The Edwardian Crisis - Essay Example

Article Analysis: The Edwardian Crisis Fraser discusses the impact of Chamberlain’s tariff reform as itworked to effectively disintegrate the power of the Unionist party in the first years of the 1900s, eventually leading to the party’s defeat in 1906. He argues that, although the party was facing serious problems before Chamberlain began to push his tariff reform policy, it was primarily through Chamberlain’s efforts that the party lost the necessary cohesion and control to maintain its strength in elections. According to Fraser, Chamberlain was able to have this kind of effect because of his astute political maneuvering that gave him a strength among the constituencies that was almost, but not quite, matched by the influential ex-ministers that formed his opposition within the party. In addition, Fraser indicates it was Chamberlain’s inability to keep the strife that existed within the party a secret that led to a disagreement between himself and Balfour that was to last until Chamberlain’s sudden illness and subsequent paralysis that forced him out of the public sphere. The standoff finally came in February of 1906 when Balfour and Chamberlain, unable to come to an agreement regarding what would be discussed at an upcoming Unionist meeting being held on Chamberlain’s insistence, agreed to publish their differences in what has become known as the Valentine Letters. Although Chamberlain’s adherents proclaimed victory for tariff reform, the letters actually gave no quarter and firmly established Balfour as the winner of the contest. However, the division that had been sown to this point served to provide both an inner distraction from greater elections and to weaken the party from inside. One of the chief arguments brought forward by Fraser is that the question over the tariff reform within the Unionist party was not necessarily being fought over whether a general tariff was appropriate or not. Instead, he claims it was being fought more on the grounds of whether it was an appropriate time to make this a prime issue within the party. Although free trade versus tariff reform was certainly a hot issue within the party, Balfour’s main contention against it remained that it was not worth pulling the party apart from within in order to push the issue at that time. Instead, Balfour adhered to a personal policy of ‘cohesion’ that kept both sides from openly committing warfare on each other.1 This changed only slightly after Balfour received word that he would not be held responsible for any adverse effects opposing Chamberlain openly would have on the party. At this point, although Balfour openly admitted he was not keen on the tariff reform policies proposed by Chamberlain, he never opposed them outright, instead falling back on a strategy of delay and redirection.2 Another point that is not developed as well is the idea that Chamberlain was actually a fairly astute politician in working to bring about necessary reform. Although Fraser points out the various ways in which Chamberlain gained support enough to force his own hand in the discussions, he does it in a way that tends to downplay the advantages Chamberlain had at his command. He indicates the strength with which Chamberlain pursues his goals: “When his Liberal Unionist partner, the Duke of Devonshire, who headed the rival Free Food League, objected to this, Chamberlain in May 1904 captured the Liberal Unionist Association and put himself in the Duke’s place as president.”3 Mention is made of how this move enabled Chamberlain to strengthen his hold on the constituencies, which in turn gave him strength enough to compete with the ex-ministers of Balfour’s group, but this discussion is placed so early in the paper and is immediately suppressed under the discussion regarding the opposition and the way in which this division was kept hidden. Nevertheless, Fraser’s argument is convincing. He enumerates several places in which Chamberlain’s own actions to drive his agenda forward actually served to split the party, such as his refusal to heed Balfour’s directive and instead worked “to drive the free traders from the party and to make his programme the official one.”4 Fraser also brings this point to bear by mentioning that Balfour “had seen to it that no fiscal resolutions were endorsed by the party, either voting them out on the ‘previous question’, or by leading his party out of the Commons before a division.”5 He uses authentic sources, often going directly to the sources themselves, as in the papers and letters that were written directly by Chamberlain and by Balfour, as well as by those close to them such as Chamberlain’s wife and Balfour’s secretary, but uses these judiciously to support the arguments he’s making rather than to make the arguments for him. Zebel, on the other hand, paints a very sympathetic picture of Chamberlain as a hero for social reform and the betterment of not only Britain, but also of all of her Colonies. His article focuses on the various reasons why Chamberlain would have decided to take such a politically controversial path, where he obtained his ideas regarding tariff reform and why he ended up in such open defiance of apparent