Hamas - Terrorist Organization, Popular Amongst Its Populace - Case Study Example

 HAMAS - Terrorist Organization, Popular amongst its Populace HAMAS My experience teaches me that truth can never be propagated by doing violence. Those who believe in the justice of their cause have need to possess boundless patience and those alone are fit to offer civil disobedience who are above committing criminal disobedience or doing violence. ……..…. Mahatma Gandhi (Prabhu & Rao, 138) 1. Hamas These words from Mahatma Gandhi – who dedicated his entire life to propagate non-violence clearly indicate that terrorism and or violence are no means to achieve justice. His world renowned philosophies posit that patience is prime the pathway to attain justice. This case study will make an attempt to delineate the fundamental nature, reality, existence and objectives of an approach, popularly termed as “terrorism”, that is radically opposite to the Ghandian philosophy. In order to achieve the goal of this study, a terrorist group called “HAMAS” has been selected to be studied as the case. At the outset, it may be pertinent to understand the term “terrorism”. As per Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorism has been defined as the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. Usually terrorists - the proponents and practitioners of terrorism, aim unlawful use of force to terrorise the group that, in normal conditions, does not endorse their ideologies. In recent times, organizational terrorism, one of the variants of terrorism has arisen in almost all parts of the globe and have remained in the spotlight from quite sometime. Majorly, terrorism is centered around the effort to draw the attention of the governments to the cause of these organizations. Universally it is believed that such terrorist groups or organizations lack political support or social backing. 2. The Origin As per one of the Hadiths (utterances and practices/decisions of Prophet Mohammed, Hadiths were collected after his death and they help with respect to the interpretation and understanding of Quran – the Holy Book): “The Day of Judgment will not come about until Moslems fight Jews, when Jew will hide behind stones and trees. The stones and trees will say, O Moslems, O Abdullah there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him. Only Gharkad tree, would not do that because it is one of the trees of the Jews” (Hamas Covenant 1988). Article Seven of 1988 covenant as per which the radical Islam group called Islamic Resistance Movement or Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya – Hamas in abbreviated form, was formed. Many feel that Hamas is an Israeli creation, on the contrary Israelis feel that Hamas was created by Iran and that Iranians support it through funding, training and by providing resources like weapons etc. Literature indicates that Hamas’s formed from the ranks of Muslim Brothers Movement, in the Islamic Center in the Gaza Strip. Hamas was founded by Sheikh Yasir Ahmed during the first Palestinian Intifada on December 14, 1987. Israeli Military Administration legalized the Mujamma‘ (the Islamic Center) in 1978 and the Mujamma‘ became responsible for development, administration and control of religious and Islamic institutions within the Gaza Strip. The Mujamma‘ leaders enabled social activities at the individual and societal levels those were conducted as per the Islamic norms. These were primarily pivoted on the strategic goals of up liftment of the Muslim community and to set up schools and Quranic classes to spread the message of Allah. The feeling that Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was reduced to a state of insignificancy (politically and otherwise) the Mujamma‘ leadership started pondering dwelling on the idea of becoming PLO’s alternative. This called for a revamp in Mujamma‘- conceptually, strategically and structurally to gear up for armed struggle against Israel. Sheikh Yasir Ahmed directed the followers to smuggle weapons and firearms. During the same period there was a growing tendency amongst Islamic youth to take to violent activities against Israel, this fact facilitated the establishment of Movement of the Islamic Resistance, i.e. Hamas. Hamas reflected a shift of ideologies in their strategy from reformist to political. 3. The Structure As per practitioners’ and researchers’, Hamas’s inter and intra-organizational engagements are based on hierarchical structure (Mishal, 580) and annually around USD 90 million is spent for educational and other social welfare projects which include building up of hospitals, orphanages etc. Owing to this all, few scholars have classified Hamas to be a social organization but at the same time there have been claims about Hamas’s being a terrorist outfit. The internal structure of Hamas has been quiet similar to other terrorist organizations where the prime goals are clandestinely resilient and flexible operations. To make it difficult to be cracked down, Hamas has been understood to been operating in discrete, disparate and small operational groups. The political bureau