Whether or Not Arnold Has Committed Criminal Offences - Essay Example

Criminal Law Assignment A. Whether or not Arnold has committed criminal offences. The mens rea of Arnold is clearly shown when he called a police station threatening to release a toxic gas into the underground rail system. Arnold was a member of an anti-capitalist organisation committed to the violent overthrow of society. The actus reus of Arnold was his act of releasing poisonous gas at a busy station. From the facts, the consequences of his conduct are clear, Bill, a police officer, died and Carl, a passenger was seriously injured, before he was brought to the hospital and eventually committed suicide. However, the given facts show that certain considerations had intervened between the acts of Arnold and the consequences which subsequently occurred, namely: a) the authorities closed down the train; b) when he was already off duty, Dan left Carl; and c) before undergoing treatment, Carl slit his own throat and died. Furthermore, the facts provide that Arnold had been diagnosed of severe depression but had not yet been treated. The general rule at common law is that when a defendant has caused a victim's death, and has been proved to have had the necessary mens rea for murder, he may be able to avoid a conviction for murder by establishing that he comes within the scope of the defence of diminished responsibility. In such instance, if the defendant succeeds with the defence, his liability is reduced from murder to manslaughter, the sentence for which is at the discretion of the judge. This form of manslaughter is described as "voluntary" because there will have been evidence that the defendant did intend to kill or cause grievous bodily harm bur certain kinds of extenuating circumstances partially excuse his conduct. In the present case, Arnold had recently been diagnosed, but not treated, with severe depression. This is a ground for diminished responsibility. The rule is that if the defendant can prove on a balance of probabilities a defence of diminished responsibility, he will be guilty of manslaughter rather than murder. The statutory basis for the defence of diminished responsibility is set forth in section 2 (1) of the Homicide Act of 1957 which provides. "Where a person kills or is party to a killing of another, he shall not be convicted of murder if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing." An abnormality of mind is a state of mind which the reasonable man would consider abnormal. It is thus defined widely. In R v. Byrne (1960) 2 QB 396, the defendant had strangled a young woman and then mutilated her body. He claimed he was subject to an irresistible or almost irresistible impulse because of violent perverted sexual desires which overcame him and had done so since he was a boy. There was evidence that he was a psychopath, and could exercise but little control over his actions. The defence of diminished responsibility was rejected by the trial judge, and the defendant was convicted of murder. The Court of Appeal allowed the defendant's appeal on the basis that the trial judge had been wrong to exclude, from the scope of the defence, situations where a defendant was simply unable to exercise any self-control over his actions. Lord Parker, CJ said: "Abnormality of mind means a state of mind so different from that of ordinary human beings that the reasonable man would term it abnormal. It appears to us to be wide enough to cover the mind's activities in all its aspects, not only the perception of physical acts and matter, and the ability to form a rational judgement whether an act is right or wrong, but also the ability to exercise will power to control physical acts in accordance with the rational judgment. According to the commentaries of Clarkson and Keating (2003), diminished responsibility has been pleaded with success in the following type of cases: mercy killers, deserted spouses or disappointed lovers who kill while in a state of depression, reactive depressions, chronic anxiety states, alcoholism, women suffering from "pre-menstrual syndrome", and "battered wife syndrome" cases (e.g. R v. Ahluwaliah [1992] 4 All ER 889 and R v. Thornton (No) [1992] 2 All ER 1023). Moreover, even with respect to Carl, Arnold can interpose the defense that he is not the cause of the latter's death since there was an intervening cause. Indeed, sometimes after the defendant's act, there is an intervening act or event before the death occurs which contributes to the death. The legal effect is that the defendant would not be responsible for the death where the victim dies as a result of some subsequent act, unconnected with the defendant's act, which would have caused the death on its own even if the defendant had not inflicted the original injury on the victim. It is the inevitable conclusion, therefore, that Arnold is criminally liable for voluntary manslaughter of Bill and of Carl, who committed suicide. Carl's suicide is not a sufficient intervening cause, and defendant is still liable since the victim would have died nonetheless as a natural consequence (R. v. Corbett [1996], Crim LR 594). It is also the rule at common law that where defendant's conduct led the victim to do something which eventually caused the latter's death, as when Carl slit his throat "to cut short his agony" then the chain of causation is unbroken (R. v. Williams and Davis, [1992] 2 All ER 183; R. v. Roberts, [1971] 56 Cr App R 95). Indeed, it has been held that if death is caused by a combination of two causes, and the defendant's act remains "an operating and a substantial cause," then defendant will still be liable (R. Malcherek [1981] 73 Cr App R 173). B. Whether or not Dan has committed abandonment of a victim. The general rule at common law is that omission does not give rise to criminal liability. However, there are stated exceptions when failure to act will give rise to the offence of