Chinese Communist Party Control Over the Military - Case Study Example

Has the Chinese communist party retained control over the military (re: Mao, “Power flows from the barrel of the gun… the Party must control the gun”)? How and why? Party-Army Relationships Chinese politics over the years has been characterized by party-army relationships. Army has been the pivotal point and the major force in the Chinese politics. The party-army relationships have existed since the beginning of the Communist regime. Although the relationship is bound to fail, the importance of the army still remains because of a number of reasons such as determining the result of an influential power struggle, putting down a mass uprising or a coup and displacing rebellious figures within China (Joffe 1996, p299). The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) It is a unified military organization that is responsible for all sea, land and air forces. It is divided into five major service branches and they include: naval force, air force, the reserve force, ground force and the second artillery command. The second artillery command is accountable for all nuclear and missile weaponry. It is estimated that there are about 3 million people serving in the China’s military. PLA reports to an eleven-member government Central Military Commission (CMC). There is integration between the Party CMC and the government CMC and people are selected by the Party Standing Committee to serve on the CMC. The CMC meets on a regular basis to address matters pertaining to administration and formulation of policies. Core members of CMC serve as a bridge between the leadership of CCP (Chinese Communist Party), PLA and the government. Analysts agree that the administrative and organizational reforms that have been done have partially transformed PLA from being involved into too much politics. Instead they have at least transformed into a professional military (Dumbaugh 2010, p10). The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) It is also known as the Communist Party of China (CPC). It was founded in the year 1921 in Shanghai, China. After nearly three decades of struggle, the party finally victoriously won the new democratic revolution. It was the party that founded the People’s Republic of China in the year 1949. The party is mainly founded on ideology and politics. The party gets its ideas and policies from the people and then turns those into State laws and the decisions are passed in the National People’s Congress of China through the State’s legal procedures. The party’s activities are conducted within the framework of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (ChinaToday 2010). Chinese Communist Party Control over the Military Many scholars have identified the symbiotic correlation between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). They believe that the demise of one of them leads to the death of the other. To some extent this is not true because many of these scholars attribute the survival of CCP today to a number of things. The survival is dependent on effective state affairs administration, economic development, and forceful campaigns against corruption rather that using the use of guns to suppress dissenting views. The ability of PLA to sustain CCP can not be ignored especially at times of severe political crisis. However, CCP can not legitimately solely rely on guns for its survival (Brodsgaard and Zheng 2006, p5). The People’s Liberation Army is seen as being under total control of the Chinese Communist Party. This is evident from the Mao’s quote “the Party commands the gun but the gun must never command the Party” (Scobell 2003, p6). The Long March depicts the overlapping of the civil and military leaders in the Communist China. Examples of Long Marchers were Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping and they were seen as both military and civil figures. It was very difficult to distinguish whether the individual was a civilian or a soldier. Between 1949 and 1997, China’s strategic decision-making and doctrine is dominated and controlled by one man. Much has changed since the Mao era and leaders who took over from Mao era have no experience in army. In China, military doctrines, employments, decisions and policies are influenced by culture rather than civil-military and strategies. PLA is assumed to have a major impact on the political outcomes (Scobell 2003, p7). The National Defense Law of 1998 states that the Chinese army supports the absolute leadership of the CCP. The adoption of NDL proves that the PLA is being put under state with the subsequent removal of their party control. Uncertainty still exists in the China’s leadership. For example, it is not clear what Central Military Commission (CMC) means, is it a state or a party CMC. This is because in 1985, a parallel membership identical to CMC party was created. This suggests that the relationship between the army and the State Council is that of a joint administration or a line authority with the function of implementing decisions. It becomes clear that the broad decision making is left to the president of the republic, (National People’s Congress) NPC standing committee and the State Council (Shambaugh 2004, p50). Jiang Zemin accession to power and holding of three offices also brings ambiguity to the Chinese Communist leadership. Jiang Zemin held the position of the president, CMC chairman and the CCP general secretary. Efforts that have been