Breakdown of IT during Hurricane Katrina - Essay Example

and number] in format: 12 May 2002] Breakdown of IT during Hurricane Katrina One of the main situations that occur after an extensive natural disaster is the need to restore not only the human elements of existence, such as housing, water and food; but also the need to restore the operational elements of a community, city or country that has been hit by the disaster. This would include what has been termed as "hastily formed networks" (Denning, 15) that is a convergence of two seemingly opposite but nonetheless connected groups of advanced networking technology and human organization issues. Hastily Formed Networks Defined Denning (2006) writes that the "first priority after the precipitating event is for the responders to communicate. They want to pool their knowledge and interpretations of the situation, understand what resources are available, assess options, plan responses, decide, commit, act, and coordinate. The heart of the network is the communication system they use and the ways they interact within it" (16). There are five elements that make up an HFN which includes "(1) a network of people established rapidly (2) from different communities, (3) working together in a shared conversation space (4) in which they plan, commit to, and execute actions, to (5) fulfil a large, urgent mission" (Denning, 16-17). The basis for forming an HFN for quick responses to emergencies or an urgent task, then disbanding the entire group upon completion of the desired outcome is not an entirely new concept as historically, an HFN has become a necessity in such devastating events such as: "(1) the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center attack that took 2,749 lives which resulted in severe economic impact, especially to airlines, and a stock market loss of $1.2 trillion, (2) the December 26, 2004 tsunami from a 9.1 earthquake that took over 283,000 lives, (3) the August 29, 2005 category-5 hurricane Katrina, which knocked out electric and communication infrastructure, over 90,000 square miles of Louisiana and Mississippi and displacing 1.5 million people" (Denning, 15) No matter the severity of the disasters and the impact on economic and environmental containments, there is an important moot point to be made: the "quality of the response depends not on response planning or on new equipment, but on the quality of the network that came together to provide relief" (Denning, 15) This type of response is not simply limited to what and how quickly relief was provided but also in how quickly the infrastructure response was mobilized. This infrastructure response includes restoration of voice and data communications, medical needs, etc. which are indirectly tied to the victims or those who are affected by natural disaster events. There are three categories that have been awarded when an HFN will respond and are broken down in the following table (Table 1): Category Characteristics Examples K: Known Know what to do Use existing network structures May choose not to respond Fast response team for time-critical business problem or opportunity KU: Known/Unknown Know what to do Don't know time or place Responding network structure known Local fire, small earthquake, civil unrest, military campaigns UU: Unknown / Unknown Don't know what to do Don't know time or place Responding network structure unknown 9/11 attack, other terrorist attacks, large earthquake, major natural disasters (Note: KU events can become UU events when scaled up to large areas or populations) Table 1: Kinds of events requiring response from hastily formed networks1 To further explain the category challenges, "the first category is the easiest and the least likely to stress the HFN; the middle category is the type that emergency agencies such as police and fire departments prepare for; but, the third category challenges are more defined as: Genuine surprise: the precipitating event is in no known category. There has been no advanced planning, training, or positioning equipment Chaos: everyone is overwhelmed and no one understands the situation or knows what to do. People are frantic and panicky Total insufficient resources: available resources and training are overwhelmed by the magnitude of the event Multi-agency response: several agencies must cooperate in the response, including military, civilian government, and private organizations. These groups have had little or no prior reason to collaborate. The shock of moving from a state of "coexistence" to a state of "collaboration" can be overwhelming Distributed response: the response is distributed over a geographical area into many local jurisdictions. The authority to allocate resources and reach decisions is distributed among many organizations. Decisions by command-and-control do not work. Lack of infrastructure: critical infrastructures such as communications, electricity, and water do not work. Makeshift infrastructures must be deployed quickly. (Denning, 16) IT Breakdown During Hurricane Katrina One of the most agreed upon outcomes of this natural disaster is that the HFN completely broke down and did not meet any of the requirements of the third category at any level. Hurricane Katrina completely overwhelmed the resources in every category. This