Human Factors: Pilot Ergonomics in Naval Aviation - Research Paper Example

Human Factors: Pilot Ergonomics in Naval Aviation Human Factors: Pilot Ergonomics in Naval Aviation Introduction The issue of human factors and ergonomics in naval aviation, in the United States, is essentially considered to have come to the limelight during the Second World War. However, advances, which aided to its development, came from the 20th century developments (Benchmark Research & Safety, 2010). Before the Second World War, the focal point was on shaping the human to fit the machine that is trial and error, rather than shaping machines to fit the human being. A lot of the human factors and ergonomic in naval aviation advances were derived from the military necessity. With the launch of the First World War, the first fighting to utilize the recently created airplanes in combat, the need arose for ways to quickly train and select qualified pilots. This provoked the growth of aviation psychology, as well as the start of aeromedical research (Benchmark Research & Safety, 2010). Even though, advances were made during that time period, according to Meister (1999), the momentum for developing the discipline was not met as a result of a lack of personnel and critical mass of technology as there was in the Second World War. The time period between the First World War and the Second World War saw a decrease in research, though a number of accomplishments were made. Aeromedical research went on to see some developments in laboratories built at Wright Field in Ohio, as well as the Brooks Air Force Base in Texas. These laboratories carried out researches, which focused on further recognizing the characteristics of victorious pilots, and establishing what concerns environmental stressors had on flight performance. The fundamentals of anthropometry, also known as the study of human body measurements, were also applied to the creation of airplanes during that time period. In the private sector, in addition, automobile driving behavioral study was also carried out (Meister, 1999). This paper will discuss some of the human factors that relate to pilot ergonomics in naval aviation. The outbreak of the First World War, and the two intrinsic needs it created, formed the means for coming up with the human factors and ergonomics discipline (Salvendy, 2006). Primarily, the need to organize and utilize vast numbers of individuals made it unfeasible to select men and women for particular jobs. Hence, the focus migrated to designing for people’s abilities, while lessening the unconstructive consequences of their restrictions. Then, the Second World War saw the turning point where the technological progresses had finally outpaced the capacity of men and women to compensate and adapt to poor designs. This was mostly witnessed in airplane crashes by highly-skilled pilots caused by problems in control configurations, as well as instrument displays (Salvendy, 2006). Enemy contacts were also missed by aggravated radar operators. Investigational psychologists were asked to study this matter through adapting laboratory techniques to resolve applied issues. The discipline or subject of human factors and ergonomics, as a result, was born, even though the persons involved did not notice it at that time (Benchmark Research & Safety, 2010). The two decades, which followed after the end of the Second World War, saw the prolongation of military-aided study driven mainly by the Cold War (Salvendy, 2006). Military study laboratories, which were established during the Cold War, were enhanced and extra ones were created by the Army, the Air Force and the Navy. These laboratories were Human Engineering Laboratory (HEL), Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center (AFPTRC) and Naval Electronics Laboratory (NEL) respectively. Institutes of higher education also set up research laboratories, with the aid of government funding, counting the ones at the Ohio State University and the University of Illinois built in 1946 and 1949 respectively (Salvendy, 2006). The private sector witnessed the development of human factors and ergonomics groups in the aviation industry such Boeing, Grumman Corporation and McDonnell Douglass among others. They also witnessed the rise of electronics, as well as communication, in this crucial subject matter (Benchmark Research & Safety, 2010). The Human Factors Society (HFS), the chief professional group for human factors, as well as ergonomics practitioners, in the United States, was fashioned in 1957 with roughly 90 individuals going to the initial AGM. HFS changed its name to the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (HFES) in 1992. The society, at the moment, has over 4500 members, a majority of whom actively take part in one or more of the 23 technical associations and are always present at the annual meetings. As from in the mid 60s, the discipline continued to develop and grow in its earlier recognized areas. In addition, it grew into other areas comprising of computer hardware in the 60s, computer software in the 70s, weapon systems and nuclear power plants in the 80s, the Internet and automation in the 90s, and adaptive technology in the 2000s among other areas. Most currently, new areas of interest have surfaced comprising of affect, nanoergonomics and neuroergonomics (Hobbs, 2008). A reliable theme, which has surfaced over the past decades, is the ever growing sphere of influence human factors, as well as ergonomics, as technology grows and advances (Norman, 1988). What began as a scarcely defined break off of investigational psychology, which centered on the interaction of individuals with machine controls, has now grown to include approximately any interaction of individuals with their surroundings. With the fast advancements in science along with technology, in such fields as nano and bio-technology, it is fascinating to contemplate on what recently discovered issues human factors, as well as ergonomics, will be referred on to resolve. These days, as it was at its