put in place since 1997 are geared towards disentangling the military from party control (Shambaugh 2004, p51). Although the party in the recent years has retreated from certain key sectors in the state, it still has direct control in areas such as the legislature, nomination of high state leaders, the media, and the courts. Being the sole party in China, its system of rule is exceedingly authoritarian. The Chinese Communist Party has firm control of the military and they support the Mao’s belief of complete control of the gun. Taking over of the key positions in the party and the military by Deng, Jiang and the current president Hu Jintao, shows how the party has much control over the military. When Jiang resigned in 2004, he made sure that the military continued to show loyalty to the party before passing the control of the party to Hu Jintao (Tang 2005, p17). Current Status of the Relationship between CCP and PLA There are two dimensions of the CCP and PLA relationship under Hu Jintao leadership. There is the institutional relationship between the military and the party and close private ties between the PLA’s high ranking officials and the party leader. CCP controls both the military and the political systems. Hu calls for institutionalization of the military enabled him garner support from the young and lower-ranking military officers though this was met with a lot of resentment by the senior generals. The reason why this was supported by the young and the lower ranking military officers was because it could speed up the pace of their promotions (Ma 2008, p.9). Although it is thought that CCP has much control over PLA, recent developments indicate that this may not be true. It is emerging that PLA is increasing its influence over the state affairs. Denial to visit Berlin by the US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was largely blamed on the elements within the PLA. The party still controls the appointments and dismissals of positions within the military but in order to prevent any political challenge, the party uses defense budget to procure loyalty from the military (Shu-ling 2010, p1). The Chinese government spends huge sums of money in the military budget to ensure the military remains loyal to the party. Since the time Hu took over the presidency of China, he has been increasing the military budget. To get more support from the lower ranks in the military, the financial arm of the government has been releasing money that is being used to improve the living conditions of the PLA members (most of the military in the lower ranks are members of PLA). Its military operations like Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTWA) are geared towards increasing the army’s capabilities and strengthening the CCP rule in China (Watson 2009, p12). The link between the party and the military is still strong and many people in China still believe that none can exist without the other. Most top political leaders also hold military positions and this is an indication that the political party has control over the military (Edwards and Jeffreys 2010, p25). Conclusion The relationship between the political party in China CCP and the military PLA is one that can not be ignored. Since its inception at the start of communism, its role within the state of China has been significant. In 1985, the adoption of NDL saw the military being put under the control of the party. The military political influence was reduced. Much of its activities are turned towards improving their professionalism in military. Recent developments within China indicate that the Chinese Communist Party is slowly losing control over the military. It is not much evident but the signs indicate that it is involving itself much in the state affairs. Another key significant thing is heavy expenditure of the party in buying allegiance from the military. The party fears any political challenge from the military and thus it is forced to buy allegiance to prevent any uprising. This means that the party is slowly its control over the military. Despite all these, the party has the power to appoint and dismiss the leaders within the military. References Brodsgaard, K. E. & Zheng, Y. (2006) The Chinese Communist Party in reform. Oxford, UK: Taylor & Francis. ChinaToday.com. (2010) China Information: The Communist Party of China (CPC). [Online]. Available at: http://www.chinatoday.com/org/cpc/ (Accessed: 13 November 2010). Dumbaugh, K. (2010) Understanding China’s political system. Darby, PA: DIANE Publishing. Edwards, L. & Jeffreys, E. (2010) Celebrity in China. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Joffe, E. (1996) Party-Army relations in China: Retrospect and Prospect, The China Quarterly, 146, pp.299-314. Ma, C. (2008) CCP/PLA Relations under Hu Jintao Leadership, Asia Centre Conference Series, pp.1-9. Scobell, A. (2003) China’s use of military force: Beyond the Great Wall and the long march. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Shambaugh, D. L. (2004) Modernizing China’s military: Progress, problems, and prospects. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. Shu-ling, K. (2010) Analysis: Politics and the military blur in China, Taipei Times, 5 October, p.1. Tang, W. (2005) Public opinion and political change in China. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Watson, C. A. (2009) The Chinese armed forces and non-traditional missions: A growing tool of statecraft, China Brief, 20 February, p.12. Read More