that was at the top of the pyramidal structure, was responsible for laying policies and guidelines. This bureau also managed and executed the terrorist acts against its opponents (primarily military, the citizens and other groups with clashing objectives). Hamas is a hierarchical organization and it has various sections each of which has a clear cut roles to be executed. Functionally, Hamas comprises of the five prime divisions (jihaaz), these are: • Al-Ahdaath (Events)- this division would coordinate strikes and boycotts of Israeli products. Al-Ahdaath would provide first aid and arrange funerals of martyred Palestinians. This jihaaz also acted as the eyes of Hamas leaders by providing information like public opinion, street developments etc. It is also reported to undertake monitoring of dubious looking collaborators and others specially Palestinians who are in touch with Israelis. • Al-Ilaami (Media) - this division is synonymous with public relations office, Al-Ilaami would communicate with the world media and would make sure that Hamas’ messages reach their intended destinations (Gray & Larson 127). This wing would also note the reactions and statements of various international media to understand the effect of their activities on the intended population. Al-Ilaami is also responsible for inducting, training and managing journalists to report for Hamas, through their publications and website. • Al-Amn (Security) - is the security section that would verify the credentials and character of its new recruits, Al-Amn would also carry out intelligence related activities like prevention of infiltration by Israeli agencies and informants etc. (Aboul-Enein 1) • Al-Aksary (Military) - trains new recruits, it also prepares the blue-print of the missions and executes violent plans against their enemies. Sheikh Salaah Muhammad Shehaada set up this wing. The Fatah militants were inducted into Al-Aksary. This military wing was responsible for setting up of underground training and firing sites. The key objectives of the Hamas’s military indicated that Hamas would resort to violent activities such as suicidal attacks, guerilla action and terror campaigns. • Ansar (Helpers) - comprises of Palestinians who are not full Hamas’ members but are ‘charter’ members, they assist and support Hamas to graduate as full members. The Helpers were recruited at schools, colleges and union. The three mandatory conditions to become helper of Hamas are: To be supportive towards Hamas’s doctrine and goals. To religiously follow Islamic ideals. To undergo a security check to ascertain if the member is serious about joining the Helpers group. In a nut shell, Hamas is supposed to have been inspired by KGB – USSR’s national security agency and various feature films for developing their operational security. They have been using dead drops in passing messages and Quranic ciphering for writing messages and for preparing other documents. 4. Goals and Motivation Three key goals are driving Hamas. These are: 1. Even before its formation as a part of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas has, aimed at injecting the spirit of Islam in the Palestinian society by encouraging Islam based education and other social activities. 
 2. Hamas wants to liberate Palestine and create it as an Islamic State. As per Hamas, it is only through the revival of Islam can Palestine be liberated. 3. Hamas aims to take care of the welfare of he populace in and around the region it operates. As mentioned earlier Hamas has invested considerably in social activities like setting up of schools, colleges, hospitals and orphanages and also maintains a large network of social welfare organizations. It can be seen that Hamas presents a blend of social and political objectives which seem to be competing against each other (Jarbawi 2008). This can be seen from the fact that on one side Hamas wants to take over Palestine by the use or force and on the other Hamas wishes to preserve wellbeing of the region in which it operates. Such a wide range of activities in its objectives, brings into a significant flexibility in their operations. There have been a number of instances when Hamas had to face dilemmas and in such circumstances Hamas’ inclination towards its political interests. It is worth inclusion here that the two sides (social and political) of Hamas are mutually exclusive and independent of the other. As far as the social aspect of Hamas is concerned, three causes of anxiety come into existence, these are: Firstly, the Palestinian Islamic social organizations could act as conduits to enable channeling of funds to Hamas’ political and military activities. However, these claims have been refuted by all associated with these social welfare organizations. Secondly, it is being apprehended that these social associations operating under the aegis of Hamas, could serve the purpose of recruitment or encourage violent activities. Thirdly, it is felt that Hamas could make use of these organizations to extend its political coverage. But for all reasons, these organizations do act as image boosters