Potential Automated Systems - Essay Example

Question How have the social responsibilities of ship management business managers changed over the years What now is a major part in their business policies Give relevant examples of genuine companies if possible. (Not NYK). Maximum words 1500 Introduction Scientific developments have led to transformation in the role of humans on ships. A wide variety of potential automated systems have been included. Many modern ships have adopted various elements of this automation. In some instances these functions have been combined to reduce personnel requirements dramatically. Traditionally, a ship's crew is divided between the deck department, which is responsible for navigation and ship management, and the engine department, which is responsible for the mechanical integrity and operation of the engine room. Automation has implications for both the engine and deck departments. One of the primary responsibilities of the deck department is safe navigation. They are responsible for communicating with other ships, communicating with the vessel tracking system, planning safe courses, executing courses, and avoiding collision with other ships. When executing manoeuvres, the deck department communicates the required changes in engine speed to the engine room, where the appropriate adjustments are made. Automation plays a major role in the deck department, and prototype systems suggest that automation may play an even more important role in the future. Automation in the deck department began with the development of the radar, and has progressed to radar enhanced with automated radar plotting aids. More recently, the electronic chart display information system is beginning to replace paper charts. Perhaps the most advanced automation systems are artificial intelligence systems that combine navigation and ship performance information to provide routing and manoeuvring suggestions to the crew. Other developments include more advanced autopilots that enhance fuel efficiency, and complex combinations of engine, rudder, and thruster's controllers that enable the watch officer to dock the ship without need for multiple tugboats. Several countries are working to develop fully integrated bridges that combine elements of all these automated systems to produce an integrated suite of navigation and ship control aids. These changes may make it possible for a single person to act as the helmsman, lookout, and watch officer. (Dicken, 2003) Similar changes have occurred in the engine department. Older ships operate with a 24-hour watch consisting of a wiper, a water-tender, a fireman, and an engineer. However, technology has automated many aspects of the engineering department and has made unattended engine rooms possible. Automation supports planned maintenance with computerized schedules of maintenance tasks. Automation also supports predictive maintenance by tracking changes in vibration signatures of engine components and providing sophisticated ultrasound data that verify the structural integrity of system components. On these ships, the engine room is monitored remotely and engineers perform maintenance during normal work hours. (Dicken, 2003) Automation Pros & Cons Automation on modern ships has begun to blur the distinction between the deck and engineering departments. In older ships, a bell system relayed bridge commands to the engine room, where the engines were manually adjusted to meet bridge orders. Now, direct control from the bridge allows the deck department to implement engine speed changes directly. In addition, displays on the bridge convey data that were once only available to the engineering department. Providing deck personnel with data from the engine room imposes new demands on them. These changes may introduce new knowledge requirements regarding interpretation of engine room data similar to those found in the process control domain. Introducing remote monitoring systems distances mariners from a wide variety of potentially useful information (smells, noises, vibrations) only available in the engine room itself. Although technology has changed the deck and engineering department, and blurred the distinctions between the two, the responsibility for safe passage remains that of the captain. Thus, human interaction with automation remains a key element of safe ship operation. Beyond the automation associated with ship control and operation, technology supporting ship management is also becoming common. Almost all modern cargo ships have some kind of computer or computer system aboard. Some vessels have stand-alone, desktop computers, whereas others have a local area network (LAN) that links all computers aboard the ship. Most commonly, these computers are used for communication, reporting, payroll, and inventory purposes. Some ships have computers that run special programs to automate various operations that were previously handled manually. For example, routine operations such as cargo loading, ballast control/monitoring, and engine room control/monitoring can now be automatically monitored from several points on the ship, including the bridge. Computers used for shipboard management are often linked to corporate offices so that captains can communicate and respond to corporate directives. Although these systems can enhance management efficiency, they can also increase the workload of captains as they are increasingly required to conform to management procedures of shore-based operations. Other problems relate to a lack of training and maintenance support for these systems. For example, the most common form of training was through manuals and tutorials; shipping companies offer minimal hands-on or classroom training, if any. Training tends to be passed down among the crew. In addition to limited training, the maintenance of computer systems and programs is another area found lacking in support. Although shipping companies install computer programs, the crew must maintain the system themselves when at sea. Generally, there is no designated person aboard ship who is formally trained or responsible for computer maintenance. Computer problems tend to be fixed, or are attempted to be fixed, by whomever aboard has the most computer or electronics experience. Most frequently this person is the radio operator. However, recent crew reductions may eliminate this position. During interviews with mariners, one captain noted that although he had considerable experience working with computers