The Chinese Decision to Enter the Korean War - Essay Example

Kyoung Kim Prof. Rovner GOV.069 04/25/06 The Chinese Decision to Enter the Korean War China's decision to intervene in the Korean War can best be explained by her desire to establish the legitimacy and secure the future of the Chinese Communist Party by manipulating external factors to achieve internal objectives, rather than any desire to challenge the supremacy of the United States. For many years, China's involvement in the Korean conflict was seen through the dominant international relations theories of the cold-war, namely the 'balance of power' paradigm. Since the end of the Cold War, new evidence leads us to re-evaluate the analysis put forth by the Realists and Liberalist standpoints. China's intervention in Korea cannot be ascribed simply to wanting to maintain the semblance of balance of power, "a theory of state behavior [that] explains and predicts how states respond to threats posed by a potentially dominant, revisionist and aggressive state"1, based on the assumption that states seek to, "maximize their power in order to survive in a competitive international system".2 US presence in the Asian region led to China and the US pursuing purely security related strategies that were mutually exclusive, inadvertently generating mutual hostility. Similarly, Chinese responses cannot be generalized into the Chinese merely wanting to secure their national interests without taking into consideration many other factors such as leadership challenges, domestic imperatives, and political consensus amongst domestic bureaucracies that can impinge upon foreign policy. The general understanding and belief is that China's foreign policy has been shaped primarily by external stimulus with domestic factors playing only a marginal role. However, the inability of existing theories to fully explain the reasons for China's entry into the conflict signifies that we must look at explanations that go beyond functional concepts of International Relations but also look more closely at internal factors and domestic compulsions. Students of international relations are well aware of the impact of domestic policies and how they shape foreign policy, with governments bowing to strong domestic opinion on a particular issue. What is less evident however is that governments also manipulate events in order to influence domestic politics, especially to create a stronger national identity. This is particularly relevant in the context of the Korean War, when one recollects that China was then emerging from the throes of a protracted civil war and that the People's Republic of China had been formally declared less than a year earlier, in October 1949. When the internal polity of a country is in a state of flux, any government which is seen as defending a nation's interests will only emerge stronger. China's entry into the Korean conflict can therefore, largely be seen to emanate as a result of the CCP converting a external 'threat' into an opportunity to consolidate its position internally. Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910 and remained under Japanese occupation until the end of World War II. In August 1945, the Soviet Union and the United States decided to oversee the surrender of Japanese forces to the North and South of the 38th parallel respectively. This was to be a temporary arrangement, with a united Korea the ultimate aim. In the interim, the US and the Soviet Union established governments in their respective zones that were sympathetic to their political ideologies. The US installed Syngman Lee in South Korea, while the Soviet Union backed North Korea Kim Il-Sung, with both wanting a unified Korea, under their own system and stewardship. However, North Korea was bolstered by Soviet advisors and military equipment was better prepared to seize the initiative. The North Korean attack across the 38th Parallel in June 1950 was a resounding success North Korea could not capitalize on their gains. North Korea failed to accomplish two crucial tasks, namely the total annihilation of the South Korean army and the surrender of the Lee government. This provided the leeway for US intervention in Korea, as the US believed that the invasion of South Korea was a part of a larger Soviet design to spread communism worldwide. With US intervention, the status-quo ante was restored, but the ease with which it was achieved prompted the US, under the banner of the UN, to carry the war northwards beyond the 38th Parallel, with the aim of uniting all of Korea under a sympathetic government. The early study of China's decision to enter the Korean War was based on the state-centric assumption of a traditional realist approach to the study of international politics. China's foreign policy was treated as a product of a rational, unitary state pursuing and maximizing its national interests in response to external stimuli. Realism argues that the reasons for Chinese involvement in Korea were based around its desire to achieve security on the international scene by aligning itself with Soviet power. However that is being overly simplistic. Mac Donald argues that, "The realist assumption of undifferentiated motivations among states obscures real differences in methods of perception and the purpose of collective behavior".3 He adds that, "China's Marxist-Leninist leadership, was convinced that it was part of a larger global social revolution that could expect only hostility from a world dominated by capitalist imperialism".4 Had that [global revolution] indeed been the case. China should