Homeland Securtiy. Post-Mortem of the US Governments Response to the Times Square Cesium Terrorist - Essay Example

? Post-Mortem of the US Government’s Response to the Times Square Cesium Terrorist Attack Scenario The scenario chosen for thisproject is a hypothetical terrorist attack on Times Square in New York City. In this attack, terrorists have obtained cesium stolen from a hospital’s medical equipment, and detonated this cesium with a TNT bomb in Times Square. On the day of the attack, Times Square had its normal amount of visitors and wind conditions were calm. Immediately after the attack, NYPD and NYFD were quick to respond, but later crisis and radiation management efforts by the EPA were slow and hindered rescue efforts. Abstract This memo was created as the result of a post-hoc examination of the Times Square cesium terrorist attack. It aims to highlight the significance of long- and short-term fatalities, cost of property damage, and loss of public confidence in safety as outcomes of radiological attacks; and because of this significance, uses these outcomes to measure the relative success of the federal government’s response to this attack. Furthermore, this memo attempts to highlight areas that could have been improved before the attack to prevent this level of devastation, including better management of existing resources, better protection of existing radiological supplies, and a better understanding of the nuclear terrorist threat. Lastly, this memo aims to highlight the previously unexpected outcome of wind to show the effect confounding variables can have on the federal, state, and local governments’ responses to crises like this. Background The threat of nuclear terrorism has been apparent since Brian Jenkins published his groundbreaking “Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?” 37 years ago, yet because of a wide variety of attack types the federal government is charged with defending against, the threat of a nuclear terrorist attack has remained legitimate (Cameron 1999). While the potential exists for terrorists to create a crude nuclear device or attack an existing nuclear plant, the potential for a terrorist to use radiological terrorism has always been far more probably. In fact, in his testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the President of the Federation of American Scientists Dr. Henry Kelly stated that, “The Committee will undoubtedly agree that the danger presented by modest radiological sources that are comparatively easy to obtain is significant,” (Kelly 2002). In his article “Nuclear Terrorism Reconsidered”, Gavin Cameron offers an explanation of a terrorist’s motivation to use these weapons by saying, “The technical feasibility of radiological terrorism make it by far the most likely form of nuclear weapon. […] Radiological weapons would, like nuclear-yield weapons, set a group apart and take its terrorism to a different level” (Cameron 1999). In this quote, Cameron shows why radiological terrorism remains such an appealing style of attack for many terrorists: this type of attack instills the same public fear as a nuclear attack yet is much more technologically in-reach for many terrorist groups. There are several factors that contribute to the effectiveness of a radiological terrorist device. Among these are “the amount of material released, the nature of the material, the details of the device that distributes the material, the direction and speed of the wind, other weather conditions, the size of the particles released, […] and the location and size of buildings near the release site” (Kelly 2002). All of these variables are important in the process of assessing the damage caused by an attack and potential evacuation and decontamination plans. Because of these uncertainties, estimations of the impact of such a weapon are extremely inaccurate and difficult to interpret. Outcomes Fatalities Fatalities are the most obvious measureable outcome of a radiological terrorist attack, yet may not be the most informative in this attack. In a radiological attack, fatalities must be divided into short-term and long-term fatalities. Short-term fatalities are likely to be caused by “immediate tissue damage [leading] to acute radiation poisoning,” (Kelly 2002), yet are likely to be small in comparison to other types of nuclear terrorism. These fatalities will be easy to measure but will not tell authorities much about the true impact of the attack. Cameron (1998) referred to them as the least catastrophic type of nuclear terrorist weapon because of this diminished capacity to immediately kill, yet long term dangers till persist. The Times Square Alliance estimates that 500,000 people “go through Times Square everyday,” (Alliance), meaning if residents in an area of five city blocks had an estimated one-in-a-thousand chance of getting cancer as Kelly (2002) estimates, this attack will be responsible for 500 new diagnoses of cancer. Clearly the long term effects of these types of weapons are far more devastating than the short term effects, yet any loss of life for any reason is unacceptable. Property Damage The loss of property value because of this cesium terrorist attack on Times Square would be in the billions, if not trillions. Kelly (2002) highlighted the damage New York would face from an attack such as this by saying, “Over an area of about three hundred typical city blocks, there would be a one-in-ten risk of death from cancer for residents living in the contaminated area for forty years. The entire borough of Manhattan would be so contaminated that anyone living there would have a one-in-a-hundred chance of dying from cancer caused by the residual radiation. It would be decades before the city was inhabitable again, and demolition might be necessary.” Clearly, the loss of property could not be in a more valuable area. The complete evacuation of not just Times Square, but the borough of Manhattan would cause one of the hottest housing markets in the world to completely collapse. Manhattan would essentially turn into a large quarantine zone and would have to be abandoned for forty years. In terms of measuring success or failure based on outcomes, this outcome has to show failure on the part of the federal government to protect the property of its citizens and the soil of its cities. Furthermore, this devastation would not just be in Manhattan, or New York state for that matter, but would be spread out over “an area of approximately one-thousand square kilometers, extending over three states,” according to Kelly (2002). A radiological attack affecting three states would be detrimental to property value and to citizens’ living situations across the east coast. Public Confidence in Government In order for governments to effectively lead citizens, people must have confidence in their government officials, yet does public confidence in government increase or decrease