Social Cleavages and the Effect on the Transitional Democracy of Brazil - Essay Example

Social Cleavages and the Effect on the Transitional Democracy of Brazil The unprecedented reelection f Fernando Henrique Cardoso in October 1998 raised hopes inside and outside Brazil that the reforms initiated since his Piano Real would be consolidated and expanded. Reelection guaranteed continuity, thus increasing the prospects f success. Brazil had certainly been lacking continuity in institutions and leadership since 1985. Yet only days after Cardoso's reelection, contagious financial turmoil in the "new world economic order" and political crises deeply rooted in Brazil's old order caused hopes for the future and gains f the past to evaporate almost overnight. The repercussions f the Russian and Asian financial crises, together with the apparent fraying f Cardoso's governing coalition and a unilateral moratorium on federal debts declared by some states, exposed the fiscal and political fragility f Cardoso's policy agenda. Brazil's ability to recover quickly from the global economic shocks and Cardoso's success in winning legislative assent on major structural reforms as f May 2000 reveal as much his political skill as the many overlooked strengths and growing versatility f the Brazilian political system. The discussions in the texts to be reviewed here place in crisper perspective the political and institutional conundrum facing Cardoso's administration. The seven books share many features. Each in its own way addresses critical political and institutional issues facing Brazil today. For most f these analysts, the central question is, why has Brazil's new democracy performed so poorly in terms f redistributive reforms and democratic governance Why has the return to democracy resulted in neither good governance nor improvements in the country's profound social deficit While the authors have their own distinctive approaches and ways f framing f the central problem, this review will focus mainly on the themes f democratic governance and social welfare. As a group, the works under review here reveal four shortcomings. First, they understate the achievements f democracy in Brazil. This assessment stems in part from mostly normative hidden assumptions about an ideal type f democracy, in comparison with which the performance f Brazilian democracy falls short. Second, these authors perceive more continuities than breaks in Brazilian political development, with corrosive practices and institutions f the past remaining intact--or even strengthened-following the transition to democracy. Third, they underestimate the capacity f the three key political institutions in Brazil--the parties, the legislature, and the executive or generalize about their hypothesized weakness. This problem is especially egregious in the analysis by Ronald Schneider, who describes the Brazilian party system as "primitive" and blames the "dysfunctional public sector" as the root cause f the country's economic and political crises. But the problem is equally visible in the books by Souza, Weyland, and Hagopian. Despite a growing body f research showing otherwise, (Martins 78-93) several f the texts reviewed here illustrate how works on Brazilian party systems and legislative-executive relations continue to be dominated by outdated, impressionistic, and overdrawn arguments and evidence. The first signs f a modern democratic government in Brazil appeared in 1945 when the military deposed President Getlio Vargas. Vargas had created a "semi-corporatist authoritarian regime (the Estado Nvo) based largely on the military." Once Vargas had been removed from power, Brazil instituted a competitive multi-party system. Multi-party systems are not a requirement for democracy, "but certainly the history f democratization has been associated with the development f parties and their legitimation." This step towards a true democratic government was negated in 1964 when the military forced a reversion to an authoritarian form f rule. The president remained the top government official, but he was merely a puppet to the military. The Army officer corps choose a general who the Congress would elect for president for a set term. (Weyland 3-31) Castelo Branco managed to hold the hardliners demands at bay with the enactment f concessions. To make his successor's transition to office easier, Castelo Branco and his advisers reformed the constitution so that the next president could assume power in a "normal" constitutional regime. General Artur da Costa e Silva took over as President in 1967. He experienced an average economic growth f eleven percent per year, which lasted from 1968 until 1974. However, the political atmosphere was not fairing as well as the economy. There were many student demonstrations and two major industrial strikes. To rectify this situation, the government reacted with highly repressive police action. Costa e Silva then implemented the Fifth Institutional Amendment. This amendment "authorized the suspension f normal civil rights, such as habeas corpus, justifying the measure by the need to protect national security."6 What made this amendment even more undemocratic is that it had no expiration date; the effect f this would have long term consequences. Costa e Silva was able to take this action because "in presidential systems, the [elected president] winner takes all: He or she can form a government without including any losers in the