The American War of Independence - Essay Example

1 TACTICS PAPER The American War of Independence was concluded not because of the readiness, the might or magnificence of the military forces but because the 'inferior' party outmaneuvered the 'superior party. This paper answers the questions 'why' and 'how' and compares and contrasts the tactics used by each party and comments whether these are effective or not and if not, tries to identify the causes of its failure. The colonials, composed of 13 states, was a world nonentity when it came to international warfare. Great Britain, on the other hand, was a world power unparalleled in naval and terrestrial supremacy. It just clobbered France in the French and Indian War and decades before demolished the 'great' Spanish Armada. But by whatever stroke of fate, the colonials completely trounced the mighty forces of Great Britain. The rout was so unexpected that the historian John Ferling quoted George Washington as saying that the "American victory was a little short of a standing miracle".1 Ferling went on to say that the skirmishes and battles "often hinged on intangibles such as leadership under fire, heroism, good fortune, blunders, tenacity and surprise".2 The British forces all throughout the war played the aggressor , employing time-tested strategies and tactics that it had used before against the French, Spanish and Irish foes. The colonials, meanwhile, a complete tyro in any warfare, were always on the defensive employing tactics that were best suited for the occasion. Preparation-wise, the British came into the war armed to the teeth, with its regular army undergoing round-the-year training. According to Stephenson, because of its hefty war chest, 2 "Britain's army was well-fed, well-clothed and in tiptop condition".3 The colonials meanwhile, "often dismissed by the British as ragtag"4 were surviving on a measly budget accorded them by the Continental Congress. Thus, in some skirmishes, they were on the brink of starvation, sometimes attired in tattered clothes and shoes and sometimes in decrepit condition. The triumvirate of King George III, Secretary of State George Germain and Prime Minister Lord North formed the nucleus which decided what tactics Britain should implement in the war in the New World. This nucleus ,based in London, 3000 miles away from the arena of war, was responsible for the coordination, the logistics and the communication needed to win a war. Meanwhile, the Continental Congress, composed of delegates from all the colonies and based in Philadelphia, was the brain and the nerve center , the controller and the coordinator of the colonial forces. With the riches coming from its colonies in the West Indies, Canada, America, Gibraltar and India, there was no doubt that Britain entered this war financially prepared. The Congress, on the other hand, aware that any victory would hinge on how well-oiled the war machinery would be, desperately sought finances both from abroad and from the home front. It used the strategy of diplomacy and psychology on England's long-standing enemies, France and Spain, stoked the latter's hatred and resentment and came out extracting some financial support as well as munitions from both. Since that was not enough, it used 4 tactics to raise money locally i.e. loans from "well-to-do merchants and planters"; "forced loans ... from farmers who were given certificates of indebtedness"; by levying money or goods "apportioned among the various states"; and by "issuance of paper money, the famous Continental currency".5 3 It was a well-known tactic that to win a war involving hand to hand combat, it was necessary to overwhelm the enemy with sheer numbers. Thus, both sides frantically found means to harness all the manpower it could find. The British had the upper hand in this particular warfare because of its royal coffers. Thus, other than its regular troops, it was able to hire 30,000 German mercenaries from Hesse-Kassel and Hesse-Nassau, which "made up around one third of the British troop strength in North America."6 Negro slaves belonging to loyalist masters were also conscripted. "More than 20,000 black soldiers fought on the British side."7 Indians, reminded by the British that colonials, because of their hunger for expanding their settlements, were always a threat to ownership of their lands, joined the war. According to Merrell, "an estimated 13,000 warriors fought on the British side; the largest group, the Iroquois Confederacy fielded about 1,500 men."8 But of all people, the loyalists were the ones that the British relied on to zealously carry their cause. George Germain assumed that loyalists which comprised 1/3 of the 3 million population "could be organized in the face of terrorist reprisals." This tactic was a costly blunder because the loyalists lacked "unity of interest andthey were intimidated by the organized violence of the Sons of Liberty; in the north by mobs and committees; in the south by terrorist posses."9 The British also tried to conscript Catherine the Great's Russian troops but "the summer's hope of Russian troops"10 was dashed. George Washington, aghast at the possibility of a horde of British army swallowing his regular troops, asked Congress for extended enlistment of militiamen and pressured Congress "to start drafting, browbeating, appealing to patriotism and allowing the rich to avoid the 4 the draft by paying two substitutes to serve in their place." Also later, he ordered that soldiers be "exalted and revered as heroes in order to motivate them to fight" as well as reminded them of the British soldiers' "past inhumane treatment."11 Washington, also, because of manpower shortage, lifted the ban on black enlistment in the Continental army in January 1776. Many were slaves promised freedom for serving and at least 5,000 black soldiers fought for the revolutionary cause."12 The militiamen proved to be one big asset for the colonials as during