The Contribution of SEA to the Evolution of the Contemporary EU - Essay Example

Table of Contents The Contribution of SEA to the Evolution of the Contemporary EU 2 Introduction 2 Historical Overview 2 Single European Act 4 Assessment of Success 6 Competition Law 7 Schengen Agreement 9 Single European Currency 9 Conclusion 10 Bibliography 11 The Contribution of SEA to the Evolution of the Contemporary EU Introduction The Single European Act [SEA], approved by European heads of state and passed into EU law in 1986, stands out as a significant treaty within the context of European deep integration and has, undoubtedly, substantially contributed to the harmonization of labour, consumer and general economic laws and policies across the EU (Moravcsik, 1991). Despite its indubitable significance, however, claims to the effect that the SEA is solely, or even primarily, responsible for the harmonisation of economic, consumer and labour laws throughout the union, is erroneous insofar as it effectively ignores the contribution to the aforementioned made by treaties both pre and post the SEA. Through a historical overview of the treaties upon which the EU is founded, followed by a discursive analysis of the enlargement process, the creation of joint borders through the Schengen Agreement, and the formulation of a monetary regime whose outcome was he implementation of a single EU monetary unit, the research shall demonstrate that while the SEA contributed to both the deepening and the fortification of the integrative process, it is hardly single-handedly, or even primarily, responsible for the evolution of the EU of 2005. Historical Overview The European Union is a unique example of political economic integration. Even though Paul and De Burca date the creation of the EU to the birth of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, others have contended this to be erroneous, insisting that the evolutionary process spanned five decades. This argument is forwarded by Molle (2001) and expressed in his contention that evolved from a limited common market with only six member states to a regional political and economic bloc, comprising twenty-five nations, in the span of five decades, the European Union provides political economists and legal scholars with a unique insight into the legal strategies and frameworks requisite for the realization of such an ambitious project. The European Union project, as noted by Molle (2001), was predicated on the assumption that regional political and economic unification could restore European global economic and political power and with this assumption functioning as a prime motivator, legislature and treaties among towards the realization of the stated goal, entered the formulation stage I 1948 and the implementation stage in 1952 (Molle, 2001). 1952 witnessed the passage and implementation of the EU’s founding treaty, the Treaty of Paris. At this stage, the European integration process was confined to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, with membership limited to the six founding nations (Molle, 2001). While many observers, including proponents of deep European regional integration dismissed this treaty as unimportant and hardly expressive of the grander European integration, or unification project, Molle (2001) insists that it was an integral first step in the integrative process with the success of this treaty leading directly to the negotiation and subsequent passage of he much more important Treaty of Rome in 1957 (Molle, 2001). The latter led to the establishment of the European Economic Community whose gradual growth, as in expansion of membership and trade benefits and cooperative economic policies, eventually gave rise to the European Union (Molle, 2001). In his presentation of the roots of the European Union, Molle (2001) contends that comprehension of the integrative process, from the historical perspective, fortifies arguments pertaining to the fallacious tendency of some international relations, legal and political economic scholars, to select a particular inter-European treaty and hail it as the cornerstone of the EU. A comprehensive and accurate understanding of the evolution of the European Union must proceed from the premise that each of the many treaties and legislatures which frame the EU is important in its own right and, in the main, was borne out of the conditions created by a preceding treaty (Molle, 2001). Consequently, when assessing the contribution of the SEA to the integrative process and the evolution of the EU as an ever expanding and increasingly integrated regional political and economic bloc, one must do so based on the understanding that the SEA is one of a series of treaties and did not, in and by itself, lead o the harmonization of economic, labour and commercial policies within the European Union. Certainly, as shall now be seen, it played a fundamental role in the aforementioned but appreciation of that role must not be based upon the negation of the equally important contributions made to the integrative process by other treaties, both preceding and succeeding the SEA. Single European Act The Single European Act [SEA], entered into force in 1987, had two fundamental goals. According to Pinder (2001) the first of these goals was the creation of a single European market, characterised by legislative harmony, and common practices, ultimately giving rise to that level of intra-regional economic, commercial and labour as required for the establishment, and subsequent sustenance, of a single monetary regime. Within the matrix of the stated goal, the SEA effectively obliterated artificial and national boundaries to the movement of goods, labour and services, across and