Whether Rules of War Are a Sentimental Absurdity - Essay Example

Running header: “‘Rules of war’ are a sentimental absurdity; once war begins, the gloves are off, and one should fight by any available means”. Discuss Student’s Name: Name of Institution: Instructor’s Name: Course Code: Date of Submission: Introduction In 2004, four US civilian contractors, who at the time worked in Fallujah were attacked and killed by soldiers of the Al Qaeda. As if that were not enough, the bodies were burned before they were dragged along the streets. And to add more salt to the wound, two of the gruesomely charred bodies were hung by rope on the Euphrates Bridge and left there dangling. Fives years later, 2009, US Navy SEALs captured Ahmed Hashim Abed, the mastermind of the Fallujah ambush. But after being taken to custody, Abed claimed that one of his captors had punched him. And to prove it he showed a swollen lip. As a result, three of the Navy SEALs were court-martialed, charged with assault, dereliction of duty and giving false statements (Kozak 2009). Indeed, this strikes one as ironical. One would expect that perhaps Abed deserved what he had got- if his claim was true- and even more. But then there are rules to be obeyed even in war. The question however is whether the so-called laws of war are practical and realistic, and if they really apply in actual wars and to what extent. This paper will attempt to examine these aspects. Now, whether there is sufficient ground for justification or not, the fact remains that both the German and US soldiers intentionally broke the Geneva Convention rules, and are therefore guilty of war crimes. Besides this, it is understood that war exposes certain behaviors in people that would not be seen in day-to-day normal life. Can War be Civilized? The general implication of the Laws of War is that war can be civilized. In other words, there is a civilized way to take someone’s life. According to Connolly (1915), the concept of laws of war generally accepts the socialist contention that war in its entirety is an atrocity. And having done that, it seeks to categorize the atrocities and from them single out those that are more atrocious than others. This is quite confusing. Connolly (1915) further argues that talking about ‘humane warfare methods’ and ‘rules for civilized warfare’ are merely sentimental expressions that are but unreal and hypocritical. As he puts it: they are merely “intended for consumption by those at home”. Then he goes on to assert that all warfare methods are inhumane and barbaric. For example, during WWI, many argued against the use of what were referred to as dum-dum bullets. It was claimed then that the bullets inflicted grievous wounds, and that this was against humane and civilized warfare. But Connolly notes that the same people who made this outcry were the very ones who exulted in the results of firing a shrapnel shell, containing 340 bullets that scattered in all directions, and in doing so tore legs and arms off, maimed and burst human bodies. Indeed, one wonders which between the dum-dum and shrapnel shell is more humane- if such a comparison is valid. Another argument had to do with the rule on attack and bombardment of defenseless towns. Yet British fleet went up and down carrying out orders, bombarding defenseless places from Africa to Ireland at times when no clear wars had been declared. In light of this, Connolly argues that no warfare is civilized to validate the so-called laws of war. However, another question that arises has to do with the psychology of a man at war. Following rules indeed requires a sufficient degree of sobriety. Nevertheless, does such sobriety exist in a war setting as it does in the living room, or for one in an air-conditioned office within the Pentagon? In Paul Fussell’s (2003) book “The Boy’s Crusade”, one British Captain by the name of John Tonkin says, “Geneva Conventions… makes people believe that war can be civilized. It can’t.” Asymmetric War Another underlying assumption of the laws of war is that all wars happen in a certain systematic way. That the two sides in a war are clearly defined, are holding definite positions and that one of them will eventually surrender. Yet, even in such cases, there are hardly any systematic ways for war to happen. This, I guess, is what necessitates what Lopez (2002) refers to as “making rules as we go along.” For instance, between December 2008 and January 2009, Israel and Hamas fought a fierce battle in the Gaza strip for three weeks. The Israeli forces targeted Gaza’s urban infrastructure. As a result they devastated populated areas in their attempt to counter and end Hamas’ barrage of Qassam rockets indiscriminately fired at the Israeli cities in the South. Amid fears of mounting civilian casualties, the war ended inconclusively in January when Israel call for a unilateral ceasefire. The UN Human Rights Council appointed Richard Goldstone a former South African judge who was also the chief UN prosecutor in Rwanda and Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Goldstone’s team announced its findings in September, concluding that both sides, Hamas and Israel had indeed committed crimes against humanity. Since then the report has been interpret as an extension of the Israel-Palestine Conflict. However, the report raised and addressed crucial issue, some explicitly and others implicitly, e.g. the difficulty in identifying civilians and distinguishing them from combatants- not only in this specific context but in the general contemporary warfare, e.g. the war against terrorism. By the very fact that terrorism was initially merely a crime and only acquired its recent war-stature mostly in the aftermath of 9/11, is a manifestation of the many changes in the concept of war, e.g. the definition and identification of the civilians. Gross (2010), in his own attempt to examine the link between the laws of war and the protection of civilians, contends that the present measures used to prevent civilian casualties are too rigid and overlook the complexities of modern warfare. As a result, they bar warring states from dealing with irregular forces. The laws in question were a result of treaty developments that included 19th century agreements on safeguarding the sounded and sick. In the 20th Century, these were slowly extended to include war prisoners and civilians caught up in war. The key principle as we have seen was that a military force must not direct its operations at non-combatants. This includes the directive that military forces are supposed to act in a way to distinguish themselves from civilians, e.g. wearing