How an Infant Colony Withstood the Strategies and Might of Britain - Essay Example

1 STRATEGY PAPER When America chose to rebel against its colonizer, Great Britain, it was well aware that all the odds are stacked against its favor. Britain, a few decades ago, vanquished France in the French and Indian War and centuries before, humiliated Spain by sinking the 'invincible' Spanish Armada. These were executed with the use of superior strategies and tactics behind excellent leadership. It was expected these would be put to good use again. Indeed, America's victory was as to the words of George Washington " a little short of a standing miracle".1 How an infant colony withstood the strategies and might of Britain and how it organized and laid out plans to defend itself from a superior and well-trained force and what strategies it utilized to answer the time-tested tactics of the British, this paper will tackle. To analyze this phenomenon, WJ Wood had this to say i.e. "The Americans did not simply outlast the British in the Revolutionary War, but, won their independence by employing superior strategies, tactics and leadership".2 Wood was however, only half-correct because Britain, with its status as the world's prime conqueror and as a veteran of many major wars, was no stranger and in fact replete with superior strategies and wily tactics and was blessed with the best military leaders. Therefore, there must be other factors that went into the equation to produce Britain's shameful defeat. First consideration was the fact that Britain was waging a war in a land, more than 3,000 miles away and we can only conjecture that there would be problems of logistics and communication along the way. And rightly so, Stephenson claimed that the British strategists (King George III, 2 PM Lord North, Secretary of State George Germain) "never provided the timely guidance and the commanders in the field never furnished accurate enough predictions of what to expect and differed so much among themselves as to the proper course to pursue".3 A more formidable problem was the difficulty of sending transports of ammunitions, military equipment and troops just in time to stem the tide of a particular battle in Britain's favor. It also had to battle inclement weather and fierce winds. Second consideration, was the fact that Britain had to design a multi-pronged strategy to answer simultaneous threats that may divide the kingdom. The American rebellion was only one front. The possible invasion by France and Spain was another. The need to cohesively cement its hold on Canada, West Indies, Gibraltar and India was yet another. It was clear that these "limited the options available to the British"4 and not to mention divide the British forces. In sharp contrast, the colonists were waging a war in their own backyard. Thus, they enjoyed the advantage of a familiar terrain and a cooperative citizenry, called the militia, which is generally hostile to the British. The strategies and tactics may not be at par with British standards but they were well coordinated, controlled and centralized by the Continental Congress based in Philadelphia and later in Annapolis, Md. To finance the war, the Congress employed diplomatic and psychological strategy on France and Spain with successful results. The rest of the money was obtained through deft arm twisting of the populace i.e. loans; forced loans with certificates of indebtedness; levies; issuance of continental currency. In that age when cellphones, internet, two-way radios haven't seen the light of day, the colonists had the Committee of Safety, composed of mounted messengers of which Paul Revere was the most 3 noted. Thus, communication was relatively fast as opposed to that of the British which was agonizingly slow and marked with delays. The strategy of mobility and speed, seemed to be one major difference between the two forces. If the colonists, who were fighting a war of principles and liberation and a war against injustice, followed a plan of frenetic haste in all its moves including guerrilla tactics of "persistent, if inaccurate sniping from the cover of hedges, trees and buildings"5 , the Britons were generally lackadaisical and anemic. Mackesey reported the "ministers' summer habit of haymaking in the country"6; General Howe also took two months of 'hibernating' in Halifax, N.S. before attempting a landing in force. These attitudes mirrored the inefficiency and signified that the ministry "was troubled by internal stress, lacked leadership and waged war without gusto".7 These could also be explained by the fact that while colonists treated the war as their own personal war, the British other than having to fulfill a duty, felt that it wasn't morally right to decimate persons belonging to their own race. This war was also a mad race to outnumber each other. Thus, both parties were engaged in the partisan warfare of recruitment, training and fielding of men to the arena of war. The British relied on its loyalists among the population which according to the Congress "was estimated to be nearly 3 millionof whom 600,000 were Negroes".8 Britain