Universal Principles for the Conduct of War - Research Paper Example

How history provided strategic thinkers with universal principles for the conduct of war Introduction According to Alastair Buchan in his book War and Modern Society, strategic theorists are not able to provide an applicable and updated “Corpus of theory” similar to that available to economists. Strategic studies have tried to analyze the role of military force in international relations and their importance (Buchan 3). Alternatively, an ROTC Army manual on the American military history affirms that "all large nations distinguish the principles of civil war and integrate them in their Army doctrines" and thus these principles help the Armies to win in any battle. It is many people’s beliefs that history has provided strategic thinkers with universal principles for the conduct of war. This essay is going to discuss how history provided military strategic thinkers (Napoleon and Carl von Clausewitz) with universal principles for the conduct of war (Buchan 92). The historically known Principles of War, Sun Tzu documented were influential to strategic thinkers of the Wars. There is a belief that, history provided strategic thinkers such as Napoleon and Carl von Clausewitz with universal principles for the conduct of war (Mahnken 29). There are no approved principals of War, although a number of strategic thinkers have their own principles (Cimbala 26). The War principles, which Carl von Clausewitz identified in his essay “Principles of War” and thereafter discussed in his book, about war were influential to military thinkers of the North Atlantic region. Military strategy is a set of ideas, which military organizations implemented to achieve desired strategic goals. Founded from Greek strategies, military strategy during its first appearance in the 18thcentury was termed in its sense as the “general art” and “arrangement art” of military troops (Buchan 72). Military strategy aimed at conducting and planning of military campaigns, the disposition, and movement of forces, and enemy’s deception. The western father of the modern strategy steady, Clausewitz, stated that military strategy as “the battles’ movement to achieve the goals of a war”. B.H. Liddell Hart also gave a definition, which had less emphasis on battles, explaining military strategy as “the art of applying and distributing military means to achieve and fulfill policy ends (Cimbala 31). Hence, the two strategic thinkers gave the supremacy to aims of politics over military objectives. Military strategy was among the “arts” and “sciences” trivium that governed how to conduct warfare, and the rest were tactics, the maneuvering forces, and execution of plans in battle, maintenance, and logistics of an army During the 19th century,. This view prevailed since the time of Roman, and the boundary between tactics and strategy during this century was blurred, and in some times, the categorization of a verdict was a matter of personal opinion. Tactics and strategy are almost related and are on similar range, modern thinking puts the level of operation between strategy and tactics (Cimbala 33). All deal with time, distance, and force although the strategy has large scale, endures for many years, and is societal. On the other hand, tactics have small scale and engage the disposition of less elements lasting for only few hours or weeks. Historically, people understood strategy as governing the prelude to military battle while, on the other hand, tactics governed its execution. However, during the twentieth century world war, the distinction between battle and maneuver, tactics and strategy, expanded due to the advancement of transit and technology (Cimbala 35). Most people hold the belief that, this military strategy history really provided strategic thinkers such as Napoleon and Clausewitz with universal principals on how to conduct wars. History has a lot of guidance on how to plan and conduct military wars, whereby most of strategy thinkers rely on (Collins 59). For instance, it is often true that history has art of strategies, which defines how to achieve the goals of a war. In addition, in its best form, strategy focused on military issues. In historical societies, a political leader or a king was similar to a military leader. If not, then the communication distance between a military and political leader was small. However, since then there was need of growth of professional armies, the relationship between military and political leaders came to recognition (Collins 61). In most cases, there was a decision that the two needed separation. This history gave military strategic thinkers such as Napoleon and Clausewitz principals on how to conduct and plan military wars. Napoleonic strategy The revolution of French and the War of Napoleonic that followed highly revolutionized military strategy. This period’s impact was still to be experienced in the early stage of World War I and American Civil War (Buchan 92). With the invention of small cheap arms and the increase of the drafted civilian soldiers, military armies grew fast to massed formations (Collins 82). This led to division of the army into several divisions and further into the corps. Following this division, it resulted to divisional artillery, mobile cannon, lightweight with firepower and great range. The firm formations of musketeers and pikemen firing massed lobbies gave way to hostility in Skirmish lines (Collins 83). Napoleon really benefited from the Napoleonic history. He took the advantage of these historical developments to carry out a brutally “strategy of annihilation”, which was effective. Napoleon invariably decided to achieve solution in battle, with the main aim of destroying his enemies and attackers, usually attaining his goal though powerful maneuver. As a leader and major general, Napoleon applied the grand strategy in the same way as operational strategy, hence making use of both economic and political measures (Collins 89). Secondly, Napoleon effectively used historic information to conduct the battle of Austerlitz (Cimbala 24). This is another reason, which can make one believe that history provided the strategic thinkers with principals of conducting wars, is how Although he was not the core founder of the military methods he used, Napoleon effectively merged the relatively powerful maneuver and the stages of the battle to become