Historical Origins of Mercenaries - Term Paper Example

Historical Origins of Mercenaries For all of recorded human history and most likely beyond, mercenarieshave been an integral part of structured warfare. Only since the nineteenth century has the use of mercenaries been the exception and not the norm during military conflicts. Only in modern times did armies motivated by nationalist allegiances predominate. However, the mercenary profession has seen resurgence in the last few decades. Various African nations have experienced a need for outsourcing military services as has the U.S. to shore-up its depleted forces in Iraq. Additionally, the United Nations is currently considering using mercenaries in regions such as Rwanda and Darfur, Sudan. The history of the oldest profession for men is long, rich with glorious accounts of adventure, an integral part of world changing events and the topic of this discussion. The ancient Greeks and the Romans were known to use mercenaries on many occasions. The Egyptian Pharaoh Ramses II hired Numidian mercenaries to fight in the Battle of Kadesh in 1294 B.C. (Dupuy, 1986: 98). King David of Biblical fame utilized mercenaries in 1000 B.C. to drive the Philistines from his homeland of Israel. Hannibal’s army which made the epic march across the Alps in a bid to invade Italy and conquer the Roman Empire in 200 B.C. was entirely composed of mercenaries. Half of the Norman army that invaded and conquered England in 1066 was hired by William the Conqueror. During the Italian Renaissance, cities contracted mercenaries (condottieri) to guard against impending rivals from attacking and to prevent upsetting “the productive economy by forcing normal citizens into military service” (Zarate, 1998: 84). The majority of the army that fought the Thirty Years’ War that lasted from1618 to1648 was made up of mercenaries and the British famously hired Hessians to fight the Americans against during the American Revolutionary War (Zarate, 1998: 85). Hiring foreign military forces was commonplace until the 1870 Franco-German War. This was the first war in which the ‘nation-in-arms’ model gained predominance among the militaries of the world. Following this conflict, armies become increasingly built on the concept of national loyalty (Milliard, 2003: 6). In ancient Greece, mercenaries were used extensively in several aspects of warfare and became tightly interwoven within the economic and social fabric of the era. The Spartan, Persian and Athenian naval fleets provided employment for many thousands of indigent men. The constant conflicts which raged over the entire Mediterranean area during this period provided the need for employment which in turn supplied the armies. Tyrannical rulers emerged in many Greek cities and throughout Persia during this time which contributed to the increasing instability of these regions. These barbaric rulers “willingly employed men from outside the states they ruled, to support their regimes and to wage aggressive wars” (Sage, 1996). Mercenaries remained a fundamental aspect of society in this region of the world including areas of warfare, economics and politics. Without their unique services, many cities and states would have been brutally conquered. In the fifth century BC, Greek cities did not have a need for mercenaries because the prosperity experienced during this era allowed for many of the men to easily secure employment in the civilian sector (Parke, 1933: 14). By 400 BC, this ceased to be the case. The Peloponnesian War, which lasted for almost 30 years along with the depressed economic conditions of the fourth century B.C. fueled the need for mercenaries. The agricultural sector was severely affected which forced many farmers, who previously were the group that sustained Grecian armies, to leave their farms to pursue work as mercenaries. In 380 BC, Isocrates wrote regarding the situation, “many (are) compelled through want of daily bread to serve as mercenaries” (Griffith, 1968: 4). The increase in the supply of manpower caused by the economic downturn resulted in the lowering of pay for mercenaries. “Between 400 and 350 BC the rate of pay for mercenaries fell from as many as eight to four obols per day” (Griffith, 1968: 297). This amount had again decreased by half by the late fifth century A.D. which now coincided with the wages unskilled workers made. Unlike these low-paid workers, mercenaries also expected to acquire a share of the spoils of war through pillaging. In addition, the reward for victory was another mission and more riches to acquire. As an example, “Alexander rewarded the Thessalian cavalry for its bravery at Ipsus by sending them in advance of his main army to occupy Damascus” (Tarn, 1925). Mercenaries were often recruited from the economically disadvantaged regions of the ancient through medieval periods. Rome conscripted Cretans, Gauls, Numidians and others to fight in the Punic Wars. By the third century A.D., German mercenary detachments were the Roman army’s greatest strength. In Venice, recruits for mercenary work came from Dalmatia. The mountainous regions of Europe provided a majority of the mercenaries utilized during the Middle Ages. Kings of England Richard I and Henry II hired mercenaries from the mountainous areas of Wales and France. Genoese crossbowmen were generally recruited from the Ligurian hills, Sardinia and Corsica (Delbruck, 1975: Vol. 2, 250). A steady source of mercenaries in the medieval England period was the younger sons of noblemen. Those who had been disowned by their family and were not willing to enter the Church became mercenaries. The knights of medieval England are an example. Some worked for the same Lord while others traveled the country offering their services to the highest bidder. Many of these mercenaries united with William the Conqueror during the 1066 English invasion hoping to receive allotments of land for their efforts. Those that were hired as mercenaries during the Crusades were similarly motivated. As the economy of England experienced a revival during the thirteenth century and population centers became the economic focal point of the nation, noblemen, who generally owned land outside these areas, increasingly found cash in short supply. Lords could no longer afford mercenaries but the towns now could (Gaier, 1965). Because of the plague, labor became increasingly scarce during the fourteenth century particularly in England and Italy. As an example, in