Unionist leadership. Throughout his article, Zebel continues to make the argument that the ideas Chamberlain brought forward were ideas that had already been brought forward, primarily by the National Fair-Trade League, after having already been predisposed to helping the economies of both Britain and the Colonies. “To aid the home economy, he investigated the possibilities of finding new outlets for Britain’s surplus goods and capital in undeveloped areas of the globe”6 in the 1870s. Zebel outlines how Chamberlain slowly came to the realization that tariff reform was a necessary goal beginning with his passion for Imperialism and progressing through his contact with the Colonies as Colonial Secretary. Working within the Colonial office, Chamberlain “instructed the colonial governors to submit detailed reports on the penetration of colonial markets by foreign competitors and to recommend possible means of diminishing such inroads.”7 However, Zebel also argues that the incentive for Chamberlain to pursue tariff reform when he did was an attractive Canadian offer regarding corn. “Chamberlain was evidently so impressed with the offer that he promised to urge its acceptance by the cabinet.”8 He succeeded in winning approval for the proposed deal and then left on a prearranged tour of South Africa, but while he was gone, Ritchie and Balfour, the former outright opposed to the issue and the latter concerned about political consequences, worked to repeal the decision, gaining Chamberlain’s agreement on the heels of his return from South America. Zebel’s argument ends by indicating that Balfour’s wishy-washy decision-making regarding tariff reform is what ultimately placed Chamberlain on the receiving end of hostility within the party. One of the strong points of Zebel’s article is the plausibility of how Chamberlain came to take the actions and positions he took as it relates to tariff reform. By tracing his history as a supporter of the free trade system prior to his involvement in the Colonial office, Zebel traces out how increased awareness of colonial concerns, as well as continuing concern regarding Britain’s stagnant economy, coupled with previous suggestions and current proposals that outline a plausible solution to all of the above finally enticed Chamberlain to take a strong stand on the issue, firmly believing he was working for the betterment of the country. He is also able to present a strong impression that Balfour was quasi-supportive of Chamberlain until the very end, when political concerns forced him to waver. In attempting to portray a supportive stance regarding Chamberlain, Zebel’s argument for a blameless, guileless hero of the realm is somewhat marred by his inability to shed an honorable light on Chamberlain’s decision to infiltrate into the constituencies through the use of branches and flyers portraying his ideas as possible party reform measures. He indicates Chamberlain continued to push for tariff reform by building up his influence on the constituency while keeping himself to the shadows because of a pledge to avoid public controversy.9 As he traces the steps in Chamberlain’s slow conversion from the free trade system to the tariff reform policies he proposed, Zebel makes a convincing argument for an informed individual who has access to a wide variety of sources making the best suggestion for bringing the country out of the financial stagnation it had been experiencing as well as helping out its colonies. His presentation of Balfour indicates Chamberlain was not as staunchly opposed as might have been perceived even while making mention of a glut of media outlets that were opposed to Chamberlain’s ideas. Introducing Ritchie’s actions while Chamberlain was away and Balfour’s inability to stand strong on an issue instead paints an ugly light on these other politicians for blocking progress. Thanks to a very organized, well-documented approach, Zebel is still able to present a convincing article that is as sympathetic to Chamberlain as Fraser’s equally convincing article is against him. While Fraser portrays Balfour as a man sitting on the fence yet leaning strongly toward the free trade faction, Zebel claims Balfour was actually standing on the side of tariff reform until well into the debates, at which time he suddenly switched sides, stabbing Chamberlain in the back. While Fraser blames Chamberlain almost exclusively for the demise of the party, Zebel indicates the divisions were instead caused by outside forces. Footnotes 1 Fraser, P. (1962). “Unionism and Tariff Reform: The Crisis of 1906.” The Historical Journal. Vol. 5, N. 2, p. 150. 2 Fraser, 1962, p. 164. 3 Fraser, 1962, p. 149-50. 4 Fraser, 1962, p. 150. 5 Fraser, 1962, p. 151. 6 Zebel, S. (November 1967). “Joseph Chamberlain and the Genesis of Tariff Reform.” The Journal of British Studies. Vol. 7, N. 1, pp. 132. 7 Zebel, 1967, p. 139. 8 Zebel, 1967, p. 144-45. 9 Zebel, 1967, p. 152. Bibliography Fraser, P. (1962). “Unionism and Tariff Reform: The Crisis of 1906.” The Historical Journal. Vol. 5, N. 2, pp. 149-66. Zebel, S. (November 1967). “Joseph Chamberlain and the Genesis of Tariff Reform.” The Journal of British Studies. Vol. 7, N. 1, pp. 131-57. Read More