Terrorism: AL-Shabaab - Research Paper Example

Terrorism of the Henley-Putnam The affiliation of regional terrorist groups to international terrorist groups is an imminent threat to peaceful co-existence of human beings. To be specific, the unexpected origin of religious fundamentalism within Somalia and its spread prove that terrorist groups make use of religious belief and internal problems to infiltrate into mainstream societies. Thesis statement: The case study on Al-Shabaab proves that its origin is related to the weaknesses of Somali government, its internal structure is not different from other jihadist groups (religious and political fractions), motivation is based upon global jihad, its goals are based on political and religious supremacy of Islam, threat is related to the rapid spread of religious fundamentalism and terrorism, and anti-terrorism policies can save Somalia from the negative influence of this terrorist organization. Case Study: AL-Shabaab This section is broadly divided as: origin, structure, motivation, goals, threat, and effectiveness of anti-terrorism policies. Origin First of all, the origin of the jihadist group, named as Al-Shabaab, is indebted to the military aims of political Islam in Somalia. To be specific, Al-Shabaab originated as a military subsidiary of the Islamic Courts Union or ICU. When the ICU lost influence and support during its clash with Transitional Federal Government in Somalia (TFG), Al-Shabaab gained momentum and began to exert its influence in Africa. Besides, this terrorist organization was formed in the year 2006. One can see that the origin of this terrorist group is deeply rooted in the Islamic concept of jihad. For instance, the masterminds behind the origin of this terrorist group served in Afghanistan during late 70s. Hansen (2013) states that, “A proper exploration of the history of Al-Shabaab should start with the origins of this network, which are amongst the Somalis travelling to Afghanistan in the wake of the Soviet intervention, during the Afghan war of 1979-89” (pp.19-20). To be specific, those who (say, Somalis) served during this time returned to Somalia and helped the ICU while fighting against the TFG. The defeat of ICU by the TFG resulted in the fragmentation of ICU into different groups. During this time, Al-Shabaab (say, one among these fragmented groups) declared its aim, i.e., the leadership of jihadists in Africa or the fight against the foes of political Islam. One can see that Al-Shabaab amalgamated the idea of political Islam to the core of religious fundamentalism. To be specific, the leaders of this jihadist group gained the confidence of the mass by proclaiming their ultimate aim, the superiority of religion beyond the government. As pointed out, Al-Shabaab originated in Somalia as the military wing of the ICU. Kirk (2011) states that, “Founded in 2006, it was part of the Islamic Courts Union-the organization that ruled Somalia until Ethiopian forces entered the country and helped install the Transitional Federal Government” (p.9). On the other side, clan wars in Somalia ended up in the origin of different militant groups. When Al-Shabaab amalgamated religious fundamentalism to its core, its influence spread to other parts of Africa. One can see that the ICU was based upon the legal aspects of political Islam. On the other side, the internal problems in Somalia, especially clan wars and political instability, resulted in the origin of Al-Shabaab. To be specific, the members of different Islamic groups in Somalia were not ready to give up fundamentalist ideas. So, they formed Al-Shabaab as a militant group as the continuation of their protest against the authorities. Besides, the origin of this militant group pinpoints the influence of religious fundamentalism among the mass in Somalia. From a different angle of view, one can easily identify that the internal problems in Somalia helped this jihadist group to have an easy entry into the mainstream society. Structure The leadership structure of this jihadist group is similar to other religious fundamentalist groups. For instance, the current emir or the commander of this jihadist group is Moktar Ali Zubeyr. One can see that this leader’s aim does not limit within the religious and political contexts of Somalia. Instead, his aim is transnational, i.e. the unification of different religious fundamentalist group within the roof of Islamic Caliphate or the overall control by Islam. Besides, this jihadist leader gained popularity among the group members because he was deeply interested in the future development of this jihadist group. On the other side, this group consists of the members from different clans within Somalia, and foreigners who are in favour of the supremacy of Islam. But the leadership consists of trained jihadists because training is the foundation of leadership. Daniels (2012) states that, “The military structure of Al-Shabaab is decentralized, with separate leaders heading operations in the Bay and Bakool regions; southern and central Mogadishu, Puntland, and Somaliland; and Hassan al-Turki’s brigade in the Juba Valley” (p.58). Besides, this group accepts its members from other local groups within Somalia and neighbouring states. The leadership provides ample importance to the concept of global jihad and supremacy of Islam. But the group members provide importance the problems faced by them within their public domains. For instance, clashes between different clans and similar internal problems force the youngsters to join jihadist groups. Within this scenario, the leaders of this jihadist group know that they must accelerate the clash among different clans. In addition, they know that loyalty to the group is indebted to the clash among different clans in the society. This sort of internal problems within the civil