Dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir - Term Paper Example

Kashmir Conflict Introduction In 1998 both India and Pakistan, despite global opposition, successfully tested nuclear weapons. This is a concern because of the general fears that surround nuclear proliferation. However, it is also a greater concern in this instance because India and Pakistan have been involved in conflicts since their separation at independence in 1947. Previously, both countries were part of the British imperial India. In 1947 Pakistan was established as a predominantly Muslim country while India remained predominantly Hindu. The result is “the world’s most bitter dispute” according to Time magazine1 In 1999 Lester W Grau and Ali A Jalali described partition as “the bloody division [that] left a bitter rivalry and hostility.”2 Since partition in 1947 the two countries have fought three wars. Two of these wars were fought over the province of Kashmir. The province of Kashmir is located in India, on the border between India and Pakistan. It is the only state in India with a Muslim majority (67.2 percent).3 Consequently, it has been a point of hostility, endemic guerrilla warfare, and occasional conventional military clashes. Additionally, for the last few years the threat of nuclear conflagration has hung ominously over the province. The following discussion will look at this dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Initially, the background of the dispute, events between 1947 and 2001 will be considered. Then events over the last decade, the current situation, will be examined. Finally, prospects for the future, specifically prospects for the resolution of the dispute will be considered. The Background In 1947 with independence pending the Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, demanded independence for the Kashmir. The British refused to consider this proposal. Additionally, they refused to consider partition of the state. According to Grau and Jalali this might have been the best approach as the Muslim population is focused in the north, on the border with Pakistan while the Hindu minority is largely located in the southern region of the province adjacent to India. Regardless, this option was rejected and upon independence the fate of the Kashmir was postponed for one-year by a ‘stand-fast’ agreement.4 Like many ceasefires and truces in this region this one evaporated almost as fast as it was signed. Muslim Pashtun tribesmen from Pakistan took to regularly raiding into Kashmir. The Maharaja was ill equipped to respond and India refused to intervene until Kashmir agreed to annexation. The Maharaja “eventually decided to accede to India, signing over key powers to the Indian government – in return for military aid and a promised referendum.”5 When Indian troops entered the Kashmir, Pakistan invaded to ‘defend’ Kashmiri autonomy. The result was the first India-Pakistan War, fought in and over the Kashmir. It ended on New Year’s Day, 1949 when the United Nations brokered a cease-fire agreement and dispatched a peacekeeping force to the region.6 Map 1: Kashmir Remarkably, this cease-fire was tenuously maintained through fifteen years of “unending artillery duels and annual clashes on the world’s highest glacier.”7 However, in 1965 war broke out again. India accused Pakistan of infiltrating local insurgents into the Indian controlled region and fermenting rebellion. In response India crossed the cease-fire line and occupied key defensive positions. Eventually another cease-fire saw them return to their original positions. In 1971, while a devastating civil war raged in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) Indian troops entered that country. That ignited the third India-Pakistan War. Although that war was not fought in the Kashmir directly one of its results was the “Simla agreement that turned the Line of control [cease-fire line] into their unofficial temporary border.”8 Since 1972 India and Pakistan have not fought another war although the border conflicts have persisted. Also, as noted earlier, the potential for catastrophic conflict increased significantly in 1998 when both countries successfully detonated nuclear devices. According to the BBC the Kashmir conflict “is potentially one of the most dangerous disputes in the world and in the worst-case scenario could trigger a nuclear conflict.”9 One year later hostilities on the disputed border flared up again. Pakistan infiltrated forces and militants into the Kashmir in the Kargil area and the Indian government responded with force. Although there was no official declaration of war the two countries were in conflict in the Kashmir throughout 1999. Muslim fundamentalism also had a significant impact on the region during the 1990s. Pakistan was one of the few backers of the Taliban government in Afghanistan. It also permitted the training of Muslim militants to take place in Pakistan. Many of these soldiers fought in the Kashmir with local Muslim insurgents the same way they fought in the Sudan, and against the Russians in Chechnya and Afghanistan. To international Muslim militants the Kashmir was simply one of many campaigns for Muslim self-determination.10 In early 2001 Michael Fathers suggested that the dispute in the Kashmir was stumbling towards resolution.11 Fathers was neither the first nor the last to wrongly suggest that resolution of the dispute was pending. There have been many false starts towards peace initiatives in the Kashmir. Fathers was so mistaken a decade ago and in 2011 the dispute persists Situation since 2001 The global context of the Kashmir situation changed entirely on September 11, 2001. The attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center meant that Muslim extremism immediately had a much higher profile. Also, America, its allies and NATO all awakened to the massive and catastrophic implications of militant Islam. Since September 11, 2001 the Kashmir dispute has come to be seen as one aspect of the global conflict between militant Islam and the west