The Truth About Iraq May Be Elusive - Essay Example

The Truth About Iraq May Be Elusive When the leaders of a country intentionally mislead its citizens, it is a cause for concern. When the deception leads a country into war and lives are put at risk it is cause for a thorough investigation. There needs to be a determination whether the administration misled the country by intentionally lying about the situation and events, or whether it was due to mismanagement or incompetence. Was the intelligence on Iraq deliberately corrupted or was there an administrative blunder that skewed the presentations Was there an overall rush to war after 9/11 during which period the evidence was disregarded in favor of "groupthink" To answer these important questions, it's necessary to examine the irregularities that surrounded 9/11 and the events that led up to the War in Iraq. We will find a pattern of mismanagement, deceit, and rationalization. The loudest and most convincing case for going to war was based on the belief that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD). United Nations weapons inspectors had been in and out of Iraq on an irregular basis for the 10 years prior to the fall of 2002 and again just months before the war. They had never found verifiable evidence of a WMD program. In November 2002 the UN team returned to Iraq headed by international expert Hans Blix. They were still unable to report with any conviction the presence of WMD. During this period Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, was getting concerned about the lack of evidence for WMD. And he was not alone. General James Marks, in charge of ground intelligence had similar misgivings. When Rumsfeld was questioned about his uncertainty he later admitted that he was unsure. He said, "I was very worried about it" (Woodward 100). When asked if he was aware that a two star general named Spider Marks shared a similar concern about the lack of WMD evidence Rumsfeld replied, "No. I mean, we dealt with the combatant commander's people. I may have met him, but I don't know him" (Woodward 100). It may seem incredulous that in the fine tooth search for WMD, the Secretary of Defense had not talked to, and in fact did not know, the General in charge of ground intelligence. To mislead the public on this critical breakdown in communications would serve Rumsfeld no good purpose. We can only guess that the failure was due to incompetence, indifference, or 'groupthink'. While Rumsfelds's beliefs may have clouded his objectivity, the Niger uranium connection can not be so easily dismissed. During the State of the Union address in January 2003, Mr. Bush said to the nation, "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa" ("State of the Union Address"). However, the CIA had discredited this information as early as 2002 (Stein). Both the CIA and the State Department had voiced doubts about the authenticity of the documents. Yet, the information was included in the address to the public. Days before the war, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the UN Security Council held that the documents were suspect and inaccurate. The FBI would later investigate them as forgeries (Getrz). In the days before the war, Congress raised concern over the issue of the Niger uranium connection. In a letter to President Bush dated March 17, 2003, Representative Henry Waxman wrote, "In the last ten days, however, it has become incontrovertibly clear that a key piece of evidence you and other Administration officials have cited regarding Iraq's efforts to obtain nuclear weapons is a hoax". Because Waxman could see the wheels of war beginning to spin, he closed his letter with a sense of urgency, "Given the urgency of the situation, I would appreciate an expeditious response to these questions.". Honest leaders would have provided a quick and honest reply. The Honorable Henry Waxman would have to wait a full six weeks. On April 29, 2003 he received a letter from a low level State Department employee. It said in part, "Based on what appeared at the time to be multiple sources for the information in question, we acted in good faith in providing the information earlier this year to the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors responsible for verifying Iraq's claims regarding its nuclear program" (Kelly). This was the same IAEA that had deemed the information suspect. These irregularities could not be explained by incompetence or bad judgment. This was a deliberate attempt to strike fear into the public and motivate public opinion. The delay in responding and the level of response further demonstrates the cavalier attitude the administration had taken with regards to the truth on this issue. Another telling clue about the extent of the administration's knowledge came from President Bush in his first interview after the war started. In his exchange with Tom Brokaw, the president said he was "fairly confident" that we were going to discover a "weapons of mass destruction program" (Moore 46). Already they had abandoned the notion of weapons and were now promoting the existence of a program. The elusive program would eventually wane into the potential to develop a program. Nuclear was not the only WMD the White House was claiming to be in the hands of Saddam Hussein. Colin Powell was scheduled to make a speech making the case for WMD in February 2003. He requested that CIA Chief George Tenet attend the session, sit behind him, and nod his head in agreement as a way for Tenet to "give his personal imprimatur to all the intelligence information Powell gave to the United Nations about Iraq" (Mann 353). Mann contends that this presentation was not meant for the UN or overseas, but was for the benefit of changing US public opinion (354). Powell displayed detailed descriptions of mobile biological weapons laboratories gleaned from