What Is the Hybrid Warfare and What Challenges Does It Present - Article Example

The term HYBRID warfare is increasingly used to describe current and future conflict; what is it and what challenges does it present? The end of theCold War and the events of 9/11 have provided a catalyst for unprecedented challenges to the international order and national security policy. Arguably the most important challenge has been the appropriate and most efficacious method to combat a transient and intangible enemy, which transcends borders and the conventional notion of an organised army that “yet has shown a remarkable resilience against traditional military firepower”1. Moreover, Mahmood’s observations highlight the changing nature of conflict and the fact that the contemporary international framework has removed pre-existing regional controls and heightened conflict zones with the incidence of civil wars doubling2. This has resulted in a new political order in the international arena with novel conflict scenarios, thereby creating a demand for military manpower and expertise. Additionally, the redefinition of these security strategies has reinforced the debate regarding the notion of contemporary conflict scenarios falling within the model of “hybrid” warfare and the focus of this paper is to critically evaluate the increasing use of the term “hybrid warfare”. Moreover, in evaluating the heightened recognition of hybrid warfare as a reality, this paper will further consider the challenges this model presents to current and future conflict. It is submitted at the outset that a central trigger in the development of the term “hybrid warfare” is the rise in insurgency and terrorism threats posed by both state and non-state actors3. In particular, it is the increasing problem of countering non-state actors and failure to adequately define terrorism as a crime under international law that has perpetuated conflict between conventional military groups and intangible non-state actors4. As a result, the novel conflict scenario falls has created a hybrid model of warfare, often leading to the redefinition of security strategies5. However, it is precisely the redefinition of these security strategies has left gaps in the core functions of the armed forces forcing the British Army to reconsider pre-existing military doctrines6. Moreover, contemporary warfare is becoming increasingly significant, changing armed forces around the world and the ways wars are fought as highlighted by Glenn’s reference to the reaction of Israel’s Defence Forces to Hezbollah’s tactics on the field as a prime example of hybrid warfare7. Indeed, the 2007 Geneva opines that “as new forms of armed conflict multiply and spread, they cause the lines between public and private, government and society, military and civilian to become blurred”8. This blurring of the distinctions in traditional warfare has created debate regarding the contemporary relevance of the manoeuverist doctrine, further fuelled by the British Army’s formal adoption of an official counter-insurgency doctrine, which was published in Part Ten of its Field Manual in 2001. Alderson comments that the “pamphlet is the latest in a line of Army publications that have wrestled with the challenges of applying military force to meet the threat of revolutionary war and insurgency thrown up by the Cold War”9. This has created polarised argument with regard to whether or not we are growing a generation of Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN) professionals at the expense of “real war” fighting capabilities10. However, the challenges faced by the hybrid war model highlight the need to acknowledge the reality of constitutes “real war fighting” capabilities in current and likely future conflict scenarios11. Similarly, from the US military perspective, Hoffman refers to the 2005 National Defense Strategy expansion of conventional military strategy objectives to include the notion of modern threats to address non-state action12. Additionally in highlighting the central challenges to current and future conflict, Hoffman asserts that US recognition that changing military strategy “did suggest that the most complex challengers of the future could seek synergies from the simultaneous application of multiple modes of war”13. As a result, the blurring of distinction of traditional warfare has resulted in calls for regulation as a result of the increasing reality of what is termed “hybrid warfare”. Accordingly, it is submitted that arguably the greatest challenge in current and future conflict scenarios is identifying the source of conflict and addressing legitimacy of undertaking military action against non-state actors in particular due to complex state groups14. This argument is reiterated by Hoffman’s reference to the comments of Australian Defence Academy that: “The possibility of continuous sporadic armed conflict, its engagements blurred together in time and space, waged on several levels by a large array of national and sub national forces, means that war is likely to transcend neat divisions into distinct categories”15. This in turn correlates to Williamson’s argument of hybrid warfare signalling a move from “Fourth Generation Warfare”16, whereby future conflicts blend into “into a hybrid form, wherein