Military attack strategies in Singapore - Essay Example

Military Attack Strategies in Singapore Introduction It is astonishing to know how a small country like Singapore has build up a strong military force since its independence on August 9, 1965 (“Background Note”). Bilveer Singh revealed that the state was able to effectively strengthen its security “during the Cold and Post-Cold War era through a judicious mix of building up national defense capability and synergies with external strategic partners” (1). Stated otherwise, Singapore has mainly focused on the use of hard power to secure the country from any external threats. However, due to globalization, it has also considered employing soft power. The Republic can thus be described as having a strong economic “and military power supplemented with strong internal control of its political system” (Singh 1). Military Policy For several years from its independence, Singapore has always put emphasis on “the importance of military power for survival and security” (Singh 7). In fact, the country’s name Singapore “which in Sanskrit means Lion City” has been observed as mirroring the nation’s attitude towards any attack (Singh 7). The prime reason of which has been attributed to its “acute sense of insecurity and vulnerability” after its expulsion from Malaysia (Da Cunha 133). As such, the city-state’s leadership has made its military as the center of its continued existence. It can therefore be deducted that Singapore’s prosperity and confidence as a nation in the international sphere largely depends on its military force. To this end, Lee Kuan Yew affirmed this objective in his inaugural speech. He declared: “to survive, we must be sure that we cannot be just over-run or invaded by armies, or knocked out by rockets / We must have the capacity to resist invasion and to call on friends who will be ready to help us if we are invaded / In other words, we must have the capacity to prevent a successful invasion” (Yew, qtd. in Singh 15-16). Such declaration by Singapore’s highest official has supported the claim that ensuring survival had been critical for a small country like Singapore (“The Evolution”). The basis then of Singapore’s creation of a strong military force is to “have the capacity to resist an invasion” if there would be one (Yew, qtd. in Singh 15-16). On the other hand, the purpose of its strategic alliances with the super-powers of the world is for the country to have friends (allies) who will help them in case of invasion. The prime minister then summarized the mentioned goals by saying that the state “must have the capacity to prevent a successful invasion” (Yew, qtd. in Singh 15-16). In such case, Singapore’s military policy is also geared towards deterrence and diplomacy. Military Attack Strategies Singapore’s military force (Singapore Armed Forces) was actually formed with the help of Israel. The state then adopted “the Israeli model of a national conscript defense” (Singh 16). Conscription was done by requiring the male citizens who were able-bodied and at least eighteen years of age to serve a term in the armed forces of the country (“Conscription”). During this period, they were taught the basics of military training, the laws of war and the commitment to defend the country in case of invasion. For the following years, Singapore has successfully built “an impressive defense capability” (Singh 16). However, this defense concept was changed, the “poisonous shrimp” strategy was transformed into “porcupine strategy” (Singh 16). Accordingly, the former Chief of Operations, Singapore Armed Forces, Lee Hsien Loong justified such change by contending that “the Republic needed to adopt a defense posture that was capable of inflicting intolerable costs on potential enemies as well as to outlast attacks in actual combat” (qtd. in Singh 16). He said: “So we need a policy which says, if you come, I’ll whack you, and I’ll survive / This is a workable strategy / I may not completely destroy you, but you will have to pay a high price for trying to subdue me and you may still not succeed” (Loong, qtd. in Singh 16). Obviously, this statement is practically a warning to any group or country which has a plan to invade Singapore. It is violent indeed but is strong enough to erase plans of attack by invaders. Somehow, the state is just making sure of its full security. The remark warrants a no complete loss or win situation. The state may not totally destroy the would-be invader but rest assured, the would-be invader will gain a substantial loss and will not succeed. In view of that, Loong further stated: “We do not go on the basis that if somebody attacks us, we will hit them and will hurt them / But we will go on the basis that we will hit them and we will be around to pick up the pieces at the end” (qtd. in Singh 17). This announcement connotes Singapore’s complete willingness to fight against an invader. It is of no doubt then that Singapore will fight back by full force if an act of invasion occurs. Presently, “Singapore has created a highly developed hard power approach and strategy of securing itself” by employing “models adopted from Sweden and Switzerland as well as Israel” (Singh 17). It has “a large pool of conscripts in the active and reserve forces” (60, 500 active and 213, 800 reserve) (“Singapore Armed”; Singh 17). It also has “a standing army (50,000 active in 4 combat divisions with 413 tanks), buttressed by a small air force (6,000 active with 136 total combat aircraft including 6 fighter or ground attack squadrons, 20 armed helicopters and supporting air defense guns and missiles), navy (4,500 active having 1 SSK submarine, 24 patrol and coastal combatants, 4 mine countermeasures and 6 amphibious warfare ships), and paramilitary forces (108,000 active)” (Singh 17-18). Furthermore, part of Singapore’s military attack strategies is its military agreements with several countries. Amongst these various arrangements are the following: (1) “joint military exercises with” Southeast Asian countries, “US, UK, Australia, New Zealand and India” (2) “intelligence sharing with ASEAN states as well as important strategic partners such as the US, UK and Australia” (Singh 19). With the continuing relevance of new military techniques, Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) has utilized “technology as force multipliers” which allows “its various units to fight in an integrated manner” (Da Cunha 145). It has been spending a considerable amount of money for research and development which focuses on the discovery of new powerful military weapons (“Singapore Armed”). The Republic has also established military manufacturing industries which are assigned with the duty of developing military hardware (“Singapore Armed”). Moreover, the country has designed an educational system which produces national servicemen capable of being trained to operate the armed forces’ “sophisticated platforms and systems” (“Singapore Armed”). “The SAF officially opened its Murai Urban Training Facility (MUTF) to hone the SAF’s networked urban operations capability” (“Singapore Armed”). Conclusion Singapore’s sense of insecurity has greatly contributed to its decision of utilizing military power to the fullest. Significantly, the state has been successful towards this aim. It has created a strong armed forces as well as important alliances. Nevertheless, because of globalization, Singapore changed its military policies and strategies. Deterrence and diplomacy was considered while its military strategies were transformed to conform the existing warfare trend. Works Cited “Background Note: Singapore.” US Department of State. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1 Apr. 2010. Web. 2 Sept. 2010. . “Conscription.” Fact-index.com. Fact-index.com, n.d. Web. 2 Sept. 2010. . Da Cunha, Derek. Singapore in the New Millennium: Challenges Facing the City-State. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002. Print. “Singapore Armed Forces.” Academic Dictionaries and Encyclopedias. Academic Dictionaries and Encyclopedias, n.d. Web. 3 Sept. 2010. . Singh, Bilveer. The Military and Small States: The Role of Hard Power in Singapore’s Domestic and Foreign Policy. [PDF file]. . “The Evolution of Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Challenges of Change.” [PDF file]. . Read More