and computer programs, the alternating captain knew very little about computers. When the latter captain had computer problems, he had to wait until the ship was in port for the problems to be fixed. The captain of another ship reported that their computer and automation problems were too complex for the crew to fix. As automation becomes more sophisticated, there is a need for more training in the use and maintenance of the systems because they often require skills and knowledge not needed with less sophisticated equipment. Operation and management of modern commercial ships link many different types of automation including management decision support systems, e-mail, complex navigation systems, and supervisory control of power systems. In many ways, the automation-induced changes in the maritime industry parallel changes in other domains, such as process control, aviation, operating rooms, and manufacturing systems. Just as automation in the maritime domain promises increased safety and efficiency, automation in other domains has made similar claims. However, reality has frequently failed to meet the expectations. Moreover, poorly conceived automation may eliminate small mistakes at the expense of encouraging large blunders. These mistakes can undermine the effectiveness of automation and compromise system safety and efficiency. To better understand whether problems from other domains might also apply to the maritime domain requires a detailed definition of automation. Such a definition would also help identify how changes in training and system design might mitigate automation-induced problems. The shipping companies have a great deal of influence on their future cash flow when they frame their strategy. The choice between new ships and old, flexible ships or specialized and debt or equity finance all make a difference. Once these major decisions are made an owner may use his management skills to optimize cash flow on a day-to-day basis through efficient ship management and resourceful chartering, but major cost and revenue items are beyond his control. They have already been determined by the initial investment decision. Once these particular decisions have been made, the owner is very much at the mercy of the market and his bankers. (Scott, 1997) On the revenue side the owner can play the spot market, in which he accepts full market risk, or time charter which shifts that risk to the charterer. Earnings also depend on the 'productivity' of the ship, i.e. the number of tons of cargo it can carry in a year. Again we find that the initial investment decision has a part to play in determining productivity by investment for rapid cargo handling, greater cargo flexibility to enable the ship to pick up backhauls, and high speed. Drawing these factors together with the influences on cost, we can deduce that in terms of the trading cash flow there are many options. Age, size, technical flexibility and cargo management all play a part in generating more revenue and cutting costs. (Scott, 1997) When we turn to the capital account, the picture changes substantially. The large modern ship financed by debt carries an annual cash flow for interest and debt repayment in excess of/its operating costs, whereas the small old vessel financed on equity would have no cash flow obligations on the capital account. As a result, during a depression the owner of a small; old vessel can afford to withdraw from the market and leave his vessel in lay-up until conditions improve, whereas the owner of the large, modern, debt-financed vessel faces a fixed capital charge that must be paid even if the ship is laid up. If, however, he is registered under a national flag he has little capital to depreciate against profits, and he will pay high taxes. (Words = 1499) Question 2: Explain how a new Container Terminal/Port Development may cope with or influence the external environment in which they operate. Give relevant examples of external environments, (minimum 7). Maximum words 1200 Introduction Ports are the crucial interface between land and sea. Ports were crowded with ships and bustling with dockers loading and unloading cargo. Modern ports are more subtle. Today, ships make fleeting calls at highly automated and apparently deserted terminals, sometimes stopping only a few hours to load or discharge cargo. Before discussing ports we must define three terms 'port', 'port authority' and 'terminal'. A Port is a geographical area where ships are brought alongside land to load and discharge cargo-usually a sheltered deep water area such as a bay or river mouth. The Port Authority is the organization responsible for providing the various maritime services required to bring ships alongside land. Ports may be public bodies, government organizations or private companies. One Port Authority may control several ports, e.g., Saudi Ports Authority. Finally, terminal is a section of the port consisting of one or more berths devoted to a particular type of cargo handling. Thus we have coal terminals, container terminals, etc. Terminals may be owned and operated by the port authority, or by a shipping company which operates the terminal for its exclusive use. Ports have several important functions which are crucial to the efficiency of the ships which trade between them. Improved cargo handling requires investment in shore-based facilities. If bigger ships are to be used, ports must be built with deep water in the approach channels and at the berths. (Scott, 1997) Container Revolution Bulk, containers, wheeled vehicles, general cargo and passengers all require different facilities. There is also the matter of providing storage facilities for inbound and outbound cargoes. Finally, land transport systems must be efficiently integrated into the port operations. Railways, roads and inland waterways converge on ports and these transport links must be managed efficiently. Port improvement plays a major part in reducing sea transport costs. Some of this technical development is carried out by the shipping companies who construct special terminals for their trade, or shippers such as oil companies and steel mills. For example, the transfer of grain transport from small vessels of 20-30,000 dwt to vessels of 60,000 dwt and above depended upon the construction of grain terminals with bulk handling and storage facilities. Similarly the introduction of container services required container terminals. However the port industry provides much of the investment itself. The