The Making of Russian Political Traditions - Essay Example

The Making of Russian Political Traditions From Monarchy to Empire: Explaining Russia's Survival and Expansion, 1240-1725 This work is intended for disclosing the key factors favorable for Russia's survival and expansion during XII-XVIII centuries. Phenomenon of any empire rising and expansion is not unique. We can compare and contrast the life cycles (i.e. appearing, expansion, golden age, decline, and oblivion in final) of many empires, e.g. the Roman Empire, the Mongol Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the British Empire, the Russian Empire, etc. Here our primary aim is in describing "driving forces", both external and internal, which were most important at the stages of appearing and expansion of the Russian Empire. It is obvious that features of such "driving forces" were specific for each empire, so these forces were essential for making political, economic, and even cultural "frames" of these empires. First of all, we need to juxtapose principal historic events of that time. The political and economic decline of Kiev in XII-XIII centuries led to strong regional developments (Keenan and Raeff, 2003). Rostov, the earliest princely centre in the north-east, was included in the princely rotation system for a long time. In the XII century, it became the patrimony of the younger branch of Vladimir II Monomakh's family. Under his son Yury Dolgoruky (1125-1157) and grandson Andrew I (1157-1174), the principality reached a high political and cultural development. In the XIII century, the principality of Moscow was created as an apanage (royal grant) within the grand principality of Vladimir. This new seat grew in importance when Michael Khorobrit, brother of Alexander Nevsky, conquered Vladimir (1248) and made himself prince of both centers. Daniel, Nevsky's son (1276-1303), was the progenitor of all the later Rurikid princes of Moscow. Yet, at that time the principality is very small and has insignificant political influence (Martin, 1995). The beginning of Moscow's rise to its later preeminence came during the reign of Daniel's son Ivan (1328-1341), who, by cooperating with khans of the Golden Horde, and also by his shrewd purchases (probably of tax-farming rights), greatly expanded the influence of his principality (Keenan and Raeff, 2003). We know that in time of the Mongol invasion many of the conquered cities made an unusual recovery and adjustment to the new relationships. Of course, some cities, such as Kiev, never fully recovered in Mongol times. However, new centers, such as Moscow and Tver, arose and flourished in Mongol times. The local princely dynasties continued unchanged in their traditional seats. Moreover, the northern Russian princes fell to quarreling and to maneuvering for their own advantage in the politics of the Golden Horde. In this period, rising of Muscovy was caused by "symbiosis" with the Golden Horde. However, why Muscovy was not "absorbed" by the Golden Horde Firstly, the Golden Horde was unstable as any multinational and highly heterogeneous empire, so its domination was not permanent. Then, this "symbiosis" was not comprehensive. Influence of the Golden Horde in the areas of religion and intellectual life was practically nonexistent. Limited contacts between the Slavic and Turkic populations, and the strong Orthodox clergy control in Muscovy were very favorable for surviving Russian culture. Comprehensive cooperation was only in the areas of the secular culture of the court and counting house. "Here, Slavs and Tatars elaborated together an international subculture whose language was Turkic and whose administrative techniques and chancellery culture were essentially those of the Golden Horde" (Keenan and Raeff, 2003). Severe and destructive conflicts between Muscovy and the Golden Horde appear only in the XIV century, when the Golden Horde was at the stage of decline. Conflicts between Dmitry Donskoy, grand prince of Moscow, and Mamai (1381), and also Tokhtamysh attacks on Moscow (Martin, 1995) signify the end of this "symbiosis" in the political sphere. Next period differs in severe struggle of Muscovy against other principalities for dominance in the north-eastern region. We can't clearly delimit this period from the previous one. Indeed, yet from the beginning of the Tatar period, the Rurikid princes displayed much disunity. The princes of Moscow used the Golden Horde support to oppose the princes of Tver, Pskov, and Novgorod. The links between Moscow and the Golden Horde were crucial to Moscow's later preeminence (Keenan and Raeff, 2003). Here, we can see not only military support, but also economic and politic preferences within the "symbiosis" stated above. The Golden Horde not only afforded Moscow a steady and profitable export trade for its furs but also led to close relations between the Muscovite hierarchy and the patriarchate of Constantinople. It seems that from those times derives idea of Moscow as the third Rome. This special relationship was one of the principal factors for the eventual rise of Moscow as leader of the Russian lands. Also, there were "natural" factors favorable for economic growth. Muscovy is linked with all of the major navigable river systems and with the steppe. Then, Muscovy is near the major fur-producing regions and the most intensely settled agricultural lands (Martin, 1995). Because of all these factors, Moscow came to a position of