more than it is seen as a specific struggle over the disputed territory of Kashmir. The new context of the conflict became evident within months of the September 11 attacks. In early December 2001 terrorists attacked the Indian parliament in New Delhi using suicide vests, grenades and small arms. The terrorists, security forces and a civilian were all killed in the attack. The Indian government immediately blamed Kashmiri militants acting with the support of the Pakistani military and intelligence services. "There is credible technical evidence that Thursdays terrorist attack on the seat of democracy and sovereignty of Indian people was the handiwork of a terrorist organisation based in Pakistan - Lashkar-e-Tayiba," reported Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh.12 Singh elaborated on the new paradigm for the Kashmir. "Pakistan asserts that it is with the rest of the international community in its fight against terrorism, that it does not promote or encourage terrorism. It is our expectation that it will certainly abide by what it says itself," he said.13 Pakistani support of Kashmiri militants was support of a terrorist organization when India, the west and America were all ramping up their anti-terrorist struggle. In the wake of the attack on the Indian Parliament a major military stand-off developed along the international border and the line of control dividing the Kashmir. Less than one year after Fathers predicted that a resolution of the conflict was possible it was on the verge of becoming a hot war again. At the time globalsecurity.org identified the assemblage of forces along the Pakistan-India border:14 By late May 2002 as many as 700,000 Indian Army and paramilitary forces have deployed along the Indo-Pakistani border and the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan has reportedly deployed as many as 300,000 troops, and perhaps as much as three-fourths of the army [which would be nearly 400,000 troops], at or near the Indian border. Both Pakistan and India have placed their forces in the disputed border area on alert. In the spring of 2002 approximately one million armed troops faced off over the Kashmir, less than one year after an American pundit suggested a solution was at hand. A resolution was not at hand in the spring of 2001. In fact, the conflict was about to take on global dimensions and the differences between Pakistan and India were about to assume global significance with the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. A decade later, in 2011 the dispute continues to fester. In January 2011 the Pakistan Daily Times reported that the Pakistani Parliamentary Committee on Kashmir was disappointed with the Pakistani governments emphasis on relations with Afghanistan and the Untied States at the expense of the Kashmiris: “The negligence on the part of the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs towards the Kashmir issue and the prime focus on Afghanistan related issues or western borders has pushed the core issue between Pakistan and India in the background,” committee Chairman Maulana Amin Fahim lamented.15 Despite the conflict in Afghanistan and the global dimensions of the war on terror members of the Pakistani government remain focused on Kashmir. While the Pakistani Parliamentary Committee on Kashmir may lament the decreasing spotlight on the region other commentators see the Kashmir dispute as key to resolution of wider issues in the region. Former US ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson once stated that as long as the Pakistani government was obsessed with occupying the Kashmir “Pakistan will not stop treating India as the strategic threat” and the Pakistani military will continue to support Islamic militants in both Afghanistan and the Kashmir.16 From this perspective resolution of the disputes over the Line of Control in Kashmir, and the Durand Line and the insurgency in Afghanistan are intimately linked to Pakistans foreign policy objectives and its perception of itself as a bastion against Hindu India and a leader of the global Muslim community.. Implicit in this comment is that resolution of the Kashmir issue might decrease Pakistani support of Islamist militants in both Afghanistan and Kashmir. If the Kashmir issue were resolved the Pakistani government might feel less of a need to support militant Islam in all its manifestations. If the Kashmir issue were resolved and Pakistan felt less threatened by India it might be inclined to cooperate more with American initiatives to address Islamist training camps in Pakistan. It also might be less inclined to assert itself in Afghanistan, by supporting the insurgency, to counterbalance India and secure its northwestern borders. Simply put, resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan will not solve the Kashmir dispute, but resolution of the Kashmir dispute might facilitate resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan. Conclusions Contrary prognostications aside there would seem to be no easy resolution to the Kashmir crisis at hand. Arguably, the conflict reflects the precipitous British withdrawal from India and the disputatious borders that were established throughout the Himalayan region. The problem that afflicts the Kashmir is typologically related to the problems along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The borders that the United Kingdom assigned to the region in the era of independence reflected former colonial concerns as much as the existent situation on the ground. The line of control through the Kashmir was never intended to become a permanent border and reflected a convenience rather than recognition of the ethnic and religious differences on the ground. This is also true of the Durand Line, a remnant of the colonial era that divides Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Durand Line was imposed on the region in 1899 by the British empire. While it divides Afghanistan and Pakistan it also divides the Pashtun nation and, for this reason, does not reflect the