Joint Military Operations - Assignment Example

JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS Joint Military Operations Background As the American Civil Warheaded towards its end, it was important that the military victories that had been recorded within and across the fortified territories would be perfectly complete. In the light of this, it was important that rapid military enforcement would be carried out against Vicksburg, Mississippi, which was at the time part of the last Confederate-controlled section of the Mississippi River.1 Vicksburg was a fortress city that dominated the entire block of last Confederate-controlled section and so defeating this section was not going to happen as an easy task. It was for this reason that it became necessary to use joint military operations, which was largely led by The Union Army of the Tennessee’s Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant. In this paper, there is further analysis of the entire joint military operations to understand the core elements that went into it, including its objectives, the fallouts from it, the centers of gravity, and major lines of operations used. Analysis of the Campaign One unique thing about almost all joint military operations is that fact that they are started with very specific strategic aims and objectives in mind. This was no different with the Vicksburg Campaign, which was undertaken with the prime aim of capturing Vicksburg, which was a fortress city that dominated the remaining Confederate-controlled section of the Mississippi River2. To achieve this aim, it was important to ensure that the whole Campaign was guided by specific objectives which defined the actions that needed to be taken. Two specific objectives stand out in the campaign. The first of this was to entrap the Confederate army which was under the control of Lt. Gen. John Pemberton. The second objective was to overwhelm the Confederates early enough so that they could not fully organize their defenses. By executing these two objectives successfully, the ultimate aim was expected to be attained. Primary evidence available shows that the objective of overwhelming the Confederates early enough so they could not fully organize their defenses was implemented by the use of immediate assault against Stockade Redan for May 19.3 This assault was later to go a long way to mark the desired end state. Regrettable for Grant however, the assault, which was the desired end state to bring about the achievement of the ultimate aim, did not succeed as expected. This made historian Shelby Foote record that Grant "did not regret having made the assaults; he only regretted that they had failed”4. The failed desired end state seemed to have been clearly supported by senior military members as Lt. Col John A. Rawlins issued a Special Orders No. 140 on May 25, 1863, stating to Grant that “It is desirable that no more loss of life shall be sustained in the reduction of Vicksburg, and the capture of the Garrison”.5 Under Rule 8 of military practice, which emphasizes on military objectives, it is stated that “military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and offers a definite military advantage”.6 Relating this to the joint military operation that was involved in the Vicksburg Campaign, one derives two major military objectives from the larger strategic objectives. The first was to take advantage of the natural inequalities of Vicksburg to gain position that would make it possible to start mines, trenches and advance batteries. The second military objective was to trap Confederate soldiers and citizens alike so that there could be resounding capture of that whole territory. There is primary evidence to back these objectives as Grant is noted to have recorded in his memoirs that “I now determined upon a regular siege—to out-camp the enemy, as it were, and to incur no more losses”.7 According to Echevarria, strategic centers of gravity come to play in any typical military operations when decisive actions are taken to ensure that there comes that point where one side irrevocably begins to win and the other starts to lose.8 Such decisive actions lead to the creation of centers of gravity which brings about favorable changes in the ground operations such that there is the need to change or cease planned and current activities, especially by the opponent. Relating this to the Vicksburg Campaign, one identifies the strategic center of gravity as that point when Grant realized that even if he had 50,000 Union soldiers, he would not be able to effectively undertake an encirclement of the Confederate defenses and implement the siege. This led to the decisive action where he called for help from Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, who acted swiftly by shifting Union troops in the West.9 Clausewitz explained that there is a friendly center of gravity when there is locality of strategy or course of action that helps one’s own forces or its allied forces to achieve its objectives.10 Based on this, the friendly center of gravity that can be found with the siege of Vicksburg can be said to be that moment when Grant caused a command change on June 22 by stationing one division at the rear end of the Confederate forces. Specifically, there is primary evidence to suggest that the additional division was stationed at the vicinity of the Big Black River Bridge to act as a covering force.11 In line with the objective that had been set, this friendly center of gravity was considered so powerful and effective that it was regarded as the reason that the IX Corps which was under Maj. Gen. John G. Parke became transferred to the command of Grant. One of the most decisive identified enemy points through the whole operation can be said to be what came became known as the Louisiana operation. This is because the Louisiana operation was masterminded by the enemy, who in this case was Pemberton. More specifically, Pemberton wanted to implement this decisive point by cutting all the communication lines of Grant that were along the Mississippi River. Given the importance of communication in any military operation, one cannot underestimate how decisive and threatening this point was for the enemy. The motive for having this decisive point was to ensure that there could be something done to favor the entire Vicksburg garrison. But to execute this successfully, it was important to counteract the forces of Grant as they were also targeting the Vicksburg garrison very directly. The decisive point was therefore implemented through Lt. Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith, who Pemberton had asked to be in charge. Once there was the decisive point, it was important to have an operational concept that would match it booth for booth. It therefore became important for the Grant forces to act very swiftly to the proposed decisive point so as to avert any dangers that the enemy could pose. It is interesting to observe that because the decisive point was implemented as an indirect attack through Lt. Gen. Smith who also forwarded the order to Maj. Gen. Richard Taylor, it was expected that the operational concept to attack the enemy’s decisive points would also be undertaken in an indirect manner but this was not the case. Instead, the Louisiana operation that was started by Pemberton was nullified when all three assaults by Taylor were defeated in three different battles. The three assaults and how they were defeated became known as Battle of Millikens Bend, Battle of Youngs Point and Battle of Lake Providence.12 The campaign was sequenced in such a way that the progress or transition from one phase to the other was dependent on the outcome with the enemy and how far the enemy progressed towards the forces of Grant. In effect, it can be said that the campaign was sequenced in a dependent manner, basing on signal from the camp of the enemy and as predicted by the climate of the whole operation. A typical example of this was when as a result of growing activity from the Confederate as part of the Louisiana operations Grant took a decision to send troops from within the battlefield in Vicksburg trenches to the bank of the river. In a related development, Grant responded directly to the dictates of the enemy by ordering Brig. Gen. Alfred W. Ellets Mississippi Marine Brigade and Joseph A. Mowers brigade to be at the vicinity of Miliken’s Bend as a response to the sending of Maj. Gen. John G. Walker to the Confederate division. Since the enemy and for that matter Pemberton did not operate in what can be called a direct operational manner, it became necessary to have branches that could respond to each of the diverse and indirect strategic divisions placed. For example at Louisiana alone, there were branches and sequels that led to what became known as the 3rd Louisiana Redan. For each of these series of related attacks and strategic positioning, it was important to have branches and sequel operations that responded to them. This was indeed an important component of the whole joint military operation because each branch or sequel demanded that there would be the introduction of officers, commanders and strategists, all of who would be brought together in a jointed effort to achieving victory on the battle line. Regardless of the fact that the branches and sequels were at times placed at different quarters and made up of commanders and strategist coming from different locations, it was still important that there will be a form of synchronization of services and assets. This was done with the ultimate aim of ensuring that the presence of the different forces would not amount to the creation of entirely different operations that would each have its own aim and objectives.13 By implication, the campaign required synchronization of services and assets to ensure that the ambition that was started when the need for the operation was spotted would remain unchanged to the very end of the operation. The synchronization therefore came in different forms, particularly land and sea. Several major lines of operation were associated with the whole battle of Vicksburg. Whiles some of these were on the part of Grant, others were on the part of Pemberton. For example, there was what became known as the Confederate line, which was the main fighting line commanded by Pemberton himself. The Confederate line was therefore the defensive line, which was in place to ensure that the fortress city of Vicksburg, Mississippi was well surrounded and protected against the intrusion of the enemy. With the Union forces advancing, Pemberton could only resource 18,500 troops in the defense line. This led to the creation of what began known as the Vicksburg line, which comprised of a larger troop made up of four divisions. Later, Grant created the siege line and the supply line, both of which sought to counter the first two lines. Certainly, the campaign required a shift in the weight of effort in the line of operation from one phase to the other. This is because as explained earlier, the two major lines of operations used by the enemy were each made up of different scope and extent of power and might. As the lines of operation took center stage within each phase, it was therefore important that there will be a shift in the weight of efforts in that was put in place to cater for the lines of operation. One other reason that this shift was particularly important, apart from the fact that the changes came with improved military force was the fact that the campaign was with more or less a counter responsive approach, which required that there would always be a direct response to what the enemy brought on board. After it was all said and done, it can be said that the campaign achieved its objectives. Indeed according to many military operations analysts, not only were the objectives achieved in terms of the intended siege but that it also happened to be one of the most successful and tactically approached military operations.14 From the discussions so far, it is very certain that one major factor that accounted for this success was the fact that the campaign was not approached as an isolated and disjointed operation that rested with the efforts of only a few people. Rather, Grant put in sufficient efforts that ensured that there was a shared approach to the handling of the defense line. The success of the whole campaign can be attributed to the fact that there was a joint military operation which was clearly executed by following to the letter, all that there ought to be followed about any typical joint military operation. The termination phase was more of a gradual process than an event. This is because even after the surrender on July 4, there continued to be isolated actions. This was regardless of the fact that the fortress city had fallen and that there had been so many casualties from the defense line. The minor actions therefore went on till July 9 when the Mississippi River became firmly in the hands and under the control of the Union. One other significant event that was part of the overall process forming the termination phase was when the Confederacy was split in two. This makes several historians argue that the people protecting the interest of the Confederacy and for that matter the fortress of Vicksburg showed a very good fighting spirit on the need to possess what belonged to them by paying whatever cost they were required to.15 Conclusion To conclude it all, the important role that shared responsibility plays in military operations has been showed with the campaign of Vicksburg, which eventually led to a siege. This is because even though along the line Grant wanted an assault but did not get that, he could still achieve his earlier aim of taking control of the fortress of Vicksburg and bringing the Confederate and its defense line to the ground. References Antulio J. Echevarria. Clausewitz’s Center Of Gravity. Naval War College Review, Winter 2003, Vol. LVI, No. 1 Ballard, Michael B. Vicksburg, The Campaign that Opened the Mississippi. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004 Bearss, Edwin C. The Campaign for Vicksburg. 3 vols. Dayton, OH: Morningside House, 1985. Catton, Bruce. The Centennial History of the Civil War. Vol. 3, Never Call Retreat. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965. Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. Foote, Shelby. The Civil War: A Narrative. Vol. 2, Fredericksburg to Meridian. New York: Random House, 1958. General Carl Von Clausewitz (2009). On War: The Complete Edition. Wildside Press LLC. pp. 144 Grabau, Warren E. Ninety-Eighty Days: A Geographers View of the Vicksburg Campaign. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2000. Grant, Ulysses S. Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant. 2 vols. Charles L. Webster & Company, 1885–86. Joe Strange and Richard Iron. Understanding centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. Part 2. The CG-CC-CR-CV Construct Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Oxford History of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. Smith, Jean Edward. Grant. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. Tomislav Z. Ruby. Effects-based Operations: More Important Than Ever. Parameters. Autumn 2008. 27-38. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 2011. Read More