HUMINT Intellegence Effectivness during the War on Terror - Research Paper Example

Research Proposal: HUMINT Intelligence Effectiveness during the War on Terror Amanda Kiser INTL507-Intelligence Operations Purpose Statement Measure the importance of HUMINT intelligence operations throughout the War on Terror as well as possible improvements of its use for future insurgent Wars STATEMENT OF PROBLEM/RESEARCH QUESTION In the War on terror, HUMINT has become the most valuable type of intelligence. Being able to recruit and use “assets” to retrieve vital data about an insurgency is the only way to identify who is fighting against the United States led coalition and win. The difficulty presented in developing US HUMINT capabilities is that the leadership entrusted with the development and vectoring of intelligence capabilities come from a more technical background and widely overlook the importance of HUMINT development. Currently the US intelligence system is designed for collecting against a single enemy in a very centralized approach. This does not work against an insurgency. Because of the stubbornness and technical backgrounds of the current leadership the United States military intelligence system is at risk of becoming irrelevant, by over-controlling intelligence personnel the intelligence system has ceded control to untrained personnel. As the “Long War” drags on those personnel gain more experience and find by trial and error what works but without the training to influence reporting and formalize the process the maximum advantage to be gained by HUMINT is never realized (O’Hern, 2008). The question addressed within this study is the effectiveness of HUMINT within the War on Terror. Moreover, it is important to study the possible improvements from the lessons learned of failed missions. This paper will address prior mistakes and possible improvements to achieve a different outcome in the future. Thesis HUMINT is the most effective intelligence method within the War on Terror and has proven successes however, it is not without fault and needs to ever evolve with the fast pace of changing threats. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY Future HUMINT collectors must balance sophisticated interrogation techniques that have been employed throughout history with infiltration by US personnel and turning native assets. An effective United States defense strategy must include the capability to wage and win insurgency warfare. That strategy must include a better focus on clearing stovepipes and create avenues for interagency information sharing in order to effectively exploit all HUMINT assets and maximize combat effectiveness. However, it must also maintain its superior capability to decisively win a conventional war. Future wars will undoubtedly be protracted conventional wars that develop into insurgency style warfare, as the US’ current adversaries are eastern societies that have historically relied on “indirectness, deception, attrition, and protraction” (O’Hern 2008, 259). Thus, there is a need to improve HUMINT within this capacity in the future. The enemy is ever changing so does the methods that the United States collects intelligence. Literature review The dominance of America as an economical, political, and military force in the world makes a target for terrorists. As the leading economy in the world, the U.S is perceived as a valuable market and a competitor. America spends millions of dollars on wide range of research and expansion of projects that do not exist in the rest of the world. The products of the research and development are very appealing to foreign companies and countries because they know adopting these developments can save them a lot of money and offer military and economic goals and international goals. In order to protect their interests and its citizens, the U.S security agents relies more on using HUMINT intelligence than technological means of intelligence collection (Ainsworth 2008, 99). Intelligence is data or information that is evaluated, analyzed, and translated into a product to sustain a specific customer. Intelligence is both a product and process. It has played a significant purpose in warfare and diplomacy throughout history. Human intelligence often referred to as the HUMINT is the utilization of human beings as reliable sources of intelligence data or information. The security agents attain crucial information via interrogation of the detainees and elicitation of data or information from unwitting individuals. Despite the technological advances that have been made in gathering intelligence such as communication intercepts and data collection with satellites, HUMINT stands out as the most reliable source of information (O’Hern 2008, 269-264). The increasing terror plots and insurgency such as detection of bombs and grenades in the U.S and its allies can be attributed to HUMINT or human intelligence. HUMINT is a source of intelligence attained from information gathered and offered by human sources. HUMNIT is an essential and indispensable source of intelligence collection, which has developed into a significant form of intelligence acquisition after the drawbacks of the technological intelligence collection mechanisms. Human intelligence has proved to be effective in the sense that the operation officers rely on secret spies about possible threats of attacks. In unraveling recent terrorist plots, human intelligence was collected via interrogation of captured and detained terror suspects. Further, the operation officers infiltrate terror suspect’s cell phones, which assist counterterrorism agents to attain good intelligence on the membership and activities of the group. In turn, this leads to attainment of crucial information about terror activities (The U.S Army 2008, 351). It is significant to understand how HUMINT functions or operates. Human source screening or assessment is the rational start of HUMINT information gathering. This step involves choosing individuals who may be vital sources of data of HUMINT. The agency aims to locate people with crucial information in order to interrogate them. Proper cross-indexing and recording of the feedback of interviews is significant. HUMINT is very reliable because it easily acquires small bits of data or information particularly in situations when there is need for additional interviews with the same individual (Ainsworth 1998, 1448). As with other fields that collect intelligent information, intelligence evaluation and assessment