Housing and Benefits for Asylum Seekers in the UK - Essay Example

Running Head: HOUSING AND BENEFITS FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS IN UK Housing and Benefits for Asylum Seekers in UK of the of the institution] Housing and Benefits for Asylum Seekers in UK Abstract Of all the individuals or groups treated harshly by society, refugees and asylum seekers are often amongst the most disadvantaged and marginalised. Excluded from their homelands, often under the most traumatic and disabling circumstances, they are frequently forced to seek shelter in countries with indigenous populations with whom they share little in common. In many cases these differences are multi-faceted, reflecting language, culture, religion and colour. The reality for many asylum seekers is being homeless, stateless and status-less within a system that is far from welcoming. This paper examines the housing experience of asylum seekers in the UK, within an unfolding scenario of legislative reform and political manoeuvring. Housing is at the very cornerstone of reception and resettlement (BRC 1987, 96-99; Carey-Wood etal. 1995, 66-72; Majke 1991, 267- 283; Refugee Council 1997; Robinson 1993, 170-186) and controlling access to housing has become an increasingly important part of the government's asylum and immigration strategy. Without adequate shelter, few other opportunities exist for those unfortunate enough to be destitute. With no permanent address, there is little chance of establishing the minimum rights of citizenship, which offer inclusion into the host society. Introduction Social exclusion has been a reality for many thousands of asylum seekers over a prolonged period of time. This was true even before the more draconian measures introduced in the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. The prevailing environment of competition, performance review and value for money has had the effect of increasingly marginalising the most vulnerable groups in British society. In all but a few notable exceptions, the needs of asylum seekers have been inadequately addressed by either public or private sectors (Zetter and Pearl 1999a, 24-27). This has been due to a combination of institutional inertia and political sensitivity - both cock-up and conspiracy. The most recent legislative measures have further exacerbated the process of exclusion, generating additional hardship for an already overburdened group by extending uncertainty and increasing dependency. In reality, the rights and entitlements of refugees are little changed by the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. They remain eligible to receive support and assistance in terms of both benefits and housing from the public sector. This is an important distinction from asylum seekers. Refugees are individuals or households whose status under the 1951 Geneva Convention has been approved by the UK government: that is, their 'well founded fear of persecution' has been accepted. They are likely to have either permanent or long-term status of residence in the UK and generally share in the usual rights of citizenship. (Duke, 1995, 12-18) Those with refugee status are eligible for assistance under the homelessness legislation and qualify for the housing register. To a large extent, such households have fewer institutional barriers to overcome than asylum seekers. Asylum seekers have no such clarity of outcome, for which they depend on the result of their pending application. While in this state of limbo, they are disqualified from access to employment, benefits or permanent housing, and are thus placed at the very margins of society. Indeed, at certain times within the mid-1990s, large numbers of single asylum seekers were actually destitute. (Joly, 1996, 121-128) The political reality behind the asylum legislation appears, therefore, to indicate a reliance on two cardinal principles above all other considerations: 1. the control and limitation of public expenditure, particularly personal benefits 2. the maintenance of an image of political toughness. (Robinson, 1985, 305- 330) It seems likely that excessive zeal in investigating applications and a tough interpretation of events has contributed significantly to the low level of acceptances. It is against a backdrop of increasing demand and spiralling cost that successive governments have implemented asylum policy and practice designed, in effect, to deter applications, legitimate or otherwise, for sanctuary in the UK. The asylum legislation Change in government policy in this area has been enacted by a series of key pieces of legislation. The 1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act was followed by the 1996 Asylum and Immigration Act, which was coupled with associated measures contained within the 1996 Housing Act. The primary objective of each of these statutes has been to remove asylum seekers from being the responsibility of the public sector, principally through eliminating access to benefit entitlements and/ or public housing. The 1996 Acts had the practical effect of driving into destitution and homelessness thousands of mainly single asylum seekers who were deemed to fall outside of the protective safety net of the homelessness legislation. Eligibility for income support and housing benefit for in-country and 'on appeal' applicants were initially removed by regulation, restored by the