Command and Control (C2) Execution during Operation Restore Hope - Research Paper Example

How Command and Control (C2) was executed during Operation Restore Hope (United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I-II) Insert Insert Grade Course Insert Tutor’s Name Submission Date Superlative command systems or C2 has not been realized in current US experience, mainly when combined forces have been deployed for purposes of peace. Similarly, on occasions where America has been involved in peaceful operations either as a solitary entity or as a group with others, the joint doctrine of US has not been adhered to. Owing to a diversity of parameters mostly determined by political environments in the regions under operation, C2 along with other command activities transform with time and are influenced by aspects that are different from the major objectives of managing and employing a successful force. Operation Restore Hope (United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I-II)) is a typical example of how command control is implemented and represents the many faces of C2 in the sense that it is possible to provide a practical analysis of command and control through the highs and lows of UNOSOM1. UNOSOM was the foremost endeavor by the United Nations to conduct, achieve and offer humanitarian support in Somalia and to execute the initial ceasefire by the UN to end the civil war in Somalia in the early 1990s2. The entire course started in 1992 and ran through 1993 to officially end in 1994. Operation Restore Hope was a multifaceted operation in the sense that it involved several parties and was originally developed by the United Nations to avert the prevailing civil war then. As a result, the operation had three segments UNOSOM I, UNITAF and UNOSOM II all of which represented the different phases of the operation. Whereas UNOSOM I was coordinated by the United Nations and was the original operation to oversee a ceasefire of the civil war, UNITAF was a US unilateral approach towards clearing the way for humanitarian support in the horn of the African nation. UNOSOM II, on the other hand, was a combination of UN and US efforts to oversee the ceasefire and guarantee humanitarian assistance for majority Somalis. As a result, the entire Operation Restore Hope was a joint operation and involved command and control. At the heart of this document is an evaluation of how command and control was implemented in the Operation Restore Hope. Among the major areas to be covered are how C2 was executed, the failures of C2 during the operation, the successes of the operation and the lessons learnt from the operation. Just like majority of joint operations UNOSOM I-II was influenced by regional political factors that had a significant sway on how command and control was implemented. As a result, the standard C2 arrangement was not entirely adhered to in order to address the reality on the ground. As to whether command and control was successful or not in the Operation Restore Hope, there are many responses to the question depending on how the situation is viewed. In reality, the entire operation failed in the sense that the ceasefire brokered by the world body was not observed and fighting continued until the last minute of the operation. Therefore, on the basis of the results of the operation, it is appropriate to state that command and control was not successful during the operation restore hope. However, by observing other factors and indicators, there are a number of considerations that portray the operation as a success. The outbreak of civil war in Somali opened an avenue for the suffering of many people in the country and the United Nations was forced to act along with the African body (OAU) to mitigate the suffering as a result of the conflict. Majority of Somalis were vulnerable to numerous dangers like malnutrition, sickness and famine. The Operation Restore Hope was necessitated by the need to prevent the suffering of the Somali people from the civil war. The United Nations was involved in Somali when the civil war broke up3. The intention of the world body was to cushion Somali citizens from the impending suffering. The escalating violence was projected to create a humanitarian crisis that the United Nations and international community were determined to avert. A number of resolutions were ratified by the Security Council most of which tasked the UN with the establishment of a ceasefire to the civil strive. After the establishment of the ceasefire it became necessary to develop a force to observe the implementation of the ceasefire. UNOSOM I was born out of a need to create a united force under the United Nations to ensure that the ceasefire was implemented to the latter. Owing to the fact that the operation involved joint cooperation, command and control C2 was necessary for the course to be accomplished. The structure of authority was based on C2 in the sense that commanding the operation was not a unilateral affair but joint in nature. The three faces of the operation restore hope UNOSOM I, UNITAF and UNOSOM II prevailed at different phases of the Somali conflict. Apart from UNITAF, the two other phases were combined in nature and the tenets of command and control were applied accordingly. UNITAF represented the US efforts to create an enabling environment for humanitarian support to the strife stricken Somali’s and was slated to take a short time. However, UNITAF proceeded to become a lengthy battle that derailed humanitarian assistance. However, it was a handy opportunity to test the readiness to implement the ceasefire by the parties involved. UNOSOM II was created by combining AMISOM I and UNITAF to create a formidable force to observe the implementation of the ceasefire, create a viable environment for humanitarian assistance and explore the prospects of peace in