Florence, Italy, the population fell from near 100,000 in 1300 to just over 50,000 by the year 1400. The labor shortage forced cities to build fortifications to protect themselves then following the plague; mercenaries were employed for offensive campaigns as the city was now defensively fortified (Cipolla, 1980: 302). Long, enduring military campaigns necessitated the need for mercenaries. Citizen soldiers could not be used in far-off pursuits because they had to be back on the farm to plant and harvest. If they were involved in a long military campaign, the citizens of the town would starve. They were a good fit as defenders of fortified cities but only mercenaries could be relied upon for missions far from home. “Mercenaries could be used to garrison strongholds or fortified positions, for they could be continuously employed, as citizen troops could not be. And, having no homes, they were not always longing to return to them. And through the winter they could earn their retaining fee, while citizen troops were accustomed to fight only in the good season of the year” (Adcock, 1957: 22). Hiring mercenaries was found to be cost-effective in part because, unlike a standing army, they could be released at the end of a military campaign. During the sixteenth century, German mercenaries earned about the same amount of money as skilled workers but looting supplemented this income. According to the contract they signed, they could essentially keep what they found or took from enemy soldiers. This supplemental income increased their earnings to approximately double what the average skilled worker earned. Another source of income involved ransoming prisoners. “Around 1600, it was fair to require as ransom the annual income of the prisoner’s property or his annual pay if he did not possess property” (Redlich, 1956: 33). From the earliest beginnings of warfare through the sixteenth century, generally speaking, combat skills were of more importance on the battlefield in deciding a conflict than were mere numbers. The emergence of large-scale nationalist armies caused a reduction of need for mercenaries. The use of firearms was also emerging at this time which further reduced the role of the highly skilled mercenary soldier. Firearms had several distinct advantages over the use of longbows and crossbows. Bow use required training and skill, which the mercenary already possessed but aiming and shooting a musket took much less time in which to become proficient. In addition, firearms were less costly because it took far fewer weapons and men to affect a similar outcome (O’Connell, 1989: 111). By the late 1700’s, the period of the French Revolution, nationalist armies began to be the favored method of fighting wars and by 1870, during the Franco-Prussian War; this method was used almost exclusively. From the eighteenth century forward to today, economic prosperity and expansion has brought about a further reduction in the available supply of mercenary soldiers. Along with a diminished supply, the demand decreased as well as countries began forming their own standing armies. As a consequence, wages for mercenary work fell steadily. “The foot soldier of the 18th century received pitifully low wages. In the era of Frederick William I, a Prussian infantryman received eight groschens for five days plus free clothing and shelter while a Brandenburg clothmaker earned two to three groschens per day” (Redlich, 1964: Vol. 2, 246). The years of the Cold War (1945-1989) saw a major buildup in arms and soldiers by the developed countries of the world particularly in the U.S. and the former Soviet Union. Following this period, large stores of both military commodities have been in a state of over-abundance. Many highly-skilled soldiers became suddenly unemployed but events worldwide, particularly in Africa, have increased demand for mercenary soldiers. Both the Americans and Soviets were quick to help support other countries militarily and/or financially if they agreed to political concessions which were seldom an issue for desperate nations. The end of the Cold War meant that the two superpowers had less incentive to support other regimes thus these smaller, less developed nations began relying on mercenaries for military assistance. The scaling back of the militaries of the former Cold War adversaries has increased the demand for mercenaries in the developed world as well. For the past quarter century, nations of all types have found it necessary to outsource the training and supply of these military and security needs. Private Military Companies (PMC) have emerged to fill this void. PMCs are described as “profit driven organizations that trade in professional services intricately linked to warfare offering services that range from operational support and military training to strategic planning and even full-scale combat. PMCs bring their military expertise to places where Developed World armies are often loath to intervene” (Zarate, 1998: 75). Mercenaries have played an integral part in shaping the history of the world and did not disappear simply because many nations replaced them with armies of their own. They now exist principally within a corporate setting, a type of venue which began about a thousand years ago when the rulers of the Byzantine Empire hired highly trained Norse mercenaries. Corporate mercenaries have evolved, grown and prospered over the many years of their existence as have PMCs. “Post-Cold War military demobilization and lucrative opportunities in the private sector have been a boon to PMC recruiting. Insurance tends to be comprehensive and the salary well exceeds government-grade pay” (Zarate, 1998: 85). The benefits that modern PMCs offer have been an attractive draw for the professional soldier. The mercenaries of today come from all the nations of the world especially the U.K., South Africa and the U.S. PMCs have grown since the years of the Cold War primarily because developed countries have experienced an increase in the need for the military knowledge and access to personnel which is precisely what modern PMCs provide. The armies of the world shrunk by an astounding six million during the decade of the 1990’s while, at the same time, many governments of developed nations developed non-intervention policies except in matters concerning national defense. Because of these factors, there has been an upswing in the need for trained mercenaries for the first time in nearly 