courts and then formalized by statute within the 1996 Asylum and Immigration Act, alongside housing and homelessness restrictions. However, following appeals brought on behalf of asylum seekers, a ruling by the High Court in October 1996, upheld by a ruling in the Court of Appeal in February 1997, decided that local authorities had a duty to provide housing and sustenance to the homeless under s21 of the 1948 National Assistance Act. As a result, the responsibility for thousands of homeless asylum seekers shifted from housing departments to largely unprepared and under-resourced social services departments. The result was that in many local authority areas, chaos ensued, resulting in a scramble for accommodation, which was wholly reactive and initially unco-ordinated. The worst standard of hotels and bed-and-breakfast accommodation was used and, on occasion, asylum seekers were even forced to share beds. This sequence of events and the accompanying intensification of demand brought the system, in London at least, near to collapse. The number of asylum seekers supported under the 1948 Act had grown from about 900 in late 1996 to almost 7000 a year later. Later on in the year, following a prolonged period of policy vacuum, the government set out its proposals for asylum reform in a White Paper (Home Office 1998). In essence, the measures contained within the White Paper were, with some minor amendments, subsequently enacted within the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Bill, which became law in November 1999. This comprehensively overhauled legislation and policy with regard to asylum seekers, following the government's stated objective of establishing a system that discourages and rigorously tests asylum claims. (Home Office 1999a) Compulsory dispersal does not sit well with the avoidance of social exclusion, as people generally gravitate to areas where they are most secure and well served. However, the Home Office has justified this menu by proposing measures to curb the further marginalisation of already marginalised areas, and arguing that these measures would also safeguard asylum seekers. The Act extended the disentitlement of asylum seekers to public funds, completing their virtual exclusion from monetary benefits. Under the new regime, support for asylum seekers is provided outwith the existing statutory benefits arrangements and is no longer founded on cash payments but, instead, through a system of vouchers at 70 per cent of income support levels. When introduced, this proposal caused a great deal of concern from a wide range of sources, in terms of both humanitarian and utilitarian perspectives. Not only were asylum seekers being expected to survive on significantly reduced levels of benefit but the potential for administrative complexity and inequity in the use of vouchers added further pressure to an already unwieldy system. (UNHCR, 1997, 63-72) Several key organisations, most notably the Local Government Association (LGA) and the Refugee Council, have chosen to work alongside the Home Office, ostensibly to devise a practice framework for delivering the most sensitive and effective programme. Very early in the consultation process, the government's intransigence on the core aspects of their asylum proposals had become clear. (Association of London Government, 1998, 45-57) Those opposing the measures had to take whatever opportunities were available to soften the impact. Such a strategy proved untenable, however, with the Refugee Council ultimately severing their linkage with the asylum measures by pulling out of the partnership. The corollary of LGA involvement was the introduction, on 6 December 1999, of a voluntary interim scheme of dispersal offered in advance of, or in preparation for, the statutory scheme due for introduction on 1 April 2000. The scheme was geographically modelled on the cluster areas detailed later in this paper and co-ordinated by regional consortia. The latter were corporate vehicles for providing asylum-seeker accommodation and delivering associated services, led invariably by local authorities but including other interested agencies. Cluster areas and social exclusion Despite the intent of the Home Office to avoid social exclusion, the act of dispersal, even to planned clusters, will at the very least create additional uncertainty and bureaucracy. The potential pitfalls in the wholesale, compulsory relocation of thousands of traumatised individuals about the country can only give rise to limited chances of success. This has certainly been reflected in the experiences of the LGA interim scheme, which has proven largely ineffective in coping with the number of asylum seekers channelled through it since its introduction. This is not due to the inability of local authorities to provide housing but arises largely because these arrangements have failed to produce a coherent strategic response to the dispersal demands placed on them. Not only have the Home Office set out for cluster areas failed to be achieved but there has also been little reduction in the ad hoc dispersal arrangements entered into by London boroughs, independent of the LGA's efforts. The Secretary of State also has the power, should he/ she consider it appropriate, of compulsion, designating, following appropriate consultation, an 'asylum seeker reception zone'. The list of cluster areas contained few