The Al-Shabaab Terrorist Group - Research Paper Example

The Al-Shabaab Terrorist Group and The Al-Shabaab Terrorist Group Al-Shabaab rose rapidly to prominence between 2006 and 2012. The short history of Al-Shabaab reveals that the group underwent two dramatic transformations during it development process. The Ethiopian invasion in Somalia led to the drive for Al-Shabaab’s reorganization, training, and collaborations with consequent improvement in their operations. The primary objective of this research paper is to describe Al-Shabaab militant group that is based in Southern Somalia. The paper will focus on the historical background and organization of the Al-Shabaab group since 1990s through 2006 to 2012. The paper will highlight all the characteristics of terrorist groups that qualify Al-Shabaab to be considered a terrorist organization. Another area of focus of this research paper will be on the activities that show the effectiveness of Al-Shabaab in achieving its goals. Al-Shabaab group is a threat to the United States homeland security because it is attracting several young Americans and threatening to cause terror in the United States of America. Key words: Al-Shabaab, militants, forces, suicide Introduction Al-Shabaab is a militant group composed of Islamist youth with a foundation in Somalia. Al-Shabaab, also referred to as the Mujahideen Youth Movement, was formally recognized by Somalia government in 2012 (Sharamo & Mesfin, 2011). It is believed that Al-Shabaab is a Somali-based cell of the militant Islamist affiliate of al-Qaeda that controls the larger part of southern Somalia, where is has imposed its own form of Sharia. The number of members in Al-Shabaab militia was estimated to fourteen thousand, four hundred and twenty-six in May 2011 (Leuprecht & Hall, 2013). The quarrel between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda over the union leadership caused the spread of Al-Shabaab; Al-Shabaab quickly lost their ground due to widespread disintegration. Members of the Al-Shabaab describe themselves as waging jihadists against non-Muslims whom they refer to as kufaars (Odhiambo, Onkware, Kassilly & Ntabo, 2012). The group is engaged in a constant combat against the Transitional Federal Government and the African Union Mission to Somalia. The motive of the Al-Shabaab is to eliminate foreign interference in Somalia; they thus kidnap, intimidate and kill aid workers to accelerate the suspension of humanitarian operations and an exodus of relief agents. Al-Shabaab is one of the most dangerous groups of the time and it is raising concern throughout the world because of its merciless terrorist activities. The Historical Background of Al-Shabaab Al-Shabaab was initially a representation of the hard-line militant youth that was within the Islamic Courts Union. Currently, Al-Shabaab is described as the extremist splinter group of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) (Mwangi, 2012). Islamic Courts Union was a group of Sharia courts who collaborated to form a rival administration against Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government. ICU was larger group within which Al-Shabaab operated. The ICU broke up, and the Al-Shabaab reorganized themselves into a more combatant group. Al-Shabaab began a campaign of encouraging people from all localities across the country to join their ranks. The motive of this campaign was to encourage additional people to participate in the jihad group operations in order to increase in numbers and maintain power. The chief of awareness raising of Al-Shabaab, Sheikh Mohamed Shongole, requested parents to send their unmarried girls to fight alongside male militants (Little, 2012). Massive inclusion is one of the strategies that terrorists groups employ in order to gain financial and human resources to aid their perilous operations. The initial members of Al-Shabaab are believed to have emerged and organized themselves into a group in 2003 (Leuprecht & Hall, 2013). The group formerly emerged as militant youth wing of al-Ittihad al-Islam. Al-Ittihad al-Islam was one of the Somali extremist groups of 1980s and 1990s. Al-Shabaab remained inactive for several years without taking control of any territory. It is believed that the group might have taken years of rest in organizing deadly attacks to commence later. Leadership challenges and lack of finances were among the constraints that hit the group during this period of inactivity. The year 2006 saw the removal of the Islamic Courts Union from Mogadishu, the Somalia capital, by Ethiopian forces (Leuprecht & Hall, 2013). The Islamic Courts Union had established a modicum of central authority