Human Factors in Aviation - Term Paper Example

Human Factors in Aviation [Student’s Name] [Institution Affiliation] Introduction The term ‘human factor’ has become significantly popular, as the commercial aviation industry has realized that human errors cause most aviation incidents and accidents rather than mechanical failures (Harris, 2011). Human error has become a key concern in air traffic management and maintenance practices, although it has been mostly associated with flight operations. Human factor professional work with pilots, engineers, as well as mechanics to apply the latest knowledge on interface between commercial airplanes and human performances to assist operators improve efficiency and safety in their daily operations. Human factors entail gathering information on human capacities, limitations as well as other attributes and applying it to machines, tools, tasks, systems, environments, and jobs to produce comfortable, safe, and effective human use (Harris, 2011). In aviation, these factors are committed to better comprehension of the way people can safely and effectively be integrated with the technology. This comprehension is then translated into training, design, procedures and policies to assist humans perform better. Human beings are ultimately trusted with ensuring the safety and success of the aviation industry in spite of rapid gains in technology. Humans have to continue to be flexible, knowledgeable, efficient, and dedicated which exercising good judgment. In the meantime, the aviation industry continues to make huge investments in equipment, training as well as systems that have long-term implications. Since technology is evolving faster than the capacity to predict the way people will interact with it, the aviation industry is no longer depending as much on the intuition and experience to direct decisions pertaining to human performance (Harris, 2011). In its place, a sound scientific basis is important for evaluating the implications of human performance in procedure, training, and design. To get to this point, the discipline of human factors and ergonomics has come a long way to get to the current point. This paper focuses on the history of development and progress of human factors in aviation, highlighting the significant changes. History of Development and Progress of Human Factors in Aviation The role of human factors in aviation has its root in the earliest days of aviation. The importance of worker capacity and limitation in the work design environments and work was acknowledged in the early 1900s. Numerous research studies in various areas important to ergonomics were undertaken under the auspices of government bodies or under separate institutions (Cameron, 1985). Members of various disciplines met to talk about their interests in ergonomics, the significance of using experts from various professional backgrounds to add to the work design environment and work was acknowledged. The essential belief of those who instituted the “Ergonomics Society of Australia” was that in handling particular issues related to human factors, various disciplines had to contribute. It was deemed that provided these professionals had mutual chief interests in consideration of the workers’ needs and understanding of the way the needs could be achieved, they would offer solution to work design problem (Ferguson, 1969). The earliest application of ‘human factors’ was on design in a wider sense. Changes in the place of work led to new needs of the workers in the latter half of the century. This led to the importance of the skills and knowledge application of a wider array of disciplines to manage these needs to be recognized. Lane, the Director of Aviation Medicine contributed to most developments on human factors. His interest in human factors generated key research and development in the realm of pilot safety as well as performance in the aviation sector. Lane (1953) in his description of human engineering argued that the discipline relies on numerous disciplines effort, and it was a merger of “anatomy, physiology, biological science, physical anthropology, and particular applied experimental psychology, in cooperation with different engineering divisions.” Lane argued that the aim of human engineering was to find out human beings ability to offer standards, which govern the machines’ design for effective workers application, as well as to facilitate a helpful incorporation of machines and man for the completion of a general undertaking. Lane interest in human factors generated imperative research and development in the machine operator safety and performance area in the aviation industry. From the 1930s, aircrafts sought to resolve whether individual attributes such as dexterity, concentration, and reaction times were important forecasters of a pilot’s ability to be trained flying. Significant efforts were directed towards determining the proper selection methods for flying training, much significance was directed at such attributes such as the impact of neuromuscular and neurosis coordination, especially regarding reaction times for tracking as well as manipulation of aircraft controls (Ferguson, 1969). The Flying Personnel Research Committee was formed in 1940, and it led to the expansion of research beyond flying performance and selection methods to safety and comfort, operational efficiency, clothing, motion