Iraqi exiles. When the vans were found months later, they contained simple bioprocessing equipment, but absolutely no bioweapons traces (Kaplan). The sensation of the mobile WMD factories accented by Tenet's presence oversold the war on this feature. Other information that Powell described at the UN that February was also highly suspect. David Kay, one of the country's foremost authorities on Iraq and WMD, had analyzed it. He discovered that all the information "...had come from a single source, the Iraqi defector used by the Germans, intelligence code-named Curveball" (Woodward 216). US intelligence had been warned that Curveball was unreliable, drank heavily, and had psychological problems (Woodward 217). Once again, this blatant disregard for the facts can not be attributed to poor communication or honest oversight. This was done to benefit the administration's public relations drive to go to war. The effort to link Iraq to WMD was taking place against the backdrop of the policy of pre-emptive strikes. This was a policy that had been drawn up by Paul Wolfowitz and Dick Cheney in the first Bush White House. It states that the US could, and in most cases should, attack anyone who may someday have the potential to attack the US. The US should be preemptive in attacking any future enemies. The senior Bush and the Clinton administration rejected the policy. It was resurrected by Bush Jr. and the Cheney neo-conservatives. This was one more justification for attacking Iraq. Saddam may have a program or a plan that may someday be threatening. As American troops overtook Baghdad and began their long occupation, the search for WMD continued. But with the exception of a few decades old gas canisters, no weapons of mass destruction were ever found. A report was issued in Oct 2004 that said, "Iraq's nuclear capability had decayed not grown since the 1991 war" ("Report Concludes"). The White House responded to the report by saying, "...the report showed Saddam Husseins's intent and capability and justifies the decision to go to war" ("Report Concludes"). However, there was nothing in the report that would justify the White House's steadfast assertion for war. Saddam Hussein had been captured nearly a year earlier, there were no WMD, and the war was continuing amidst escalating violence. The reasons that were publicly given as a justification to go to war had been neutralized. There had been a thorough search for WMD and all parties agreed that they did not exist. Saddam had been captured and was awaiting trial in an Iraqi jail. Though the administration had played the democracy card on occasion, with WMD and Saddam off the table the cries for democracy became more vocal. The administration would now use the establishment of a free and democratic Iraq as the reason for going to war. Was this a realistic and worthwhile endeavor Or was it a red herring designed to hide more sinister and secret motives In the month before the war began, Thomas Carothers of the Council on Foreign Relations wrote, "Bush the realist actively cultivates warm relations with "friendly tyrants" in many parts of the world, while "Bush the neo-Reaganite" makes ringing calls for a vigorous new democracy campaign in the Middle East". Clearly at this point Bush was well-intentioned yet misguided and confused. In fairness, the administration was dealing with the aftermath of 9/11 and an uncertain future. However, it should also be noted that his drive to spread democracy was on an as needed basis. The case of Pakistan is a prime example where a dictator is allowed to flourish in exchange for logistical considerations. Still, it was never clear that we had ever entered Iraq for the purpose of spreading democracy. A classified report issued by the State Department in the weeks before the war painted a grim outlook for democracy's chances in Iraq. Dated February 26, 2003 it discloses that, "...daunting economic and social problems are likely to undermine basic stability in the region for years, let alone prospects for democratic reform" (Miller). The article dampened any hopes of establishing a democratic country in the region for years. It further warned that, "Electoral democracy, were it to emerge, could well be subject to exploitation by anti-American elements" (Miller). It is difficult to imagine that the Bush administration would have democracy as a priority while facing an armed conflict and the discouraging report from their own State Department. By September 2004, in the absence of WMD and Saddam, Bush gave a speech advocating the spreading of democracy around the world. He was now being more focused and highly specific on his aims for democracy. He said, "We will be standing with the people of Afghanistan and Iraq until their hopes for freedom and liberty are fulfilled" ("Bush Touts"). This was a considerable commitment to occupy the area until they had achieved a democracy that the State Department, just 18 months earlier, had estimated could be years away. The administration took up the full court press for democracy in March 2005 when Condoleezza Rice proclaimed the ambitious goals the administration had regarding democracy in the next four years. She stated their goals included, "...pressing for competitive presidential elections this year in Egypt and women's right to vote in Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries" (Kessler and Wright). Still, she faces the same old dilemma of selling F-16s in the region to Pakistan's dictator. When we see Rice making the unrealistic goal of the woman's right to vote in Saudi Arabia and the hypocrisy of selling fighters to a tyrant, it doesn't give the cry for democracy very much credibility. There is a high probability that the public reasons for going into Iraq may not even resemble the real reasons. The logic of going there to fight the terrorists so we don't have to fight