in June 2006 and the members Al-Shabaab had served as its military wing for more than five years. The Al-Shabaab began to rise in prominence as a branch of the resistance to Ethiopia invasion upon Ethiopia’s raid. The militia group appeared to have secured legal status at that period since it acted as the government arm in fighting against external aggression. The influence of Al-Shabaab grew rapidly in 2007 (Thomas, 2013). Eritrea actively supported Al-Shabaab; Eritrea used the group as a proxy against its long-term enemy, Ethiopia. The Al-Shabaab group retreated to the swampy areas of South Somalia from where the members conducted conventional guerilla campaigns that led to the defeat of advancing Ethiopian forces. The association of Al-Shabaab with Al-Qaeda signaled a new approach in 2008. Al-Shabaab militia launched a several fights involving a series of coordinated suicide attacks that hit the government offices, United Nations agencies and the Ethiopian consulate. The State Department of the United States identified Al-Shabaab as foreign terrorist in February 2008. Ethiopian soldiers pulled back from the capital of Somalia in 2009 (Shinn, 2011). Al-Shabaab maximized on this withdrawal and continued their fight against President Sharif Ahmed, the former leader of Islamic Courts Union. Al-Shabaab succeeded in its campaigns against the Transitional Federal Government by capturing Bidoa in January 2009 and killing the three ministers of the government on December 3, 2009 in a suicide bomb attack launched on graduation day in a medical school (Kirui & Mwaruvie, 2012). Burundi and Ugandan soldiers, who were then serving as part of the African Union’s peacemaking mission replaced the Ethiopian forces; these forces were largely confined in Mogadishu. The Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility of multiple suicide bombers attacks at a rugby club and Ethiopian restaurants in Uganda capital, Kampala in 2010 (Poole, 2010). This was the first transnational attack by the Al-Shabaab, which suggested that the group had the responsibility of causing regional destabilization. Kenya Defense Forces launched military operations in Southern Somalia in mid 2010. The Al-Shabaab were accused of several attacks that occurred in Northern Kenya. The Kenya Defense Forces destabilized the Al-Shabaab fighters. By the year 2012, Kenyan forces had dislodged the Al-Shabaab forces from their strategic city of Kismayo that constituted the group’s most crucial strongholds and source of revenue (Kirui & Mwaruvie, 2012). The Al-Shabaab militia engaged in revenge missions in Kenya through launching several grenade attacks in the capital city Nairobi in busy areas such as bus stages and nightclubs. The most recent attack facilitated by the Al-Shabaab was the Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi that occurred on September 21, 2013; the attack claimed seventy lives and approximately two hundred and fifty severe injuries. The Organization and Leadership of the Al-Shabaab Al-Shabaab is believed to have several foreigners within its leadership ranks. The composition of Al-Shabaab is characterized by multi-ethnicity, with its strategic positions occupied by Afghanistan and ethnic Somalis who have expert training from Iraq and Afghanistan. The National Counterterrorism Center reported that Al-Shabaab’s leadership members originate from desperate local groups who are in most cases recruited by force (Ulrichsen, 2011). The foot soldiers of the Al-Shabaab are primarily concerned with local and clan-related affairs as opposed to global jihadist. Al-Shabaab strategizes their operations by fighting in groups and alliances to exploit local vulnerabilities through manipulation of clan networks with an objective of retaining power. The group seems to be immune to local politics and most Muslim converts from neighboring nations have been conscripted to difficult and undesirable work. Presently, the internal leadership structure and organization of Al-Shabaab is not clear with foreign fighters migrating out of the country; however, much of its leadership positions are held by the Al-Qaeda. The structure and composition of the Al-Shabaab is increasingly decentralized as it is deploying several leaders out of the country and recruiting others in their home countries (Farley, 2011). The objective of Al-Shabaab is to spread to all countries of the world and have greater control and power in the long-run. The group has engaged in massive recruitment and deployments beginning from Southern Somalia and spreading to the neighboring countries such as Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia (Crook, 2013). There have