coalition." Because he did not have any f his opposition in the government to contend with, it made it possible for Costa e Silva to pass this amendment. Shortly after instituting the Fifth Institutional Amendment, Costa e Silva died from a stroke. After much debate among the Army officer corps, it is decided that General Emlio Garrastaz Mdici would be the next president. He ruled the most authoritarian regime since 1964. "Although elections were held and Congress continued to function (with a suspension in 1969-71, broken only to ratify Mdici1s succession in early 1970), Brazil was in the grip f the security forces, which were locked in battle with several small guerrilla movements."8 Still, even after the guerrilla forces were suppressed, arbitrary procedures and dictatorial practices continued. This is not a unique occurrence in Latin American states. Linz reveals that "...in many [Latin American] countries the periods f democratic rather than authoritarian presidentialism have been short. Most presidents have been de facto governors deriving power from a coup rather than an election, or a dubious election." Brazilian presidents were chosen in much the same way: a dubious election where the Army officer corps appoint a general who will become the next president. From there, the legislature, who are comprised f military backers, elect the general. However, Mdici1s administration was considered to be somewhat legitimate by the middle and upper class because f Brazil's continued economic growth and reign f "law and order." After Mdici1s term was up, General Ernest Geisel was elected president. One f his Geisel's main concerns was the unequal income distribution; but this problem was compounded by the rapidly growing external debt. Geisel decided to reform the welfare programs that the former governments had left in disrepair. To minimize the negative effects f the new welfare programs, continued high economic growth was imperative. However, continued growth was not quite as easy as it had been in the past. In 1973, the OPEC oil price shock took its toll on Brazil, since Brazil imported nearly 80% f its oil. To cut back on oil importing would have slowed economic growth, thereby hindering the plans for a more equal distribution f wealth. To counteract this problem, Brazil depended on its oil reserve and also borrowed oil from abroad. This created even more f an external debt though. (Muller 50-68) Geisel expressed his hope for a gradual redemocratization, beginning with distenso (decompression), although he also warned that national security was indispensable to ensure development. Before Geisel could begin any form f redemocratization, he needed support from the officer corps. Hardliners could be expected to oppose or even sabotage any attempt at liberalization. There was also widespread speculation as to how much control the president had over the security apparatus. There were many incidents that show that liberalization was still far off. Innocent citizens were being arrested and tortured at the hands f security forces. Federal censors imposed stricter rules on the media. The Brazilian Bar Association spoke out against the government's failure to account for missing people that were believed to have been apprehended by security forces. In one specific case, Fred Morris, a United States1 citizen and former Methodist missionary, was arrested and tortured which created American interest in the liberalization f Brazil. Francisco Pinto, a prominent radical MDB deputy from Bahia, was deprived f his congressional seat and stripped f his political rights. These occurrences hardly seem that f those f a true democratic system. One f the major factors in the democratization process was the elections f 1974. ARENA governors dominated in their elections, which was not surprising since ARENA controlled the legislature that elected the governors. These results may have led the presiding government's political strategists to underestimate the opposition. The government then gave all those running for Senate and state legislatures free access to television. This may have led the public to believe that the opposition party, the MDB, represented a viable alternative to the ARENA party. The outcome f the direct election proved that the people wanted reform: The MDB had almost doubled their representation in the lower house, (the total number f seats had been increased from 310 to 364), jumping from 87 to 165. ARENA dropped from 223 to 199. The results in the Senate were equally dramatic. The MDB delegation went from seven to twenty, as ARENA dropped from fifty-nine to forty-six. While ARENA had won by a small margin in the total vote for federal deputies, the MDB won in the total vote for senators, which was the best indicator f national opinion. In addition, the MDB won control f the state legislatures in key states where the urban electorate was crucial: So Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, Rio de Janeiro (including the city f Rio), Paran, Acre, and Amazonas. Works Cited Martins, Leoncio Rodrigues, "Eleicoes, fragmentacaio partidaria e governabilidade," Novos Estudos, no. 41 (Mar. 1995):78-93 Muller, Edward N., "Democracy, Economic Development, and Income Inequality," American Sociological Review 53 (Feb. 1988):50-68. Weyland, Kurt, "Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America," Studies in Comparative International Development 31, no. 3 (Fall 1996):3-31. Read More