abandonment of or failure to assist a victim. The offence of abandonment of or failure to assist a victim is punished at common law if there exists a legal duty on the part of the defendant to take positive action. In R v. Miller (1983) 1 All ER 978, it was held that "Unless a statute specifically so provides, or the common law imposes a duty upon a person to act in a particular way towards another a mere omission to act cannot lead to criminal liability." A positive duty to act exists in the following circumstances: a) duty arising from a contract; b) public duty; and c) voluntary assumption of responsibility/ reliance. In R v. Pittwood (1902) 19 TLR 37, where a person is under a positive duty to act because of his obligations under a contract, his failure to perform the contractual duty in question can form the basis of criminal liability. In R v., Dytham (1979), a uniformed police officer saw a man who was being kicked to death. The police officer took no steps to intervene and drove away when it was over. He was convicted of the common law offence of misconduct in a public office as he had neglected to act to protect the victim or apprehend the victim. It was held that a person in a public office may be under a public duty to care for others. In R v. Stone and Dobinson (1977), the defendants were visited by S's sister Fanny and took her in providing her with a bed but over the following weeks she became ill. She did not eat properly, and eventually died of blood poisoning as a result of infection. The defendants had not obtained any medical assistance for Fanny although they had known she was unwell. The defendants were convicted of manslaughter. The Court of Appeal held that defendants had been under a common law duty to care for Fanny. This duty had arisen from their voluntarily assuming responsibility for looking after her knowing she was relying on them. The defendants' failure to discharge this duty was the cause of the victim's death. It was held in this case that there is a common law duty of care where there is a relationship of reliance between defendant and victim. Thus if someone voluntarily assumes responsibility for another person then they also assume the positive duty to act for the general welfare of that person and may be liable for omissions which prove fatal. Applying this legal principle, it means that Dan is criminally liable for abandonment of Carl. The factual considerations which would place Dan under criminal liability are: a) first, Dan is an ambulance worker; b) Dan attempted to assist Carl; but c) he ran away from the scene when it was time to go off duty. The fact that Dan is an ambulance worker would place him under a public duty to give assistance to Carl at that time when a poisonous gas was released in the railway. In other words, it was his job to help Carl or at least to bring him to the proper persons who could give timely medical attention. In this case, Dan's attempt to assist Carl is an overt act which shows that Dan had voluntarily assumed the responsibility to help Carl. And, third, when Dan ran away from the scene, this was an omission amounting to abandonment. On the other hand, Dan may interpose the following defences: 1) that he was already off duty when he left Carl; 2) that he merely attempted but did not assume responsibility to take care of Carl; and 3) that he had taken some medication for diabetes but had not yet eaten all day. R v. Pittwood (1902) 19 TLR 37 held that where a person is under a positive duty to act because of his obligations under a contract, his failure to perform the contractual duty can form the basis of criminal liability. However, Dan may interpose the defence that he was already off duty when he left Carl. R v., Dytham (1979) held that a person in a public office may be under a public duty to care for others. But Dan may interpose the defence that his case should be distinguished from Dytham which involved a police officer who did not discharge his duty to apprehend a criminal offender. Although R v. Stone and Dobinson (1977) held "that there is a common law duty of care where there is a relationship of reliance between defendant and victim. Dan may interpose the defence that his case should be distinguished from Dobinson since he did not yet voluntarily assume a responsibility. He merely attempted to help but did not yet assume. In R v Quick [1973], the defendant, a diabetic was charged with assaulting his victim. The assault occurred whilst the defendant was in a state of hypoglycaemia (low blood sugar level due to an excess of insulin). The court held that the defendant should have been acquitted on the ground of automatism. His unconscious state had been the result of external factors, i.e. the taking of insulin. The general proposition in law is that the defendant's conduct must be "voluntary" or "freely willed" if he is to incur liability. It may be involuntary for a variety of reasons, one of which is automatism. Automatism occurs where the defendant performs a physical act but is unaware of what he is doing, or is not in control of his actions, because of some external factor. Applying the law and jurisprudence, and after weighing the available defences, the inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that Dan is criminally liable for not helping Carl when the latter needed his assistance. Dan should be convicted of abandonment. I. Bibliography 1. Textbook on Criminal Law, 7th edition, Oxford University Press by Michael Allen. 2. Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine, 2nd edition (revised 2004). Hart publishing by G.R. Sullivan and A.P. Simester. 3. Criminal Law Text and Materials, 5th edition (2003), Sweet and Maxwell by CMV Clarkson and H.M. Keating 4. Smith, J.C. and Hogan, B. (2002) Criminal Law, London: Butterworths. 5. Elliot, C. and Quinn, F. (2002) Criminal Law, Dorset: Longman 6. Perkins and Boyce, Criminal Law (3rd edition) Read More