200 years. Corporate mercenaries have taken the place of nationalist soldiers because “they can perform services which governments approve of, but hesitate to attempt themselves because of political, military or financial costs” (Howe, 1998: 5). PMCs have been contracted to perform specific duties for the U.S. in every key post-Cold War military venture, served in place of American soldiers in Liberia and Colombia among others and operate the communications and computer systems for NORAD. PMCs have also been busy in developing nations fighting small-scale battles, many of which are not well-known to the outside world. Developing nations do not have access to high technology weaponry therefore require the assistance of PMCs. “Almost any group operating inside a weak state can now acquire at least limited military capabilities, thus lowering the bar for creating viable threats to the status quo” (Zarate, 1998: 95). Blackwater USA, a preeminent PMC in the U.S. is currently supplying the American military with security troops in Iraq. This firm has been contracted by the Pentagon to supply forces to guard against insurgent attacks on oil wells. Blackwater USA has recruited heavily from Chile for this mission. Chilean commandoes first train at Blackwater facilities in North Carolina before being deployed to Iraq where they will remain for six months to a year. According to Gary Jackson, President of Blackwater USA, “We scour the ends of the earth to find professionals. The Chilean commandos are very, very professional and they fit within the Blackwater system” (Santiago, 2004). The U.S. is facing a shortage of troops in Iraq and has hired more than 10,000 private security forces to fill this gap. Troops from America, the Philippines and Bosnia, all possessing experience in the special forces are employed in Iraq for various duties such as airport and oil field security to protecting dignitaries. These modern-day mercenaries earn as much as $1000 per day. A former sergeant in the U.S. army who is presently employed as a private soldier said, “This place is a goldmine. All you need is five years in the military and you come here and make a good bundle” (Santiago, 2004). PMCs such as Blackwater USA go further than simply training and supplying security personnel. They also offer an extensive psychological counseling program. “I personally come from a special operations background and I feel comfortable that we have the procedures in place that will allow them [the mercenary soldiers] to handle the stress” (Jackson cited in Santiago, 2004). International laws concerning the regulation of activities involving mercenaries were first documented with the Hague Convention of 1907. In short, this international agreement explicitly does not prevent persons from crossing a nation’s border to lend support as mercenaries (Hague Convention, 1907). The United Nations, in 1970, echoed the Hague Convention ruling. U.N. Resolution 2625 held that “states may not organize or encourage mercenaries, but the states are not forbidden from knowingly tolerating mercenary conduct which crosses state borders” (United Nations General Assembly, 1970). The Geneva Convention, which is concerned with the treatment of prisoners of war does not speak to the specific behavior of mercenaries but does require the nations that signed the Conventions to “hold mercenaries accountable for conduct that amounts to grave breaches of the Conventions’ terms” (Geneva Convention, 1946). Collectively, these international laws regarding mercenaries affirm that individual nation states are not allowed to encourage, organize, or dispatch mercenaries but may knowingly allow mercenary endeavors. International law does not address private corporations within nations that train and supply mercenaries. Had the United Nations employed mercenaries through a PMC, such as Blackwater USA, to intervene early on in the civil war that ravaged Rwanda, for example, hundreds of thousands of innocent people would be alive today. “From 1990 to 1994, Rwanda was plagued by a civil war between Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups” (Keeler, 2002). Mass violence engulfed the region including rapes, assaults and murders beginning in 1990 and escalated to a peak in 1994. Neither the U.N. nor individual countries came to the aid of these desperate people. The world watched while, in just the span of 100 days, 600,000 Rwandan citizens were butchered and this is only a three month period during the four years of genocide in that country. Though the use of a PMC at the height of violence in this region probably would not have stopped the violence, had the U.N. sent mercenaries in 1990, the outcome most definitely would have been different and many lives would have been saved. “In the case of Rwanda, before the violence reached a critical mass, a PMC could have intervened to dispel the conditions which encouraged the bloodshed to escalate” (Shawcross, 2000: 129). In the given example, Rwanda could be substituted for Darfur, Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone or a host of other similar situations where mercenaries would have been useful had the world leaders had the foresight and wisdom to utilize their unique services. Those that are critical of the use of mercenaries argue that paid warriors do not promote long-term peace. However, men, much as weapons that are designed to kill, can be used to save lives and often have been throughout the history of the world. Critics also claim that mercenaries cannot be held liable for atrocities committed on the battlefield. Putting aside that a small percentage of all soldiers, state-sponsored or private, has the opportunity to go outside the rules of engagement; PMCs operate under contracts which could have enemy engagement rules written into them. Policing the world and preventing aggressive and horrific acts is the most honorable of professions. Many are willing and some are able and if only the world will recognize the benefit of mercenaries, the world will be a better place in which to live for all its inhabitants. Works Cited Adcock, F.E. The Greek and Macedonian Art of War. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1957. Cipolla, Carlo M. Before the Industrial Revolution: European Society and Economy, 1000-1700. New York: Norton, 1980. Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land (Hague Convention No. V). 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