breakdown in communications and why the breakdown occurred is still being debated and new plans in the process of being implemented. As each area of the communication network is dissected in an effort to triangulate not only why the breakdown occurred, but, how it degraded so rapidly. Communication breakdown is not the only tier being analyzed in an effort to learn from the entire disaster, but, also how the process of evacuation needs improvement along with structural integrity of the levees has been brought into question. An effort has been made by the Governor's office and through Presidential initiatives to "overhaul that agencies that oversee flood protection." (Associated Press, 2006). The overall immediate objective was to repair the damaged levee breaches in time for the June 1, 2006 hurricane season and as such have been looking at ways to repair the levees in such a manner to ensure they remain erected. The Levee Breaches One of the main communication and IT breakdowns was the lack of understanding by the Army Corps of Engineers as to the exact reasons behind the collapses that occurred along the levee path. McQuaid (2006) reports from the Washington Bureau that a "loose barge may have caused a large breach in the east side of the Industrial Canal floodwall that accelerated Hurricane Katrina's rising floodwaters in the Lower Ninth Ward and St. Bernard Parish". It is with common knowledge that the general public now knows that the obvious extensive damage that occurred through flooding was a result of the levee breaches. What does require examination is why the design failed and how the ultimate breakdown of communications during and directly after the hurricane. This is only minimally examined in this paper as this is a continuous process of governmental adjudication at all levels. The tragedy did not simply end with Hurricane Katrina, but Hurricane Rita added insult to injury. The already suffering residents of the 9th ward found their exile lasting a little longer and as a result of having no communication abilities and there was a need to further evacuate more residents. The Initial Communication Failure As with every large natural disaster, there needs to be a starting point in the knowledge transfer. In the area of hurricane disasters, the starting point is the NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration). As the NOAA look toward quicker and effective hurricane forecasting in an effort to reduce costs to both humans and property. Many insurance companies look toward the hurricane forecasting models in an effort to underwrite their property policies. There are three different factions involved in forecasting the hurricanes for each season which include: Mark Saunders at University College London, Gerry Bell at NOAA, and James Elsner at Florida State. Each of these three teams get together to work on the following year's hurricane forecast and then pass that information onto the public and government officials. Common knowledge, after the fact, was that the warnings from the National Hurricane Centre were not headed by any officials from FEMA or the local government. The initial hurricane reports did not project the devastation that would ultimately follow. As a result of the disastrous events of Katrina, the NOAA has not only changed the way forecasts are viewed by officials, but also on how the U.S. prepares for natural disasters. The Emergence of New Technologies Disasters tend to bring out technologies that are borne out of necessity and not desire. One of the technologies that has fulfilled the importance of communication is the wireless and high speed telecommunication portals. This technology introduction has "filled the communication gap for rescue workers before the return of land- and cellular-based technologies" (Granelli, 2005). With the disaster as extreme as it was, many technological companies provided both hardware, software and wireless capabilities to those workers that required this ability in order to perform their jobs during the disaster relief program. The importance of using this technology of both WiMax and Wi-Fi is in the expediency of getting the system up and running in areas that access to traditional methods was not possible. This technology was utilized as a follow-up to the technologies that were made available during Hurricane Charley in 2004 and also points to "the efficiencies of emerging technologies in crisis situations and as such having the ability to use such technologies as voice-over-IP services can ensure that people are constantly in touch" (Granelli, 2005). The Aftermath As outlined in the following table is a small example of the extensive amount of damage that occurred in various neighbourhoods as related on www.NOLA.com Figure 1: partial New Orleans Power Progress Chart in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina The customers affected by the power outages found that about "fifty-eight percent of Entergy's 190,000 customers were still without power as of October 6, 2005" (The Times-Picayline, 2005) and as such this is one area of the IT infrastructure that needs to be re-evaluated in an effort to ensure the electrical grids are up to present standards that are in other major cities. Senate Committee Investigation In