claimed that 1/3 of this was loyal to its cause. To ensure an overwhelming army, it also hired 30,000 mercenaries from Hesse Kassel and Hesse Hanau, Germany as well as Indians and Negroes. "In Nov. 1775, Lord Dunmore, offered freedom to any slave who would rebel against his master and join the 4 British army".9 An estimated 20,000 black soldiers fought on the British side. The colonists, meanwhile, had a regular army supplemented by local militiamen. The militia was almost always devoid of the training and the discipline of regular soldiers but since they were utterly numerous, "they were able to overwhelm regular troops at the battles of Concord, Bennington and Saratoga".10 Throughout the 8-year war, General Washington had mastered the art of surprise attack. He had imitated the strategy of a wolf who bides its time, surrounds its prey and when at the most opportune time, makes a swift, deadly attack. When he had to capture Boston, he had to wait patiently until winter, when his troops would be able to drag overland the spoils of war i.e. the heavy artillery and cannons from Fort Ticonderoga to a position overlooking Boston. General Howe realizing the untenability of his position was forced to flee to Halifax. Again, taking advantage of a blinding snowstorm on Christmas night, Washington marshaled his forces and relentlessly and swiftly attacked first Trenton and next Princeton, capturing so many regiments of enemy soldiers. He followed this up by taking a high, overlooking position, symbolic of his full control of New Jersey. The British strategy, meanwhile, depended on its naval superiority. Thus, it was characterized by sea and river blockades as well as capture of primary coastal cities with spacious and deep harbors such as Boston, New York and Charleston. To reduce the colonists to complete submission, its main strategy was "to secure control of every port, sealing off the colonies from all communications with Europe and then pursue a scorched earth policy in the 5 interior".11 This strategy was effective because Gen. Howe was able to subdue New York and drive away Washington's forces. So many authors claimed that by committing strategic blunders upon strategic blunders, it was the British themselves who wrote finis to their own military expedition in America. Ferling asserted that these blunders helped the colonists to stymie the British strategy and moves. A case in point was when Gen. Howe drove away Gen. Washington's forces from Long Island, he virtually allowed Washington's army to escape and regroup again by his "hesitation in following up his initial attack" and his "laxness in guarding the East River which separates Long Island from Manhattan".12 The reason Howe refused to pursue Washington was his presumption that he made a total rout of the latter's forces and again the presumption that the Continental Congress would capitulate and seek out peace. Instead of giving chase, Howe settled down and waited for spring. But of all blunders, the one that was nonpareil was the plan to divide the colonies into two, and to isolate New England which they considered to be the hub of the rebellion and separate it from the more malleable southern colonies. The plan was to seize control of the Hudson River- Lake Champlain line and since New England had been blockaded by sea from the southern colonies, the blockade would then be completed and New England would be squeezed by economic pressure. As British Gen. Burgoyne posited "because the course of the Hudson River, so beneficial for conveying all the bulky necessaries of an army, is precisely the routefor cutting the communication between the southern and northern provinces, giving confidence to the Indians and securing a junction with the Canadian forces".13 Gen. Howe himself was convinced this would "dry up the rebel armies' flow of supplies".14 6 Thus, Gen. Burgoyne's forces based in Montreal was to move south to Albany,NY. Gen. St. Leger was to head the forces based along Lake Ontario. It was to move east and meet Burgoyne's forces in Albany. Gen. Howe, based in New York City, was to move north up the Hudson to Albany. The strategy ended up as a total debacle. St. Leger was stopped on his tracks by the colonist forces headed by Gen. Arnold and was forced to retreat; Gen. Burgoyne's forces suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of militiamen-studded forces at Bennington and was trapped and later forced to surrender in Saratoga; Gen. Howe escaped defeat by refusing to move north and instead captured Philadelphia. There were several analyses for this great debacle which crippled Britain. The most compelling one was the roughness of the terrain. One look at the map, would show that the Adirondack and the Catskill Mountains would prove to be a big barrier and hindrance to any military movement. Crossing these mountains alone would sap the energies of even the healthiest men. Another writer claimed that the act of diverting forces to Canada and the Lake Ontario area merely resulted to a "divided command" and merely weakened the British forces. Mackesey himself said that the strategy included