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Evidence from China could be adduced to show that collectives made crop procurement administratively far simpler; and besides, it could be postulated that collectives controlled by the poorer peasants would be readier to hand over surpluses than capitalistic rich peasants, farming individually. The book starts from early years of Liang Heng and the role of his family in self-identity. Liang Heng describes that when his parents divorced, their family was u8nder public attacks rejected the divorce and separate living of married people.
Liang Heng portrays that the self-criticisms of Mao's opponents on collectivization were not the only signs that, by 1955, the consensus was that he had proved his case. Another indication was provided by moves to accelerate the nationalization of industry and commerce. The plenum had discussed how industry and commerce should react to the high tide of agricultural collectivization, and shortly afterwards the party leadership set about readying China's capitalists for a collectivist upsurge to match the one taking place in the countryside.
The solution of the problems of socialization seemed to lift a great burden from Mao's mind. Liang Heng writes: "Now I knew why Father was always asking us to study the works of chairman Mao and write self-examinations when we had done something wrong" (42). The consolidation of the regime was now assured. He could turn his attention to the even harder and more long-term task of developing China into a modern, industrialized nation, a task which, understandably, obsessed him (Chen 87). The main part of the book describes self-identification and search for self of the author.
A special attention is given to political changes in Chinese society and their impact on the author. The new Mao's policies pointed out that while party members in their enthusiasm might not yet mind the extravagance involved in the building of club houses, offices, new houses, and the purchase of large quantities of expensive equipment for cultural and entertainment purposes, when the time came for accounting after the autumn harvest and they found that their incomes had not increased, or had even declined because of all this investment, they would be extremely dissatisfied and their enthusiasm for production might be dampened.
As well as roundly condemning the expenditure of labor and money on cultural and welfare projects, the directive criticized the neglect of sideline occupations and the setting of unrealistic production targets (Schoenhals 31). Liang Heng vividly portrays that Mao sustained a second setback at the 8th Congress, in the realm of economic policy. The ' leap forward ' approach to development was firmly rejected. This was only to have been expected in the light of the successful opposition to adventurism put up by Mao and his colleagues during the summer.
The report was infused with a spirit of moderation, indeed caution, engendered by the experience of the first plan. Political leaders again hammered the leap forward when giving the second lesson to be learned from experience: the importance of coordinating key projects with overall arrangements so that the various branches of the economy could develop proportionately. Political formulation underlined the need to avoid excessive complacency about the achievements of the first plan;
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