Somali. Therefore, NOMISION II was a stronger force than UNOSOM I and it was deemed to be more effective in realizing the objectives of the first mission. The command structure of UNOSOM II was more involving in the sense that it was a more integrated. In developing the operation restore hope program, the United Nations did not act alone rather it was supported by numerous regional organizations like Islamic conference, OAU and the Arab league. This boosted the relevance and necessity of the operation in the sense that it erased any chances of revolt against the master plan. The development of a ceasefire in Somali created a need for a neutral force to oversee its implementation. However, as it became evident with time the UN mission was not locally acceptable and the war that followed the introduction of the operation was an indication of local and regional dissent to the operation. Therefore, in essence, the operation restore hope that was characterized by UNOSOM I, UNITAF and UNOSOM II, was a failure because it never realized the full implementation of the ceasefire and that it led to a bloody war that ended in defeat of the UN forces and the United States. Part of the reason why the mission failed was the misapplication of command and control. Perhaps the structure of command used in the operation was not appropriate. Ever since its inception, command and control has never been applied in its standard form. Therefore, the customization of the structure of command was not unique in the Somali situation. However, as it became evident, the structure of command and control which was strategically based on the regional political environment was a failure. This brings into question the viability of command and control along with whether it is necessary to customize command and control on the basis of local and regional factors or not. Conceivably, a more viable question is whether the customization of command and control was the reason for the failure of the Operation Restore Hope. Practical peace functions are intricate. Their organizational formations and command correlations develop over time as a task of the undertakings assigned, and the condition on the ground- including the mission- is originally approached. For instance, the United Nations force in Somali UNOSOM was diverse with a number of countries contributing soldiers. Basically, eighteen diverse nations supplied forces. Out of the total number, fourteen countries were directly under the Force Commander, (originally from Turkey) General Bir. These varied in dimension from companies to contingents and symbolized a myriad of dissimilar heights of military capabilities and languages. The entire national forces apart from those of America were ostensibly under fighter command (COCOM) to UNOSOM – and were UNOSOMs military to control and UNOSOM was accountable for their logistical support4. Source: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/peace_alberts/recent.html Actually, these forces functioned under a diversity of employment constraints and retained direct communication with their state governments. Missions were bargained with them instead of being assigned to them5. Three states (Botswana, Morocco along with Zimbabwe) offered their soldiers under COCOM under French contingent commander. Nevertheless, these forces as well retained direct links to their domicile governments and took part enthusiastically in developing their own armed missions and functions. Accordingly, the conventional military control prerogatives inherent in COCOM were not entirely executed. Logistics aid was often reliant on US military, despite the fact that the resident UN procurement scheme was also on the go on some logistics affairs. In reality, the UN undertaking and the part of American forces in that assignment developed with time and with varying circumstances. ACT was providential enough to prepare a practicum that appraised the development of the alliance and its assignment with the superior US representative who took part. These episodes are also evaluated from the standpoint of the US fundamental command in a current account of Operation Restore Hope. American forces were ostensibly under the strategic control (TACON) of UNOSOM, except only in circumstances of commitment6. As a realistic theme, they were under MG Montgomery, American Army, serving as both the second-in-command UNOSOM leader and the commandant of all American military in Somalia (USFORSOM). The major fighting components were structured into a Quick Response Force (QRF) obtainable for TACON along with UNOSOM on occasions that MG Montgomery considered it necessary, a choice made in consultation with the US CINC in charge for the area, CINCCENT. American Logistic Support Command was incessantly led by MG Montgomerys OPCON as second-in-command UNOSOM commandant. OPCON stood for permanent control of the military than TACON, whereas both ease the chief officer from guaranteeing logistics assistance to the force. This symbolized the logical association for the Logistics Support Command for the reason that UNOSOM had exceptionally limited sovereign aptitude to support military under his control, and it was dependant on American Logistic Support Command to sustain majority of the country forces that UNOSOM had ostensible COCOM. Other American forces in addition to close to Somalia accounted to USFORSOM. Particular Forces are, in accordance to American doctrine, offered by SOCOM as a sustaining CINC. Both American doctrine in addition to practice check the obligation of armed intelligence utilities to UN or other non-American commands, as a result the Intelligence Support Element (ISE) tasked in Somalia accounted to USFORSOM. Minor US military constituents not consigned to the Quick response7 Force as well stayed under American C2 system and were under American command arrangements. UN