have received the wholehearted support of the Soviet Union, but as records show, that was not the case. In fact, Russia was quite ambivalent of the Chinese revolution in its early stages fearing American intervention and even advised China to seek a settlement with Chiang Kai-shek "urging that he [Mao] stop at the Yangtze and share power with Chiang Kai-shek, [but] Mao ordered a final three pronged offensive that conquered the Southern half of the country and sent the Kuomintang into exile on Taiwan".5 From this it can be inferred that even in the Korean War, Russian and Chinese aims in spite of being part of the 'same global social revolution' were quite different. Moreover, realism focuses on predicting how a rational state would behave in seeking to secure its interests, believing that if one state can predict how the other will react in response to its own actions, armed conflicts can be avoided. This is a very idealistic view and goes counter to the earlier view that in Realism, military force is the key instrument to achieve a state's objectives. In fact, the lack of awareness of each other's cultural and historical legacies did not encourage empathy, on account of which, both sides made serious miscalculations of each other's intentions and capabilities. To that extent, defensive realism suggests that states can better secure their security interests by following more moderate policies short of armed conflict. Liberalism covers a broad canvas in which, "states are but one [of many] actors in world politics, and even states can cooperate together through institutional mechanisms and bargaining that undermines the propensity to base interests simply in military terms".6 Hence, while Liberal theory like realism, also takes for granted overall global anarchy as a constant, it instead focuses on ways to avoid conflicts by regulating state behaviors through institutions and non-state organs. While Realism seeks to portray Chinese involvement in the war purely along alignment choices, Liberalism analyses the change in Chinese government at the time and its desire to appear as a rational player in the international arena by making use of third parties, in this case the international community itself, to convey its stand. According to Weatherby the communist government's main concern was with Taiwan and the threat it held to their regime. She believes that support of Taiwan was the leading factor in its decision to involve in the Korean conflict.7 Although the US maintained that the task of the Seventh fleet was that of an impartial observer, it was apparent that for all practical purposes, "the United States had virtually reentered China's civil war on the GMD's [Guomindang's] behalf",8 with China asserting that US intervention in Taiwan was gross violation of international laws and the UN charter. The prospect of an amphibious invasion of Taiwan was put on hold as, "the CCP leaders had to reconsider the implications of America's hostility towards the new China".9 Instead, China decided to concentrate on helping North Korean counter the American threat, since historically, occupation of Korea had been the springboard for an invasion of China's eastern territories. Hence the US intervention convinced the CCP that the outcome of the war in Korea was inexorably linked to the security of its eastern provinces. Taiwan and Korea both constituted threats that were external in nature but which has an effect on internal stability and security. In this case, it is not clear whether Chinese intervention in Korea did indeed contribute to China's overall security as it has been made out to be. The North Korean invasion of South Korea had unintended consequences. While dispatching the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait, Truman declared that, "the occupation of Formosa by communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to US forces[and]created an entirely new and firm commitment of keeping Formosa out of the hands of Peking's communist rulers".10 This was a great blow to Chinese interests and prestige and gave rise to the perception that the US was trying to encircle China. Shortly before China's involvement in Korea, the Chinese premier and foreign minister Zhou En-lai declared in a speech that, "'the Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate foreign aggression nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by imperialists".11 While the communist government clearly saw the American government and its involvement in Korea as a threat, the US perception was quite different. As per Hastings, "The United States was convinced that its policies in the Far East presented no threat to any legitimate Chinese interests. Washington therefore persuaded itself that Peking would reach the same conclusion".12 This was obviously not the case. Zhou En-lai called the Indian Ambassador and conveyed to him that, "if the United States or United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel, China would send troops to defend North Korea".13 This message was duly conveyed by the Indian government to the US authorities, but to no effect. Accordingly, the question of Chinese intervention was debated in a meeting of the Political Bureau in early October 1950, and it was decided by Mao to, "Establish the Chinese People's Liberation Army of Volunteers (CPV) to aid North Korea".14 The statements made by the Chinese and US governments should be viewed in terms of posturing by the respective countries in the face of perceived threats to their national interests. By pointing out that intervention