society is exploited by this jihadist group. Within the scenario of this group, Shura Council is the ultimate authority. Practically, leadership is vested upon the emir, who co-ordinates the local administrators. But one can see that Shura Council acts the role of religious authority and the emir is the co-ordinator of military section and local administration. From a different angle of view, the leadership provides ample importance to local politics and internal insurgencies because they know that the same can help them to be influential among the mass. On the other side, the leadership depends upon converted members to accomplish difficult tasks. As the new converts from foreign nations are not aware of the risk, manipulation becomes easier. Still, the ultimate leadership of this jihadist group is vested upon the most notorious terrorist organization, i.e. al-Qaeda. Besides, this loose structure of leadership helps this jihadist group to accept foreign jihadists. Technically, the global leadership of this terrorist organization is vested upon al-Qaeda because this jihadist group is affiliated to the same. On the other side, regional leadership is vested upon the Emir. But this dual leadership created trouble among the members because some of them support the global leadership and some others support the regional leadership. Those who support the regional leadership claim that their leaders must provide ample importance to the internal problems faced by them. On the other side, those who support the global leadership claim that global spread of Islam and the implementation of Sharia law is their ultimate aim. So, one can see that the concept of jihad is amalgamated with the basic structure of this jihadist group because most of the leaders are in favour of the spread of Islam beyond national boundaries. Motivation The most important motivation behind Al-Shabaab’s effort to take control of the civil society of Somalia is political. To be specific, the leaders of Al-Shabaab know that mere religious influence cannot help them to exert pressure upon the political context of Somalia. So, they decided to combine religious fundamentalism with militant nationalism. From a different angle of view, extension of their influence beyond national borders is important for jihadist groups. When this fact is superimposed into the context of Al-Shabaab, one can see that this group did not limit its influence within their national border. For instance, the proclamation of Al-Shabaab in the year 2010 proves that they are ever ready help the ally jihadists in their neighbouring nations. Great Britain: Home Office (2010) states that, “In February 2010 Al-Shabaab announced their intension to coordinate their operations in the Horn of Africa with Al Qa’ida and have publicly offered support to Islamic extremists in Yemen” (p.7). As pointed out, the political context of Somalia is deeply influenced by different clans. Besides, clashes among different clans are not strange happenings in Somalia. One can see that clans accelerate militant nationalism in Somalia. So, leaders of Al-Shabaab decided to exploit the conspiracy or ill feeling among different clans. Besides, Al-Shabaab began to recruit members from different clans. When the government in Somalia decided to accept aid from other nations to fight against the religious fundamentalist groups, Al-Shabaab emerged as the protector of these groups. So, one can see that the interest in national politics motivated the leaders of Al-Shabaab. In addition, the members were in favour of the involvement in clan wars and the fight against the authorities. So, the leaders decided to provide importance to the military aspects of their group. Gradually, this jihadist organization emerged as a militant group in Somalia. Within this scenario, training defines the efficiency of this militant group in the society. So, the leaders began to recruit foreigners, especially the migrant Somalis in foreign nations. Besides, the leaders sought training in the Middle East and some members served during civil wars and jihad in other nations. To be specific, the tactical approach of the leadership helped this jihadist group to emerge as a militant group. In addition, this sort of tactfulness and pre-planning helped the group to take control over a number of cities within the Somali society. In short, the gradual transformation of this militant group from a jihadist group to militant nationalism and to global support to jihad proves that active role in the national politics motivated the leaders and the members of Al-Shabaab. Goals One can see that this jihadist group’s primary aim/goal is to implement Sharia laws within the civil society of Somalia. Bukovac (2010) states that, “Al-Shabaab instates an extreme interpretation of Sharia, the Islamic legal system, in the areas it controls” (p.21). The leaders are aware of that implementation of religious laws will help them to be influential within national politics. Besides, their secondary aim/goal is to act as a military subsidiary group to help global jihadist groups. From a different angle of view, the members of this group support the primary goal, and the leaders support the secondary goal. Within this scenario, the primary goal is considered as utmost important because strict implementation of religious laws and the fight against the authorities helped this jihadist group to terrorize the civilians. On the other side, the leaders consider that it is essential to support the global effort to restore the Islamic Caliphate. Bruton (2010) opines that, “The Shabaab’s formal declaration of allegiance to al-Qaeda on February 2, 2010, will further heighten fears that the group may lend its fighters and its territory to further the global jihad” (p.12). To be specific, both the goals never contradict each