commencement, HFE is still a multi-disciplinary line of work (Benchmark Research & Safety, 2010). The profession, in the United States, materialized from the behavioral sciences such as experimental psychology, as well as various engineering disciplines. Also, the profession, in European nations, found its origins in the physical sciences such as human physiology. Individuals, these days, from a number of disciplines varying from engineering, psychology and physiology, center their exceptional abilities and skills to the study of how humans interact with systems. People, who are interested in learning more about the proper history of the human factors, as well as ergonomics discipline, are encouraged to go through the very educational book written by Meister (1999). The writer of this shortened history is very much obliged to this work. The mistakes of maintenance staff can be the most noticeable aspects of maintenance human factors (Meister, 1999). However, to comprehend why and how maintenance errors arises, we need to recognize the organizational background in which they take place. Incidents or accidents are normally prompted by the measures taken by the operational personnel, such as maintenance engineers or pilots. Nevertheless, these measures take place in the circumstance of local conditions, such as workplace conditions, communication, as well as equipment. Also, the task environment comprises of risk controls. These are aspects such as procedures, precautions or checks designed to handle hazards, which threaten safety. Local conditions, risk controls and personal actions can, in turn, be persuaded by organizational factors for instance company policies, management decisions and resource allocation. In order to comprehend and eventually prevent accidents, it is essential to trace the root of causes back through all the aspects of the system comprising of all organizational influences. This is normally referred to as root cause study (Brewer & Hsiang, 2002). Human error is a peril to almost all superior technological systems. It has been projected that human error is concerned in 70% of aircraft accidents in addition to 80% of all shipping accidents. Human error is also concerned in at least 58% of medical misfortunes. According to some research centers, approximately 80,000 individuals, in the United States, die each year due to preventable medical errors. Therefore, it should not be shocking to find out that human error is a considerable threat in airline maintenance (Norman, 1988). The application of the phrase ‘human error’ should not mean that we have any issue with humans. Maintenance errors, in many cases, are symptoms of showcasing problems in the organization. Even though, they are unnecessary events, errors are priceless opportunities to make out improvements. There are two key approaches to explaining errors made by humans which are physical descriptions, as well as psychological descriptions (Norman, 1988). Physical Descriptions of Errors A plain approach to the classification of human errors is to explain them in terms of the visible measures of the error-maker (Hobbs, 2008). Faults are normally split into acts of omission, timing or commission and precision. An omission or oversight is a failure to perform an essential action like, for instance, leaving an oil cap unsafe. Commissions, on the other hand, are cases whereby an action is carried out, which should not have been carried out, for instance, cross-connecting wires. Precision and timing errors engross an action carried out at the wrong time, in the incorrect order or without the essential level of accuracy, for instance, using the inaccurate setting on a torque wrench (Hobbs, 2008). The most widespread maintenance faults in a Boeing database are oversight or omissions: parts or equipment not installed and unfinished fitting of parts. In a Canadian study, a majority of usually reported maintenance faults with airworthiness inferences were commissions comprising of the unsafe operation of systems like thrust or flaps reverser during maintenance, and the unfinished fitting of components, an omission or oversight (Hobbs, 2008). An investigation of more than 1,000 maintenance accidents reported by NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System, showed that a majority of the common difficulties were the omission of a necessary service procedure, followed by a number of documentation abnormalities, as well as the installation of incorrect parts, a commission. Also, physical descriptions are extremely useful and, in a majority of cases, are fairly easy to apply (Hobbs, 2008). Sadly, they give extremely little insight as to why the error took place, or what it portrays concerning the wider system (Brewer & Hsiang, 2002). For instance, if the only information people have concerning a negative incident is that a professional fitted a component in the wrong part, then they would not be capable of determining a sufficient response from options like changing procedures, redesigning or equipment modifying training. To recognize the root causes of maintenance irregularities that include human error, people need to have an understanding of the individual’s thoughts at the time of their mistake (Hobbs, 2008). Psychological Descriptions of Errors This field requires us to classify errors in line with the individual’s intentions or aims during the time of their act (Benchmark Research & Safety, 2010). For instance, instead of just concluding that a professional did not safeguard a plumbing connection, people would try to comprehend their approach at the time of the mistake. Also, for instance, people would want to know: Did the professionals forget? Did they just want to leave it loose? Did they suppose that an associate was going to finish the task? Clearly, people can never recognize for certain what an individual was thinking, but they can normally make sensible judgments. An easy way to allocate a psychological description to a mistake is to picture what the individual who made the mistake