The Unity of Ulster Unionism - Term Paper Example

The Unionist party was formed in the late 1800s, as support for the Union of Great Britain and Ireland in 1801, which was the result of Irelands inability to govern itself in the late 1700s (Bolton, 1966, p. 218). On the other side were home rulers, who were the descendants of the liberal party that existed in the early 1800s, who believe that the Irish government should have autonomy up to a certain point, while combining its ethos with that of the British (Bolton, 1966, p. 218). The basics are that the Unionists were made up of diverse segments of the population – Conservative, Liberal, and Irish – that were committed to the union of Ireland with Britain, as well as committed to opposition to the “independent, Dublin-based, Catholic-dominated Irish parliament” (Kennedy, 2005, p. 189). These parties were in opposition, and the year 1890 produced a change in the Unionist party that was the result of the disintegration of the home rule party. To understand the events that occurred in the Unionist party in 1890, a little background on the weakening of the home rule party is in order. This party was led by Charles Stewart Parnell, a charismatic figure who was committed to bringing home rule to Ireland, which called for an autonomous Irish parliament, and was brought to the forefront of Irish politics in 1885-1886 (Foster & Jackson, 2009, p. 414). Parnell also endorsed an agrarian policy that would have been revolutionary, as he was also president of the National Land League, and the policies of this League were that tenant farmers should hang on to farms, refuse to pay excess rents, and boycott rack-renting landlords. The ruling class of landlords and Conservatives saw this as a dangerous class war against property owners (McCaffrey, 1968, p. 113). However, in 1890, Home Rule endured a split because of a divorce scandal involving Parnell, and this weakened the nationalist party considerably (McCaffrey, 1968, p. 134). The scandal occurred when Parnell was named in a divorce proceeding involving the wife of one of his followers, with whom he was conducting an affair. The liberals seized upon this, demanding that Prime Minister Gladstone repudiate his alliance with the Irish party so long as Parnell was at the head (Beckett, 1966, p. 402). However, Parnell himself showed no signs of going anywhere, which forced members to to support either him or Gladstone, who was against Parnell because he had to appease his own Liberal Party base, a base that wanted Parnell gone (Curtis, 1963, p. 315). This split the Irish party, as some members stood by Parnell, while others stood by Gladstone, who now wanted Parnell replaced (Beckett, 1966, p. 403). This led to a broken Nationalist party that remained broken until 1900, and, even when they were unified in 1900, they were still weakened, as the old wounds never completely healed (Mcdonough, 1977, p. 64). It also considerably weakened Parnell, as the clerics were against him, he had to fight for hearings, and he was pelted with mud. Parnell, still trying to shore up support, travelled incessantly, driving himself so relentlessly that he collapsed and died in October of 1891 (Beckett, 1966, p. 403). As Parnell was an charismatic figure, capable of bringing together disparate groups of people, his scandal and death left the Nationalists demoralized and without a charismatic leader around whom they could fight, and the devotion to home rule faded (McCaffrey, 1968, p. 135). This is important to the evolution of the Unionist party, as, just prior to this, Parnell was the unquestioned leader and his party was in the ascendancy, carrying 85 seats in the 1885 Irish election, which made home rule seem inevitable (Beckett, 1966, p. 395). Then, through a series of events, home rule did not pass in 1886, despite the fact that it was a rather watered down bill – Ireland was to be governed by an Irish government under the bill, but Westminster parliament was still the ultimate authority and would control defence, foreign relations and all matters affecting the crown (Beckett, 1966, p. 397). This rejection was deemed by some historians to be a tragic one, and, if the home rule had passed, the partitioning of Ireland could have been averted (Mansergh, 1940, p. 149). Nevertheless, Parnell had remained a popular figure who had built a powerful coalition that still made home rule seem inevitable, and, if it were not for the divorce scandal, Parnells fortunes might not have turned and history might have been very different for the Unionists (Beckett, 1966, p. 402). Before this scandal occurred, the Unionist morale, like the Nationalists, was also fading, for a variety of reasons. One is that W.H. Smith, the Unionist leader of the House, was having health issues in 1890, and there were grave doubts about whether he could continue as the House leader. He did continue as leader in June of that year, but was greatly weakened. Another reason was the legislative initiatives were not being passed, and the machinery was grinding to a halt, due to the Opposition dissecting the bills that were presented clause by clause (Curtis, 1963, p. 304). The demoralization affected the Unionists greatly, as they were exhausted by the legislative machinations, that they preferred to take a vacation then attend