in Taiwan / Korea was in violation of international laws as well as the UN charter, China was only trying to secure the peace through international institutional mechanisms. Another indicator in this regard is the appeal made in the form of the message conveyed through the Indian ambassador, clearly indicating Chinese thresholds in order to avoid a military confrontation. Yet all these efforts did not stop the US from upping the ante leading to a clash of arms. This could perhaps be attributed to the relative absence of other interest groups such as trade forums and people-to-people interactions or a Chinese diaspora, given China only (recently) having been proclaimed a Communist state.This is evidenced by China's shift in policy towards Indochina which came to be viewed as an extension of the "confrontation between the revolutionary forces and reactionary forces in the East",15 and the beginning of Chinese military assistance to Vietnam. The Chinese intervention in Korea can be seen in the light of an individual level of analysis, which is particularly relevant to Chinese internal dynamics, and that is the role of the paramount leader. This is particularly true of China where power is concentrated in the hands of the top leadership, with very little separation of powers. The paramount leader thus stakes his entire reputation to justify a particular course of action and the outcome of that decision can decide the fate of a leader. Though in 1949 Mao "dominated the CCP's decision making processhe could not dictate everything as he would during the Cultural Revolution", and thus he had to tread cautiously in that, "it would have been foolish for him not to take them into consideration [the opinion of his colleagues]".16 Other lesser reasons included China's desire to overcome the psychological effects of a century of imperialism and of China seeking to position herself as a leader amongst the newly-independent nations emerging from under the yoke of imperialism. The Chinese word for crisis, 'weiji' denotes both danger and opportunity. Thus, the US intervention in China was exploited by Mao as it, "[confirmed] Mao's fundamental view of the aggressive nature of US policy in Asia, and an opportunity to confront the United States".17 Throughout August and September 1950, the Chinese Political Bureau debated a possible role in Korea, but Mao could not mobilize the necessary degree of support. It is only when the North Korean attack petered out and the US offensive across the 38th Parallel loom on the horizon could obtain the approval of the Political Bureau. Accordingly, when the question of Chinese intervention was debated in a meeting of the Political Bureau in early October 1950, it was decided by Mao to, "establish the Chinese People's Liberation Army of Volunteers (CPV) to aid North Koreaand Peng Duhaiwas appointed CPV commanderby Mao [in his capacity] as chairman of the Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Commission".18 Thus, the Chinese decision to enter the Korean War was as a direct result of Mao's own personal beliefs and experiences molded over a period of time. Mao's approach to war was a, "amalgamation of traditional military thought, Leninist theory, and the lessons Mao derived from his decades of conducting protracted war[which was] a romanticized notion of war and a belief that the Chinese could overcome a technologically advanced enemy through superior will and morale".19 It is apparent that had the outcome of the war in Korea been different, Mao's leadership would have been at stake. That being the case, once China became involved in the conflict, there was no question of backing down unless it was accompanied by a change of leadership. This decision thus, had nothing to do with wanting to maintain the 'balance of power' or any such Realist idea but was an opportunity for Mao's to put his stamp as the unquestioned leader of the 'new' China by mobilizing "the party and the nation under the banner of patriotism and nationalism".20 At the heart of constructivism is the belief that the social world is the result of human construction and that people must build their own identity. Cavour is reputed to have foreshadowed the constructionist view of national identity which, "assumed that the state would, or at least should, have the power to transform the identities on a people and territory that it came to encompass".21 To this end, concurrent to military preparations the CCP paid equal attention to arouse and mould the political consciousness of the people by a well orchestrated campaign of "political indoctrinationcombining 'internationalism and patriotism' ,"22 projecting the US as a spent force. A national identity was thrust upon the Chinese people by the power of the modern state. This Constructivist approaches while acknowledging the human element, "in the fulfillment of national aspirationsallow individuals very little choice over what [type or kind] of nations they belong to".23 Thus when Mao proclaimed the founding of the PRC, he did not "claim to be establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat",24 although the CCP had come to power primarily on the strength of the peasant class. The concept of 'nations-of-intent' becomes especially applicable when the territorial limits of a state are ambiguous. Restraint in international affairs becomes a "product of each state's assessment of its capacity to take and hold new territory, together with a calculation of the benefits of upholding the rule of law in international affairs".25 In June 1950, the Chinese Communist regime had