The Viability of Primary and Secondary Qualities - Essay Example

Ideas: The Viability of Primary and Secondary Qualities For George Berkeley, the theory of Ideas espoused by Locke was flawed. He was particularly troubled by the notion that realism was defined by our ability to sever the idea of the existence of things from the things being perceived. Perception was thus a critical theoretical foundation for Berkeley's assault on Locke; it was critical because, in his view, an idea was simply an idea and did not resemble the material object (Berkeley, 1710). Locke's approach, by contrast, assumed a separate reality with a fixed extension, motion, and extension. The essence of the philosophical debate, therefore, centered on Berkeley's refusal to believe that reality consisted of abstractions that could be separated from a material object. In order to explore this debate in more depth, this essay will examine Berkeley's critique of Locke regarding the viability of primary and secondary qualities. As a preliminary matter, for Berkeley, the proffered distinction between primary and secondary qualities, an integral theoretical concept underpinning John Locke's notion of Abstract Ideas, was an issue of fundamental importance. Our knowledge of the world around us, in Berkeley's view, was dependent on the viability of this distinction. Berkeley's ultimate rejection of this distinction, and the theory of Abstract Ideas was bold; Locke, after all, was not the first philosopher to believe in the validity of the distinction. Indeed, Berkeley challenged some of the greatest thinkers as the distinction had also been embraced by such luminaries as Descartes, Newton, and Galileo. A brief presentation of Locke's approach to primary and secondary qualities is necessary because it highlights the bases of Berkeley's attacks and because Locke's work served as the authoritative statement of the viability of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Berkeley was most troubled by Locke's philosophical premises dealing with human knowledge of the world and perception. More specifically, Berkeley found fault with Locke's attempt to distinguish, by virtue of his primary versus secondary qualities analysis, actuality from our sensory interpretations. Berkeley pointed out what he claimed to be contradictory assertions by Locke and denied the logical cohesion and therefore the viability of such a distinction. He also pointed out the epistemological problems which, he asserted, rendered Locke's distinction nothing more than speculation. Locke, in Berkeley's view, was hardly an empiricist. Berkeley could simply not accept Locke's assertion that an underlying quality could be separated from the mind. Locke stated, by contrast, that a quality was a power that was capable of producing an idea in our mind. This definition was significant because it separated the quality from our mind; more particularly, Locke established a causal relationship in which a quality inherent in an object caused us to have an idea about that object. Berkeley, because he rejected the separation, also rejected the notion of causation. Berkeley's strongest criticisms, however, derived from Locke's attempt to divide a quality into two specific types. This criticism dealt with Locke's attempts to draw a distinction between what he termed primary qualities and secondary qualities. Locke characterised primary qualities as being inseparable from the object being observed. Everything had fundamental properties. These fundamental properties were constant. Locke viewed solids, extensions, figures, motion or rest, and number as primary qualities; Berkeley, for the reasons mentioned below, argued and demonstrated that these primary qualities did not exist. The denial of these primary qualities served as the basis for his rejection of the notion of abstraction of ideas. Berkeley stated that these qualities were illusory and therefore could not produce in us ideas about the object being observed. Ideas were ideas and nothing more. Nor did Berkeley accept the premise that a justified knowledge of these phantom primary qualities was inherent not in our ideas, which were the effects, but in the object. These primary qualities did not produce ideas in us, there being no causation, and there was no resemblance because the idea was the only reality. This notion of resemblance could not, in Berkeley's view, provide a comparatively close glimpse into the actuality of an object because there was no resemblance. Consequently, Berkeley found these alleged secondary qualities, in effect, to be deceptions. They gave us no knowledge of the underlying actuality. In short, this is where Locke's theory misled us and distorted the truth of the knowledge being sought. As a matter of common sense and logic, Berkeley argued that this distinction led to conclusions which conflicted with everyday experience. This conflict, though, was the essence of the theoretical debate. Berkeley found that Locke's world of justified knowledge, as compared to our sensory world, was a rather drab place. The primary qualities were without taste, without colour, and without odor. These were all secondary qualities; more particularly, the senses belonged to us individually, and Berkeley did not see the logical need for Locke's primary qualities. Berkeley went so far as to deny the distinction. The essence of his criticism was that Locke was contradicting himself. On the one hand, there was an underlying material reality. This underlying material reality, in turn, was able to produce ideas in us through our sensory perceptions which were not the truth of the matter. Material reality was independent and separate from what we perceived it to be. On the other hand, Locke also argued that we were unable to comprehend this material world accurately. In short, we were capable of knowing nothing more than our perceptions and our ideas that were the effects of this underlying material reality. To put it mildly, Berkeley found this contradiction extraordinarily foolish. In short, Berkeley found no distinction and he found the concept of resemblance to be forced and contrived. This world devoid of secondary qualities would therefore be incomprehensible and unknowable (Berkeley, 1710). In addition, Berkeley attacked the idea that primary qualities produced uniforms ideas. Different people perceived primary qualities differently; as a result, there was no evidence to support the proposition that any qualities were mind-independent. The epistemological problem that Locke faced was in Berkeley's view, therefore, a very real challenge that could not be surmounted. By characterising secondary qualities as an aspect of perception, meaning subjective, how did we know that the primary qualities were not also subjective. We did not know, and this was an additional weakness that Berkeley pointed out in rejecting in the viability of Locke's distinction. This incompleteness rendered Locke's entire theoretical framework untenable. In short, Berkeley found the theory of Abstract Ideas to be flawed in certain respects and to be incomplete. Another flaw noted by Berkeley was Locke's insistence that primary qualities, from our point of view, existed only to the extant that they were perceived. What more could we know about these qualities than our ideas What use, therefore, was Locke's distinction if, under all circumstances, this was the ultimate limit of our ideas. Locke's ancillary distinction, between justified knowledge and unjustified knowledge, was therefore irrelevant to knowledge as it affected us. We were trapped in a vicious circle and Locke offered no suggestions for transcending this trap. Indeed, he created the trap with his very distinction. Some have argued that Berkeley misunderstood Locke's work. This type of argument proceeds on the premise that Berkeley overextended Locke's argument by interpreting it as stating that no secondary qualities exist. This overextension, if true, would make any attempted distinction impossible. I do not believe, however, that Locke escapes Berkeley's criticisms for the reasons stated hereinabove. The Berkeley-type critiques are fair readings of the text. In conclusion, while attractive, Berkeley has identified significant problems associated with the distinction that Locke attempts to draw between primary and secondary qualities. These problems are the foundation for Berkeley's rejection of the theory of Abstract Ideas. The epistemological criticisms are particularly damaging. He supports a distinction which is logically inconsistent. In my view, the distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities, as expressed by Locke, are not valid. This makes Berkeley's rejection of the theory of Abstract Ideas more persuasive. References Berkeley, G. (1710). Principles of Human Knowledge/Three Dialogues. Penguin Books Ltd: London (1988) Locke, J. (1689). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Retrieved 28 July 2006. http://humanum.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Locke/echu/ Read More