reality on the ground.17 The Pashtun nation has kinship ties that cross the international border and many of the insurgents in Afghanistan are Pashtuns who have relatives living on both the Afghani and the Pakistani side of the Durand Line and do not recognize the border. Indeed, many Pashtun see the solution for that region as the establishment of a Pashtun state that encompasses northwestern Pakistan and southeastern Afghanistan.18 In a similar sense the Line of Control in the Kashmir is an imperial, external imposition on the topography and human geography of the region. The original partition of India and Pakistan was based on religion. Pakistan was to provide a Muslim state, independent of Hindu dominated India. However, the partition agreement saw Kashmir, with its majority Muslim population, join India, rather than Muslim dominated Pakistan. The dispute will fester as long as Kashmir is part of India yet majority Muslim. While it cannot be said that an end is in sight for the dispute there have been positive developments over the past five years. In 2005 bus service was resumed between the two sides of Kashmir for the first time in over fifty years and in 2008, the first road to cross the Line of Control was reopened.19 That said, the WikiLeaks disclosures that occurred in December 2010 may have added further fuel to the fire in the Kashmir. The Guardian reports that leaked diplomatic cables by US officials reveal that US officials “had evidence of widespread torture by Indian police and security forces and were secretly briefed by Red Cross staff about the systematic abuse of detainees in Kashmir.”20 Apparently both the International Red Cross and the US State Department are aware that India continues to use torture to obtain information from Kashmiri militants in their custody. This evidence is indicative of how seriously India takes the threat to the Kashmir. It is also likely to harden the opposition of Kashmiri militants to continued Indian rule. Clearly, these revelations do nothing to move the dispute closer to a resolution. Rather, they reveal the importance that India attaches to suppressing Kashmiri militants and the lengths that they are willing to go to to attain that objective. On the other side of the Line of Control, elements of the Pakistani government remain firmly committed to a significant change in the status of Kashmir. The aforementioned Pakistani Parliamentary Committee on Kashmir recently called on the Pakistani government to mark Kashmir Solidarity Day (February 5) with suitable pomp and circumstance: “The whole nation from Khyber to Karachi should be active on the day, so that a strong message of support from the whole of Pakistan should go out to our Kashmiri brethren, who are struggling for their right to self-determination.”21 Clearly, both sides remain intransigent in their support of a Kashmir linked to their national government. Interestingly, neither the government of India nor that of Pakistan supports the idea of an independent and autonomous Kashmir: Rather, both countries, wish to see Kashmir as part of their territory. Partition of Kashmir might provide a solution as the Muslim population of Kashmir is concentrated in the northern Pakistani dominated portion of the state and the non-Muslim population is largely concentrated in the southern, Indian controlled part of the state. However, the governments of India and Pakistan both oppose partition of Kashmir as do the majority of Kashmiris. In other words, partition provides a possible, theoretical solution, but it is opposed by all parties directly involved in the dispute. With an autonomous Kashmir a non-starter and India and Pakistan both firmly committed to controlling Kashmir rather than its partition, it is difficult to see that the dispute is any closer to a resolution today than it was a decade ago when Fathers described it as stumbling toward resolution. On the positive side this dispute has simmered and occasionally flared up throughout the decade since both India and Pakistan revealed that they had nuclear capabilities without ever becoming an out and out declared war, let alone a nuclear exchange and it seems reasonable to assert that the conflict will continue to smolder without becoming grounds for a nuclear confrontation. References “2002 – Kashmir Crisis”. Global Security. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kashmir-2002.htm. BBC News. “Q & A: Kashmir dispute” November 6, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2739993.stm. Burke, Jason. “WikiLeaks cables: India accused of systematic use of torture in Kashmir” The Guardian December 16, 2010. Fathers, Michael “Play Nice: Half a century, two wars, thousands of killings, millions of damaged lives. Are India and Pakistan stumbling toward resolution of the Kashmir divide?” Time February 5, 2001, pp 18+. “Government blames LeT for Parliament attack, asks Pakistan to restrain terrorist outfits”. Rediff on the Net. December 14, 2001. http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/dec/14parl12.htm. Grau, Lester W and Ali A Jalali “Flashpoint or safety valve?” Military Review 79: July 1999, pp. 66+. Lakshmi, Rama “India Wages a War of Words; Pakistan Again Assailed for Attack, U.S. for Its Response” The Washington Post December 19, 2001, p. A32. Maitra, Ramtanu. “Dangerous line in the sand”. Asia Times. March 13, 2003. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/EC13Ag02.html. Rashid, Mehmood Ur. “Of Violence and Responsibility” Greater Kashmir January 13, 2011. Rehman, Fazlur “Kashmir committee expresses displeasure over governments efforts” Daily Times January 13, 2011. Schofield, Victoria “Kashmir: Origins of the dispute” BBC News January 16, 2011. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1762146.stm. The Telegraph. “A brief hisotry of the Kashmir conflict” September 24, 2001. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1399992/A-brief-history-of-the-Kashmir-conflict.html. “US Afghan war review: On track, down a cul-de-sac” The Guardian December 17, 2010. Read More