May, 2006, the Senate Committee into the investigation of emergency response and whether there is a general lack of unpreparedness that needs to be addressed was published. It points out that 'the failure of government at all levels to plan, prepare for and respond aggressively to the storm point out that the failures were not just conspicuous, they were pervasive" (Senate Committee, 2) One of the plausible arguments that came out of the report is in direct alignment with what the HFN mandate under each of the categories: Category Characteristics Examples K: Known Know what to do Use existing network structures May choose not to respond Fast response team for time-critical business problem or opportunity KU: Known/Unknown Know what to do Don't know time or place Responding network structure known Local fire, small earthquake, civil unrest, military campaigns UU: Unknown / Unknown Don't know what to do Don't know time or place Responding network structure unknown 9/11 attack, other terrorist attacks, large earthquake, major natural disasters (Note: KU events can become UU events when scaled up to large areas or populations) The Committee pointed out that "effective response to mass emergencies is a critical role of every level of government. Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, this country went through one of the most sweeping reorganizations of federal government in history the reorganization was designed to strengthen our nation's ability to address the consequences of both natural and man-made disasters in its first major test, this reorganized system failed. Katrina revealed that much remains to be done" (2) The report by the Senate Committee outlines exactly the logistics in communication was poorly handled and stated the "problems in obtaining, communicating and managing information plagued many other aspects of the response as well. FEMA lacked the tools to track the status of shipments, interfering with the management of supplying food, water, ice and other vital commodities to those in need so too did the incompatibility of the electronic systems used by federal and state authorities to manage requests for assistance, which made it necessary to transfer requests from the state system to the federal system manually" (10). Conclusion Natural disasters are an accepted part of our daily lives and in an effort to ensure that people are not displaced or unaccounted for during disasters, it is important to look at the larger picture of keeping the telecommunications aspect of daily living. New technological advancements to replace older out-of-date and ineffectual communication methods will need to be installed in areas where it is imperative to keep communications fully functioning. Hurricane Katrina has taught both the government officials and those involved in rescue services that communications cannot be brought to a standstill during times of crisis. The United States government learned the hard way that loss of lives not directly related to the initial Hurricane damage could have been avoided had proper communications methodologies been in place prior to the hurricane becoming as bad as it turned out to be. Throughout the subsequent enquiry into how the disaster went wrong so quickly, the Senate Committee has developed a list of recommendations to improve upon communications and technology infrastructures respective of natural disasters. This list of seven recommendations include: "(1) abolish FEMA and replace with a National Preparedness and Response Authority (NPRA), (2) endow the NPRA with the full range of responsibilities that are core in prepare for and responding to disasters, (3) enhance regional operations to provide better coordination between federal agencies and the states and establish regional strike teams, (4) build a true, government-wide operations center to provide enhanced situational awareness and manage interagency coordination in a disaster, (5) renew and sustain commitments at all levels of government to the nation's emergency management system, (6) strengthen the underpinning of the nation's response to disasters and catastrophe, and, (7) improve the nation's capacity to respond to catastrophic events. Through the subsequent invoking of these recommendations and the improvements in telecommunications and technical systems that fit in with the recommendations can the improvement of the natural disaster response teams be equipped to deal with potential tragedies quicker, more efficient and more effectual. Works Cited 58% of homes still lack power. (2005, October 6). (Thursday). New Orleans, Lousiana, United States: The Times-Picayline. Affairs, S. C. (2006). Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared. United States Government. Denning, P. J. (2006). Hastily Formed Networks. ACM, 15-21. Gorder, P. F. (n.d.). Hurricane Forecasting: Reducing Future Losses. (R. L. Duel, Ed.) News 11. Granelli, J. S. (2005, September 9). Hurricane Katrina Reveals Strengths of Emerging Technologies. News Briefs, p. 1. McQuaid, J. (2005, September 6). Barge may have caused breach. (T. Times-Picayune, Ed.) New Orleans, Louisiana, United States. Press, A. (2006, May 22). Levees ailing before Katrina hit, report finds. Retrieved May 25, 2006 from CNN (U.S.): http://us.cnn.com. Read More