skirmishes, they just thronged around and engaged in the guerrilla tactics of "persistent, if inaccurate, sniping from the cover of hedges, trees and buildings."13 They were just so numerous that they overwhelmed the British forces in the battles of Bennington, Concord and Saratoga. The British forces, on the other hand, engaged in conventional warfare and mainly relied on their naval superiority and concentrated their warfare on cities along the Atlantic seaboard especially ones with deep harbors such as New York, Boston and Charleston. They were cautious not to stray deeper inland as militiamen abound therein and the terrain became more and more strange to them. The colonials, in sharp contrast, fighting an emotional war, were waging a war in their own soil and enjoyed the advantages of a familiar terrain and a supportive populace. The hereinabove advantages were put to good use when the colonials frustrated the British attempt to win the war by isolating and separating New England from all the southern states and squeezing it economically so as to force it to capitulate. The plan was for Gen. Burgoyne (stationed in Montreal), Gen. St. Leger (based in the Lake Ontario area) and Gen. Howe (established in New York City) to meet and to assemble their forces in Albany, N.Y. and 5 thus control the Hudson River-Lake Champlain region so as to block all enemy forces, munitions and supplies and thus paralyze enemy forces. The whole strategy backfired on their faces as the strategy was not only too complex but also involved a rough terrain consisting of the Catskill and Adirondack Mountains and because the areas were littered by zealous militiamen whom the colonial generals were able to assemble in so short a notice. If the militiamen were deadset on overwhelming the enemy forces in the battles of Saratoga and Bennington, the loyalists who were relied on and expected to be "tapped in support of the regular striking force"14 fizzled out and were a non-factor in the war. The humiliating defeat by Burgoyne in Saratoga and Bennington coupled with the retreat by St. Leger was a turning point in the war as the British were forced to move their campaign in the southern states. More importantly, these defeats convinced France that America is on the verge of victory and made France "to make an open alliance with the Americans after two years of semi-secret support."15 The hereinabove victory by the colonials however, was neutralized by the victories of Gen. Howe, who changed strategies at the last minute and instead moved south to capture Philadelphia and forced the Congress to vacate and move to Annapolis, Md. The war of American independence in the New England area, in a nutshell, was a contest between the tactics of Gen. Howe and the strategies of Gen. Washington. While Howe was a brilliant strategist, he was however given to dilly-dallying, tarrying and the predilection to "haymaking in the country."16 A case in point was when the colonials captured Dorchester Heights, overlooking Boston, Gen. Howe escaped to Halifax, N.S. and in a leisurely manner 6 waited for 2 months to make his next move. If Howe was slow and indecisive, Washington was wily and quick not to mention his ability to inspire his troops. Aware that he couldn't snatch back Boston from Howe's grip, he waited for winter to come so that his soldiers could drag the cannons and mortars that were captured at Fort Ticonderoga through frozen rivers and roads. He then strategically positioned these heavy arms up high in Dorchester Heights, which made Howe gave up Boston. Washington also had this knack of surprising and attacking when least expected. When Howe displayed superiority of tactics and forces in his domination of New York City, Washington was left with no recourse but to escape the British tentacles. Crossing the Delaware River and in a blinding snowstorm on Christmas night, he surprised and overwhelmed some 1,200 Hessian soldiers in Trenton and followed this up with another surprise attack in Princeton. As in many of his conquests, he then took up a high position with a view of central new Jersey. This is in conjunction with his strategy of maintaining his principal striking force so as to block any British advance to the interior. Howe, himself, had to take credit for the masterful seizure of New York City but he had also to take the blame for the escape of Washington's forces. He had the opportunity to entrap Washington in Manhattan and force his surrender but due to his laxity and hesitation he fell into another blunder. In short, Howe always had the strategic initiative but he always failed to use it to great advantage. Mackesey made a profound study of why British strategies failed to prosper. According to him, King George III who regarded military administration as his prerogative "made no attempt to steer strategy" 17 while Prime Minister Lord North should be blamed for his "ignorance of war and opposition to rearmament."18 But the harshest words were reserved 7 for Secretary of State George Germain. According to Sir John Fortescue, "the appalling problems of the government which waged the war for America were reduced to the folly and ignorance of Germain."19 To sum up the cause of the emasculation of British strategies, the British tacticians failed "to strike the balance between strategy and operations."20 Mackesy also probed on the success of American tacticians i.e. the Continental Congress. He said, "the American defense had been well planned and obstinately maintained and their retreat had been covered with skill and courage."21 He further added that the Congress was well aware it cannot win the war by maneuvering the superior British forces in open field. For this kind of war, guerrilla tactics had to play a major role. Thus, it was deemed that they can outfox them better by fighting "among small enclosures and narrow lanes and by skirmishing in the woods or digging in a strong position."22 It