surprises, with all of them enjoying a crude surplus of housing and much weaker housing demand than in the south east. Each of the regions contains a high representation of the most deprived areas in the Social Exclusion Unit's catalogue, with Liverpool, Manchester and Birmingham occupying three of the top five places. (Buckley, 1996, 26-30) An obvious concern, therefore, is that the concentration of dispersal on these cluster areas would serve only to relocate highly vulnerable asylum seekers in areas with communities that are themselves marginalised and disadvantaged. This would not only undermine existing government policies for tackling social exclusion in these areas, it would actively contribute to increased deprivation. The government has acknowledged these dangers: The dispersal policies are likely to compound the exclusion of asylum seekers, unless great care is taken in selecting the cluster areas. The targeting of a new and inevitably marginalised group on localities which already accommodate socially vulnerable communities, may accentuate deprivation and exclusion experienced by the host communities without wider programmes of support for those communities. (Home Office 1999a) Some local authorities have generated considerable resentment by 'dumping' their asylum seekers in neighbouring boroughs or even further afield (Zetter and Pearl 1999b, 235- 254). While not all local authorities are openly hostile to asylum seekers, confusion and inconsistency characterises many of the policies and practices that they have adopted. Sporadic examples of good practice may exist within individual departments but rarely do local authorities display evidence of a corporate approach to strategic planning or management of asylum services. Of the other main protagonists, RSLs have also shown a marked reluctance to commit themselves to the asylum-seeker cause. Caught in a policy vacuum, with ambivalent messages from the Housing Corporation (Housing Corporation 1997, 57-58, 1998), many RSLs have perceived asylum seekers as too risky a group to house. This has been based on a combination of political sensitivity, financial risk (although this was somewhat tempered by the Court of Appeal judgment requiring support under the National Assistance Act 1948) and more general uncertainty about length of stay, support needs and ultimate status. The third main group of players in the scenario is the refugee community organisations (RCOs) which in the main comprise members of the communities they seek to serve. The 6.6 million allocated by the Home Office to fund the voluntary sector in relation to the dispersal process, including the development of 20 additional RCOs, has been little in evidence on the ground in the cluster regions. The prevailing situation therefore remains one in which services to asylum seekers are often provided in spite of the relevant agencies rather than because of them. Many of the success stories that do exist have, in part, been the result of a critical mass of multi-ethnic groups and communities which have generated an impetus to identify and respond to an often diverse range of needs. Examples of this are the Tamil community in Newham, the Somalis in Tower Hamlets and the Polish community in Manchester. The cosmopolitan nature of London, and, to a lesser extent, of cities such as Manchester and Birmingham, has made this possible. The prognosis for the establishment of viable communities in other, less well-served areas of the country appears less hopeful. Conclusion Those indicators that have emerged during the first few months of the interim arrangements have served to confirm the worst fears of the most sceptical. Despite the recognition by the Home Office of the need to work closely with the voluntary sector, little of substance has been forthcoming. Committed to a system of one-stop shops modelled on the Refugee Council's facility in Brixton, the infrastructure has been developed at a national and/ or regional level rather than in local areas. Little, if any, additional funding has filtered down to enhance, encourage and establish stronger networks of RCOs in the proposed cluster areas. Yet the government continues to acknowledge the essential role to be played by the voluntary sector if the cluster areas are to prove viable propositions. In addition to the fragile infrastructure, other, perhaps more fundamental factors threaten to derail the viability of the dispersal programme. by asylum applicants. The number of new presentations exceeded the government's estimate by almost 50 per cent, reaching over 70,000 in 1999. This has placed a significant strain on the resources of local authorities to respond in the short term. (Panorama, 2000, 5A) The excess demand has been further exacerbated by a potential shortfall in supply post-1 April 2000. The negotiations between NASS and the prospective providers have proven more complex than originally envisaged due largely to the difficult commercial terms being offered. In the meantime, the impact on the interim arrangement is that the practice of dispersal is roving even more problematic than the policy. (Panorama, 2000, 5A) Logistical difficulties have emerged over the transportation of asylum seekers away from London, as has the identification of sufficient accommodation that meets the requirements originally laid down by the government. This has resulted in asylum seekers