them at home does not hold up to scrutiny. The nature of terrorism makes that strategy unworkable. A small mobile cell could slip into the US without regard for what was happening in Iraq. There is also the ethical question of destroying your neighbor's country so you don't destroy yours. These reasons can be discarded as rhetoric. There has also been speculation that the roots of Iraq war lie in the relationship between the Bushes and Saudi Arabia's House of Saud. The House of Saud is the Royal Family and has ruled the country with an iron fist. They are obscenely oil rich and have a long history with the United States and especially the Bush family. According to Unger, the families are more than just business partners, they are close personal friends (15). They have "pulled off elaborate covert operations and gone to war together. They had been involved in the Iran-contra scandal, and in secret U.S. aid in the Afghanistan War that gave birth to Osama bin Laden" (Unger 15). Together they armed, trained, and supplied the terrorist leadership that we are facing today. The large number of Saudis that participated in the 9/11 tragedy makes it fathomable that the Saudis were indirectly complicit at some level in the action. The Bush family may be aware of this and unable for personal reasons to divulge it. The Saud family may have some personal debt to George Bush over this issue. With the outlawed gang of bin Laden on the international run, Bush may have been able to take the risk of attempting to get the Iraqi oil reserves without the objections of the apologetic Saud family. If this was the plan, it has failed to be executed effectively. Other theories for the invasion include war profiteering by government contractor Halliburton and their subsidiary Kellogg Brown and Root. Dick Cheney, ex CEO of Halliburton, has been the war's biggest supporter and Halliburton has flourished since the war's beginning. The stock price has soared 300% since the invasion in 2003. The market capitalization has gone from $10 billion to $30 billion. Halliburton maintains that their Iraq operations are a small fraction of their total business. However, their current contract is valued at $8 billion and could go as high as $18 billion ("Value of Halliburton"). This is a very significant amount for a company whose annual sales are only $20 billion. The war could be contributing over half of their yearly revenue. Halliburton may have been exploiting Cheney's policy of pre-emptive strikes. Having looked at the many aspects and possibilities that led the US into the war, in the end there are some assumptions that need to be made. It needs to be assumed that the administration is staffed by reasonably bright people without diminished capacity. The weapons experts are probably some of the best in the world and the intelligence analysts are reasonably competent. Cheney and Rumsfeld have a long history with the Defense Department and understand its inner workings. With that in mind, there is almost no probability that they could have believed that Iraq had WMD. Neither the inspectors nor the analysts could say they existed. Reasonable people in the defense business would draw the same conclusions. The intentional misleading of the American public evolved into the unrealistic hope of democracy as a way to continue to justify our presence. There were no WMD and there was no more Saddam. Reasonable people would conclude that the administration's goals of an American version of freedom in Iraq and the women's vote in Saudi Arabia were a fairy tale. There is little doubt that the Saudis were somewhat complicit in 9/11 at some level. This action could not have escaped the notice of the iron fisted Saud family. They may have a financial interest in disrupting the oil supply to drive the price up. One of the biggest financial benefactors, Halliburton, has had a major influence by enforcement of the preemptive policy. Cheney drafted the policy, went to Halliburton as CEO, and returned to the White House to utilize the office and the policy. We may never know the truth, but we can be certain that the reasons we have been given are not the reasons that are real. Works Cited "Bush Touts Spreading Democracy at UN." CBC News. 21 Sep. 2004. 21 Mar. 2007 . Carothers, Thomas. "Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror." Foreign Affairs (2003). 21 Mar. 2007. Gertz, Bill. "FBI Probing Forged Papers on Niger Uranium." The Washington Times 19 July 2003. 21 Mar. 2007 . Kaplan, Fred. "Vanishing Agents: Did Iraq Really Have Weapons of Mass Destruction" Slate 30 May 2003. 21 Mar. 2007 . Kelly, Paul V. "Bush Administration's Reply to Waxman's Letter." . 29 Apr. 2003. Rep. Henry Waxman. 21 Mar. 2007 . Kessler, Glenn, and Robin Wright. "Rice Describes Plans To Spread Democracy." Washington Post 26 Mar. 2005. 21 Mar. 2007 . Mann, James. Rise of the Vulcans. New York: Penguin Group, 2004. Miller, Greg. "Democracy in Iraq Doubtful, State Department Report Says." Los Angeles Times 14 Mar. 2003. Moore, James. Bush's War For Reelection: Iraq, the White House, and the People. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2004. "Report Concludes no WMD in Iraq." BBC News. BBC News. 21 Mar. 2007 . "State of the Union Address." The White House. 28 Jan. 2003. US Government. 21 Mar. 2007 . Stein, Jeff. " Bush Team Sought to Snuff CIA Doubts." San Francisco Chronicle 26 Oct. 2005. 21 Mar. 2007 . Unger, Craig. House of Bush, House of Saud. New York: Scribner, 2004. "Value of Halliburton Troop Support Contract Continues to Increase." Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. 20 Sep. 2004. US Congress. 21 Mar. 2007 . Waxman, Henry. "Letter to the President." Representative Henry Waxman. 17 Mar. 2003. 30th District California. 21 Mar. 2007 . Woodward, Bob . State of Denial. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006. Read More