still to forge an identity for itself. Its most difficult task was, "to establish the authority and credibility of the CCP as China's ruler by creating a true, extensive and internalized support on the part of the Chinese people and to the Communist regime".26 Thus for the masses that constitute China, "the CCP's management of the Korean crisis [would be] a test case of the CCP's ability to rule China and to safeguard China's prestige and national interests".27 Seen in this light, constructivist theory looks into important domestic analysis on the changes affecting Chinese decision-making and explains how abrupt change in Chinese political identity resulted in the re-direction of its interests abroad and its subsequent involvement in the Korean War. Jian believes that Beijing's management of the Korean problem should be understood taking into consideration three rationales: "the party's revolutionary nationalism, Asian-wide or worldwide revolution, and its determination to maintain the inner dynamics of the Chinese revolution."28 In addition, Johnston claims, "China's version of realism can only be understood by filtering it through the country's distinct cultural and historical experience."29 Thus China exploited the Korean crisis to promote the CCP's authority and credibility at home and by forging a new identity on the international scene. In retrospect, what stands out is the failure of all the countries involved - Russia, China, the US and the two Koreas - to appreciate each other's security interests and capabilities. When Russia and China tacitly endorsed Kin Il-Sung's plan to invade South Korea, they had not anticipated a determined and forceful US response. The CCP leadership perceived, "[incorrectly]that American military strength in the Asian-Pacific area was inadequate, making major American intervention in the internal conflicts or revolutionary changes in an Asian country unlikely".30 The US too, failed to appreciate that by carrying the war into North Korean territory, it kindled Chinese insecurities. The Chinese leadership felt that UN forces would not stop at the Yalu River but would press on into Manchuria, compromising the security and sovereignty of the fledging Chinese State. For Mao, any US move to occupy all of Korea was tantamount to the US declaring war on China, and thus Chinese intervention in Korea came to be justified as an essentially defensive measure. The US also underestimated Chinese military capability and resolve with MacArthur assuring Truman that, "if the Chinese try to get down to Pyongyang, there would be slaughter".31 All wars are the result of misinterpretation, and the Korean War was no exception. In sum, despite the considerable insight provided by Realism and Liberalism into the systemic and domestic issues behind China's decision to involve itself in the war, neither theory gives a sufficiently thorough analysis. Constructivism integrates more of the actors that shape global politics into the analysis, but still falls short of giving a plausible enough reason for Chinese intervention in Korea. Of all the theories, an Individual level analysis offers the most convincing reason for Chinese intervention, including aspects such as the timing of China's entry into the conflict. To sum up. the security of China could best be served by "guaranteeing the safety of the Chinese-Korean border, promoting the CCP's authority and credibility at home, and enhancing the new China's prestige on the international scene".32 Mao and the CCP leadership pursued a comprehensive strategy to achieve these goals. References Appleman, Roy E. "Disaster in Korea." The Chinese Confront MacArthur. Texas A&M University Press. 1989. Boose, Donald W (Jr.). The Korean War Revisited, 04/14/2006 . Chen, Jian. China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation. New York. Columbia University Press. 1994. 04/14/2006. . Cribb, Robert. Thinking Like a State: Nations-of-Intent and the Impact of Domestic Politics on International Affairs in East and Southeast Asia. Australian National University. "Deng Xiaoping and the Fate of the Chinese Revolution." March, 1997. 04/12/2006. . Graham, Fry, Michael., Erik, Goldstein., Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy. Ed. Langhorne, Richard. Continuum International. London. 2005. Hastings, Max. The Korean War. Simon & Schuster. 1987. Johnston, Alastair, Ian. "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China" The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New Directions in World Politics. Ed. Katzenstein, Peter J. New York. Columbia University Press. 1996. 04/16/2006 < http://www.ciaonet.org/book/katzenstein/katz07.html>. "Korean War (1950-1953)." Chinese Intervention. 04/16/2006. . Linser, Roni, ed. "Theories of International Relations". A Brief Guide to Theories of International Relations. Department of Political Science. University of Melbourne. 2001. 04/12/2006. . Macdonald, Douglas, J. "Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism" International Security Vol. 20, no. 3 (1995, winter). 04/16/1006. . Ogilvie-White, Tanya. "Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate", The Nonproliferation Review. Fall, 1996. 04/16/2006 . Sheng, Michael M. China's Decision to Enter the Korean War. Korea and World Affairs, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Summer 1995. 04/12/2006 . Stueck, William. "Rethinking the Korean War." A New Diplomatic and Strategic History. Princeton University Press. 2004. Weathersby, Kathryn. "The Korean War Revisited." The Wilson Quarterly. Vol. 23, Summer 1999. Read More