other and this jihadist group is an apt example of political Islam. So, one can see that Al-Shabaab’s ultimate aim/goal is to support the effort of global jihadists to take control over the whole world. Threat From a different angle of view, the threat from this jihadist group is not limited to the national boundary of Somalia. For instance, this group recruits some of their members from foreign nations. Besides, most of the leaders underwent training in the Middle Eastern nations. When the global jihadist groups are seeking support from regional groups, Al Shabaab supplied their members to fight for their religion. On the other side, global jihadists consider Somalia as a safe haven because they can keep themselves safe from coalition forces fighting against jihadists. This is a serious threat to humanity as a whole because terrorism does not have any national border. In addition, this jihadist group is deeply interested in extending their influence beyond their national boundaries. For instance, the leadership of Al Shabaab considers that it is their duty to fight against the nations which support the peacekeeping forces. Ploch (2011) makes clear that, “Al Shabaab has threatened attacks in Uganda and Burundi, which have deployed troops to the African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and has threatened other countries and Western targets in East Africa” (p.1). This sort of external support gained by jihadist groups may weaken the central authority in these nations. The Al Shabaab and similar jihadist groups attract youngsters by providing economic support to their families. This negative influence will end up in further problems because jihadist groups consider the members as mere instruments to implement their plans related to global jihad. So, one need not misunderstand that the influence of this jihadist group is limited to the context of Somalia. Instead, the influence of this jihadist group extends to other nations because it is linked with global terrorism. Anti-terrorism This group (say, Al-Shabaab) exploited the weaknesses of the central authority or the government and tactically infiltrated into the core of the civil society. Besides, this group promised the people that implementation of religious laws will help the nation to have a stable government. But the narrow-mindedness, based upon religious fundamentalism, resulted in the rapid spread of terrorism within Somalia. When this group began to recruit foreigners and support global terrorist groups, the world nations began to suspect their motive. Besides, the world nations suspected that this jihadist group supports the Somali pirates. The suicide bombings and other attacks undertaken by this jihadist group from 2006 to 2014 proves that the same is strong enough to terrorise African nations. Still, the world nations failed to foresee the rapid growth of this jihadist group. Rollins (2010) states that, “One of the major mistakes that contributed to the emergence and strength of Al Shabaab was the labelling of the leadership of the Courts as extremist and jihadist, and the failure to identify and target the leadership of Al Shabaab, according to some observers” (p.20). To be specific, the world nations, especially the nations in Africa, did not expect the formation of Al Shabaab from the detached sleeper cells related to ICU. In the present condition, anti-terrorism measures initiated by the Somali government, especially the direct attack by Somalian National Army (SNA) is showing gradual progress. For instance, the areas like Bulobarte and Wajid District were under the control of Al Shabaab. But now, these areas are under the direct control of the Somali government. So, future may prove the efficiency of the policies against terrorism in Somalian context because the authorities are trying to tackle this serious problem. Summing, Al-Shabaab deeply influenced the civil society of Somalia because this jihadist group exploited the religious belief of the people. Besides, this group imitates the structure of other groups related to terrorism. The division of this jihadist group into religious and political fractions prove its global agenda. To be specific, this sort of division helped them to exert influence upon the religious and political context of Somalia. On the other side, the plots undertaken and successfully implemented by this group is terrifying the world nations because global spread of terrorism disregards national boundaries. Still, the international effort to implement anti-terrorism policies in Somalia is showing gradual progress because SNA is able to recapture some of the areas which were under the direct control of Al-Shabaab. In short, this case study on Al-Shabaab proves that strong central authority (say, government) and inculcation of democracy beyond religious belief are essential for world nations to deal with the problem of terrorism. References Bruton, B.E. (2010). Somalia: A New Approach. New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations. Bukovac, M. (2010). Failed States: Unstable Countries in the 21st Century. New York, NY: The Rosen Publishing Group. Daniels, C.L. (2012). Somali Piracy and Terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Maryland, MD: Scarecrow Press. Great Britain: Home Office. (2010). The United Kingdoms strategy for countering international terrorism annual report March 2010. Surrey, UK: The Stationery Office. Hansen, S.J. (2013). Al Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Kirk, M. (2011). Ending Somali Piracy Against American and Allied Shipping. (n.p.): DIANE Publishing. Ploch, L. (2011). Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U. S. Response. (n.p.): DIANE Publishing. Rollins, J. (2010). Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U. S. Policy. (n.p.): DIANE Publishing. Read More