uniforms and carrying weapons openly. The Geneva Conventions make clear the roles of both the combatants and civilians in distinguishing between the two groups. The Conventions add that when in doubt, military forces must ‘stand down’, meaning that they are supposed to assume those targeted are civilians. But even if combatants are identified among a group of civilians, that does not make the civilians legitimate targets (Carpenter, 2011). These directives again bring into question the ‘systematicity’ of war. For instance, it provokes questions including whether all these involved in war wear uniforms, or openly carry guns, or even care enough for the civilians that they are willing to put their lives and mission at risk. The answer to these questions is not easy. Many wars today do not happen between clear-cut groups. Al Qaeda, for example, is a global group with global influence that seeks to employ secrecy and stealth as its major strategies of war. Al Qaeda is an example of what Falk (2002) refers to as “borderless map”. Its soldiers are not willing to come to the open as they don’t believe in fair play, a stance that got them to start the war in the first place. In this light then, Gross (2010), argues that these laws favor insurgents (such as guerillas wearing civilian clothes). Kozak (2009) agrees, “rules of war are greatly significant… unfortunately, they create an unleveled field and frustration when one of the sides at war does not follow the rules”. Many wars today are not fought in the bushes. They are fought mostly in urban environments between unformed state soldiers and un-uniformed guerillas (Gross 2010). According to Gross (2010), the problem is not that these laws do not adequately protect civilians, but that they protect nonstate militants. Furthermore, the notion of innocent civilians is to him a mistaken assumption in this modern war. He argues that many civilians today are not merely bystanders. He points out that they abet and aid insurgents by producing propaganda, provide food and shelter and store weapons. Indeed, these are all possibilities. But there is no clear way to decide who is who and what does he/she do. A line has to be drawn, and it must clearly define who becomes a target and who does not. Otherwise, to assume these roles on all those who seem like civilians is to declare war on every single person within a territory. Tied to this question of protecting civilians even at the expense of the military operations is the focus on the ultimate objective of such an operation; to win the war. No war party takes parrot in war expecting or willing to lose. Is it possible or even realistic that a particular party would be willing to lose a war for the sake of protecting civilians? Discussion: Winning a War But even with General Petraeus’ taking charge in Afghanistan, many, including republicans started accepting that the war in Afghanistan might have been lost. The same strategies used by General Petraeus in Iraq, albeit remodeled to fit with a different context in Afghanistan, did not bear the same fruits. Indeed there has been bitterness in the US. The democrats have been pointing fingers at the republicans for having been adrift with the war. The republicans have been telling the democrats to stop ranting and, Dick Cheney said, “do what it takes to win the war” (Weber, 2009). Now the question follows, what does it take to win the war? What can a state do to ensure it does not lose a war, which would be embarrassing? Germany’s invasion of the neutral Belgium as a strategy to gain advantage over the allies is still recognized as a crime of war today. In December 1944, about 90 American soldiers were killed by Germans. The context of that war was as follows. In their last minute-gamble to turn the war in their favor, Germans succeeded in overrunning American lines. In the process they captured thousands of prisoners. Amongst these were more than a hundred GIs. But in their haste, the Germans decided the prisoners were a burden. Therefore, the American soldiers were thrown into a filed and shot with machine guns. Moreover, to be sure, the Germans walked through the bodies shooting other ones who had survived that first shooting in the back of the head. In retaliation, the US soldiers stationed at Liege did not take any prisoners for two whole weeks. In other words, they killed them. During the war in Vietnam, with every sign showing the US had already lost the war, Richard Nixon continued to air-raids and bombings. These raids have largely been described as the last kicks of a dying horse. The US government having realized that it was losing a war that it had helped start, decided on bombing. Perhaps, Richard Nixon hoped that e could turn the war around. The US could not afford total embarrassment although that is exactly what it got. Conclusion In the end, all these factors meet at one point; winning the war. Many times a military group hopes that things will go their way. The confederates in the American Civil War did. Unfortunately, things usually go wrong in the field that put question to the initial hope for victory. At such times, not willing to forfeit that hope, warring parties adopt other strategies; wrong or right, moral or not. The circumstances are made even harder in Falk’s (2002) borderless map. Then rules simply do not apply anymore. References Carpenter, C 2011, ‘Fighting the Laws of War: Protecting Civilians in Asymmetric Conflict’, Foreign Affairs, viewed 10 March 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67483/charli-carpenter/fighting-the-laws- of-war?page=show Connoly, J, 2003, ‘Can Warfare Be Civilized?’ The Worker, viewed 10 March 2012, http://www.marxists.org/archive/connolly/1915/01/warfrcvl.htm Falk, RA 2002, ‘Identifying Limits of a Borderless Map’, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 1, 26-87. Fussel, P 2003, The Boy’s Crusade: The American Infantry in Northwestern Europe, 1944-1945, New York, Modern Library Gross, ML 2010, Moral Dilemmas of Modern War: Torture, Assassination and Blackmail in an Age of Asymmetric Conflict, New York, Cambridge University Press. Kozak, W 2009, ‘The Real Rules of War’, The Wall Street Journal, viewed 10 March 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870430450457461066000837288 6.html Lopez, GA 2002, ‘The Style of the New War: Making the Rules As We Go Along’, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 1, Spring 2002. Weber, J 2009, ‘Cheney: Do What It Takes To Win a War’, Washington Times, viewed 10 March 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/22/cheney- obama-do-what-it-takes-win-war/ Read More