can play numerous supporting functions. HUMINT starts with biographical intelligence, which assist, locate a hostile undercover individual or persons who might partially mislead an analysis of country intelligence services for beneficial reasons. In addition, cultural intelligence is very essential since it helps understand the social setting of an individual. In order to obtain cultural intelligence, the HUMNIT agents analyze the character and culture of the person. For instance, during the First World War, intelligence officers analyzed both the culture and character of certain country in order to establish their connection with war (Champion 2011, 11). HUMINT conducts its intelligence information gathering in the following manner; locate important data or information to be gathered determines where this data or information is situated assesses the person who possess the information looks for ways to meet and evaluate people with access to the required data or information Locate a potential person and them recruit that individual as an agent Sustain a positive relationship with the individual, and get a reliable flow of important information. After HUMINT identifies the above information, they start assessing and analyzing a person or group of people to establish their potential and capabilities to critical questions. In addition, HUMINT identifies people who fit a pre-established source profile. The aim of this process is to locate people who may have data of interest and can be convinced to cooperate. People willing to cooperate undergo debriefing in order to give crucial information about terror or war on drugs (Dunleigh 10). In case a captured extremist or terrorist refuses to reveal crucial information about terror plans and activities, security agents use interrogation technique to obtain the required information. Intelligence interrogators are trained individuals. HUMINT interrogator often interviews the detained person in accordance with the cooperation of the person. In some instance, they may be forced to be aggressive if an individual is not willing to talk or share important information. At the end of interrogation process, the interrogator checks his information to ensure it is identical to the available information or some new valuable information has been gained (Dunleigh 12). Methodology The research used both qualitative and quantitative methods to investigate the effectiveness of HUMINT in providing essential information about terror activities and plans. A number of HUMINT intelligence officers were interviewed to give their perceptions about the effectiveness of HUMINT in offering intelligence information. Findings The study found out that HUMINT is the most effective means of intelligence information collection. This is because it derives firsthand information from captured suspects. In addition, HUMINT is very reliable because it easily acquires small bits of data or information particularly in situations when there is need for additional interviews with the same individual. However, despite its effectiveness in presenting crucial information about terror plots, HUMNIT has reported some failures in its operations. For instance, sharing of intelligence information or data with other intelligence bodies is a problem. For instance, prior to the September 11 2001 attacks, the FBI did not disclose planned attacks on the U.S to the CIA so that they could act on it. HUMINT needs to work with other intelligence bodies such as CIA to avoid further attacks such as the September 11, 2001. In addition, they should conduct accurate analysis of information they have and strive to act on it. HUMINT needs to improve its methods of data collection by forging networks of regional and domestic recruits (Alexander 2008, 110). Conclusion For many years, HUMINT has been used by countries to obtain important information about their enemies and plans. The operational agents attain crucial information via interrogation of the detainees and elicitation of data or information from unwitting individuals. In addition, HUMINT derives firsthand information from captured terror suspects, which may reveal the activities of terrorists or insurgencies. Despite its success in providing crucial intelligence information, HUMINT has failed to work other intelligence bodies. This behavior has left the national security of the U.S exposed to terrorists. However, HUMINT method of information can be enhanced when intelligence officers are able to recruit and use “assets” to retrieve vital data about an insurgency is the only way to identify who is fighting against the United States led coalition and win. In addition, future HUMINT collectors must balance sophisticated interrogation techniques that have been employed throughout history with infiltration by US personnel and turning native assets. An effective United States defense strategy must include the capability to wage and win insurgency warfare. That strategy must include a better focus on clearing stovepipes and create avenues for interagency information sharing in order to effectively exploit all HUMINT assets and maximize combat effectiveness. References Ainsworth, John. 1998. Sidney Reilly’s reports from South Russia, December 1918--March 1919.Europe--Asia Studies ABI/INFORM Global 50 (1998), 1447-1470. Retrieved online from  https://edge.apus.edu/access/content/group/security-and-global-studies common/Intelligence%20Studies/INTL502/content/Week%202/Russia.pdf Alexander, Matthew, and John R. Bruning. How to Break a Terrorist. N.Y.: Free Press, 2008. Champion, Brian. Spies (look) like us: The early use of business and civilian covers in covert operations. International Journal of Intelligence & Counterintelligence 21 (2008), 530-564, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=32744432&site=ehost-live. Dunleigh, Lowell M. Spy at your service, Sir. Studies in Intelligence 3, no. 2; 81-93. Retrieved online from  https://edge.apus.edu/access/content/group/security-and-global-studies-common/Intelligence%20Studies/INTL502/content/Week%202/Service.pdf Murphy, Cullen. Torturers Apprentice: The Atlantic, retrieved 24 November 2013 http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ archive/2012/01/torturers-apprentice/308838/. O’Hern, Steven K. The Intelligence Wars:  Lessons from Baghdad, New York: Prometheus Books, 2008.  The United States Army. Army releases new interrogation manual. September 08, 2006. http://www.army.mil/article/1/Army_releases_new_interrogation_manual/ Read More