between EU member states (Pinder, 2001). It establishes the legal basis for the unrestricted movement of capitals goods and services between member states, effectively declaring the legal obliteration of intra-EU national boundaries and the replacement of the aforementioned with a single EU regional/supra-national boundary. The first goal of the SEA, as articulated in the above was not just the establishment of a single EU market but the solidification of the region’s singularity of market. The creation, and subsequent fortification, of the envisioned EU market was deemed impossible were the economic aspect of the integrative process not accompanied by the establishment of legal and political institutions and policies as would facilitate and legitimize the latter. Within the contextual framework of the aforementioned, the second goal of the SEA was articulated as the reformation of existent EU political institutions for the explicit purpose of maximising efficiency of supra-national intra-EU operations, the legitimisation and fortification of the sovereignty of EU law and the integration of foreign policy into EU regional treaties for the purpose of increased harmonisation between political and economic institutions and operations across the member states (Westlake, 1994). In light of the above, one might very well affirm that the goal of SEA was the establishment of the political, economic and legal matrix for the creation and fortification of a single European market, characterised by the seamless passage of goods, services, capital and labour across `national’ boundaries, concomitant with the harmonisation of EU economic policies and legislature. The SEA did not establish a single monetary regime, embrace legislature for monetary unification or introduce such laws as would establish the EU borders as the legally acknowledged ones. In other words, the SEA needs to be judged on the basis of its stated goals and the extent to which it established the environment that would accept the more radical integrative legislature established by later treaties. Assessment of Success Speaking strictly within the framework of SEA’s explicitly articulated goals, the aforementioned treaty can be, almost two decades following its implementation, be judged as a success. In affirming the success of the SEA, Huelshoff (1994) argues that SEA must be comprehended as the first of the series of radical treaties which transformed the European Economic Community from a bloc of economically interdependent countries which sought the harmonisation of economic policy in specific areas, to the European Union, a sprawling regional bloc characterized by deep economic and political integration and harmonisation. The SEA succeeded in the stated primarily due to the fact that it fortified the linkage between the Union’s economic and political institutions, thereby ensuring that the one will no function as an impediment to the others, even as it introduced the notion of the sovereignty of EU law (Huelshoff, 1994). From this perspective, therefore, the SEA can be safely judged a success insofar as established the ascendancy of EU law over certain aspects of national law and solidified the inextricable co-dependant interrelationship between EU political and economic institutions so that, instead of their conflicting with one another as had often occurred prior to the passage of the SEA, they would complement one another, with each facilitating the goal attainment objectives of the other. In other words, the SEA established the legal framework for the evolution o the EU, not just as an economic bloc but as a deeply integrated regional and political unit. Largely agreeing, Kreppel (2003) contends that the SEA achieved both the first and the second through the establishment of the European Parliament’s [EP] co-equal status with the Council of Ministers, further endowing the latter with the legal authority to take the initiative in the formulation, discussion and passage of legislature. The aforementioned co-equal status, concomitant with the legislative powers and discretions awarded, functioned to establish, not just the supra-national institutional framework of the EU but the sovereignty of European Union law, ultimately allowing for harmonisation throughout the EU and paving the way for expansion of membership. It did so consequent to the fact that the establishment of supra-national institutions, fortified by the sovereignty, or supremacy of EU law, enabled the relevant legislative, executive and judiciary EU bodies to establish the uniformity of law and institutions throughout the EU simply by affirming that EU law superseded national law as pertained to the movement and treatment of goods, labour, services and capital (Kreppel, 2003). In doing so, the SEA effectively fortified the EU’s supranational institutions and established the legal parameters within which existent and future members must operate and by which they must abide. Within the context of the stated, the SEA was successful with further evidence for success being found in Competition Law and the extent to which the SEA paved the way for later treaties. Competition Law As early as 1957, and within the context of the limited EC Community, the EC Treaty established the antitrust parameters of intra-EC economic activity and cooperation. Through both Article 81 and Article 82, the EC sought to protect free enterprise, as based on economic, commercial and market competition, by both outlawing restrictive agreements [Art. 81] and prohibiting the abuse of dominance [Art. 82] (Niels and ten Kate, 2004). Within the context of the aforementioned, the EC sought the sustenance of the competition regime within the community. Almost three