For example, during WWI, many argued against the use of what were referred to as dum-dum bullets. It was claimed then that the bullets inflicted grievous wounds, and that this was against humane and civilized warfare. But Connolly notes that the same people who made this outcry were the very ones who exulted in the results of firing a shrapnel shell, containing 340 bullets that scattered in all directions, and in doing so tore legs and arms off, maimed and burst human bodies. Indeed, one wonders which between the dum-dum and shrapnel shell is more humane- if such a comparison is valid.

Another argument had to do with the rule on attack and bombardment of defenseless towns. Yet British fleet went up and down carrying out orders, bombarding defenseless places from Africa to Ireland at times when no clear wars had been declared. In light of this, Connolly argues that no warfare is civilized to validate the so-called laws of war. However, another question that arises has to do with the psychology of a man at war. Following rules indeed requires a sufficient degree of sobriety.

Nevertheless, does such sobriety exist in a war setting as it does in the living room, or for one in an air-conditioned office within the Pentagon? In Paul Fussell’s (2003) book “The Boy’s Crusade”, one British Captain by the name of John Tonkin says, “Geneva Conventions… makes people believe that war can be civilized. It can’t.” Asymmetric War Another underlying assumption of the laws of war is that all wars happen in a certain systematic way. That the two sides in a war are clearly defined, are holding definite positions and that one of them will eventually surrender.

Yet, even in such cases, there are hardly any systematic ways for war to happen. This, I guess, is what necessitates what Lopez (2002) refers to as “making rules as we go along.” For instance, between December 2008 and January 2009, Israel and Hamas fought a fierce battle in the Gaza strip for three weeks. The Israeli forces targeted Gaza’s urban infrastructure. As a result they devastated populated areas in their attempt to counter and end Hamas’ barrage of Qassam rockets indiscriminately fired at the Israeli cities in the South.

Amid fears of mounting civilian casualties, the war ended inconclusively in January when Israel call for a unilateral ceasefire. The UN Human Rights Council appointed Richard Goldstone a former South African judge who was also the chief UN prosecutor in Rwanda and Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Goldstone’s team announced its findings in September, concluding that both sides, Hamas and Israel had indeed committed crimes against humanity. Since then the report has been interpret as an extension of the Israel-Palestine Conflict.

However, the report raised and addressed crucial issue, some explicitly and others implicitly, e.g. the difficulty in identifying civilians and distinguishing them from combatants- not only in this specific context but in the general contemporary warfare, e.g. the war against terrorism. By the very fact that terrorism was initially merely a crime and only acquired its recent war-stature mostly in the aftermath of 9/11, is a manifestation of the many changes in the concept of war, e.g. the definition and identification of the civilians.

Gross (2010), in his own attempt to examine the link between the laws of war and the protection of civilians, contends that the present measures used to prevent civilian casualties are too rigid and overlook the complexities of modern warfare. As a result, they bar warring states from dealing with irregular forces. The laws in question were a result of treaty developments that included 19th century agreements on safeguarding the sounded and sick. In the 20th Century, these were slowly extended to include war prisoners and civilians caught up in war.

The key principle as we have seen was that a military force must not direct its operations at non-combatants. This includes the directive that military forces are supposed to act in a way to distinguish themselves from civilians, e.g.

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