the plan "to enlist the help of numerous loyalists in the area and open the reservoirs of Indian and Canadian help that could be tapped in support of the regular striking force".15 Since obviously, no such help was produced, one factor for the loss was the predilection to presume help would come. In sharp contrast, there was no chronicle whatsoever of any major blunder on the colonists' side. Gen. Benedict Arnold was caught in the act of surrendering the key fortress of Westpoint to the British. But this was not a blunder because it just did not materialize. The backfiring of the hereinabove British strategy seemed to be the start of its downward fall. The French, convinced that America could win its war, entered the fray and openly supported America while Spain chose to support clandestinely. Finally, America's 7 diplomatic strategy bore fruits abundantly. The British refusing to be cowed transferred its military operations to the southern states and with Gen. Clinton heading the amphibious forces, promptly captured Charleston, S.C. But this was ephemeral as the Britons suffered successive defeats at King's Mountains, Cowpens and Guilford Courthouse. Finally, the coup de grace was executed by the team-up of Gen. Washington and French general Rochambeau against Gen. Cornwallis' forces at Yorktown leading to Cornwallis' surrender on Oct. 19, 1781. Another strategy that was worth mentioning was the plan to divide the British forces. While Washington spearheaded the colonists fight in the colonies south of New England, two arenas of war simultaneously occurred. One was in the high seas, where private American vessels engaged the British navy in naval skirmishes and unexpectedly routed the naval power . One such derring-do was executed by Capt. John Paul Jones , who bravely attacked and sunk British vessels off the coast of England. Of course, British naval power was now neutralized by the resurgence of French naval forces which had broken down the British blockades along the Atlantic coasts of America. It should be surmised that British naval forces had already suffered physical and psychological fatigue after years of sea battles while French forces came in fresh and reeking of revenge. It should be mentioned that France entered into treaties of commerce and alliance with America. The other arena of war was in the west. When the British vanquished France in the French and Indian War, Britain didn't know what to do with the vast possessions west of the Appalachian Mountains which was passed over to them by France. Britain, discouraged the colonists to inhabit these vast lands in order to hold a firm control of the colonists and 8 allowed the Indians to roam in these lands using them to harass the American frontier. The colonists then decided to send several hundred frontiersmen led by George Rogers Clark to halt these attacks . The group surprised the British and Indians and captured the frontier posts of Vincennes and Kaskasia. From then on, the west was opened to the colonists signaling the great western migration. The Treaty of Paris sealed America's victory on Sept. 3, 1783 and forced Great Britain to acknowledge that the 13 colonies had become free and had become the independent nation of the United States of America. In summation, Britain lost its grip and hold of its colony in America because of several factors: the strategies and tactics it utilized bombed out because of poor coordination and bad communication between the planners based in London and the commanding generals in America; because of delays; because of the lack of determination and zest to push the war to its finish; because the generals were too presumptuous; and because of costly blunders and because France by lending its naval superiority, maimed England's superior naval advantage. On the other hand, the colonists or continentals were victorious because they conceptualized more potent and effective strategies and tactics which worked because they were deftly and efficiently controlled by the Continental Congress which is based near the center of all colonies i.e. Philadelphia; because they waged an emotional and personal war in its own backyard; because the sheer number of the militiamen overwhelmed the more superior forces of Great Britain; because there was no major blunder; because they had better tacticians and the strategies were the result of hundreds of heads in the Continental Congress and because France and Spain aided them. 9 BIBLIOGRAPHY Black, William. War For America: The Fight For Independence. New York: 59. Ferling, John. Almost A Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Funk and Wagnall's Encyclopedia. The American Revolution. New York: RR Donnelly and Sons Co., 1998. 1995. Grolier Universal Encyclopedia. The American Revolution. New York: Stratford Press, Inc., Mackesey, Piers. The War For America. 1775-1783. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993. Stephenson, Michael. Patriot Battles: How The War of Independence Was Fought. New York. Harper Collins, 2007. Wood, W.J. Battles of the Revolutionary War. New York: De Capo Press, 2004. Read More