ports within a region are locked in cut-throat competition to attract the cargo moving to inland destinations or for distribution within the region. Hoong Kong competes with Singapore for the Far East container distribution trade. Rotterdam has established itself as the premier European port in competition with Hamburg, Bremen, Antwerp and, in earlier times, Liverpool. The facilities provided in a port depend on the type and volume of cargo which is in transit. As trade changes, so do the ports. Small local ports Around the world there are thousands of small ports serving local trade. They handle varied cargo flows, often serviced by short sea vessels. Only small ships can be accommodated and the port probably handles a mixture of containers, break-bulk cargo plus shipments of commodities in packaged form or shipped loose and packaged in the hold prior to discharge. Cargo is unloaded from the ship on to the quayside and stored in the warehouses, or on the quayside until collected. Large local ports When cargo is higher, special investment becomes economic. At the same time the break-bulk facilities may be expanded to handle regular container traffic, for example, by purchasing container handling equipment and strengthening the quayside. Large regional ports Ports handling high volumes of deep sea cargo require heavy investment in specialized terminal facilities. Unit loads such as pallets, containers or packaged timber are handled in sufficient volume to justify a unit load terminal with cargo handling gear such as gantry cranes, fork lift trucks and storage space for unit load cargo. For high volume commodity trades, moving in volumes of several mt a year, special terminals may be built (e.g. coal, grain, oil products terminals) capable of taking the bigger ships of 60,000 dwt and above used in the deep sea bulk trades. Regional distribution centres Regional ports have a wider role as distribution centres for cargo shipped deep sea in very large ships, and requiring distribution to smaller local ports. Containers are handled in container terminals; unit load terminals cater for timber, iron and steel and ro/ro cargo. Homogeneous bulk cargoes such as grain, iron, coal, cement and oil products are handled in purpose built terminals, often run by the cargo owner. Ports and terminals earn income by charging ships for the use of their facilities. Shipping market cycles Cycles are not unique to shipping. Many different types of cycle have been identified. 6 In shipping the existence of cycles has long been accepted as part of the shipping business. As the markets became increasingly normal, and trade progressively regular, there was from time to time more tonnage available at a given port than there was cargo ready for shipment. The result was that shipping became an industry enjoying very fluctuating prosperity. The close association in the joint ventures was not proving mutually beneficial, because the Venezuelan Line refused to accept containers, while Grancolombiana became dismayed with the chaos and incompetence of its partner. The Venezuelan Line repeatedly bungled the routine operation of chartering a vessel. (Brooks, 2000) As container use spread in Latin America and throughout the world, the Venezuelan Line did not budge, and in early 1981 tried to obtain from the government a total ban on the entry of containers into the country. In the case of containers, the Venezuelan Line could not claim ignorance for its colossal blunder, because Grancolombiana had repeatedly warned of the consequences. In an ideal world, Grancolombiana should have handled the merchant shipping of Venezuela, while the latter country should have taken charge of oil in Colombia. The Grace Line had introduced containers to Chile as part of the company's efforts on the Pacific Coast of South America; by 1969 the port of Valparaso already was handling 3,827 containers and the next year the number rose to 5,445. Containers had found a niche as one more type of specialized cargo, but it remained to be seen whether containers would completely replace break-bulk operations. The Chilean Line, with its long tradition of openness to new technology, did not oppose the introduction of containers: Early trial runs had already convinced the company by 1965 that containers were the most economical way to move general cargo. Ports are also increasingly attending to environmental and sustainability issues as they formulate business policies and propose new developments. A key point here is that ports are able to support environmentally favourable forms of transport. (Brooks, 2000) A joint venture of Hapag-Lloyd, the Harrison Lines, and KNSM had completed by 1978 the first stage of bringing container service to the Caribbean and Central American ports north of Colombia and Venezuela; in a second stage those companies planned to bring containers into Colombia and Venezuela. To counter this threat, Grancolombiana had gone ahead and placed containers in the European service unlike the Venezuelan Line, which refused to touch them. The Venezuelan Line believed that the creation of this new office was all that was needed and otherwise remained totally opposed to the introduction of containers. The resistance in the Venezuelan Line tied in nicely with the pressure from one faction inside Grancolombiana that opposed ordering full containerships. (Brooks, 2000) References Bartol KM and Martin DC (1994) Management 2nd Edition McGraw-Hill Brooks, M.R. (2000) Sea Change in Liner Shipping, Oxford: Pergamon. Containerisation International Yearbook, various years, London: Informa Group. Dicken, P. (1998) Global Shift, London: Guilford. Dicken, P. (2003) Global Shift, London: Guilford. Dunn, J. (ed.) (1995) Contemporary Crisis and the Nation State, Oxford: Blackwell. Friedman, T.L. (1995) Cultural Identity and Global Process, London: Sage. Giddens, A. (1990) The Consequences of Modernity, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Hannertz, U. (1996) Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places, London: Routledge. Harcombe, S. and Pinder, D.A. (1996) 'Oil industry restructuring and its environmental consequences in the coastal zone', in B.S. Hoyle (ed.) Cityports, Coastal Zones and Regional Change, Chichester, UK: Wiley. Porter, M.E. (1990) The Competitive Advantage of Nations, London: Macmillan. Scott, A. (ed.) (1997) The Limits of Globalisation, London: Routledge. Wilson DC and Rosenfield RH (1990) Managing Organisations McGraw-Hill Read More