control arrangements were as well in accordance with typical UN configurations and practices. The organically arranged Office of Operations harmonizes regional bustle, although it is not involved in military authority role. Support emanates from two disconnect partitions - one for scheduling and another for Field management as well as Logistics. UN logistics assistance for armed peace procedures has been frequently and heavily criticized as excessively slow, too unwieldy, and too luxurious to support armed operations8. The main role of American Logistic assistance control in Somalia was partially an endeavor to break out the expensive, time-consuming, in addition to often fruitless UN procurement course. Source: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/peace_alberts/recent.html Direction in addition to leadership for the UN military commanders in the field (UNOSOM) emanate from the under secretary, resolutions, and Secretary General. In reality, MG Montgomery as well as forecasters of the Somalia incident concur that the UNOSOM leader as well as his head-quarters were steered greatly by the transcript of the UN decrees. This offered two dissimilar but related predicaments: Foremost was the fact that the forces commanders in the center along with their personnel were obligated to work at the entire three stages of command (planned, operational, along with tactical) whilst lacking the control experience in addition to team support required, principally at the tactical level. An in-theater workstation was interpreting strategic direction into tactical orders9. Subsequently, whereas the UN rulings indicate the duties (missions along with goals) of UN military and make out some boundaries on them, never automatically offer either the political influence or the military aptitude (personnel, logistics, information required) to achieve those undertakings or the influence to acquire the indispensable assets in addition to support required to accomplish them. Not astoundingly, the UNOSOM control systems were not apparent as operating well, and the world organization had great impenetrability in conducting victorious peace process in Somalia. Every individual constituent of the authority arrangements in Somalia make ideal sense when considered in seclusion as well as from the viewpoint of both the state governments and UN. Nevertheless, taken jointly, they made military management burdensome and ultimately unsuccessful. The UNOSOM folder is a significant and instructive condition, mainly for the hazardous operations. All three echelon of command – tactical, strategic and operational – were addressed by at UNOSOM headquarters. More often than not, the strategic is realized by a state military combined or common staff, the operational on the other hand is realized by the theater leaders, while the tactical is executed by the leaders of the force components. Hence, vast pressure for necessary and time-grave task was accomplished by the UNOSOM center. The figure of immediate subordinate commanders was far ahead of the period of control measured desirable in whichever military or institutional structure. Operation restore hope, UNOSOM, was a joint military operation in Somali that was necessitated by the civil strife in the early 1990’s. The UN brokered a ceasefire and it became necessary to develop a military force that observed the application of the ceasefire. The operation took three phases namely UNOSOM I, NAFTA and UNOSOM II. Command and control or C2 was applied in the structure of coordination in the sense that the entire operation was jointly coordinated though the solders retained direct contact with their mother countries. The C2 model as allied in Somali was categorized in three levels operational, tactical and strategic which represented the structure of command. This paper has evaluated the application of C2 in Somali during the operation restore hope. The paper started with a brief overview over the need and origins of UNOSOM. This was followed by a background evaluation of the operation. The paper focused on how command and control was executed in the course of the operation, the effects of C2 in the Somali experience, lessons learnt by American military along with the successes and failures of C2 in the operation. In essence, Operation Restore Hope failed as the ceasefire was never observed and fighting continued throughout the period. Additionally, it was not possible to arrest the parties who defied the ceasefire and by the end of the operation the country was still at war. C2 made some gains in the operation but it failed to provide an effective model for success making the operation a failure. The American military learnt several lessons from the failed operation. Bibliography Allard, Kenneth. “Somali Operations: Lessons Learnt.” http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Allard_Somalia.pdf (accessed January 21, 2013). Command Arrangements for Peace Operations. “Recent US Experience with Command Arrangements.” http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/peace_alberts/recent.html (accessed January 21, 2013). James, Brannon, and Lowrey Vernon. "Somalia and operation restore hope." Engineer 23, no. 2, 1993. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed December 15, 2012). George, Thomas. Military-Civilian Interactions: Humanitarian Crises And The Responsibility To Protect. Washington: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. Orakhelashvili, Alexander. Collective Security. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Jonathan, Dworken. "Rules of engagement: Lessons from Restore Hope." Military Review 74, no. 9, 1994. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed December 16, 2012). Rutherford, Ken. Humanitarianism Under Fire: The US and Un Intervention in Somalia. New York: Kumarian Press, 2008. Read More