Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis - Essay Example

John Fitzgerald Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis When Kennedy became the President of the United States he didn’t come into a vacuum, but inherited some problems from the previous administration – not least was the proximity of Cuba and the situation there. Kennedy was of course killed in tragic circumstances at the height of his powers, and that perhaps meant it was felt to be almost impossible to criticise him as president in the years immediately following. Now in the 21st century the argument that President Kennedy acted recklessly during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 is being put forward by historians such as the revisionist Barton Bernstein.1 Worse, he claims that the president, instead of using diplomatic channels, which might well have been effective, chose a very public military response. This essay will argue that while, to a certain extent, the above argument can be substantiated in that he did not use diplomatic methods, but at the same time Kennedy was not unduly reckless. His critics place their emphasis on his actions alone rather than the reasoning behind them. Such critics claim that Kennedy turned down a possible political solution to what was essentially a political problem and instead instituted an uncalled for military response. This charge of recklessness does not necessarily take into account the pressures Kennedy was under domestically due to American perceptions of the problem, the influence of his various advisors upon his decisions and the point that Kennedy did not act alone. To be reckless can be defined as lacking caution or to disregard dangers or consequences of actions. However the available evidence about the Cuban Missile Crisis shows clearly that the President was well aware of possible dangers and was able to choose between several possible alternative scenarios as presented by his advisors. What ever he decided it cannot be said that he acted in a political vacuum or without understanding the issues involved. There is however some evidence which points to Kennedy not acting out of purely concerns about national security according to writers such as Ronald Steel2 and James Nathan3. Castro had been in power for three years and America, still terrified of the idea of Communism after the McCarthy era, had a Communist state within a boat ride of the Florida coast. This not only led to military complications, but it also gave ammunition to opponents of the then administration. Earlier Dwight Eisenhower had been criticised by Democrats, but Kennedy the Democrat, inherited the same problem. There had already been the Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961, an unsuccessful attempt by Cuban exiles, acting with backing from the American government, to overthrow the Cuban dictator Fidel Castro.4 Back in the time of Eisenhower there had been considerable friction between the U.S. government and Castro's Communist regime. Relations between the two countries had been broken off by Eisenhower in January 1961, but even earlier Cuban exiles were being trained by the Central Intelligence Agency in order to prepare them for a possible invasion of Cuba. Kennedy had approved such plans. Then, in October 1962, only three weeks before the Congressional elections, it was discovered that missile sites were being constructed on Cuban soil. Aerial photographs clearly showed Soviet soldiers who were in the process of hurriedly constructing secretly bases for the future launch of nuclear missiles. According to Professor Ernest May5 the Soviets had for some time been openly sending defensive weapons to their ally Cuba. These included surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles. President Kennedy had already that he would not make a protest about Cuba having defensive weapons, but had also warned that if offensive weapons were installed , 'the gravest issues would arise’.6 But these secret installations were a huge step up. The already difficult situation had reached a climax. . Those who claim that Kennedy acted rashly tend to focus upon the fact that Kennedy acted in a very public way.7 They claim that resolution only came about because of Soviet moderation rather than any American action. They argue that Kennedy’s actions were driven by personal political considerations in order to improve his and his party’s standing before the important Congressional elections. Steel 8asks whether America came close to atomic destruction in order to prop up the flagging Kennedy administration.. His argument seems to be based in part upon Kennedy’s foreign affairs record up until that point. When he was still in the early months of his presidency in June 1961, Soviet leader Khrushchev announced that he would soon sign a peace treaty with East Germany, thus widening Communist influence and power in Europe. In August of that year the building of the Berlin Wall began, and also the Soviet Union announced publicly that they would once more be testing nuclear weapons. Such incidents worked to lower Kennedy’s standing on the world stage. The Soviet premier had repeatedly promised that he would not provide Castro with offensive weapons. America's top political analysts had believed the Russian’s words, according to Professor May,9 but now that promise had been broken. Kennedy’s choice of a public, media revelation of the missile crisis could possible be seen as an attempt to enhance his perceived status politically and at the same time taking the limelight away from the Communists. Steel’s claim is that Kennedy was a proud man who :- Was acutely conscious of any questioning of his courage, and with the ashes of the Vienna encounter with Krushchev still in his mouth and another Berlin crisis brewing, he had to get the missiles out of Cuba.10 Steel’s argument may have some validity if Kennedy had acted immediately in reaction to the U2 photographs of the Cuban construction of a missile launch pad in October 1962. Despite the revelation he, and the vice president Lyndon Johnson, continued with their campaign schedule. This was done it is said in an attempt to continue as normal rather than act in a decisive manner. However it also gave Kennedy time to consider his actions more carefully before making a response – not a reckless reaction. He decided to let the American people in on the situation in a televised broadcast of the 22nd October 1962. He called for a strict quarantine on any offensive military apparatus and included a public call to Krushchev to eliminate this threat to global peace and to make relations between the two nations (the Soviet Union and the United States of America) more stable. He was placing the ball in the Kremlin’s court and out of his own. The response however was a negative one. Krushchev declared that such a blockade was illegal and the Soviet Union would not observe it. He also demanded the removal of American missiles from Turkey (Not too far from Soviet borders) as well as insisting that America must not invade Cuba. Kennedy had in fact chosen a milder course of action than the majority of his advisers were recommending at the time. Kennedy had acted as modern governments usually do in that the information was not made instantly public, but time was allowed for careful consideration and analysis of the situation. He hadn’t acted totally independently, but had quickly established