Battle of Cowpens Analysis - Term Paper Example

Insert Battle of the Cowpens Battle of the Cowpens The Battle of the Cowpens is considered a crucial historical event that reveals America’s quest for revolution in the south around 1781. In a series of well-documented literary works, authors describe the event as one that ultimately led to the defeat of the British soldiers, and, subsequently, a major turning point that would see America’s attainment of independence. Moreover, the Cowpens Battle marked the second main war won by the American troops in less than 4 months against the British after their first defeat at Kings Mountain (Bearss, 1996). Historical documentaries suggest a strong influence of militia in winning this war, but even with the foregoing, MAJ Samouel Hammond became very crucial in the events that led to the defeat at the Cowpens. His skills shaped up the Cowpens war within a historical context. This paper examines the Cowpens Battle, influential personalities and their roles, task organization, command, actions and success in the events that led to the war. Further, the paper also explores the war in exceptionality of each of the forces that were involved, their weaknesses, and strengths during the war, and makes a conclusion based on these findings on who won the battle and the supporting reasons within military preparedness training. An historical inquiry into the role of Major Samouel Hammond’s during the Cowpens battle reflects quite a significant turning point in the American historical memoirs which seek to shape the contemporary military preparedness. Major Samouel Hammond was born September 21, 1757, in Farnham Parish, Richmond County, Virginia State. After attending school, Hammond volunteered for military training commanded by Mr. Grayson to fight for the American Revolution. After some years, Hammond enrolled in volunteer services in a company called Minute Men sanctioned by the committee of safety in 1775. They then organized themselves, held elections, and later equipped themselves as an army unit. Their greatest achievement during this time was when they defeated the British soldiers at Great Bridge and the Kings Mountain. During the battle, Major Samouel Hammond commanded McCall’s unit representing the militia side (Moncure, 1996; Babits, 1998). The Cowpens task organization Occurring on 17 January 1781 in South Carolina on the border of North Carolina, the Cowpens combatant consisted of the American troops and supporting militia, on the one hand, and the British troops, on the other hand. In terms of equipment, uniforms and arms organization, various documentaries suggest that the British were wearing red coats and headgear that exposed bearskin and leather caps under the Commandant of Colonel Tarleton. The American soldiers under control of Colonel Morgan were mainly dressed in blue while the America’s militia had no designated uniform and wore any form of cloth. The British armed themselves with muskets and bayonets similar to the American troops while the militias armed themselves with rifles. Moncure (1996) suggests that the British soldiers deployed in a typical European fashion. Two troops stationed at the extreme left flank commanded by Captain Ogilvie. On the infantry line were seventh Fusiliers accompanied by companies of light infantry (numbering about 500 in quantity) with two cannons interspersed among the infantry. Seventh Light Dragoons numbering about 50 troopers stationed to the right of the infantries. Most of the infantries were mere recruits and were hardly crack troops and the whole troop accompanied by Royal Artilleries. The American regiments were comprised of Maryland and Delaware continentals, Washington’s dragoons, and militias from Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia of varying numbers. Mission Command The American militia and soldiers were under the command of Colonel Daniel Morgan supported by several militias and colonels. Aged 44, Morgan was considered the oldest in the Continental Army. He had vast experience in military warfare having served as a Wagoner for Edward Braddock. He earned his promotion to serve as Colonel after displaying exemplary performance when he headed the first riffle company, his choice as a lead to the army propelled by his courage, a unique understanding of the psychology of his unit, and a strong understanding of war tactics. With this personality and military background, Morgan prepared himself with the task ahead of him. His commanding staff and the discipline of the units under him in terms of organization, training and efficiency further contributed to his success. His choice of the battlefield, earlier arrival to the battlefield and positioning his units in the battalion contributed to his victory as it positioned him away from the Cornwallis and the threat of the enemy surrounding him. Moreover, such an arrangement would give his soldiers enough time to congregate for the war. Equally, the leaders’ loyalty to Morgan during the battle helped in achieving the victory for the Americans. The Battle Action Morgan tactically and skillfully positioned his soldiers at the Hannah’s Cowpens in the South Carolina. Moncure (1996) asserts that the Virginians deployed tactically on the battlefield as if to act like a shock absorber facing the Southeast direction. The Mill Gap Road opened 800 meters into the field separating the soldiers and the battlefield. Riflemen then positioned behind the trees, from which they would attack the British soldiers and retreat into the main militia line after firing thrice. Being certain of the mighty force of the British horses, Morgan pulled all available horses together and requested for additional back up especially from McCall’s state troops who were positioned to