Counterterrorism and Intelligence - Research Paper Example

Strategic Counter Terrorism The tragic events of 9/11 had grotesquely demonstrated not only to the US but to the whole world the great threat coming from international terrorist groups, specifically the Al Qaeda, which determination and capability to inflict harm had proven catastrophic and even paralyzing (Benjamin, 2008, p. 2). This unprecedented attack, plus the existence of highly powerful technologies today which terrorists may exploit bring forth grave security implications that require strategic counterterrorism framework domestically and internationally (Alexander, 2002, p. 2). As today’s US President has spoken: “Our national security begins at home. What takes place within our borders has always been the source of our strength, and this is even truer in an age of interconnection.” (The White House, 2010, p. 9) Cognizant of the vital importance of good intelligence in the fight against terrorism and the vigilant cooperation between and among federal agencies and the US public (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004), especially so that groups, forms and operations of terrorism are varied and fluid (Wilcox, 2002, p. 27), this policy paper supports the federal government’s strong commitment to improve our national security enterprise, and to enable federal agencies/departments to share information across sectors. A joint initiative is proposed to promote smooth collaboration between DHS, DoD, FBI, CIA and other federal departments/agencies to enable trusted and secure exchange of terrorism-related information for effective detection, deterrence, prevention and response to homeland security threats. In fact, the killing of Osama Bin Laden, the master mind of the worst terrorist attacks on US soil, was the most significant achievement to date in the too-costly campaign against Al-Qaeda; this sources said was carried out in a Joint Special Operations working with the CIA. I. Defining a Higher Level of Organization Homeland against Terrorism With a highly sophisticated technology available even to terrorist goals, a highly-determined terrorist organization, and increasingly coordinated terrorist activities worldwide, a higher level of organization is needed to face both conventional and unconventional challenges of terrorism today. Thus a joint initiative between and among Federal agencies and departments is called for. To ensure check and balance, the Joint Initiative Body to be created shall be cohesive and transparent. The Joint Initiative Body shall be composed of Federal agencies and departments, which primary role and responsibilities are directly related to US security and stability. As such, these are as follows: A. Department of Homeland Security (DHS): A cabinet department of the US federal government, created only in 2003 after the 11/9 terrorist attacks mainly to secure the US from terrorist attacks and natural disasters. Its operational components are the Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and U.S. Secret Service (USSS). (Randol, 2010, pp. 1-3) B. Department of Defense (DoD): A Pentagon-based cabinet-level agency charged with the responsibility ‘to direct and coordinate military affairs and issues of national security’. Under it are the US Armed Forces – the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and several other agencies important to intelligence and security mission – the Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (Strategic Defense Initiative), the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense Mapping Agency, and the National Security Agency. The Department of Defense also operates the National War College. (Northrup, 2003, p. 292) C. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): An agency of the US Department of Justice, serving both as a federal criminal investigative body, with more than 200 categories of federal crime under its jurisdiction and an internal intelligence agency (counterintelligence). Its main goal is ‘to protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats... uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States... and... provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners’. It is composed of the Office of the Director and five functional branches – (1) National Security Branch; (2) Criminal, Cyber, Response and Services Branch; (3) Human Resource Branch; (4) Science and Technology Branch; and (5) Information and Technology Branch. (International Business Publications, 2002, pp. 10, 14) D. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): A civilian intelligence agency of the United States government that provides national security intelligence assessment to senior United States policymakers and to the President. It is composed of four distinct teams tasked with different responsibilities – National Clandestine Service, Directorate of Science and Technology, Directorate of Intelligence, and Directorate of Support. (Wilbert, 2011) II. Role and Responsibilities of the Joint Initiative Body The role and responsibilities of the Joint Initiative Body shall revolve around four strands of work detection, deterrence, prevention, and response. The Joint Initiative Body would be responsible in coordinating anti-terrorism efforts across different branches of government, and also in reaching out for necessary civil society input. Thus its role is not limited to recommending policy or plan of actions, but to craft it, ensure and oversee its implementation. Specifically, these roles and responsibilities can be defined as follows: (1) produce good intelligence; (2) know the enemy; (3) plan strategically and tactically; (4) act in coordination yet securely; (5) report in-time to the Office of the President and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; (6) keep abreast of national security situation, (7) build a reliable and secure support homeland and abroad; (8) educate the public; (9) actively involve the public in the campaign against terrorism; and (10) keep the American value intact. III. Policy A. Identifying Identification of terrorists, terrorist sanctuaries, and terrorist networks shall be done discreetly involving all branches of government, the private business, and the public. Discreetly means that it should not result to paranoia, neither to witch hunting that may jeopardize intelligence formation. Thus, specific polices may be as follows: 1. Require comprehensive security plan and structure for every federal agency headquarters homeland and abroad and for every major establishments in the United States; such must be approved by the Joint Initiative Body and must be implemented accordingly. 2. In-place a secure hotline through which public could immediately report suspicious people, events, acts, and things. 3. No leaking of information outside the Joint Initiative Body. Terror-related reports should strictly go through formal channel as determined by the Joint Initiative. 4. Formulate basic guidelines that would help people identify and determine reportable people, incidents, and things. 5. Narrow down definition of terrorism to avoid ambiguities that allow police abuse, that blurs freedom of expression and other political rights, and that deepens racial divide that may worsen racial discrimination. B. Processing Processing shall be in pursuit of achieving the truth utilizing all available resources – human and technology. Specifically, this shall translate as follows: 1. Gathered terror-related information shall be processed with the highest level of reliability using technological assistance and utilizing the department with the highest expertise on the matter. 2. Apprehended suspected terrorists shall be processed in strict observance of due process founded on the belief that confessions under torture are not reliable. 3. Suspected terrorist sanctuaries and networks shall be processed with much secrecy to avoid spreading unwarranted alarm that may jeopardize the operation. C. Tracking Tracking shall apply to person, offices, place, communication, financial transaction, mobility, business transactions, and movements. This shall be done at different levels and range, depending on the nature of the information being sought. 1. For general information by which to assess the potential existence terrorism, a standard regular observation and monitoring of the environment shall be done. 2. For suspected terrorist, lair and network, tracking shall be done in joint tactical operation, under the supervision of the Joint Initiative Body. D. Reporting In-time reporting is vital to allow in-time action. Systematic and organized report indicates analysis and sets direction for tactical response. As such specific policies are as follows: 1. Easy, user-friendly but secure procedure/technology of reporting shall be installed for civilians to report suspicious persons, things, and incidents without being compromised, yet protected also from prank reports. 2. Level reports according to urgency and importance. 3. Reports shall be prepared in joint session by the Joint Initiative. 4. Only three copies of the report shall be produced, one for the President, the other for the legislative, and the other for the Joint Initiative Body file copy. 5. Making the report public does not belong to the Joint Initiative Body but to the Office of the President. This is to ensure that reports will not be given out to media irresponsibly. IV. Shared Resources Resources shared pertain to both human and technology. Shared human resources may include agents, technicians, and leadership; shared technology may include research, manuals, books, skills, expertise, and equipments. Any shared resources by the Joint Initiative Body shall be bound with a memorandum of agreement between the agencies respecting discretion, yet giving utmost concern to win against terrorism. This is to avoid abuse, yet to ensure attainment of the Joint Initiative’s defined mission. Thus, shared resources shall only be used to pursue strategic goals and tactical objectives against terrorism. In cases where interest comes in conflict in the use of shared resources, anti-terrorism concerns shall come first, not unless the concerned agency/department proves that its concern is more urgent and more important at that time. V. Shared Services Policy on shared services should deal on harmonizing them and bring down barriers