The Irish Famine Literature Review - Essay Example

186867 The Irish famine of 1846-50, said to be one of the major disasters in the world history, set in motion many forces of mobility, discrimination, religious bigotry, negation of national fervour for the sake of livelihood etc. It forced Irish people to look for alternative lives, ruined the health and complacence of a nation, reduced it to beggary. With the potato-killing fungus the starvation and connected health problems death toll reached one million, which was one eighth of the total population. O'grada, in his famous work, argues that a large number of these pathetic deaths could have been prevented with a less doctrinaire attitude to the famine relief. The famine, which is also referred to as The Great Hunger, and The Bad Life, and its impact was terrible in terms of demographic decline, triggering off the mass emigration. From a prominent exporter of food, Ireland was reduced to the most unenviable position with its people, leaving the homeland, dying under deplorable conditions on the way to England, Scotland or America or any country that they could find a way to. Ograda writes the book with the intention of providing 'fresh perspectives by an explicitly interdisciplinary and comparative approach comparing the Irish famine with the Third World Famines'. He says one of the main differences between the two is while Irish famine killed people in a large scale and other famines did not, at least not to that extent, though all famines produce individual tragedies. Unlike today's famines that usually happen in the impoverished areas, Irish famine was in the prosperous hub, which Prince Albert called 'the workshop of the world'. (p.5). The pleas for help were treated with the philosophical context, when the Economist answered the requests with a curt "It is no man's business to provide for another.' (p. 6). It was also treated as a natural retribution that the Irish should suffer as a penance. "Many people in high places in both London and Dublin in the 1840s believed that the famine was nature's response to Irish demographic irresponsibility, and too much public kindness would obscure that message" (p.6). Potato had been cultivated more as a garden crop in Ireland and an average yield of approximately 6 tons per acre was recorded just before the famine. It was believed that Ireland was highly suitable for potato cultivation due to its acidic soil, damp, temperate climate. When the famine happened, the country was unprepared to a calamity of that scale, and landlords most of them living in England, belonging to the noble cause, could not, or did not do enough to help their farmers. Even though this is the popular conception, Ograda argues that most landlords themselves were insolvent and they were not in a position to help their tenants. During the famine, a large number of landlords lost their ownership of the land. There were other problems like over-cultivation of a rage of potato varieties, adverse consequences of industrial revolution, confiscation of the land in the earlier centuries that left the ownership in the hands of British landlords etc. When famine started and the early deaths were reported, the official reaction was to call for the verification of deaths. An enormous crisis was simmering and by late 1840s 'famine symptoms of wandering beggars, roadside deaths, rising crime rates, poorly attended burials, widespread panic about contagion, and mass evictions were commonplace throughout most of the country'. The situation raged for another five years, unabated and Ograda says that the long-lasting nature of the famine led to compassion fatigue and charitable donations dropped steadily while land clearance and emigration reached a massive scale. Prevention strategies included initially identifying the most vulnerable poor and help them through the relief committees established by the Poor Relief (Ireland) Act of 1838. Admission into the workhouses rose ominously; but the representatives of Board of Guardians refused more money for relief measures. Relief Commissioners and their Staff who in turn depended on local relief committees, to draw up the list of deserving candidates for work, without listing landlords, however in need of work they were, had to work with highly conservative lines, because of the harsh presence of inspectors, work engineers and overseers. Inspectors thought that the catholic clergy exaggerated the famine impact and this resulted in unsympathetic reports which resulted in ideologically constrained government policies and created Captain Edward Wynne like controversial authorities who were honest, hardworking; but arrogant and paranoid and were loathed by a large number of sufferers. Ograda feels that Irish famine relief efforts were constrained less by poverty than by ideology and public opinions. Public spending did not try to close the gap created by the failure of the crop. Lacking death and birth registration, it is difficult to find the correct figures today. Medical profession did not meet the challenge, because there was hardly anything they could do in way of prevention of hunger-driven diseases. They could treat connected diseases, but under the circumstances, their number and availability both were affected. Over a million people left Ireland between mid-1940s and the early 1850s, a very high percentage due to famine and a smaller percentage in search of better pasture. "But most of the mass emigration of the late 1840s was part of the famine tragedy. It was