Westminster sessions. By June of 1890, the morale was getting worse. Home rule obstructionists held up House business, and there was a threat that bills would have to wait for the next session. And, as the bills that were presented – the Balfour Land Purchase Bill and Hicks Beachs Tithe Bill – were met with indifference or active dislike by the Conservatives, the possibility that these bills would pass in the next session were growing dimmer by the day (Curtis, 1963, p. 306). All of this changed with the Parnell scandal and the resulting political fallout. The home rule partys influence in Parliament was destroyed (Beckett, 1963, p. 405). Now, the obstructionists were gone, and bills were passed easily (Curtis, 1963, p. 318). This led to a newfound tranquility in Parliament, such that Balfour was taken to say that the present situation was “so novel that I feel quite out of my element...now the rapidity with which Parliament does its work is almost embarrassing and we do not know how to spend our evenings after five oclock” (Curtis, 1963, p. 318). The result was that the House of Lords became dominated by the Unionists, so, when Gladstone again attempted to introduce a home rule bill in 1893, this was defeated, just like his 1886 bill (Fair, 1972, p. 133). Also, this enabled the Unionists to undercut the Nationalists by passing bills that improved education, increased productivity, redistributed population and democratising local government (Macdonough, 1977, p. 64). Perhaps no group of Unionists rejoiced in this change of fortunes more than the Ulster unionists of Northern Ireland. Whereas Southern Ireland was much less cohesive on the topic of Unionism, the Ulster faction was uncompromising and rejecting of all political movements that came from the South, deriding Southern Irish Unionists as “a cowardly crew and stupid to boot” (Buckland, 1974, p. 211). Northern Ireland was marked by a Unionist front that “cut across class barriers. Landowners, tenant farmers, businessmen, artisans and labourers, all combined in the movement, and many commentators have remarked upon the cooperation shown by such diverse social and economic groups in sustained political action” (Buckland, 1974, p. 211). The theory for why the North had such a cohesive Unionist element, while the South did not, was that the North was industrialized before the South was, which made the North feel that they not only did not depend upon the South, but that they had more in common with Britain than their southern neighbors (Buckland, 1974, p. 213). Out of Ulster came the charismatic leadership of Edward Carson. His election was made possible by the shifts in the Edwardian Unionist movement, which saw the Unionist movement move away from the established landed leaders, and towards a more Northern, younger, middle-class, professional type of leader (Foster & Jackson, 2009, p. 423). The shift in Unionist leadership was also precipitated by generational change, as the leaders in 1886 were aging and dying by this time, and by the fact that the landlord class was being diminished by political assault, land purchase and reform legislation. The broad Unionist alliance was also put into conflict during this time, pitting the moderate reformers with radical reformers, one of which was Thomas Wallace Russell, who led campaigns for land reforms that included compulsory sale of landlord property (Jackson, 1990, p. 846). These cracks led to rivalries within the Unionist leadership that split loyalties to the point that there was an opening for an alternative candidate, and Edward Carson fit this bill (Foster & Jackson, 2009, p. 424). Couple these factors, with fact that the Parliament Act of 1911 effectively limited the veto power of the upper house, an act that was advantageous to the Nationalist party and disadvantageous to the Unionists, which infuriated Unionists, who felt that this was a “Liberal violation of the rules of constitutional propriety” (Fair, 1972, p. 133), and conditions were ripe for radical Unionism and solidarity between the party. Carson presided over the Unionists during the third home rule crisis of 1912, and marketed Ulster unionism to the masses in a superb fashion (Jackson, 1992, p. 170). Carson rejected partition outright, stating that “Ulster will never be a party to any separate treatment” (Macdonough, 1977, p. 68). Thus, there was not an option for home rule to be implemented in the southern Ireland, and not in the north. Nothing but a total resistance to home rule would do (Macdonough, 1977, p. 68). Carsons leadership gave the illusion of cohesiveness for the Ulster Unionists, and managed to bolster Unionism as never before. This era was marked by a new way that Unionism solidified its popular support, using the newest technologies of the day. One of these methods was a very careful campaign involving Carsons image, which was propaganda-like in nature. Carsons visits to Ireland were managed by James Craig, a Carson loyalist. Film was used to publicize Unionist festivals and demonstrations. Drivers advertised their Unionism through their fender badges. Postcards were used to trumpet Unionist propaganda. Carsons image was on thousands of these postcards, as well as lapel badges and charity stamps (Jackson, 1992, p. 172). This had the effect of bonding the Unionist men and