adversaries will use all capabilities at their disposal17”. This argument highlights the intrinsic complexity of contemporary conflict scenarios and in particular the challenges faced to military strategy, which is arguably highlighted by the failures in Operation Iraqi Freedom. For example, in Operation Iraqi Freedom the shock and awe strategy was seen as instrumental to US military success and former US Vice President Dick Cheney opined that Operation Iraqi Freedom operated as “one of the most extraordinary military campaigns ever conducted”18. Moreover, Cheney argued that Operation Iraqi Freedom was a prime example of improved US military capabilities on the basis that all the air to ground fighters deployed laser guided bombs and with air to ground rapid dominance19. On this basis, the shock and awe air campaign enabled the US military forces to “strike twice as many targets”20. A central part of Cheney’s argument was rooted in the US adherence to Ullman and Wade’s “shock and awe” doctrine21. Ullman and Wade felt that in response to Operation Desert Storm concept of “Rapid Dominance” and “Shock and Awe” is imperative in ensuring US control in achieving expeditious victory in military combat22. Moreover, the Bush Administration argued that this was a key element in the alleged US “success” in Operation Iraqi Freedom23. However, whilst in the short term, the immediate effect of the shock and awe air campaign suggests that from a military perspective the campaign was a military success; the long term ramifications not only for public relations but for US military capabilities has fuelled debate as to the extent to which Operation Iraqi Freedom can legitimately be labelled a military success24. A central element of this debate is the criticism in some quarters of Ullman and Wade’s assumptions of success under the shock and awe rapid dominance paradigm particularly in context of hybrid warfare25. For example, Blakesley argues that the shock and awe rapid dominance paradigm is a widely misunderstood concept.26. However Blakesley argues that the very nature of the term “shock and awe” is misunderstood particularly with regard to warfare and fails to appreciate the wider ramifications of rigid adherence to Ullman and Wade’s theory27. In supporting his argument, Blakesley (2004) posits that the shock and awe concept is essentially geared towards impacting an enemy’s ability28. To this end, Blakesley suggests that the US approach to the shock and awe doctrine has been narrow and therefore risks implementation of a flawed military policy, which again underlines the problems faced by the reality of the hybrid warfare paradigm. This is on the basis that the shock and awe doctrine itself is rooted in assumptions; namely the control system and command and the existence of rationality on both parts29. For example, Blakesley suggests that Operation Iraqi Freedom was caused as a result of far more complex factors, which involved the role of non-state actors and therefore the shock and awe doctrine assumption is rooted in traditional concepts of warfare, again reinforcing the fundamental challenge of hybrid warfare to military strategy30. It is evident that military doctrine is clearly changing as evidenced by the rise of military strategy geared towards counter insurgency31. Therefore, Blakesley highlights the point that the nature of warfare is inherently complex and is continuing to change particularly in the post-September 11 global political framework. To this end, Blakesley suggests that the shock and awe doctrine fails to address the realities of contemporary warfare and that “despite several updates and rewrites it appears that US post modern Air Land battle doctrine is still Clausewitzian seeking the decisive battle that will defeat the enemy as well as emphasising the need for a rapid conclusion to any conflict”.32 This in turn highlights the crux of hybrid warfare; namely that “combat is complex, dynamic, lethal, uncertain, adversarial, evolutionary and fundamentally human”33. As a result, whilst military strategy clearly faces challenges in addressing the hybrid war paradigm, it is arguable that a case by case approach is needed. This is reinforced by Hoffman’s argument that the nature of war is inherently complex and therefore cannot be categorised into narrow concepts of “conventional or unconventional”34. Indeed, it is arguably the failure of recent military campaigns to acknowledge the inherent complexities of hybrid warfare that accounts for the continued problems faced by the military in addressing rising insurgency in problematic territories such as Iraq, where counter insurgency operations have not been considered core Army activities35. As such, it is further submitted that the debate regarding COIN strategy being developed at the expense of “real war fighting capabilities” ignores the important reality that addressing insurgency and non-state sector terrorism should be considered as part of “real war fighting capabilities” in light of the realities of hybrid warfare36. Accordingly, COIN strategy and real war fighting capabilities should not be considered mutually exclusive. Moreover, the strain on military resources highlighted by the use of private military contractors (PMCs) to address gaps in existing military strategy