of their effective use both jointly and departmentally. Services shared pertain to law enforcement, legal system, communication, transportation, medical, and education. VI. Fusion Centers “A Fusion Center is a terrorism prevention and response center that enables information sharing between multiple agencies working to deter terrorism and other criminal activities” (Memex, n.d., par. 2) . This shall be developed as front line resource in the fight against terror, homeland and abroad. Since there already exist a national network of fusion centers located in states and major urban areas in the US, providing interdisciplinary expertise and situational awareness aiding government at all levels to informed decision-making (Homeland Security 2011), these shall be enhanced in terms of management, technology, and coordination to fit well with the Joint Initiative against terrorism. VII. Global Integration The threat of terrorism is not only national but also international; their operation is international; also, their network has developed at an international level, that dealing with them homeland is not enough. There are the national and transnational terrorists. The former, Pressman (2007) explains, simply use the world stage to pursue national goals, and that this group hesitates mass destruction simply because they rely heavily on the same people that they are about to harm; whereas the latter operates transcending national boundaries to cause global impact thus capable of mass destruction. (p. 64) These basic differences of the two should be considered in formulating policies countering transnational threats. 1. There should be a global counterterrorism coalition that is culturally and internationally diverse to allow a broader understanding of different cultures that may help in understanding the enemy and in designing counter-terrorism plans/actions. 2. The counterterrorism strategy should emphasize allies and not simply protecting our interest. Thus the US should give direct support to countries that need help in fighting terrorism be it national or transnational terrorism. 3. The long-term strategy should focus on regaining the US leadership that respects other nation’s sovereignty, culture and tradition, and that upholds international treaties. 4. Harmonize laws and bring down barriers by which countries could work well instead of hampering speedy prosecution of terrorists. VIII. Public Education and Awareness on Terrorism It should be well-understood by the US public that terrorism is not a government problem only; it is a problem of all civilized societies that public vigilance against potent terrorist threat and active participation in the fight against terrorism is vital. However, what the public needs to know is not simply the question of what and who, but more importantly, the why. This rests on the belief that terrorism can only be eradicated if the reason for its existence is invalidated. Thus public education and awareness on terrorism must be raised to an ideological level that would result to a counter-narrative to terrorist’s narrative. In Benjamin’s (2008) words, “the United States must visibly reposition itself so that for millions of Muslims from different regions and societies, radical anti-Americanism has less purchase.” (p. 3) References Alexander, Y. (2002). Introduction. In Y. Alexander (Ed.), Combating terrorism: Strategies of ten countries (pp. 1-22). US: University of Michigan Press. Benjamin, D. (2008, October 7). Strategic counter terrorism. Policy Paper No. 7. Foreign Policy at Brookings. Retrieved from http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/10_terrorism_benjamin/10_terrorism_benjamin.pdf Homeland Security. (2011, June 24). State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved from http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1156877184684.shtm International Business Publications. (2002). US FBI Academy Handbook. Washington, DC: The Author. Memex. (n.d.) Fusion Center. Memex Technology Ltd. US. Retrieved August 8, 2011, from http://www.memex.com/global/fusion-center National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (2004). The 9/11 Commission Report: Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. New York, NY: Cosimo. Northrup, C. C. (2003). U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). In C. C. Northrup (Ed.), The American economy: A historical encyclopedia (p. 292). US: ABC-CLIO. Pressman, J. (2007). Rethinking Transnational Counterterrorism: Beyond a National Framework. The Washington Quarterly, 20 (4), 63-73. Randol, M.A. (2010 March 19). The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational overview and oversight challenges for congress. CRS Report for Congress. Congressional Research Service 7-5700. R40602. The White House. (2010 May). National Security Strategy. Office of the President of the United States of America. Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf Wilbert, C. (2011). How the CIA works. Retrieved from http://people.howstuffworks.com/cia.htm Wilcox, P.C. (2002), United States. In Y. Alexander (Ed.), Combating terrorism: Strategies of ten countries (23-61). US: University of Michigan Press. Read More