women with their leader and their cause in a way that had previously been unprecedented. It was a combination of the Edwardian advertising industry, coupled with a simplified political creed that brought the unification of the party during this time (Jackson, 1992, p. 173). Thus, despite the fact that home rule had finally passed, in 1913, the Unionist resistant to this was stronger than ever. In 1912, a quarter of a million Unionists pledged to resist home rule by any means (Ward, 1982, p. 22). This led to the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force, in 1913, which was formed to defend the Union by armed force, and they staged a coup in April 1914 that made it clear that, despite the success of the home rule bills passage, the fight against home rule was far from over. To defend against the UVF, the militant nationalists formed their own group, the Irish Volunteers. This brotherhood aimed to control the UVF behind Sean MacDermott and Patrick Pearse, both of whom “occupied key positions in the first executive” (Macdonough, 1977, p. 79). Both sides showed that they meant business, as each side bought thousands of guns from different countries (Ward, 1982, p. 22). Thus, the “reasonable politics” of the past was officially supplanted by a “morass of evermore polarized opinions, interests and issue which succeeded in bringing down the consensus that had marked British politics for decades” (Moran, 1989, p. 628). Central to the strength and solidarity of these Unionists was the signing of the Solemn League and Covenant, signed in September 1912 by over 218,000 Protestant men in all nine Ulster counties, with 228,000 women signing a supportive declaration. The signing of this pledged the men and women of Ulster to “oppose by any available means the imposition of them of a government dominated by men disloyal tot he empire to whom our faith and traditions are hateful” (Kennedy, 2005, p. 193). This effectively moved the Unionist party out of the hands of the political elite, and into the hands of the people of the northern province. Moreover, a shadow Ulster provisional government was formed, designed to spring to life if the home rule bill passed. For these Unionists, the union of Ireland, the British Empire and British Monarchy was an unassailable principle of the British constitution, and, for them, any party or anybody who was would perpetrate such a “gross betrayal and infamous treachery” of the British Union that they would be deemed “unworthy of loyalty or obedience” (Kennedy, 2005, p. 194). They thus moved “resolutely, if not gleefully, toward rebellion or at least civil war” (Kennedy, 2005, p. 195). This was cut short by World War I, as the Ulster Unionists, seeing that there was a fight even bigger than the one they had at home, went to fight for the Empire (Kennedy, 2005, p. 198). Nevertheless, these forces proved to be precursors to the future of Irish politics. It was the beginning of the agitation, that had been brewing between Unionists and Nationalists for decades, turning into violence. At its heart is the conflict between “the relationship of nationality and language; the meaning of national art; the practicability of remaking a lost popular culture; the degrees of independence of, and subordination to, the international market which make a strong economy; the reconciliation of political independence and supra-national political trends; the very nature of a separate race” (Macdonough, 1977, p. 78). These are the building blocks of conflict, and the years 1912-1914 was when this conflict turned violent, and sowed the seeds of conflict that would inflict Ireland for many generations to come. Sources Used Beckett, J. 1966, The Making of Modern Ireland, 1603-1923, New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf. Bolton, G.C. 1966, The Passing of the Irish Act of Union, London: Oxford University Press. Buckland, P., 1974, “The Unity of Ulster Unionism, 1886-1939,” History, vol. 60, no. 199, 211-223. Curtis, L. 1963, Coercion and Conciliation in Ireland 1880-1892, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Fair, J.D. 1972, “The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921: Unionist Aspects of the Peace,” The Journal of British Studies, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 132-149. Foster, R. & Jackson, A. 2009, “Men for All Seasons? Carson, Parnell, and the Limits of Heroism in Modern Ireland,” European History Quarterly, pp. 414-438. Jackson, A. 1992, “Unionist Myths 1912-1985,” Oxford University Press, pp. 164-185. Jackson, A. 1990, “Unionist Politics and Protestant Society in Edwardian Ireland,” The Historical Journal, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 839-866. Kennedy, T.C. 2005, “War, Patriotism, and the Ulster Unionist Council, 1914-1918,” Irish American Cultural Institute, pp. 189-211. Macdonagh, O. 1977, Ireland: The Union and Its Aftermath, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. Mansergh, N. 1965, The Irish Question: 1840-1921, Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Moran, S. 1989, “Patrick Pearse and European Revolt Against Reason,” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 625-643. Ward, M. 1982, “Suffrage First-Above all Else! An Account of the Irish Suffrage Movement,” Feminist Review, no. 10, pp. 21-36. Read More