push migration with a vengeance, and its tragic character has been rightly at the centre of historical writing about it," (p.105). He is sure that the assisted migration was a wrong policy, because it took the resources away from saving lives in Ireland. "Yet surely the broader implication of these efforts is that further projects, properly aimed and more humanely managed, would have been a viable form of famine relief" (p.120). A good outlay of public money and a clever, kind spending would have saved many lives in the island and it was unfortunate that the authorities did not notice such a possibility. There are many winners and more losers when the famine ended and the final records were taken into account. Ogrady feels that many groups of economic agents like landlords, farmers, emigrants, traders, moneylenders and even labourers were benefitted by the famine in the long run. Farmers and food traders flourished due to the excessive demands. The mass mortality is recorded in the folklore, although, historians do not trust its authenticity. His book mainly being about the economic and demographic dimensions of the time, he does not spend substantial time on other aspects of the famine and he thinks that the economic impact outlasted the crisis itself and there was no question of returning to The Status quo ante, while the very nature itself stood destroyed. Sir Charles Trevelyan, the British Administrator, who had made substantial name in India as an educationalist, ruined his reputation by thinking that the Irish famine was a 'mechanism for reducing surplus population'. It was an unfortunate thing to say and he justified himself by further inopportune statements. "'The judgement of God sent the calamity to teach the Irish a lesson, that calamity must not be too much mitigated. The real evil with which we have to contend is not the physical evil of the Famine, but the moral evil of the selfish, perverse and turbulent character of the people" http://multitext.ucc.ie/d/Charles_Edward_Trevelyan An unbelievable comment from a person, who thought it was necessary to educate Indians in science, English to improve the Indian conditions and he even published an account of it: On Education of the People of India. But Prime Minister Lord John Russell and his Whig administration were not far from him in the social policy. There is no doubt that the famine created far reaching repercussions not only in Ireland, and Great Britain, it also created impacts on United States, Australia and Canada. It is important to note that we are in a different era, where social reforms and welfare have rightly taken over other priorities. In the days of the Famine, this was not the case and the policy makers had other priorities in mind. "There is indeed, evidence aplenty in the record of neglect and harshness and brutality on the part of policymakers of the day - and on the part of others too" (p.232). Still it is difficult to be judgemental on an event that happened long ago, because the circumstances and way of thinking both could have been very different from today. Famine brought out both utmost kindness and utter cruelty even in the ordinary people. People responded with unbelievable generosity, while opportunists saw the expanding human misery as another scope for self-gratification. There are thousands of important players involved in the famine, relief, emigration and misery. Definitely a large number of starvation and health connected deaths could have been averted with some imagination and kindness. But placing the blame on certain players might not be the right thing to do unless there is concrete evidence. Even now, to think back and try to understand the reasons, causes, results and the ignored possibilities of the famine, we do come across multiple dimensions of it, some could be ignored, and the others too strong to be bypassed. Also it is important to decide if the blame game is useful, or necessary. When all the players are dead for more than one and half centuries, what exactly is the point in blaming them Also it is necessary to understand that if the historical truths are not laid bare, that could be a drawback for the history itself. It is not right to say that the bitter truths of history should not be told. Actually they should be told because they are part of history and as Napoleon said unless we learn from history, we are condemned to repeat the mistakes. So, it is necessary to establish the historical truths. The difficulty comes when the truths cannot be assessed as full truths, complete truths, or even near-truths. It is very important to note that a historical untruth could be a gross injustice to the person or persons involved. The idea that historians and writers should forgive all, because it happened a long time ago, is not the right one. Scholars owe it to the lost unfortunate lives that suffered and died, that the blame should be squarely placed on those who neglected to take their responsibilities. But this should never be done on assumptions and by guessing. The concrete evidence beyond doubt, if provided, it is the utmost duty of a scholar to bring it out. Unnecessary blame-game would not serve any purpose, as it could be simply based on unsubstantiated accounts, which are the bane of historians. BIBLIOGRAPHY: 1. O'Grada, Cormac (1999), Black '47 and Beyond, The Great Irish Famine in history, economy and memory, Princeton, New Jersy: Princeton University Press. 2. ONLINE SOURCES: 1. http://multitext.ucc.ie/d/Charles_Edward_Trevelyan 2. Read More