preeminence during the XIV century. In fact, after the "symbiosis" of Muscovy with the Golden Horde, we see the thoroughgoing struggle for the political inheritance of the Golden Horde. The collapse of the Golden Horde brings some negative consequences for Muscovy. Indeed, the powerful military and political supporter of Muscovy receded into the background. Then, political powers of the other competitive centers (e.g. Lithuania and the khanate of Kazan) become rising simultaneously with the Muscovian attempts to dominate. In this time, we can see "cooperation among the emerging dynasties against their internal enemies and toward the stabilization of the steppe" (Keenan and Raeff, 2003). What were the principal "driving forces" during this period Muscovy survived because of cooperation with the Golden Horde in XIII-XIV centuries. But why Muscovy became dominating political player during the following centuries In the XIV century, other political and economic centers (Lithuania, Tver, Novgorod, etc.) were as rich and powerful as Moscow. Moreover, many of the areas nominally subject to the Muscovite princes retained their own dynasties, whose members often broke away and sided with one of Moscow's rivals. Moscow emerges as the political leader of Russians only after a series of dynastic conflicts in the early XV century. At this stage, we can see basically the internal confrontations between Russian dynasties. However, external influences also were significant. For example, in the XV century Vasily II, grandson of Dmitry Donskoy, succeeded only with the help of Lithuanian and Tatar allies, in establishing his house permanently as the rulers of Muscovy. This struggle was intensified by Ivan III (ruled 1462-1505), son of Vasily II. Under Ivan III, concept of the "gathering of the Russian lands" became the leading idea in the foreign policy of Muscovy (Crummey, 1987). It is necessary to note that this concept was (and is) driving force for Muscovy "to annex all East Slavic lands, both the Russian territories, which had traditionally had close links with Moscow, and the Belorussian and Ukrainian regions, which had developed under distinctly different historical and cultural circumstances" (Keenan and Raeff, 2003). First successful attempt to realize this "concept of gathering" was in 1471 when Novgorod and its upper Volga colonies capitulated and accepted Moscow's commercial and political demands (Martin, 1995). Again we see external factor: the Novgorod Republic became involved with the Lithuanian princes in an attempt to resist Moscow, so Novgorod was absorbed by Moscow in 1478 only. This "absorption" was realized by radical way: all ruling Novgorodian families were deported and replaced by members of the Moscow military-service class, and a Muscovite governor was installed. Tver principality was annexed and absorbed by similar way (1485). Less significant principalities were annexed in the following decades. In fact, to 1505 there were no Russian princes who dared conduct policies unacceptable to Moscow. Perfunctory look at these events can not disclose main causes of such enormous expansion. Although Muscovian reign was distinguished for the annexation of the rich Novgorodian lands and for the establishment of a regular bureaucracy and a land-tenure system, these achievements created new problems for his successors. The classical system of land grants to military servitors ultimately suppressed the interest of both landlords and tenants in increasing agricultural productivity (Keenan and Raeff, 2003). Moreover, there were a number of internal dynastic problems, e.g. struggle among Ivan's relatives for succession to the throne in 1497-1502 which lead (it might seem) dynasty to decline. Solely internal factors can not explain success of Muscovian expansion. Among external factors of that time we will mention the following ones. Firstly, the west and south-west directions of the Muscovian foreign policy were determined by competition with the Polish-Lithuanian state. In the early 1490s minor East Slavic princes defected from Lithuania to Moscow (Willcock, 1832). In 1503 Muscovy achieves a truce that extended its border considerably to the west. Then, the south and east directions of the Muscovian foreign policy were determined by relations with the various Tatar confederations. By system of temporary alliances, Ivan III achieves the security on the south and east borders of Muscovy. Then, Muscovian foreign policy touched not only the nearest neighbors, but also Rome, Vienna, and Byzantium (Willcock, 1832). The Byzantine political style (e.g. autocracy, state domination of the church, etc.) was not adopted by Muscovy at that time. Of course, such political balancing was not stable. For example, peace with the Tatar confederations was broken during the rule of Vasily III, son of Ivan III (Crummey, 1987). However, strategy to avoid uniting Muscovian enemies allowed extending Muscovy with the absorption of Pskov (1510), Smolensk (1514), and Ryazan (1521). After this period, we can see declining stage of Rurikid Muscovy. At this time, all internal factors favorable for Muscovian expansion are diminishing. This stage begins in 1538 when various parties of boyars gained control of the state apparatus. Since the monarch (tsar) Ivan IV was reestablished, the major reforms were initiated by the bureaucrats and boyars. The essence of such reforms was in standardization the administration of