Resistance Against Allies in Afghanistan - Essay Example

Running head: After initial successes, why do Allied operations in Afghanistan meet ongoing resistance? How should Allied operations in Afghanistan be pursued?" After initial successes, why do Allied operations in Afghanistan meet ongoing resistance? How should Allied operations in Afghanistan be pursued?" [Writer’s name] [Institution’s name] After initial successes, why do Allied operations in Afghanistan meet ongoing resistance? How should Allied operations in Afghanistan be pursued?" Introduction The Afghanistan intervention was caused by invoking article five of the NATO charter, which called an attack on one, would be seen as an attack on them all. NATO troops only were sent in after U.S and British troops had removed Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters from the region. NATO was used as a stabilizing force. In 2002, American, British and Canadian infantry were committed, along with Special Forces from several allied nations, including Australia. Later, NATO troops were added. They responsible for the removal for Taliban as well the restriction of Afghanistan. Resistance There are a number of reasons why Afghanistan might have become a crisis for the allies. And due to this the allied operations faces a lot of resistance the first, and most obvious, is that Afghanistan is hard. That it is a notoriously difficult country to invade and control is wisdom known since Genghis Khan and Tamerlane, and proved again in recent memory with the Soviet invasion of 1979 (Shulman 2006). But it is more than geography and climate that make the situation difficult. Beyond all of the other difficulties of rebuilding a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic society after a conflict, NATO faces the extra challenge of fighting the opium harvest which funds the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters who are their primary target. The worst of the fighting is in the Southeast of the country, but many NATO countries have placed restrictions on the deployment of their troops and the kinds of tasks they can be assigned (Ciuca 2006). For the countries bearing the brunt of the casualties—the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands—this is undoubtedly the immediate source of tension. A second possible reason why are they facing resistance is the war in Iraq. If powers like the United States and the United Kingdom were not expending so many resources in Iraq, goes this argument, they could be diverted to Afghanistan along with the extra media and public attention. Thus the Afghanistan crisis is but an extension of the Iraq war crisis. While there is undoubtedly some truth to this explanation as well, the counterfactual considering what would have happened in Afghanistan if Iraq had not been invaded is impossible to test. It is clear that, to some extent, the crisis in Afghanistan is derivative of the crisis in Iraq. Tensions strained in 2002 and 2003 undoubtedly still underlie tensions between the allies (Millar &Eric2006). The allies saw themselves as having a responsibility that extended beyond simply eliminating the threat to their own national security. Success in the mission could not be defined solely in Article 5 terms, but rather had to take into account the living conditions in Afghanistan. In effect, they made a promise to leave Afghanistan in better condition than when they found it. This initial construction constrained the allies’ freedom to make policy as the mission progressed and thus resistance increased as, increasing instability in the south, rising death tolls, a bumper poppy crop, and the perception that some allies were doing their share while others were retreating behind caveats and political restrictions meant that the mission in Afghanistan dominated the conversation. When the Ministers of Defence of NATO met in Seville in February 2007, the United States pledged to extend the tours of 3200 troops, while NATO promised a mixed brigade (about 3500 troops) of uncertain origin (Neville& Bolero 2008). However, at the time of writing, tensions and resistance against the mission remained high. In Canada, for instance, a Senate report recommended that Canada continue to support the mission, but some editorialists suggested that Canada should consider withdrawing as it would result in an increase in their death tool. What is the source of the dispute over the Afghanistan and what can the transatlantic tensions tell us about the resistance? As I said above, part of the explanation is that Afghanistan has a difficult geography and has become a narco-state. Post-conflict security is difficult at the best of times, and Afghanistan is not really a post-conflict state. The dispute over Afghanistan is also always connected to, and perhaps even derivative of, the dispute over the American-led invasion of Iraq. One of the major criticisms of the allied operations is that it is under-resourced, and that the conflict in Iraq has drained money, troops, and public attention away from Afghanistan. All of these arguments undoubtedly have some truth in them, but I will set them aside here in favour of analyzing the dispute in the context of NATO’s evolving mandate and the future of the Alliance. This dispute was not principally about threat perception. The allies’ perception of the threat changed over time, from being originally a reasonably clear-cut threat to national security and to the NATO alliance, to later a more complicated combination of threat to national security, to the safety of local troops on the ground, and to the credibility