the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, which included the young Robert Kennedy, which was able to come up with alternate opinions and possible options. Also included were C. Douglas Dillon who had links with the Republican leadership, Dean Acheson and Robert Lovett, who having served earlier under President Harry Truman and it was hoped could see the present crisis in longer historical terms, and Llewellyn (Tommy) Thompson, who has a former ambassador to the Soviet Union, who perhaps the best acquainted with Khrushchev among White House advisors. A number of alternative scenarios were debated, but these were whittled down to a few – the launch of a nuclear strike against the missile sites, a strike using conventional weapons to be followed by an invasion, or the initiating of a naval blockade i.e. a siege. Gradually the majority opinion turned towards carrying out a conventional strike and plans were designed. Robert Kennedy however did not want America to make a surprise attack. He favoured a naval cordon which he felt could lead to increased pressure upon the Cubans later if required, with the opportunity to step up pressure at a later date if necessary. Together with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dean Acheson, the former Secretary of State who had long dominated American foreign policy, instead voted in favour of an air strike. Such a surprise attack was felt to be illegal according to Article Two/3 of the United Nations’ Charter11. Kennedy chose the blockade, referred to as ‘quarantine’ – the least bellicose and reckless option available to him and one in line with international law. Despite claims of revisionists according to Paterson and Brophy,12 political concerns did not take up much time in the discussions between the Executive Committee and the President at the time. Only if Kennedy had been first of all been concerned with his political future rather than national security could his actions be considered as reckless.. It may well that the Cuban Missile Crisis ended because of diplomatic action and Soviet reasonableness, but, just like Kennedy, the actions of others concerned were not carried out in a political vacuum and Kennedy was one of several players with his considered response. Arthur Schlesinger 13claims the Cuban crisis showed to the world:- The ripening of American leadership unsurpassed in responsible management of power’. Those who do not oppose Kennedy’s choices feel that the crisis in fact served to relieve Cold War tensions. I t also had positive consequences. There was the putting into place of a Moscow-Washington ‘hotline’ and the weapons testing agreements that followed. The revisionists allege on the other hand that the aftermath of the crisis was a fresh nuclear arms race. Despite this it seems that Kennedy was not predominately concerned in this case with political success. During the Executive Committee deliberations Kennedy had almost no time to give to potential internal political victories. The decisions finally made demonstrated considerable restraint as well as an understanding the implications of both international law and international opinions. There is no doubt that the President and his advisors fully understood the possible consequences of the situation as can be seen from his statement at the time :- I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace... He has an opportunity now to move the world back from the abyss of destruction.14 This may seem to be extravagant language , but as described by May, Eisenhower ,15 knowing how many nuclear weapons in total the two sides possessed, had calculated in 1960 that if either country actually used their stocks of nuclear weapons, that all people in the northern hemisphere would be destroyed. Kennedy recorded all the deliberations of his Committee so even today it is possible to know exactly what was said. At firs t all seem to have been in favour of bombing the island. The only differences of opinion were about the scale of such an attack. A few, Kennedy included, spoke of only attacking the actual missile bases in what they described as a ‘surgical strike’. The Chiefs of Staff together with a few of the others insisted that an attack must also remove any air defence sites and bomber aircraft. This would in return limit possible losses of American planes and prevent reprisals against American air bases. By the third day of debate another idea was put forward. George Ball, then acting as Under Secretary of State, made the comment that an American surprise attack would be:- ' .. like Pearl Harbor. It's the kind of conduct that one might expect of the Soviet Union. It is not conduct that one expects of the United States.16 It was decided that a public announcement by the President would give time for the United States of America to gain support from other countries. The group could not be considered as either reckless or as disregarding the consequences. Military action was eventually avoided despite the fact that Kennedy was responding to what he clearly saw as an aggressive act on the part of the Soviet Union. Krushchev had betrayed him, earlier having agreed to do nothing to raise tensions in the run up to the Congressional elections as described by Theodore Sorenson., the Presidential Counsel at the time.17 I t seems that the claims of the revisionists are mainly because of his making the issue so very public, rather than what he actually did about it. Diplomatically Kennedy did refuse to exhibit a public back down, but on the other hand he did order the removal of the missiles in Turkey. Rather than being labelled as ‘reckless’ his actions should perhaps ultimately be labelled as ‘effective’ and ‘long lasting.’ Bibliography Bernstein, B, ‘The Cuban Missile Crisis’, in Miller, L and Pruessen, R (eds), Reflections on the Cold War: A Quarter Century of American Foreign Policy, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1974, pp.121-125. Charter of the United Nations http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml accessed 23rd February 2010, Kennedy, J. Inaugural Address January 20th 1961, on ’35 John F. Kennedy, The White House http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/johnfkennedy, accessed 23rd February 2010 Kennedy, J. John F. Kennedy quotes, Quotes and Sayings, http://www.quotesandsayings.com/quotes/john-kennedy/ accessed 23rd February 2010 Kennedy, J., Televised speech, Cuban Missile Crisis Address to the Nation, 22nd October 1962 http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkcubanmissilecrisis.html accessed 23rd February 2010 May, E., John F Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis, World Wars in Depth, BBC History, 5th November 2009, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/coldwar/kennedy_cuban_missile_01.shtml accessed 23rd February 2010 Nathan, J, ‘The Missile Crisis’, World Politics, No. 27, 1974-5. Paterson, T and Brophy, W, ‘October Missiles and November Elections: The Cuban Missile Crisis and American Politics, 1962’, The Journal of American History, Vol. 73, No. 1, June 1986, pp. 87-119. Schlesinger, A, Robert Kennedy and his Times, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1978. Sorenson, T, Kennedy, Harper and Row, New York, 1965. Steel, R ‘Review of Thirteen Days’ in New York Review of Books, No. 13, March 1969. The Bay of Pigs, 14 Days in October http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days/bay_of_pigs.html accessed 23rd February 2010 Read More