further supports the argument that the British Army counter insurgency directive and US National Defense acknowledgement of hybrid warfare is necessary to address gaps in Army training initiatives in context of contemporary warfare. This is further supported when considering the potential risks posed to military strategy by the use of PMCs in such conflict zones, where insurgents target combatants and private contractors with equal measure37. Furthermore, General Sir Richard Dannatt highlights the point that: “the Mission hasn’t changed, but the situation and circumstances around it have- and so a new plan is needed. We believe that our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere have called us to question whether our previous assumptions regarding current practice and future development have been right”38. Therefore it is arguable that the British Army’s official adoption of a counter insurgency operation clearly moves towards the Army’s doctrine and strategy remaining relevant, which Dannatt argues is imperative for the military under the hybrid warfare model. Moreover, Primoratz argues that the cultural and political backdrop of such states often provide fertile ground for insurgency operations such as Iraq39. To this end, Alderson argues that any military doctrine that fails to address counter insurgency operations is outdated by “being too redolent of fifty-year old rubber plantations, the dusty jebel and the seething, violent souk”40. As such, the move towards acknowledging counter insurgency in the military doctrine is necessary and essential to acknowledging change, which is argued to be the “driving force for doctrine development”41. Accordingly, the official adoption of a counter insurgency doctrine does not constitute a move towards COIN professionals at the expense of real war fighting capabilities but rather a necessary requirement in ensuring the purpose of army doctrines to address contemporary challenges faced by hybrid warfare. Indeed, the complexities of Iraq insurgency operations were not envisaged when troops went in on a prima facie attempt at regime change liberation. As such, whilst the previous approach may serve its purpose, Alderson extrapolates that “every campaign has its own unique problems, that require bespoke strategic, operational and tactical solutions”42. To this end, express counter insurgency moves within military strategy should not be viewed as being part of a replacement doctrine at the expense of real war fighting capabilities particularly when the crux of hybrid warfare presses the need for bespoke tactical solutions. Such a narrow view of military doctrine ignores the reality that insurgency operations are a reality in warfare and therefore counter insurgency operations are vital to preserve and maintain real war fighting capabilities in order to avoid the pitfalls in the harsh lessons learned in Iraq. Bibliography Alderson, A. (2007). Revising the British Army Counter Insurgency Doctrine. Available at www.rusi.org Accessed February 2010. Banchik, M (2003) “The International Criminal Court and Terrorism”. 3 Peace, Conflict and Development Blakesley, P. (2004). Shock and Awe: A widely misunderstood concept. United States Army Command and General Staff College, June 17, 2004 Cassidy, R. (2009) Counterinsurgency and the global war on terror: military culture, Greenwood Publishing. Cheney, Heritage Foundation Speech 2003 available at www.heritage.org/Research/index_hl2003.cfm Accessed February 2010. General Danatt, R. (2008). The Land Environment - Moving Towards 2018. Available at www.rusi.org Accessed 26 February 2009. Donnelly, T. (2004). Operation Iraqi Freedom: A strategic assessment. American Enterprise Institute Galula, D. (2006). Counter-insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Westport, CT: Praeger Geneva Centre for the Democratic Armed Forces Report “Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Government: Private Military and Security Companies”(The Geneva Report) (2007) available at www.ejpd.admin.ch/etc/medialib.data/...Par.../ber-dcaf-teil2-e.pdf p.7 accessed February 2010. Glenn, R. (2009). Thoughts on Hybrid Conflict. Small Wars Journal. Hoffman, F. (2007). Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. Hoffman, F. (2009) Hybrid Warfare and Challenges. JFR, Issue 52, 1st Quarter 2009. Knights, M. (2005). Cradle of Conflict: Iraq and the birth of modern US military power. Naval Institute Press Mahmood, 2008 at www.stormingmedia.us/19/1979/A197974.html Accessed February 2010. Nagl, J. (2002) Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. Praeger Publishers Peltz, E. (2005). Sustainment of Army Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Battlefield Logistics Igor Primoratz. (2004) Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues. Palgrave Macmillan, Scarhill, J. (2008) Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army. Nation Books Revised Edition, Ullman, H., & Wade, J. (2008). Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance (1996) National Defense University available at www.gutenberg.org Accessed February 2010. Williamson, C. S. (2009). From Fourth Generation Warfare to Hybrid Warfare Wulf, H. (2004). Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries. Berghof Handbook Series. Read More