of the alliance. But everyone more or less agreed on the nature and severity of the threat. There was, to some extent, a dispute about the boundaries of the alliance as they pertained to the scope of action and the membership of the community. However, this debate took place at an abstract level rather than being explicitly about Afghanistan. It was prevalent in speeches made at the Riga conference, or in pieces published by think-tanks or conferences associated with NATO. The fact that the Afghanistan mission was so far from Europe, and that non-NATO partners were under NATO The arguments over where troops should be deployed and what kinds of caveats on rules of engagement were appropriate were the practical questions that overlay debates like: what do we owe each other once NATO has made a decision to be involved in a particular conflict? Everyone agreed that NATO should not be involved everywhere and at all times, but their arguments about what its responsibilities were are telling. Some focused more heavily on NATO’s role as a defender of values, while others concentrated on NATO’s operational value-added. The French, for instance, argued that NATO should only intervene where it had a distinct value- added over other organizations. Michèle Alliot-Marie was adamant that NATO should not be focused on reconstruction, because other organizations were better at it than NATO’s primarily military-focused organization. However, these arguments are plainly not indicative of French indifference to NATO Recommendation Coalitions usually comprise of different abilities, it will be essential to design strategies in such a manner that all units are involved in the process. The coalition leadership shall have to have a board mind set so that it can find away to sue its best possible resources and people. Coalitions have had to face situations in which a few Alliance members contribute to the humanitarian and peacekeeping stage of the operation in Afghanistan. In a few situations, members which not support the operation at all whereas non-NATO countries as well as even non-European countries decided to contribute . The coalitions must be ready for more of such challenges to make sure that those countries that do choose out do not limit the variety of options offered to those countries which are dedicated to combat. Most of the military operations in these coalitions were influenced by political and diplomatic efforts and thus restricted a lot of military action from taking place (Dibb 2001). The allied forces will have to be extremely innovative to discover ways to deliver suitable and effectual levels of military power that sustain political-diplomatic plans within the set boundaries. An extremely serious effect of these coalition operations is that they might let the Taliban leader get way which kept them in power and in a situation requiring more international management, like the term of no-fly zones (Bensahel 2006). Under such circumstance coalitions should agree on the best way of action by carefully considering the relative outcomes of letting the leaders go free. Further systematic efforts have to be made to gather and propagate lessons learned from coalition operations and act accordingly (Keohane 2002). The United States now has a number of systems in place that can provide models such models of operations. Multinational exercises are very necessary for guaranteeing interoperability with latent coalition allies and for solving all command issues. NATO must develop its ability for exercises so that it can regularly incorporate coalition-building and protection activities by the help of military actions. Conclusion Afghanistan crisis looks like it could be on the way to resolution. The United States has pledged more troops, and in public speeches recently has brought renewed attention to the allied operations missions in Afghanistan. Other countries have reportedly also increased their troop commitments, although it is not clear whether they will be deployed to the more violent south of the country. At the same time, however, other countries, such as Canada, are beginning to call for withdrawal if other countries do not increase their contributions. References Bensahel, Nora (2006); “A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation against Terrorism.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29 Ciuca, Nicolae I (2006); Roles of Alliances and Coalitions in the War on Terrorism. Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. ArmyWar College, 24pp. Dibb, Paul (2001); The Utility and Limits of the International Coalition against Terrorism. Working Paper. Canberra: Australian National University, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. 22pp Keohane, Robert O (2002). “The Public Delegitimation of Terrorism and Coalition Politics.” In Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order, ed. Kim Booth and Tim Dunne, 141-151. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Millar, Alistair, and Eric Rosand (2006); Allied against Terrorism: What's Needed to Strengthen World- Wide Commitment. New York: Century Foundation, 134pp. Neville Leigh and Bujeiro Ramiro (2008); Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan: Afganistan 2001-2007 Osprey Publishing Shulman, Mark R (2006); The Proliferation Security Initiative as a New Paradigm for Peace and Security. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. ArmyWar College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2006. 58pp Watson Ann Cynthia (2007); Nation-building and stability operations: a reference handbook Praeger Read More