been long-term leadership wrangles and disagreements among the group with most of the conflicts arising because of the affiliation with the Al-Qaeda; however, the leaders of the Al-Shabaab have sworn full allegiance to Al-Qaeda and the group has effectively split into a foreign legion. The perceived goals and motivation of the organization One of the perceived objectives of Al-Shabaab is to end foreign intervention. The Al-Shabaab views foreign intervention as a threat to their country’s social, economic, political, and sustainable development. The initial growth, radicalization, and militarization resulted from Ethiopian invasion of Southern Somalia (Anning & Smith, 2012). The Ethiopian forces rapidly succeeded in eliminating the ICU, which dissolved immediately under the raid by Ethiopia. The invasion did not achieve Ethiopia’s goals of complete elimination of Somalia’s Islamic radicalism. The invasion is believed to be the primary cause of rapid rise of the Al-Shabaab as they struggled to counteract the acts of Ethiopian forces. Ethiopia occupied Somalia between 2006 and 2009, which led to fast growth of Al-Shabaab ideology, partnerships, transformation, recruitment, and operational strategy. Additionally, Al-Shabaab’s acts of kidnapping and humiliating humanitarian volunteers reveal the group’s hatred to foreigners. Prior to the 2010 drought, the areas controlled by Al-Shabaab had the greatest harvest in comparison to the previous seven years (Anning & Smith, 2012). The group claimed credit for success, arguing that their reduction of over-sized imports paved way for Somalia’s own grain production. The leaders asserted that their policy had the effect of shifting income from cross-border farmers to local farmers. Another objective of Al-Shabaab is to establish an Islamic nation in Somalia, and if possible to other countries. The group is in constant conflict with Kufaars (non-Muslims). Reports reveal that the Al-Shabaab group prosecuted Somali’s Christian minority by affixing the label on people they suspect working for the Ethiopian Intelligence (Seay, 2013). Al-Shabaab was responsible for desecration of the graves of prominent Sufi Muslims; they claimed that Sufi practices contradict the interpretation of Islamic law. Al-Shabaab makes all efforts to dominate both national and international media while showing their hate for Christianity. The bodies of the AMISON killings were displayed alongside Bibles and crucifixes. Al-Shabaab beheads people who embrace Christianity and Western ideals, and place their corpses next to crucifixes and Bibles as a strategy of intimidating local populations. Al-Shabaab threatened to ban stations such as British Broadcasting Corporation and Voice of America because they spread Christian propagandas (Seay, 2013). During the Westgate Mall attack, the gunmen were releasing the hostages who proofed to be Muslims, but non-Muslims faced the wrath for being kufaars. The Al-Shabaab militia group intends to exploit vulnerable local populations by engaging in extensive manipulation of clan networks. The group’s objective is to cause fear and confusion across the country in order to cause a directionless state that is susceptible to their control. The long-term objective of Al-Shabaab with this attempt is to retain power and act as a government of the country. A member of the disbanded group reported that by January 2007, the Al-Shabaab was still dedicated to maintain Jihad against Ethiopians and the secular government (Wiley, 2012). The group engaged in a series of suicide attacks aiming the government offices, the deadliest being the bombing at a medical college that claimed the lives of three government ministers on a graduation day. Lack of adequate governance greatly contributed to the rise and spread of Al-Shabaab. The fall of Mohammed Siad Barre’s regime in the year 1991 left much of Somalia largely ungoverned. Lack of governance and constant checks to deter the growth of Al-Shabaab gave rise to swaths that allowed militant groups to operate freely. The Transitional Federal Government nominally controls the country; however, the Southern region of Somalia from where Al-Shabaab operates is lawless. The state of lawlessness has motivated the Al-Shabaab’s success over recruitment, fundraising, and training of recruits during the emergence stages. The state of lawlessness also provided gateways for constant interaction between Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda. The Al-Qaeda are believed to be the trainers and financiers of Al-Shabaab. Action of Al-Shabaab that makes it a terrorist organization According to Mwangi (2012), the characteristics that make Al-Shabaab a terrorist group include: 1. The Al-Shabaab militants intend to cause fear and horror among the public. The group performs calculated attacks to provoke a state of terror among the populations or specific groups of people. 