sickness, vision and lighting, hypoxia, decompression, fatigue and antigravity effects. Flying personnel research divisions were set up in association with the physiology department at the University of Melbourne and University of Sydney (Walker, 1961). Government instrumentalities also worked in association with these units, expressing an early on alarm in scientific disciplines being performed by human beings. In the early ergonomics related research, particular attention was paid to factors relating to visual standards, problems of noise in aircraft, problems of blackout in air crew and variations in atmospheric pressure with elevation. The Department of Physiology Laboratory, Tropical, and Fatigue Laboratory in the University of Queensland started key researches into the psychological and physical impacts of tropical service and investigation into the clothing design for flying in low temperatures’ and in the tropics. The influence of climate extremes on performance and comfort of all persons in spite of whether they were sick or healthy, was investigated by University of Sydney, in their Public Health and Tropical Medicine School. According to Ferguson (1969), this early research represented human factors as it was concerned with man-machine relationship in fighting and flying. In 1957, a human engineering research unit was established in the Australian Defence Scientific Service. This was the first properly established research groups in ergonomics in Australia. Lane, Cummings, and Cameron were the three main researchers associated with the research group and later they were part of the formation on the Ergonomics society in Australia. Outside the aviation sector, other works of this nature was being carried out. For instance, Peres investigated the influence of seating posture, design as well as the work place design on musculoskeletal injuries production during work processes in the 1950s. Peres was working together with the New South Wales, Occupation Health Division. This name was later changed to Ergonomics Group. Prevention of industrial musculoskeletal injuries became a critical component of ergonomics in Australia. According to Ferguson (1969), early work by psychologists focussed on studying the association between environmental conditions, performance of skilled tasks and body temperature. Important researches within the departments of engineering were important to ergonomics. In an early on expression of importance of human factors, Tichauer worked with the “Royal South Sydney Hospital” to study upper limb strains in performance processes as well as prostheses design, which would allow handicapped workers to be industrious. In the 1960s, a research within the Physiotherapy Department showed a worry by physiotherapists to use their body mechanics’ knowledge to research allied to human factors, and this led to designing of employment situations that would avert the various statuses they were requested to take care of. This early history shows that generally, individuals from various difference disciplines worked together on collaborative and individual related projects on improvement of operator safety, comfort, and performance. Establishment of a Society In 1964, concerned individuals from various disciplines teamed up for the first Ergonomics Conference in Australia. During this conference, the individuals decided on establishing the Australia and New Zealand (ESANZ), which was to represent all relevant disciplines. There were two other conferences, which reflected an early interest in safety factors and occupational health in ergonomics practice and research. By this time, the conference has adopted rules developed for the Ergonomics Society. The fourth conference was held in 1967 in the University of Queensland, Department of mechanical engineering, in recognition of the engineers concern for ergonomics. During this meeting, the judgment was made to establish state branches of the Ergonomic society. There was strong society membership representation from medicine, engineering, psychology, science, physiotherapy, and management. Most societies’ members came from tertiary institutions, and this indicated the interest in research in the ergonomics field by academics. The subsequent years saw a growth in the number of disciplines represented with certified education in safety, design as well as various field of allied health. According to Cameron (1985), the numerous experts from numerous disciplines offered components of the whole. Such outlooks were exemplified within the initial objectives of the society, to support investigation into the connection between human beings, their work, and their surroundings as well as to encourage the application of the human engineering knowledge and sciences comprehension to tackle issues, which arise from the connection. The society separated in 1986 after the New Zealand Ergonomics Society was established. While early conference showed a growing attention to workstation design, design of instruments, improvement of posture during work, and this interest concerning human factors has not waned. The modern day concerns relate to the acknowledged significance of design regarding the application of visual display units. The subject has attracted a large number of papers at the nationwide forums. Presentations addressing topics such as mental stress, physical perception, work