being dispersed purely according to availability rather than the suitability of the dwellings or the environment. This has already led to tensions with rural and suburban communities where little planning or consultation has taken place. The indications are that the current programme of dispersal appears to offer little more evidence of sustainability than those which have preceded it. Unlike some of its European neighbours, Britain continues to lack a coherent reception policy for asylum seekers. Whereas a structured approach to initial reception is central to an effective immigration policy and would be cost-effective in the medium and long terms, the reality is a fragmented and short-termist approach to policing asylum. Despite being an established activity with a constant demand, few facilities have been developed over the years for asylum seekers. Reception continues to remain a reactive, fragmented and grudgingly distributed service. Asylum is still a highly emotive topic, with strong, resource-based arguments ranged against asylum seekers but little political muscle flexed in their favour. To some degree, asylum seekers have been prepared to collude with this view because it often affords anonymity, out of the glare of media publicity and local scrutiny. This, in turn, offers a greater perception of security and privacy. Not all exclusionary pressures, however, can be laid at the government's door. The so-called 'caring' agencies, namely local authorities, RSLs and RCOs, are often equally culpable and therefore complete the exclusionary picture. There is little evidence of effective partnership between organisations (Zetter and Pearl 1999a, 24-27, 1999b, 235- 254, 2000, 675- 697) but, in contrast, many tensions generated by competition, parochial interest, political ideology and a lack of knowledge and understanding about how each operates. Asylum seekers are usually left with the task of manoeuvring through this glaring example of 'non-joined-up thinking'. For some protagonists, the failure of the asylum system may, in reality, be perceived a success, if the ensuing chaos dissuades further increases in asylum applications. For asylum seekers, bussed around the country in an ad hoc and random fashion, the results can only be further suffering, uncertainty and marginalisation from the society they have approached for assistance. References Association of London Government (1998) Weekly Statistics of Asylum Seekers Presenting to London Boroughs. London: London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham., 45-57 BRC (1987) Settling for a Future: Proposals for a British Policy on Refugees. London: British Refugee Council, 96-99 Buckley, C. (1996) Safe Havens. London: London Federation of Housing Associations, 23-30 Carey-Wood, J., Duke, K., Karn, V. and Marshall, T. (1995) The Settlement of Refugees in Britain. Home Office Research Study 141. London: HMSO, 66-72 Duke, K. and Marshall, T. (1995) Vietnamese Refugees Since 1982. Home Office Research Study 142. London: HMSO, 12-18 HACT (1994a) Housing Needs of Refugees in the North. London: Housing Association Charitable Trust, 40-42 HACT (1994b) Housing Issues Facing Refugee Communities in London: A Survey. By A. Wol, L. Firth and R. Mukherji. London: Housing Associations Charitable Trust. Home Office (1998) Fairer, Faster and Firmer: A Modern Approach to Immigration and Asylum. Government White Paper Cmd 4018. London: The Stationery Office, 120-124 Home Office (1999a) Asylum Seekers Support. London: The Stationery Office, 8-10 Home Office (1999b) Full and Equal Citizens. London: The Stationery Office, 36-38 Housing Corporation (1997) Letting to Certain Persons [From] Abroad. Circular No. R3, 04/ 97. January. London: The Housing Corporation, 55-58 Housing Corporation (1998) Temporary Lettings to Asylum Seekers. Circular No. R3, 34/ 97. January. London: The Housing Corporation Joly, D. (1996) Haven or Hell: Asylum Policy in Europe. London: Macmillan, 121-128 Majke, L. (1991) 'Assessing refugee assistance organisations in the United States and the United Kingdom.' Journal of Refugee Studies 4, 3, 267- 283. Panorama (2000) 'Human Traffic.' 7 February. London: BBC., 5A Refugee Council (1997) The Development of a Refugee Settlement Policy in the UK. Refugee Council Working Paper. London: Refugee Council. Robinson, V. (1985) 'The Vietnamese reception and resettlement programme in the UK: Rhetoric and reality.' Ethnic Groups 6, 305- 330. Robinson, V. (1993) 'British policy towards the settlement of ethnic groups: An empirical evaluation of the Vietnamese programme, 1979- 88.' In V. Robinson (ed) The International Refugee Crisis: British and Canadian Responses. London: Macmillan, 170-186 UNHCR (1997) TheStateoftheWorld'sRefugees. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 63-72 Zetter, R. and Pearl, M. (1999a) Managing to Survive. Bristol: Policy Press, 24-27 Zetter, R. and Pearl, M. (1999b) 'Sheltering on the margins: Social housing provision and the impact of restrictionalism on asylum seekers and refugees in the UK.' Policy Studies 20, 4, 235- 254. Zetter, R. and Pearl, M. (1999c) Guidelines for Registered Social Landlords on the Provision of Housing and Support Services for Asylum Seekers. London: The Housing Corporation. Zetter, R. and Pearl, M. (2000) 'The minority within the minority.' Journal ofEthnic andMigration Studies 26, 4, 675- 697. Read More