2. Al-Shabaab engages in unlawful violence and war. The group causes a series of undesirable suicide attacks with the objective of killing and harming people. 3. The objective of terrorism among the Al-Shabaab is perpetuated by religious and political goals. The A-Shabaab militia wants to retain power and establish Islamist radicalism in Somalia. 4. Al-Shabaab terrorists group disregard the safety of non-combats. There is no consideration of the civilians when launching an invasion; in fact, they maximize on killing the civilians in order to cause intense fear and traumatize non-combats. Effectiveness of Al-Shabaab in Realizing its Goals Al-Shabaab is seemingly achieving its objectives. The militia group is given support from the world most wanted criminals who ensure proper training, coordination and financing. Young men have also volunteered to join the group due to promises of huge compensations and remunerations (Mwangi, 2012). The leaders of the group are strict to the rules of operation, and do not relent even the group is suffering from dwindling financial crises. The trainers have are highly qualified and ability to offer effective training to the members to ensure a strong and well-equipped team that does not lose in any battle. The members of the group are highly disciplined; they cannot release any confidential information about the group’s operation even in the face of excessive persecution (Thomas, 2013). Additionally, Al-Shabaab has access to machinery and equipment such as bombs, guns and specialized vehicles for carrying out their killing missions. The Group’s main threat to United States The United States backed Ethiopian forces in the year 2006 in fighting against the Al-Shabaab. The Somali-American boys disappeared from their residences in Minneapolis to join the militant group, Al-Shabaab. A YouTube video released in August 2013 featured exhorting Americans joining the jihadists in Somalia (Thomas, 2013). Several American converts are joining the Al-Shabaab, including Omar Hammami who was killed in September 2013. The rate at which Al-Shabaab is gaining popularity among the American youth is a threat to the homeland security in the US. Approximately sixty Americans and Canadians have been reported to having travelled abroad to fight for Al-Shabaab, where fifteen of them have been killed, three of them in suicide bombings (Shinn, 2011). The greatest concern of the homeland security is to determine whether some recruits from the West have remained within America or they have managed to travel to Somalia without security agencies discovering their identities. The Al-Shabaab sights primarily focus on the government of Somalia; however, the recruitment efforts of the militant group pose dangers to Americans. There is a possibility of hardened recruits with American passports eventually returning home. This cadre of young people is affluent with the American culture; the group believes that attacking people who conflict their motives is not a big deal. The Al-Shabaab itself has threatened to attack the US in a number of occasions (Ulrichsen, 2011). The group remains a threat to the United States, and the country is seeking measures to counteract any Al-Shabaab attack and the associated adversities in the American land. Conclusion Al-Shabaab is a terrorist organization whose aim is to kill and intimidate the human society. The Al-Shabaab group has attracted and recruited the most wanted criminals from the West such as Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki and Samantha Lewthwaite. These notable members have engaged their time, finances, and efforts to boost the extent of group destruction across the world. Al-Shabaab has portrayed some degree of effectiveness in trying to achieve the adversarial objectives; however, the security agencies across the world are keenly watching them. The group poses threat to the US homeland security because of taking advantage of the US minors and recruiting them into the group. Security agencies in all countries have a responsibility of maintaining vigilance at all time to proven the risks associated with Al-Shabaab attacks. References Anning, S., & Smith, M. L. R. (2012). The accidental pirate: Reassessing the legitimacy of counterpiracy operations. Parameters, 42(2), 28-41. Crook, J. R. (2013). United states recognizes government of somalia after two-decade hiatus. 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