Ethno Nationalist Terrorism - Essay Example

dear client, please do not submit this to your I have to revise this according to APA format. I am also revising the content because I misunderstood the instructions. the discussion has disproportionately focused on the PLO and Hamas. may I know when is your final submission? I apologize for this trouble. I’ll finalize the revision as soon as possible. thank you! sincerely, writer Ethno-Nationalist Terrorism The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was formed in Jerusalem in 1964.1 It was established due to several reasons, such as the expansion of covert, autonomous Palestinian nationalist movement, which Arab states tried to obstruct; the growing conflict between Israel and the Arab countries over water development plans and other issues; and the increasing importance of the Palestine issue in inter-Arab political affairs.2 The PLO immediately became the ground for numerous nationalist campaigns, which were more and more oriented toward attaining autonomy of political activity from the Arab states, besides the major aspiration to liberate Palestine and guarantee the return of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees.3 After the war of 1967, and the accompanying damage to the reputation of Arab states, supervision of the PLO was taken over by autonomous Palestinian political organizations with a more revolutionary agenda than that of the original organizers. These groups have governed the PLO from then on. Fatah, which means ‘conquest’ or ‘liberation’, is the biggest group within the PLO, and the Syrian division headed by Yasir Arafat.4 It became increasingly radical as Israel continuously achieved military success, and more uncompromising about returning territories seized from the Arabs. Even more radical factions formed within the PLO, such as the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Black September. These factions argued that the best way to force Israel to hand back the occupied territories was through terrorist activities.5 The Islamic Resistance Movement, or, Hamas, was the offspring of the intifada, which signified the onset of the real political resurgence of the Islamic forces in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Hamas was established in 1987 as a wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, a political and religious group formed in 1928 in Egypt.6 The primary objective of Hamas is to build an Islamic state in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. This objective merges Palestinian national aspiration and Islamist principles. Their ideology is precise on this issue: “Hamas regards nationalism as part and parcel of the religious faith. Nothing is loftier or deeper in nationalism than waging Jihad against the enemy and confronting him when he sets foot on the land of the Muslims.”7 The Muslim Brotherhood, the key Islamic movement in the invaded lands, had recoiled from forceful opposition against the Israeli invasion, a move that hindered its absolute progress as a major force. This state of affairs abruptly changed with the spate of Palestinian revolts, which pushed the Muslim Brotherhood to fulfill a dynamic part in the opposition for the first time.8 It fulfilled this role through Hamas. It was hence that the Islamic struggle, after decades of existence, successfully surfaced as the first real defiance ever initiated in the invaded lands. Hamas eventually surpassed the Muslim Brotherhood, with an enormity that resembles that of Fatah. Its establishment has generated fierce power struggles among political organizations that had held power for many years.9 Furthermore, the growing competition between the PLO’s secular national aspiration and Hamas’s Islamic philosophy may not end even in case the Israeli occupation comes to an end, because what is at issue is the identity and future of the Palestinian people. The conflict between PLO and Hamas is primarily rooted in their ideology, leadership, foreign policy, and relation with Israel. The key ideology motivating Hamas is extremist Islam. Extremist Islam is a utopian, visionary, and expansionist principle that generally rationalizes bloodshed and hostility on behalf of what is widely considered a nonviolent religion.10 Islamists also aspire for a unified Islamic state, led by a caliph, which would eventually govern the entire world. The holy war, or Jihad, is commonly believed to be the only way to realize these goals.11 Moreover, Islamists generally condemned the power of the West and even the authority of their secular regimes for being submissive to Western powers. The elimination of these Western-style governments eventually became an important component of the Islamist objective.12 Such cynical perception of secular governments was without a doubt the manner within which Hamas perceived the PLO, the Fatah, and the