The causes of war Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea - Research Paper Example

? The Task Force Smith This document entails information pertaining North Korea and South Korea animosity and the resulting battles. The script outlines all the events that took place in the war zones, precisely three years after the end of the Second World War. The examination conducted throughout the historical events establishes the reason behind United States of America intervention into the war. ‘Task Force Smith’, is the name commonly used in reference to the war that U.S.A fought and lost to the North Koreans. Introduction The term, “Task Force Smith” derives the ill-fated battle between the United States of America (USA) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) where U.S.A lost shamefully to the opponents. The cause of the loss resulted from machinery and artillery incompetence. The Americans, under the command of Colonel Charles B. Smith, engaged in the battlefield with lesser powerful weapons as compared to the North Koreans (Murray, 2005). The troop set foot on the Korean land at a time that the enemy was advancing. The U.S.A had assumed a tremendous win following that of the Second World War. They did not train prior to the battle, used poor equipment, and approached the battle with a troop of 514 men (United States, 2007). The following outlines the deeper script of the turn of events, the artillery used to attack the enemy, the result of the war and the eventual failure of the American troops under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith. The cause of the war In the year 1950, North Korea advanced towards South Korea, three years after the Second World War, thus, provoking a battle over territorial rights. The North was fully prepared to war unlike their neighbors with whom they caught unawares. South Korea, being weak in military skills and weaponry, seek help from U.S.A thinking that it would help defeat the enemy, but this posed more than enough challenges to U.S. America lacked enough and most recent ammunition thus, they declined to attend the war (McMurran, 2008). The South Koreans further pleaded for help and the U.S.A offered two-week training to the Korean army. After the two weeks training, America applauded South Korean Military and commented on their degree of integrity and the skill, they now possessed to retaliate against the enemy. The South Koreans, overwhelmed by the praises, proceeded to the battlefield with a lion heart, as they perceived a win over an enemy they did not analyze (United States, 2007). South Koreans depended fully on guns, while their enemy had the best weaponry from the Soviets. Approximately, the north possessed over 34 tanks each with 88mm caliber. However, this did not distract the Southerners as they pursued their enemy to the battlefront. The turn of events was extremely sad as they lost their lives to the mortars and shelling of the North Korean tanks and troops. South Koreans fought relentlessly to win their bid over the sophisticated enemy (McMurran, 2008). All their efforts bore no fruits, and many lost their lives to the battle thus; they slowly retreated. America got the news at the same time that the southerners’ were retreating from the battlefield. America deployed 514 men to combat the vulnerable enemy, unknown to them that the enemy rest prepared (Edwards, 2010). The U.S.A troop and its government overlooked North Korea’s potentials in the battlefield and underestimated them altogether. North Korea had already forecasted chances that the Second World War winner would intervene into the battle were similarly high, and this led to the massive preparation in training, equipment, and competent troops. U.S.A assumed that, on stepping grounds, northerner’s would retrieve from the battle and eventually surrender. Therefore, it did not hit to them that, the northerners would dare stand them despite their number. On the contrary, North Korea remained adequately prepared to conquer the enemy, thus instead of retreating, they proceeded further into the battlefront to counter the advancing U.S.A troop (Murray, 2005). Engagement of the U.S.A troops The U.S.A troops depended heavily on recoilless rifle platoons, two mortar platoons, and a communications section. Their ammunition storages had dropped during the Second World War since, production of the weapon targeted to combat the enemies in the battlefield. As much as the U.S.A observed the importance of helping South Korea, they had to bear with the fact that they had run short of most of the necessary materials and labor (McMurran, 2008). The government had compromised efforts that the army commander had sown in order tackle the enemy competently. Colonel C. B. Smith thus, proceeded to the field with, two 75mm recoilless rifle groups, two 4.2-inch mortars, six 2.36-inch rocket launchers, and 60mm mortars. With this armament, task smiths were confident of an extreme win over the enemy. The government, from its representatives stated clearly that it had employed its muscle to make the war a success to the American’s in the liberalization of South Korean territory (Murray, 2005). America should have perceived defeat since its troop consisted of a sixth of combat men and five sixth of them were naive and understood war from mere training. They aged between seventeen years twenty years old. Col. Smith had no choice than to try the battle with young men, as most of the adequately trained personnel had quit the army after the world