the left rear of the existing troop for deployment into the defense line during the war. Hammond and Morgan in their bibliographies recall that the centerpiece of the soldiers largely consisted of regulars from Maryland and Delaware. (See Map 8 of Moncure, 1996) The British soldiers under the command of Colonel Tarleton arrived through the underbrush of the thicket ready to attack the opponents. According to Moncur (1996), the British troops were comprised of light company of Prince Wale’s American contingent, Legion infantry, and the Seventh Fusiliers separated into two divisions, each division falling to the left of the main unit, while the unit comprised the advanced guard of dragons rammed back the remaining pickets. Opening moves There seem to be diverging opinions in the sequence of events that truly started the war off. From a continental perspective, the war kicked off with artillery fire emanating from two small guns from the British side, while the militia suggests that they were the first to make a shootout. On the other hand, Tarleton does not offer any insights on true accounts on how the battle started but re-affirms that after fire suppression from red recruits of the seventh infantry his units progressed in the opponents’ direction. Upon realization, the defending units aimed at the British leading to a return fire from inexperienced fusiliers, and then withdrew into the main unit line under the command of Pickens. Sure of a victory, Tarleton ordered his troops to advance forward to engage the Americans in the fight, all this long the militia ready to attack monitored the British tactfully. Morgan had long foreseen that the victory of the battle was largely dependent on the actions of the militias; he then positioned himself amongst the militia to increase their courage and to prepare them for the task ahead while applauding the militia at every individual shootout. (See map 9, 10 and 11 of Moncure, 1996) After firing thrice, the militia withdrew around Howard’s left streaming around both flanks but largely to the left. Acting fast to seize the opportunity, Tarleton sent out fifty cavalrymen against the militia. Contrary to Tarleton’s expectations, this move only brought the Cavalrymen at the back of Howard’s left edge and repulsed by Washington. The Tarleton quest for victory did not end with this, instead he chose to press on with his course and tactically lined the 71st Highlanders and reserve Calvary on the left side while the Legion were placed on the right. With this tactical deployment, Tarleton displayed remarkable leadership qualities: opportunist and tactical (Babits, 1993; Moncure, 1996; Babits, 1998). As the actions unfolded, there exist three instances of deception displayed by the troops. For instance, the Continental troops deceived the British with the retreating militias only for the cavalrymen cornered by Washington. At the same time while learning from the events unfolding on the battlefield, Tarleton tactfully created a deployment plan that would deceive the Americans when he threatened the American left side with cavalry for a second time only to seek the attention of Washington. As a general weakness, the Continental Commandant apparently displayed neglect to the limits of his army, something that contributed in the units’ exhaustion in the field the following day. Further, a misunderstanding of an order from Howard to Wallace caused the Americans to battle, upon realizing this, Morgan ordered for a re-group and subsequent extraction of the Continental line. This action led to two effects, which greatly affected the battle’s outcome. On the foremost, the action led British to be convinced that Americans were retreating and withdrawing from the fight and the British to relinquish their balance as if the resistance had collapsed. Morgan seized the opportunity, regrouped his troops and attacked the British just 30 meters away sending the British troops in a complete disarray and panic (See map 13 of Moncure, 1996). In this instance, the militias’ reappearance on the American right toppled around the other side of British soldiers. Their return was a deception from Morgan to the militias since he had promised them free will after the three fires (Moncure, 1996). While the troops fought according to plan, the return of the planckens militia was out of plan but solely a decision of the commandant. Faced with a run through of continental troops to their frontage, Washington cavalry on both sides and militias attacking from the left side and back, the British were defeated, with panic and disarray extending over the entire British line. Bearss (1996) argues that the additional support of the militia further pushed the continentals to a clear victory over the British as the whole unit of continentals displayed confidence, inventiveness, maneuver, initiative and organized attack. By comparison, the ground lay with 10 British officers and over 100 medium ranks dead and over 200 injured, while Americans had 11 killed and 60 injured. Summarily, there were also more than 500 British soldiers who were tired, frightened and without food, who were then disarmed as opposed to killing. The total loss of the British numbered about 850 soldiers. The prisoners then evacuated to safety in Virginia and association of the military to rejoin Greene. References Babits, L. E. (1998). A Devil of a Whipping: the Battle of Cowpens. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Babits, L. E. (1993). Cowpens Battlefield: A Walking Guide. Johnson City, TN: The Overmountain Press. Bearss, E. C. (1996). Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps. Jonson City, TN: The Overmountain Press. Moncure, L. J. (1996). The Cowpens Staff ride and the Battlefield. Kansas, Fort Leavenworth. Read More