voter is presented with no apparent choice when all parties stand more or less for the same ideologies or lack thereof. Compared to Majority and Plurality systems of elections Proportional Representation burdens the voter with additional analytical information to be borne as a result of the complex nature of the system. A significant disadvantage attributed to Proportional Representation is that it is increasingly difficult to implement in larger democracies with big populations. (Powell, Bingham, and Vanberg 2000 p.383) References: Blais, Andre., Dobrzynska, Agnieszka., and Indridason, I.H. (January 2005) "To adopt or not to adopt proportional representation: the politics of institutional choice.(study covers the period from 1865 to 1939)." British Journal of Political Science.Vol.35.1. p:182(9). Fekete, Liz. (April 1999) "Why we should say no to proportional representation.(United Kingdom)." Race and Class Vol.40.4.: p 74(1). Johnson, Nevil. (January 1998). "The judicial dimension in British politics.(Special Issue on Britain in the Nineties: The Politics of Paradox)." West European Politics. Vol.21.n1. p:148(19). Oliver, Dawn. (October 1994). "Parliament, Ministers and the law. (British Government and Politics Since 1945: Changes in Perspective)." Parliamentary Affairs Vol.47.n4. p:630(17). Powell, Jr., Bingham, G. and Vanberg, G.S. (July 2000). "Election Laws, Disproportionality and Median Correspondence: Implications for Two Visions of Democracy." British Journal of Political Science Vol.30.3 p:383.  Shell, Donald. (April 1994). "The British Constitution in 1993. (includes timeline of significant constitutional events between December 1992 and December 1993)." Parliamentary Affairs. Vol.47.n2. p:293(17).  Read More