should also be borne in mind that the Britain was waging a complex war some 3,000 miles away and that alone gives the Americans an outright advantage in the speedy execution of their strategies as well as a better and more efficient communication. Another major difference between British and American tactics was that the British had a tendency to divide their forces while the Americans especially Washington always found means to concentrate his forces prior to making a decisive attack. Thus, prior to their defeat in Saratoga, the British forces were divided in Montreal, the Lake Ontario area and New York City with disastrous results. Not only that , the British forces were also distributed in Canada, America, Gibraltar, India and the West Indies. The Americans, which enjoyed superiority of 8 of numbers, used the 'divide and conquer strategy'. While Washington was engaging the British forces in the middle Atlantic states, other colonials also waged battles on other fronts i.e. the sea, the west and the southern states. The sea had always been the domain of the British royal navy. While the royal navy had 100 ships at the start of the war, America had none. However, the derring-dos of some American privateers, most notably John Paul Jones who "became the first great American naval hero, capturing HMS Drake on April 24, 1778"23 had caused embarrassment to the royal navy. The entry of France into the war also sounded the knell of British naval superiority. Division of British forces also happened when the English were forced to battle colonial frontiersmen led by George Rogers Clark west of the Appalachian Mountains and along the Canadian border. By brainwashing the Indians that the colonials were interested in their lands, and by arming them, the British were able to spur the Indians to raid civilian settlements in New England. Infuriated, Washington devised a scheme to quell these inroads. First, their winter food supplies were destroyed and then the British posts at Vincennes and Kaskasia were captured. Britain recaptured Vincennes but Clark ended the war by subduing the British and thereby opening wide the settlement of the west. Majority of British forces however, were reserved for Britain's final push to the south. Both sides made grandiose plans to gain the upper hand. Washington changed strategy from allowing the British to make the first move to being the aggressor. Thus, when the British forces withdrew to New York City, he immediately cordoned the city by establishing a defensive arc. Trapped, the British general Clinton, cleverly left New York by sea and captured Charleston and Savannah, Georgia. But instead of taking advantage of the momentum, Clinton 9 chose to return to New York and allowed Cornwallis to take over. Britain's fate took a turn for the worse as they were defeated at King's Mountain, Cowpens and Guilford Courthouse. The war's coup de grace was staged at Yorktown, Virginia. Both opposing forces utilized the strategy of using their northern, southern and naval forces to stage a decisive showdown in Yorktown. French naval forces opened the confrontation by trouncing and driving away the British fleet at Chesapeake Bay. Cornwallis was thus trapped at Yorktown. Washington took advantage by rushing the American and French forces to block Cornwallis' retreat. Because of dwindling supplies, Cornwallis was left with no other alternative but to surrender. The Treaty of Paris formally ended the war and gave the Americans its independence. To summarize, the Americans "did not simply outlast the British in the Revolutionary War but won their independence by employing superior tactics, superior strategies and leadership."24 The war was also won because of the heroism of such men as Washington, Gates, John Paul Jones, George Rogers Clark; the tenacity of the colonials and the zeal of the militiamen; the natural advantages enjoyed by the Americans and the aid of the French and the Spaniards. Conversely, the war was lost because the British fought the war less passionately than the Americans; they were outnumbered by militiamen and thus outfought; they had no real allies; they committed costly blunders; they were good only in warfare along or near the Atlantic coastline; they had to bear the disadvantages of having to fight a war 3,000 miles away from the homeland; their strategies and tactics were too conventional and less effective than their nemesis; there was hardly any coordination between the tacticians in London and the commanders at the war arena; there was inefficiency in the war bureaucracy; they tended to divide their forces and lastly their naval superiority was punctured by the French fleet. 10 BIBLIOGRAPHY Black, Jeremy. War For America: The Fight For Independence. New York: 2001. Dodge, Tom. "American Revolution," Dallas Morning News (June 29, 2007): 1. Dotingo, Randy. "Why The American Revolution Was Almost A Miracle." The Christian Science Monitor (July 3, 2007): 1. Higginbotham, Don. The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies and Practices. New York: Northeastern University Press, 1983. Ferling, John. Almost A Miracle: The American Victory In The War of Independence. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Garraty, John. American Revolution. New York: Grolier Universal Encyclopedia. New York: Stratford Press Inc, 1995. Kaplan, Sidney and Emma Nogrady Kaplan. The Black Presence in the Era of the American Revolution. Amherst, Massachussetts: The University of Massachussetts Press,1989. Mackesy, Piers. The War For America. 1775-1783. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1993. Merrell, James. Indians and the New Republic. New York: Blackwell Encyclopedia of the American Revolution, 2003. Stephenson, Michael. Patriot Battles: How The War of Independence Was Fought. New York: Harper Collins, 2007. Wood, WJ. Battles of the Revolutionary War. 1775-1783. 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