PA. Both the Fatah and PA had traditionally undertaken diplomatic transactions with the U.S. and even took part in dialogues with Israel concerning nonviolent resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian strife.13 The idea of conferring with Israel, a Jewish nation that Hamas views as a usurper of Muslim territories, has placed the PA and Fatah on the enemy list of Hamas. Within Gaza and the West Bank, the sole ideology that can rival the Islamist philosophy of Hamas is secular Palestinian national aspiration. This ideology is driven by the reasonable and rightful aspiration of the Palestinian people to build a polity with established and legitimate borders.14 Even though there is definitely nothing innately perilous about a people who desire to occupy the territory they believe is their historic native soil, nationalism has been the root of numerous hostilities and wars all over the world. Alongside irredentism and racial intolerance, nationalism can become as perilous as all other revolutionary ideologies. In its contemporary manifestation, as largely articulated by the PLO and Fatah, the philosophy of Palestinian nationalism usually satisfies these conditions. In spite of the fact that the PA, a semi-government peopled mostly by members of Fatah, is generally considered a neutral group within Palestinian politics, both the PA and Fatah have supported quite a few violent activities over the years.15 Since the mid-20th century, Palestinian nationalism has been rooted more in annihilation of a Jewish nation than building its own polity. Yasir Arafat hurled Palestinian nationalism into the global arena with astounding terrorist assaults against Israeli enemies.16 Arafat was a self-proclaimed activist who targeted Israel while also campaigning against it through different political means. The PLO became the paramount prototype for terrorist operations in the contemporary period.17 It may be argued that bloodshed for the sake of Palestinian nationalism has resulted in the devastation and fatalities in almost all the territories that the Palestinians have occupied in their pursuit of a nation. For instance, in the 1970s, the Fatah-supported PLO tried to seize control over Jordan. The outcome was Black September, a large-scale battle that led to the death of a huge number of Palestinians and the reappearance of a liberated Jordan.18 The PLO and Fatah afterward tried to build a mini-state in Lebanon, which further incited a chaotic civil conflict. Incapable of confronting the attacks from the north, Israel marched into Lebanon and the Palestinian people were compelled to take flight again.19 Ultimately, after years of banishment in Tunisia, the PLO moved down to Gaza and the West Bank after the ratification of the Oslo Accords between Palestinians and Israel in 1993. From then on, the two provinces have plunged into absolute chaos, reaching its climax in the vicious Hamas invasion of the Gaza Strip and the civil war in 2007.20 Conclusions Although Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank has achieved a certain level of success by developing into a key political movement in Palestinian society, this organization still confronts several problematic issues. It is still unclear whether Hamas will successfully transform the Islamist national aspiration into a substitute to the PLO and what it represents, into a belief system for the Palestinians in the occupied territories. This form of success will rely on the capacity of the Islamic movement to establish the legitimacy of their aspiration and the practicality of their policies and standpoints as regards the realization of the Palestinian people’s rightful national aspiration. It will also rely on the degree to which the Palestinian people are eager to accept an Islamic identity and prioritize this identity over their national identity. Matters of democracy and multiculturalism have not been a key issue until now for Hamas.21 Inability to express reasonable stances on such matters may push away a large portion of the Palestinian society and as a result weaken the influence of the Islamic movement. Hamas may successfully avoid these matters for a certain period of time by claiming that the urgent and most important concern of the organization is national emancipation from Israeli control. But in spite of that, Hamas has to clarify the grounds for their interaction with other political organizations and with society in general. From an ideological and theoretical perspective, Hamas, or the Islamic movement as a whole, denounces the idea of democracy as a Western model that is incompatible with the Islamic doctrine. Hamas asserts that the Islamic ideology upholds rules that are more unbiased and inclusive. In an Islamic system, political organizations that do not adopt Islam as a belief system will be hindered. On the other hand, the PLO continues