might have assumed the moment they knew that they had done something wrongly. If the engineers did not know they had made a mistake, it is necessary to envision what they would have supposed had they become conscious of their mistake (Hobbs, 2008). A benefit of psychological descriptions or errors is that they allow individual to place the mistake in its organizational context, and after that create countermeasures customized to the root causes of the setback (Meister, 1999). For instance, if experts conclude that a person did not execute a necessary task since they forgot, then they might deem the prompts to memory obtainable to them, like documentation. People may also reflect on what could be corrected in future to catch related memory lapses (Benchmark Research & Safety, 2010). On the other hand, if people conclude that an individual did not execute a necessary task since they thought the process did not need it, then their investigation may lead them to organizational matters such as procedure design or training. Some of the six psychological error examples that are related to maintenance include perception error, memory lapse, slip, wrong assumption, technical misunderstandings and procedure violation. The above six errors are most relevant to explain why mistakes could take place while coping with the subject matter (Hobbs, 2008). Perception Errors Perception errors refer to failures to distinguish a critical item, which the individual could have been capable of noticing. In maintenance, the issue might have been a worn out tire, a noticeable crack in a tinny structure, or an obstacle in the way of a plane under tow. Memory Lapses One of the most frequent errors or mistakes in maintenance accidents is memory failure. Instead of forgetting something concerning the past, the engineer normally forgets to carry out an action, which his or she had intended to execute in the future (Hobbs, 2008). Slips A slip refers to the inattentive performance of a recognizable skill-based action at a place or time where the action was not planned (Brewer & Hsiang, 2002). Numerous maintenance duties engross routine activities like opening and closing cowls, checking air pressures and lock-wiring. After these tasks have been performed, lots of times they begin to engross automatic skill sequences, which are outside conscious alertness (Meister, 1999). Wrong Assumptions A wrong assumption happens when someone misidentifies a common situation. The person fails to ensure that their perceptive of the circumstances is correct (Hobbs, 2008). An ordinary error of this kind happens when an engineer makes an incorrect guess while working with an assistant, such as incorrectly guessing that the other individual is going to execute a task step. Technical Misunderstandings Technical misunderstandings refer to mistakes whereby the engineer did not have the essential knowledge, or lacked an alertness of where to uncover the information they required. This is most expected to happen when a person is carrying out an unfamiliar duty, or in non-routine condition (Hobbs, 2008). Procedure Violations Procedure violations are a significant class of behavior in a majority of safety-crucial industries in fields as varied as rail transport, oil production and medicine (Hobbs, 2008). Procedure violations might be concerned in 70% of accidents in various industries. A plane hangar is a greatly regulated workplace. Professionals are expected to perform their duties as observing legal necessities, company measures, manufacturer’s safeguarding manuals and oral norms of safe behavior. Procedure violations, as a result, are extensive in maintenance (Benchmark Research & Safety, 2010). Conclusion The aviation industry cannot work without the assistance of maintenance personnel, as maintenance error is a noteworthy and enduring threat to aviation safety. Maintenance errors, in the past, were frequently perceived as nothing other than failures of persons to carry out their assigned roles. Organizations, hence, have always responded with dismissal or punishment (Norman, 1988). However, there is now universal recognition that maintenance errors mirror the interaction of personal, organizational and workplace factors. Whereas maintenance technicians should still take accountability for their performances, managing the risk of maintenance error needs a system-level response. The managerial response to maintenance error incorporates two paths. First is the probability of maintenance error, which can be minimized by counteracting error-producing circumstances in the organization (Norman, 1988). This involves attention to tiredness management, the provision of appropriate tools and equipment, as well as human factors training, and additional actions directed to human factors related to maintenance error. Second is that it should be acknowledged that maintenance error is a danger, which can be reduced, but never completely eradicated. Organizational toughness in spite of human mistakes can be maximized through making sure that suitable risk controls are set up identify, as well as correct errors, and reduce the consequences of those errors, which remain hidden, in spite of the best attempts of the organization. References Benchmark Research & Safety. (2010). What is human factors and ergonomics? Retrieved from http://www.benchmarkrs.com/main/human-factors/what.aspx Brewer, JD., & Hsiang, S.M. (2002). The ‘ergonomics paradigm’: Foundations, challenges and future directions. Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science, 4(7), 285-305. Hobbs, A. (2008). An overview of human factors in aviation maintenance. Retrieved from http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/550.pdf Meister, D. (1999). The history of human factors and ergonomics. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Norman, D. (1988). The design of everyday things. New York, NY: Doubleday. Salvendy, G. (2006). Handbook of human factors and ergonomics (3rd ed.). Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. Read More