for Hamas because it provides services of immense social relevance like running of schools, protecting economically poor sections of the society, management of orphanages etc. 4. The Threat Holocaust survivor Clara Rosenberger wanted to feel safe after a shooting attack in Netanya a few weeks earlier, so she decided to celebrate the Passover Seder in a communal setting at the Park Hotel. It was a decision she and 154 other wounded victims would live to regret; 29 less fortunate victims died when Hamas suicide bomber Abdel Aziz Basset Odeh, disguised as a woman to hide the explosives-laden vest strapped to his torso, entered the hotel dining hall and detonated the bomb sewn into his clothes in the midst of some 250—mostly elderly—people. (Levitt, 4) The case in point indicates the potency of the violent activities those have been carried out by Hamas. It may be painful to learn that between 2000 and 2009 Hamas has carried out over 425 various kinds of terrorist attacks. Over 1100 Israelis have been killed and around 2000 civilians and soldiers have been wounded. Furthermore, over 140 suicide bombing attacks have killed over 542 Israelis (see Figure 1). Fig.1 Depiction of Suicide attacks by Hamas, between 2000 and 2007, from “Anti-Israel Terrorism in 2007 and its Trends in 2008” (Tel Aviv: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center, 2008) A couple of years earlier, in Gaza, Hamas had 5,000 to 6,000 fighters and it had plans to double this number to 12,000 (Zuhur, 59). As of now it has been mentioned that today, Hamas has around 10,000 fighters. It may not be tenable to anticipate the actual threat posed by Hamas. But by all means Hamas is significantly smaller than Israeli Defence Forces. Hamas is said to be using state of the art weapons and arsenal included shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, it also uses numerous types of rocket launchers. 6. Effectiveness of policies to combat Hamas As per analysts, Israel’s conquest of Gaza will not help to bring peace nor will it bring Hamas to an end. This is so because the settlement with Israel is a dual problem that is not only technical but infested with corruption as well. On the other front, the Bush Administration while softening their stand with respect to Hamas, had accepted Hamas’ request to contest Palestinian elections. Hamas could secure a landslide win in January 2006 by claiming 76 seats out of 132 member Parliament (over 44% Palestinians polled in favour of Hamas). It is worth mentioning here that these were the first democratic elections in the Palestine authority (Mehr, 8). All most all including Hamas leaders, Israel and the US were surprised at this victory (Kifner, 2006). Analysts have indicated that the popular rise of Hamas is not because of its political goals but it is so because of the social reasons and for the reason that the win was a sort of a no confidence vote in Fatach party. The success of Hamas is expected to impact countries like Egypt and Jordan. As per the analysts, the only policy that can help to control Hamas is that it out to combine battle of arms and battle of ideas by adopting a stringent strategic effort against terror with international effort to strengthen and recognize Palestine National Authority (PNA) amongst Arab countries and also revive PNA without using Dawa (political and social activities of Hamas) funds. Such actions when adopting over short and long run may help to enable peace with Hamas. Since the populace of Palestine has indicated faith in Hamas, eliminating Hamas is certainly not the solution, in stead creation of the situation as per which it may become more practical for the sake of terror and take a normative part in activities of the future. References: "Hamas Covenant 1988." The Avalon Project. Yale University Press, Web. 2 Dec 2009. . Aboul-Enein, Youssef H. "Hamas, Understanding the Organization." Military Review July - August 2003: 1-4. Anti-Israel Terrorism in 2007 and its Trends in 2008. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2008. 34. Gray, David H, and John B Larson. "Grass Roots Terrorism: How Hamas’ Structure Defines a Policy of Counterterrorism." Research Journal of Internatıonal Studıes. 8. (2008): 125-131. Jarbawi, Ali. "Hamas and Israel: a hostile but symbiotic relationship." Al Arabia News Channel 30 September 2008: 1. Web. 2 Dec 2009. . Kifner, John. "How Hamas Rose From Wild Card to Power." www.nytimes.com. 29 001 2006. The New York Times. 30 Nov 2009. . Levitt, Metthew. HAMAS: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism. London: Yale University Press, 2006. 4. Mehr, Ben-Zion. "Hamas – How Has a Terrorist Organization Become a Political." Strategy Research Project. (2008): 8. Mishal, Shaul. "The Pragmatic Dimension of the Palestinian Hamas: A Network Perspective." Armed Forces and Society. 29.4 (2003): 580. Prabhu, Ramachandra Krishna, and U.R. Rao. Mind of Mahatma Gandhi. 1st ed. South East Asia Books, 1998. 138. Zuhur, Sherifa. Hamas and Israel:Conflicting Strategies of Groups-Based Politics . Pennsylvania: The Strategic Studies Institute, 2008. 59. Read More