to be the foremost and more potent challenge to Hamas. Hamas does not have the strong nationalist reputation and authority which the PLO has gained as a consequence of more than two decades of nationalist opposition to the Israeli hegemony. The PLO is recognized for its attempts at revival and consolidation of the Palestinian national aspiration and for identifying the Palestinian people’s national rights. If Hamas fails to adopt a definite nationalist agenda that addresses the Palestinian people’s aspirations and highlights their right to statehood and independence, Hamas may fail to become a substitute to the PLO or even a major candidate for the rightful representation of the Palestinian people. Nevertheless, Hamas will gain greater support if the PLO is unable to realize the national aspirations it has established for itself. The inability of the PLO to achieve its national aspirations will most probably become a plus point for the Islamic movement. Hamas benefitted greatly when the PLO was not able to succeed despite all the compromises the PLO leaders have agreed to. Hamas has been daring the PLO to generate any concrete accomplishment as an outcome of such compromises. However these Islamic organizations, particularly Hamas, will be obliged to accomplish their objectives and not to take advantage of the weaknesses of others as a way of acquiring greater power or influence. Although the extremist position of the Islamic movement may be pleasing to the Palestinian people, especially due to the growing disappointment with the PLO and its capacity to generate concrete accomplishments, the Islamic movement’s grand aspiration of building an Islamic society and nation in Palestine, which are beyond their reach, at least for now, may generate a similar form of disappointment. The unwillingness of Hamas to team up with the PLO may push away Palestinian people who have faith in the purity of national solidarity. The Muslim Brotherhood, from the very beginning, and eventually Hamas, have declined to team up with the PLO due to clashing political and ideological dissimilarities. Only immediately after the outbreak of the intifada did Hamas deal with this issue. In response to a request to unite with PLO, Hamas demanded as a prerequisite roughly 40% of the seats in PNC. The PLO has turned down this demand. In case the PLO yielded to this demand Hamas may have successfully seized control of the PLO from the inside. Hamas, although no longer demanding a particular percentage of seats in the PNC, demanded general elections outside and within the occupied territories to allow the Palestinian people to choose their delegates in the leadership branches of the PLO. The PLO, once more, turned down this request, claiming that it is not practical at the moment. Hamas challenges the political agenda of the PLO on the whole. Working with a secular PLO which has by now accepted Israel would weaken the core aspiration of Hamas. All these factors make it difficult to establish one unified government. Bibliography Abusada, Mkhaimar. “Palestinian Party Affiliation and Political Attitudes toward the Peace Process.” Arab Studies Quarterly 20.3 (1998): 65. Arens, Omri & Edward Kaufman. “The Potential Impact of Palestinian Nonviolent Struggle on Israel: Preliminary Lessons and Projections for the Future.” The Middle East Journal 66.2 (2012): 231+ Ben-Meir, Alon. “Hamas’s Real Agenda- Power Sharing Although the Islamic Resistance Movement Opposes the Israeli-PLO Peace Process, It Must be Allowed to Participate in Elections.” The Christian Science Monitor (1994): 19. Caridi, Paola. Hamas: From Resistance to Government. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2012. Esposito, John. Islam and politics. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1998. Faucon, Benoit. West Bankers. New York: Mashreq Editions Ltd, 2010. Frangi, Abdallah. The PLO and Palestine. London: Zed Books, 1983. Helm, Sarah. “Hamas Seeks Alliance with PLO.” The Independent (1994): 1. Hilal, Jamil. Where Now for Palestine?: The Demise of the Two State Solution. New York: Zed Books, 2007. Jamal, Amal. The Palestinian National Movement: Politics of Contention, 1967-2005. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005. Kalideen, Savera & Haidar Eid. “A One State Solution for the Palestine-Israel Conflict: An Interview with Ali Abunimah.” Nebula 5.3 (2008): 78+ Laub, Karin & Mohammed Daraghmeh. “Analysis: Hamas Wants Bigger Regional Role.” St. Louis Post-Dispatch (MO) (2013): A7. Mishal, Shaul & Avraham Sela. The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Sharif, Bassam Abu. Arafat and the Dream of Palestine: An Insider’s Account. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Weinberger, Peter. Co-opting the PLO: A Critical Reconstruction of the Oslo Accords, 1993-1995. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006. Read More