war. Similarly, the young would lesser demanding compared to their elders who understood the essence of the best weaponry at the event of war (McMurran, 2008). These young men possessed a rifle and with 120 rounds of ammunition, with which the government felt adequate for there existed no alternative. The rifles, purposely crafted for the world war, appeared to be in large stocks but of poor quality. The rifles exhibited malfunctions at a time when they were required most to tackle the enemy. The troop lacked spare parts to all artillery thus; a malfunction to any weapon rendered it void in the continuity of the war and so would the officer in possession of that given weapon Murray, 2005). Whilst in pursue of the enemy, the American troops regrouped as per the directives of Smith. In the morning of July 4 of 1950, the army had landed at the port of Taejon by train. Smith ordered some of the officers to rest while he proceeded North in search of a blocking zone against the advancing and seemingly aggressive North Korea. He discovered a sequence of successive hills that explicitly defined a view of Suwon and a command over the railroad running 300 feet below the hills. Smith and his staff agreed upon this as the most ideal position they could ever secure to besiege and adequately combat the enemy (United States, 2007). Another ill-fated American troop under the command of Colonel Miller O. Perry joined Smith’s operations on that same day. Perry’s team had an added advantage, as it possessed about 73 vehicles, 105mm howitzers, and an extra number of 108 men (Murray, 2005). At this point, Smith felt more confident of the win despite the fact that, North Korea showed no signs of fear. The number of men totaled to 514 all under the command of Smith and Perry accordingly. The troops transported artillery by trucks to settle on the hills at around 3:00 am in the cold morning of 5 July. The troop set its equipment and endeavored in digging holes that would assist in hiding visibility from their enemy. They positioned extensively along the Suwon-Osan road whilst placing Howitzers randomly along the hills but at concealed sites. Smith and Perry’s assumptions were that, as long as roads and rails remained manned all along stretching northwards, the determined enemy will befall prominent obstacles thus, coming to a stale state in the middle of control zones. Howitzers, looked more promising anti-tank artillery, compared to the rocket launchers. This is because; they could fire at a desirable distance and considerably destroy tanks as compared to the rocket launchers. The troop failed to estimate the capacity of North Koreans thus, bringing six howitzers along them to tumble down the 34-tank artillery under the command of northerners (United States, 2007). Smith and Perry called for volunteers from the 50-caliber machine gun and Rocket-launcher teams to join the infantry position (Murray, 2005). The commanders assumed that the move would strengthen the infantry position and attacking capabilities. At this position, the team would serve to bait the enemy after drawing inwards unaware of the dangers over the hills. The commanders assigned an artillery team to the north, the perceived entry point of the rival forces, ensuring concealment. The troops prepared to attack, but would first adhere to the set protocol, in that the team that was to attack first, would eventually be the first to do so (McMurran, 2008). They fought a fierce battle towards their enemy but this would only remain ineffective to secure a win over the North Koreans. Assumptions that, Koreans would retreat were severely harmful to the U.S.A troops as Koreans exhibited an identifiable degree of aggression to conquer their enemy (U.S.A). The Americans knew little on the extent to which their enemy would approach the battlefront. North Korean troops entered the warzone with variably high techniques of combat than forecasted earlier. They engaged in shooting from their leading tanks instead of the assumed vehicles. The technique rendered the U.S.As howitzers unworthy as they disabled only two out of the total 34tanks on entry into the field of fire. However, the rest of the tanks drove in with much ease whilst retaliating towards the U.S.As machine gun artillery eventually killing one soldier thus, marking the first American victim of death in the Korean soil. The tanks penetrated further to the south despite the heavy shelling from their American opponents. As they drove down towards the south, they would fire randomly over the American’s side thus, destroying almost all the vehicles parked at the infantry position. Approximately, the Korean drive-through and shelling resulted to the loss of about twenty American soldiers to injuries and deaths (United States, 2007). Colonel Smith and O Perry did not seem destructed from their thoughts that their plan was stringent and adequately strategized. The commanders remained confident from the fact that North Koreans drove south, unable to locate the artillery battery that continuously fired at them. All proceeds halted at Osan at the south, and so were the rumbling and shelling of mortar. The Americans resumed to a ceasefire as they watched over the enemies retaliation strategy. Peace existed for nearly an hour, with rain falling all the time, as the opponents tried to make corrections to their combat and attack strategies (McMurran, 2008). Smith established that North Koreans’ had staled communication, and thus, the battery artillery would not serve in the war and so would be