as a result of a radiological terrorist attack? The closest proxy available to this type of attack were the 9/11 attacks, so these attacks should give government insight into how terrorist attacks affect public confidence in government. In a Gallup poll conducted from September 7-10, 2001, 6% of respondents said they were confident in the federal government’s ability to handle domestic problems, and 8% said they had no confidence at all. One month later, between October 11-14, 2001, four times the number of respondents (24%) said they trusted the federal government’s ability to handle domestic problems and half of the former number of respondents (4%) said they had no confidence at all. This remarkable shift in public opinion was caused by one single event: the 9/11 attacks. After the attacks, a stunned and frightened public turned to its federal government for protection and for justice. When it appeared the federal government was initially providing this, public confidence skyrocketed, yet this model stands in contrast to Cameron’s (1999) ideas on a post terrorist attack public psyche. He says, “a radiological device would […] have considerable value as a terrorist weapon since its nuclear component would almost certainly ensure a considerable impact on the public’s imagination and fear- and thus on government response.” According to this model, a radiological device would create panic and extreme distrust of government’s ability to protect its citizens, leading to a decrease in public confidence. This is probably the more likely scenario in a post Times Square cesium terrorist attack. What Could Have Been Done Differently? Better Management of Existing Resources In a 2004 audit report, the EPA acknowledged the need for the agency to better manage their existing resources for counterterrorism and emergency response. The audit revealed that, “EPA does not have adequate processes for identifying, obtaining, maintaining, and tracking equipment needed to respond to terrorist acts and Nationally Significant Incidents,” (Report 2004). This inadequate management of resources undoubtedly contributed to the EPA’s slow response to the cesium terrorist attack, and definitely hindered emergency response time. In an attack like this, evacuation time is critical to preventing dangerous radiation exposure, and inefficient resource management processes like the EPA highlighted waste life-saving time. Better Protection of Existing Radiological Supplies The cesium in this scenario was hypothetically stolen from a hospital and used in a terrorist attack, yet this type of attack has happened before in reality. Dr. Kelly (1999) explains that, “In September, 1987, scavengers broke into an abandoned cancer clinic in Goiania, Brazil and stole a medical device containing large amounts of radioactive cesium.” Furthermore, “In 1999 […], Chechen rebels placed a shielded container holding the Cesium-137 core of a caner treatment device in a Moscow park,” (Kelly 1999). Clearly, better protection of existing radiological supplies is needed. This need, and its associated cost-benefit analysis, are explained by Kelly (1999). “Measures needed to improve the security of facilities holding dangerous amounts of these materials will increase costs. In some cases, it may be worthwhile to pay a higher price for increased security,” (Kelly 1999). Clearly, increased security around existing radiological supplies could have helped to prevent this attack. Better Understanding of the Radiological Terrorist Threat To say that the United States is not prepared for a radiological attack would be misleading. The United States has made preparations for a radiological attack, and has equipment in place to decontaminate attack sites and assist emergency response teams, yet a radiological terrorist threat is something the public of the United States, or any country for that matter, is not prepared for. The public shock and resulting panic would further impede rescue efforts and decontamination efforts. To prepare for this, the public needs to be made aware of the reality of the possibility of a radiological terrorist attack, and needs to be informed of proper safety measures that are necessary in case of an attack. These steps might not prepare every member of the public, but they have the potential to greatly reduce panic and shock in the event of another cesium or radiological terrorist attack. Previously Unexpected Outcomes Wind One previously unexpected outcome that significantly influenced the effectiveness of the response team was the wind speed and direction during and just after the attack. Wind has the potential to carry radiological particles with it, infecting a greater area with radiation as the wind increases. The wind was calm on the day of the attack, but that does not mean the wind cannot hamper rescue efforts. Kelly (2002) explains by saying, “anyone living in the affected area will be exposed to material deposited from the dust that settles from the cloud. If the material contains cesium (or other gamma emitters), the material will stay in the body and lead to long term exposure.” Clearly, even the small breeze of a calm day can have a devastating and unexpected influence on the effectiveness of the response team. Conclusion The overall effect of this attack is detrimental. Manhattan, and most of New York City will be uninhabitable for at least forty years with untold property value loss. At least five hundred people will be diagnosed with cancer because of this attack, and somewhere between 100-500 people have died from the initial explosion and acute radiation sickness. Furthermore, had the EPA managed their emergency response equipment more efficiently, had authorities protected existing radiological supplies better, and had the public had a better understanding of the radiological threat, this attack would not have been so bad. Lastly, federal authorities should take note of the influence of wind on emergency response efforts as this was an unexpected outcome that had a large influence on evacuation and relief efforts. In conclusion, improvements should be made to federal emergency response protocol to ensure an attack like this is much harder to commit in this country. References 1. Cameron, G. (2000). Nuclear terrorism reconsidered. Current History, 154-157. 2. Moore, D. W. (2003, October 6). Trust in government falls to pre-9/11 levels. Gallup.com. Retrieved June 01, 2011, from http://www.gallup.com/poll/9394/trust-government-falls-pre911- levels.aspx 3. Rep. No. 2004-P-00011 (2004). 4. Testimony of Dr. Henry Kelly, President Federation of American Scientists before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (2002) (testimony of Dr. Henry Kelly). 5. Times Square alliance - advertising in Times Square. (n.d.). Times Square - Official Site. Retrieved June 01, 2011, from http://www.timessquarenyc.org/about_us/advertisingtimessquare.html Read More