Atomic Bombing Issues - Essay Example

Atomic Bombing Name: Institution: Atomic Bombing Since the atomic bombings of Japanese cities in November 1945 by Americans, various theories have been put forward to explain whether this action was justified. These theories suggest a disagreement among ‘orthodox,’ ‘revisionist,’ and other theories about underlying reasons for Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings (Bernstein, 1996). Orthodox theorists believe the bombings were necessary to force Japanese to surrender. Revisionist theorists argue that Americans were not justified because there were other available alternatives to conclude the war without devastating consequences. According to Bernstein (1996), some of these strategies included carrying out (with advance warning) a demonstration of the bombs; persuading peace feelers to encourage Japanese to surrender; and using a naval blockade and conventional bombs to choke Japanese. On the other hand, other theorists borrow from orthodox and revisionist arguments to justify the American actions. Among these three arguments, analysis of events preceding the November bombings support revisionist’s view that other alternatives (without the bombings) would have worked effectively. According to Bernstein (1996), Americans could have used noncombat demonstration of the atomic bomb to make Japanese surrender. This required the Americans to give the Japanese an advance warning before carrying out the demonstration. However, uncertainties surrounding this alternative made it an ineffective strategy to force the Japanese to seek peace (Bernstein, 1996). Americans were not sure whether this demonstration would work according to expectations. They feared that Japanese would become emboldened if the atomic bomb failed to detonate. They also feared that an advance warning to Japanese would expose prisoners of war to danger, as Japanese military would take them to the expected demonstration site. American military advisers did not effectively consider this alternative because they had different bureaucratic interests. In addition, American military advisers doubted whether the demonstration would make Japanese militarists change their minds. These militarists seemed in pursuit of their own bureaucratic interests as witnessed after the two atomic bombings and entry of Soviet Union into the war (Bernstein, 1996). Despite the devastating consequences of the atomic bombs on Japanese cities, the militarists insisted on fighting to prevent land invasion. These factors indicates that the atomic bombs were unnecessary because they were used without consideration and did not compel all Japanese consider surrender. A guarantee of the imperial system and alteration of unconditional surrender presents another alternative that Americans could have used to make Japanese consider peace (Bernstein, 1996). Despite disagreements between Japanese cabinet and military, this strategy would have encouraged them to consider peace. Even though all Japanese identified preservation of the imperial system as one the key terms of surrender, militarists and other government officials could not agree on other conditions. Militarists wanted to continue with war until almost all their terms of surrender were met. After surrender, they wanted to be promised that they would be allowed to conduct their own trials on war crimes, disarm themselves, and Americans would not occupy Japan. On the other hand, other government officials were not sure about how to end the Pacific War. While negotiating for peace with Americans, they were also negotiating with Russians to prevent entry of Soviets into the war. They also did not want to take anti-military actions, fearing that this would trigger a military coup. Americans were determined to use the atomic bombs regardless of whether this strategy worked or did not work. President Truman and his advisers believed that use of the bombs would justify to Americans why the military diverted scarce resources to the bomb project (Bernstein, 1996). To some extent, this indicates that American leaders did not attack Hiroshima and Nagasaki cities using atomic bombs to serve military purposes, but rather political interests at home. Japan would have agreed to surrender if America agreed to all terms put forward by Japanese military and cabinet. Use of informal discussions or peace feelers to persuade Japanese to surrender presents another alternative to use of atomic bombs. However, the likelihood of success of this strategy was minimal. Even though these peace feelers wanted Japanese to surrender, they lack political influence. They comprised of middle-level Japanese in Switzerland. They did not have strong relationships with political and military leaders back home. They had proposed to Allen Dulles, an American diplomat in Switzerland, that the imperial system was the only important condition to Japanese surrender (Bernstein, 1996). However, intercepted communication between Japanese officials suggested disagreements at home. In some cases, these interceptions indicated that Japanese military was suspicious of American activities. On the other hand, Americans did not believe these peace feelers had the political strength needed to end the war quickly. Under these circumstances, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima was necessary to compel Japanese military consider surrender. However, the Nagasaki bombing was unnecessary because some of the Japanese military had started considering surrender after the Hiroshima bombing and entry of Soviet Union into the war (Bernstein, 1996). American leaders’ views on the impact of Russian entry into the war indicate that the atomic bombing of Japanese cities was not warranted. According to Bernstein (1996), the leaders believed that entry of Soviet Union into the pacific war would have forced Japanese to consider capitulation. The Japanese felt that involvement of a third force into the war would put pressure on the already stressed military resources. Despite American knowledge of these developments, its leaders were determined to use the atomic bombs. Even though President Truman argued that Russian entry would be decisive, he planned to use the bomb to achieve political objectives (Bernstein, 1996). He wanted to show Americans that the ‘Manhattan’ (the atomic bombs) was a good public project. The Americans also did not want to expose military personnel to risks associated with land invasion. However, the leaders understood that these strategies without the atomic bomb would have worked effectively, even though not quickly as expected. This implies that they could have delayed use of the atomic bombs until after the entry of the Russians. Therefore, the atomic bombs were not necessarily used to compel Japanese to surrender, but rather to show supremacy of the American military. The siege strategy remains the most effective alternative that would have resulted in Japanese capitulation without the need of atomic bombs. This strategy comprised of conventional bombing of Japanese cities and naval blockade (Bernstein, 1996). It was working very effectively, as it caused great destruction of military power of Japan. For the Americans, the only justification they could offer for the atomic bombing was a quick victory. This demonstrates the atomic bombing was unwarranted because the siege strategy would have starved and forced Japanese to conclude peace. Of these five alternatives, the siege strategy seems the most appropriate alternative to atomic bombing. It would have produced similar outcomes to the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombing, even though at a prolonged period. In addition, it would have led to end of the pacific war without the devastating consequences on the atomic bombs on Japanese population. In conclusion, ‘revisionists’ seem reasonable when they argue that the atomic bombings of Japanese cities were unwarranted. Americans could have applied other strategies, such as modification of terms of surrender, use of informal discussions with for-peace Japanese, siege strategy, and demonstration of the atomic bombs. However, the need for speedy conclusion of the Pacific War, bureaucratic interests, political interests, and desire for supremacy influenced greatly the use of the atomic bombs by Americans. For example, President Truman conceded knowing that entry of Russian military into the war would be decisive, but still choose to allow use of the atomic bombs to destroy the Japanese. Therefore, if the bombs were used for military purposes, Americans would have at least given the other strategies time to work before proceeding to bomb the Japanese cities. Reference Bernstein, B. (1996). Understanding the atomic bomb and the Japanese surrender: Missed opportunities, little-known near disasters, and modern memory. In M.J. Hogan (Ed.), Hiroshima in history and memory (pp.38-79). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Read More