some of the howitzers. Meanwhile, three tanks were located at the far north driving downwards with a successive fleet of armory vehicles from behind. Armed men, probably from the 16th and 18th of division four trailed along the vehicles southwards. This caught the American’s in a dilemma, as they could not ascertain whether both enemy teams acted under the same command (United States, 2007). Smith observed opponents move closer and ordered his troops to fire at a distance not beyond 1000 yards from their position northwards. The enemy severed an untold number of casualties from the American troops’ fire. However, this did not stop the advancing enemy troops as the three tanks unstoppably drove further down to close at a distance of three hundred yards. The shelling and rumbling of mortar went uncontrollable as both sides fired against each other at an even ratio. Commander Smith was quick to realize the prevailing silence from his side resulted from destruction of the A battery artillery. This would ultimately result to a dead end for the Americans’ rest outnumbered and incompetent to their enemy. Their only hope resting on the A artillery batteries and machine guns shuttered from the shelling of enemy tanks (Murray, 2005). The eventual loss Americans struggled to maintain their position against the enemy but the condition worsened in accordance to time. Smith lost his team to dead and casualties all alike but retaliated against the enemy, though with poor performance. Casualties mounted slowly but continuously and this resulted to the deterioration of force on the Americans’ side. The enemy steadily posed brutal aggression towards the Americans, but similarly, they suffered casualties. Smith and Perry estimated that each man had at most twenty rounds of ammunition, relatively inadequate to hold the enemy back. The fight grew immense and the Americans were evenly outnumbered, hence, they could not tackle it anymore. The enemy was closing in and threatening to crumble down Smith’s position, and he had to make the most fateful decision (United States, 2007). The Americans resulted to a fall back plan whereby smith ordered for withdrawal from the field. The ill-trained forces abandoned most of the equipment they carried into the field in order break through the enemy wall with much ease. They shot through their enemies easily as the mission turned a do or die affair (McMurran, 2008). Smith’s task force failed to realize that communication did not reach all troops evenly, thus leaving mates behind in the brutal hands of the enemy. Smith maintained all ethics and ensured coercion within the unit a time that the forces detected a kind of foul practice. They realized that all the wounded remained in the enemy zones for hopelessness and subsequent death. Therefore, rate of reaction and discipline took a different knot as the troops struggled for individual survival. The tally that Smith recovered from the battlefield varied extremely with that at the entry. Friendly aircrafts that Smith expected would save his side had fired inappropriately against the enemies, thus harming American troops instead. Eventually, all was lost to the North Koreans as the Americans deserted (United States, 2007). Re-entry into the battlefield U.S.A government did not stop its aggression towards North Korea and in the following period, the Americans revisited the war field with revitalized zeal to conquer the enemy. They marked the key areas that whenever let lose, would pave way for the enemy (Edwards, 2010). The troops had all the necessary machinery, artillery, force, and equipment. Similarly, training had improved as it took about three months unlike the earlier operation took a two week training. Another aspect is that the second mission deviated from the first in that, most men of the second troop were veterans and had participated in the Second World War. This implied that America had underestimated the enemy by daring North Korea with merely five hundred and fifty men and ineffective weapons. The army finally drew the best and adequate parameters on which to face North Korea. Since all procedures lay effectively, America engaged in their second war tactically and eventually defeated the northerners. This marked the end of the Korean War but a lot of pain to the Americans who lost their people in the war and could not identify their whereabouts (McMurran, 2008). Conclusions At the present day America, the battle dubbed, “Task Force Smith”, remains as a folk tale and not actually a real battle. Much of information about the war remains intact and concealed from the public, as the super powers cannot contemplate on the loss towards a weak enemy. Conclusions are that, the war shaped the country’s approach to battles and shunned any further ignorant perceptions from either the authorities or the armed forces (Edwards, 2010). The country established that the loss endured resulted from the use of improper equipment, poor training, and lack of exposure. In the modern day, America exhibits exceptional war tactics when combating enemies (United States, 2007). References Edwards, P. M. (2010). Combat operations of the Korean War: Ground, air, sea, special and covert. Jefferson, NC: McFarland. McMurran, M. (2008). An unnecessary war. Philadelphia: Xlibris. Murray, S. (2005). Atlas of American military history. New York: Facts On File. United States. (2007). The soldier's guide: The complete guide to U.S. Army traditions, training, duties, and responsibilities. New York: Skyhorse Publ. Read More