decades following the passage of the above defined competition laws, especially Article 81, the Single European Act was passed and its passage highlighted the exigencies and imperatives of fortifying the basis of the competition regime across the EU, especially in light of the removal o all intra-EU boundaries and artificial obstacles to the movement of goods, services, labour and capital. As noted by Niels and ten Kate (2004) the passage of the SEA expanded the potentialities for the emergence of cross-EU monopolies through vertical mergers. Accordingly, and for the purpose of fortifying the competition regime across the EU and within the framework of the SEA, EU competition policy began to assume a “legalistic approach,” wherein European Court [EC] case law began to establish the foundational principles of competition (Niels and ten Kate, 2004). For example, in the Virgin/British airways case, where the latter accused the former of exploiting its position of dominance to wrest away the former’s share of the intra-EU holiday market, the EC, and as per Article 81, ruled that British Airways had indeed attempted the stated through the exploitation of loyalty schemes, and that the use of loyalty schemes for the establishment of dominance constituted illegal and unfair competition (Niels and ten Kate, 2004). In their commentary on this and other cases, Bishop and Lofaro (2004) emphasise that following the entry of the SEA into force, one of the primary objectives of the supranational legislative and judiciary institutions was the re-articulation of Article 81 to subscribe to the post-SEA EU framework and to exploit it for the preservation of the EU competition regime (Bishop and Lofaro, 2004). On the basis of the above, the success of the SEA can be affirmed. The Single European Act expanded the market for competition and removed all artificial barriers and boundaries to the movement of capital goods, services and labour within the EU. However, insofar as it relied upon the existent competition law and further sought its fortification, it did so even as it maintained and protected the EU’s competition regime. Schengen Agreement The SEA is not responsible for the Schengen Agreement but, an important test of the latter’s success is whether or not it provided, or paved the way for the former. As explicated by Kreppel (2003), the Schengen Agreement was the outcome of the later Amsterdam Treaty. Defined in its simplest terms, the Schengen Agreement is an acknowledgement of the united borders of the EU and effectively establishes the joint border patrolling responsibilities of specified strategic EU border countries, further maintaining that the granting of legitimate visa entry to one of these country, constituted a legitimate right to enter those others (Kreppel, 2003). In even simpler terms, it means that if a Schengen signatory EU member state granted an entry visa to a foreign national, that entry visa gave the holder the right to travel between and within those other Schengen countries. The point here, as stated and emphasized by Kreppel (2003), is that the success, or even the ability to enact the Schengen Agreement, was immediately and inextricably linked to the legislative powers awarded the EP by the SEA, the co-equal status given to the European Parliament by the SEA, as well as the former’s ultimate success in establishing the supremacy of EU law and supranational institutions within (Kreppel, 2003). In other words, and even though the SEA is not responsible for the Schengen Agreement, the passage of the former was an outcome of, and inextricably dependant upon, the latter’s success. Single European Currency Again, the SEA is not responsible for the implementation of the Single European Currency and, in fact, the process for the creation of the European Monetary System [EMS], implying monetary integration and currency unification, precedes the passage of the SEA by almost a decade, dating back to 1978 (Henning, 1998). However, even though discussions and blueprints for monetary integration preceded the SEA, without the SEA, monetary integration remained a theoretical possibility rather than a practical reality (Henning, 1998). Concurring, Kreppel (2003) contends that the Maastricht Agreement, which followed the SEA, and which established a definitive time-frame and plan of action for monetary integration, was directly dependant upon the success of the SEA, insofar as it was predicated on the ability of the SEA of successfully fulfil the goals it had established for itself, such as economic, commercial and market law harmonization, the supremacy of EU law and supranational institutions and the removal of all barriers to intra-EU movement of goods, services, capital and labour (Kreppel, 2003). The fact that the SEA successfully fulfilled its stated objectives functioned as the basis for he later success of the monetary integrative process, wherein one can say that even though the SEA did not directly provide for monetary unification it played an integral role in the success of the former. Conclusion In the final analysis, and without awarding the SEA unwarranted importance, given that it is one of a series of treaties that are responsible for the evolution of the EU, the fact is hat it was successful in attaining its articulated objectives. As an added measurement of its success, the SEA’s attainment of its objectives lent o the later success of enlargement, monetary unification and the passage of the Schengen Agreement. Not only is the success of the SEA undeniable but equally inarguable is the role it played in the success and formulation of later treaties, such as Maastricht and Amsterdam. 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