one single event. Prior to this, all general officers in charge considered this battle approach as a very separate event. However, Napoleon decided to make use of the maneuver of battle in making decision on how and where the Austerlitz battle would be more progressive (Cimbala 37). This was among the perfect sample of the maneuver. Therefore, this is evident that history was highly beneficial for Napoleon as a strategic thinker. He used this information to make decisions about how and where the battle would be more progressive. It was only through history that he was able to make critical decisions for war. Napoleon decided to withdraw from a higher position to move his enemies forward hence this allowed the Army of French to win the war gaining a lot of victories (Cimbala 33). He made use of two strategies, which enable him to win the battle. His “move on to the rear” was to move his French Army across the communication lines of their enemies. The aim of this was to force the enemies to either match to fight with Napoleon of trying to find means of escaping around the army (Collins 87). The aim of placing his military into the rear line was to cut the communications and supplies of his opponent. Napoleon’s approach gave his enemies a negative morale hence leading to his win. Once joined, the battle would be more competitive making his opponents unable to win. This also enabled Napoleon to choose several battle angles to a battle location. Initially, the force concentration lack assisted with food foraging and sought to cause confusion to the enemies as to Napoleon’s intentions and real location (Collins 93). This strategy, together with the usage of force marches brought morale that heavily played in his favor. The “indirect” strategy in battle as well enabled Napoleon to cause disruption to the linear formations, which the allied enemies used. As the progression of the battle continued, the allied enemies dedicated their reserves to steady the situation; Napoleon was suddenly to release a flanking formation to fight with the opponents (Mahnken 29). His opponents facing consequences of little reserves and new threat, they had no other option rather than weakening and giving up to this battle. After the occurrence of this, Napoleon would lounge a highly competitive attack to break these lines. The rapture of the enemies’ line allowed him to flank the lines leaving his enemies with no choice rather than surrendering or fleeing (Mahnken 30). Another strategy used by Napoleon was the application of the inner position “central position”. This enabled Napoleon to drive away his enemies by separating their armies. The main purpose of this was to attain the men’s highest concentration into the primary conflict while restricting the ability of the enemies hence reinforcing the battle (Mahnken 31). The battle’s central position was weak thus; the full force of the enemy’s pursuit could fail since the other army required attention. Therefore, the achievement that Napoleon gained in his battle clearly portrays how history highly provided strategic thinkers with principals of conducting and planning the battles (Mahnken 35). How history provided Clausewitz with principals of conducting and planning the war Clausewitz’s book “On War” has turned out to be the most respected reference sources for strategy, focusing on political, leadership, and military. History helped him to acquire knowledge and information on how to plan and conduct military battle (Mahnken 29). The Clausewitz famous assertion was “Battle is not just a political action, but a true political tool, a policy continuation conducted by different means”. Clausewitz left “geometry” as an ineffective factor in military strategy, instead believing in the Napoleon approach of destruction of the opponents’ forces, under any cost (Mahnken 35). However, Clausewitz also acknowledged that having limited warfare could highly influence military policy through lowering the position by a “strategy of attrition”. After the end of 1890, Clausewitz’s power spread out to British strategic thinkers as well. A good example was a naval historian “Julian Corbett” whose work reflected his belief in Clausewitz’s concepts (Collins 96). Clausewitz had minimal influence of American strategic thinkers before 1945, although he influenced military thinkers such as Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx, Mao Zedong, and Vladimir, and therefore the communist and Soviet traditions. Clausewitz influenced many strategic thinkers who used his concepts to plan and conduct military wars. Many strategic thinkers who got access of Clausewitz’s book “On War’ gained a lot of knowledge on how to control Wars. Clausewitz’s idea that military wars involve “friction” that deforms to a lesser or greater degree has become common to many strategic thinkers (Collins 111). Conclusion In conclusion, history has really provided strategic thinkers with principals of conducting and planning for the military wars. People often believe that, this military strategy history really provided strategic thinkers such as Napoleon and Clausewitz with universal principals on how to conduct wars. History has a lot of guidance on how to plan and conduct military wars, whereby most of strategy thinkers rely on (Mahnken 56). For instance, it is often true that history has art of strategies, which defines how to achieve the goals of a war. In addition, in its best form, strategy focused on military issues. In historical societies, a political leader or a king was similar to a military leader. If not, then the communication distance between a military and political leader was small (Mahnken 76). However, since then there was need of growth of professional armies, the relationship between military and political leaders came to recognition. In most cases, there was a decision that the two needed separation. This history gave military strategic thinkers such as Napoleon and Clausewitz principals on how to conduct and plan military wars. Work cited Buchan, Alastair. War in the Modern Society. Harper & Row, 1968. Print. Cimbala, Stephen J. Coercive Military Strategy. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008. Print. Collins, John M. Military Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2004. Internet resource. Mahnken, Thomas. Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2012. Internet resource. Read More