the Muscovian state. "The immediate goal was to strengthen the state and military apparatus to prepare for the major colonization of the new lands" (Keenan and Raeff, 2003). However, to 1584 the Muscovian lands were depressed by the internal terror, the reduction of the bulk of the peasantry to serf status, costly wars with Crimea and Kazan. In spite of the progressive reforms of the land-tenure system, commerce, and taxation by Boris Godunov (1598-1606), the central government and military organization began to disintegrate. Then, so-called chaotic years (1606-1613) follow. We can conclude that this stage was the most critical for growing Muscovian state. The problem of anarchy was solved by a temporary ruling coalition which led to the election of Michael Romanov, as the new tsar of Muscovy (1613). The new period of Muscovian expansion begins. We must to differentiate this "exterenal" expansion of Romanov's Muscovy from previous "internal" expansion of Rurikid Muscovy in XIV-XV centuries. Success of the "internal" expansion was caused by the balancing between different external forces. So, why "external" expansion was successful too To simplify our analysis, we will divide period of "external" expansion into two sub-periods: pre-imperial, and imperial. Pre-imperial period was time of reconstruction after previous anarchy. The new dynasty refrained from involving itself in conflicts against Poland and Sweden, and in the Thirty Years' War in Europe. So, the westward Muscovian expansion was minimal. Instead of this, Muscovy begins to extend its own borders southward and eastward. When eastern Ukraine was annexed (1654), unstable truce with Sweden and Poland was broken (Willcock, 1832). In that time, the foreign policy of Muscovy was based upon strategy of support the player which was the strongest at the certain moment. There were temporary coalitions against Sweden, Poland, and Ottomans. Internal political situation was complicated by inner dynastic conflicts. At that time economic reconstruction was slow, but it was accompanied by a growth of trade and manufacturing. The state revenues profited from the expansion eastward beyond the Urals and southward into the black-soil region. The government itself became deeply involved in the development of trade and commerce, both through its monopolistic control of certain areas and commodities and by its efforts to build up such strategic industries as metallurgy. Then, the political recovery of the Russian state was due largely to the survival of the central bureaucracy and ruling oligarchy. The lines of subsequent development were determined by the growth and consolidation of these groups in the XVII century. Then, the Muscovite administration was extended first "into the devastated areas, where local institutions had been swept away, and then into new territories that had no significant political institutions, until it became a standardized and centralized mechanism powered by the colossal wealth generated by its own expansion" (Keenan and Raeff, 2003). So, external factors were not favorable for enormous expansion of Romanov's Muscovy in the pre-imperial period. However, internal state policy was very favorable for further centralization of power. Both these factors provided background for following avalanche-like territorial expansion of the newborn empire. The Imperial period begins by the reign of Peter I the Great (1689-1725). It is necessary to note that the aggressive foreign policy was realized by Peter I in all directions, e.g. against Sweden, Baltic provinces, Ukraine, and Ottomans. Success of these military expansions was grounded upon the stable economic growth. For example, by 1700 Russia was a leading producer of pig iron and potash (Keenan and Raeff, 2003). Other favorable factors were: introducing progressive European methods of education; creating powerful navy; modernization of the army structure and management; making more efficient government institutions; further centralization of administration; and also the transformation in the country's culture and style of life. We can conclude that the general "frame" of the Muscovy' way from monarchy to empire has the following phases: 1) phase of appearance and surviving (XIII-XIV centuries) differs by strategy of "symbiosis" with the Golden Horde; 2) phase of "internal" expansion, i.e. of expansion against other Russian principalities (XIV-XV centuries) differs by strategy of making temporary coalitions and alliances; 3) chaotic phase (XVI century) with disorganized and non-systemic foreign policy; 4) pre-imperial phase (XVII century) of reconstruction after anarchy differs by fast growth of internal economic powers, expansion eastward and centralization of the state administration; 5) imperial phase (from XVIII century) differs by successful expansion in all directions caused by the factors of previous phase and by reforms in economics, state management, education, and also cultural life. Bibliography: 1. Crummey, Robert. The Formation of Muscovy, 1304-1613. London: Longman, 1987. 2. Keenan, Edward, and Raeff, Marc. "Russia". Encyclopaedia Britannica. Ultimate Reference Suite [CD Edition]. 2003. 3. Martin, Janet. Medieval Russia, 980-1584. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 4. Willcock, T. History of Russia, from the foundation of Empire, by Rurik, to the present time. Devenport: Byers, 1832. Retrieved via web-service http://books.google.com. Read More