physiology, and noise have reduced. Growing interests has been on the area of musculoskeletal injuries to the lower pack, shoulder and neck girdle, upper extremity and the impact of prolonged sustained and effect of repetitive work. In addition, topics interrelated with information, technological change and the significance of information systems in the human factor and ergonomics discipline have also increased. The need for using organizational management and design within the practice of ergonomics became of interest in the 1990s. In spite of the significant interest in technological changes, issues associated with lifting and manual handling did not diminish. Although automation and mechanization modified many work practices, the demand for manual work in the aviation industry was still in existent and posed a problem for the individuals who were apprehensive of control of injuries. In Australia, the ergonomics and human factors discipline development has been narrowly related with interests in occupation safety and health. There is scarcely any ergonomics aspect, which is not linked directly or directly with the safety and health of aviation employees. The development of the field of ergonomics and human factors was tied to the fact that aviation is essentially a multifaceted socio-technical system, which involves the operation of many interacting vehicles by human beings who operate within a complex system managed by other human beings. The performance of the human operators was tightly coupled to the performance and safety of the overall system and the individual beings. Alone, human factors problems as well as the solutions to those problems were taken to be of paramount significance to the aviation industry. Human Factors after the First Air Transportation in 1940 The Wright brother took what it usually considered the first powered, piloted, and sustained flight in 1903. From then, there was a rapid advancement in aviation, with Orville Wright living to see the dawn of supersonic jet propulsion aircraft. Many setbacks mostly related to the design of the aircraft have to be overcome to allow for the rapid advancement. Safety developed into a paramount issue with pilot errors a notable cause of crashes (National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), 1921). Using the aircraft in First World War and Second World War, the performance of the aircraft and the pilot were of great concern to engineers and researchers. A good case in point of this is the recognition of the issue of “situational awareness” by Oswald Boelcke, a World War I champion. Oswald argued that the pilot should acquire the routine of taking in instinctively the general advancement of the entire multi-aircraft dogfight revolving around the individual combat in which the pilot was part of to ensure that time was not wasted in evaluation of the general condition following the end of individual combat (Hacker, 1984). Early Works on Human Factors by NACA At NACA, various setbacks were recognized early on in aviation development. The flight physiology including altitude sickness became a problem as aircraft began to operate at altitudes above 10,000ft. A NACA report communicated the test result in pneumatic chambers by German researchers who found that severe signs, such as unconsciousness, manifest themselves above 6500m (NACA, 1921). Currently, it is known that altitude sickness manifests itself as low as 2500m. Hersey (1923) describes the challenges with instrumentation. Specifically, he notes that pilots’ instrumentation use can be improper, where poorly designed but important instruments may be ignored whereas salient and unimportant instruments capture the pilot’s attention. Other researchers also identified that the problem of interpreting instruments is made complex by the time pressure and workload the pilot experiences. It became evident that the instruments has to be made for the easiest possible manipulation and reading because of the enormously short time at the pilot’s disposal for adjustment (NACA, 1921). At this time, it was clear that pilot error was a large source of serious accidents. According to a report issued in 1924, pilot errors were the main cause of serious accidents with almost two thirds of such accidents associated with pilot errors during training whereas one third of such accidents were in civil flying (Devaluez, 1924). In the French aviation, a similar large percentage (54%) of accidents was also observed and attributed to piloting errors. General, such accidents were not taken to be a problem of the interaction of the airplane and the pilot; however, it was attributed to poor piloting judgment and skills. At the time, the remedy, which was sought, was training and selection as opposed to better design of the airplanes and their instrumentation. Equipment: Instrumentation and Automation In 1914, Lawrence Sperry and Emil Cachin, France nationals, flew by the air show crowd using a new device, a gyroscopic stabilizer with their hands in the air to show they were not toughing the controls. On the second pass, Sperry held his hands in the air again whereas Cachin stood on the wing. On the third pass, the two men stood on the wings and the pilots’ seats were empty. This automation used a simple feedback control system, a concept, which has been in existence for centuries however, one whose usefulness did not exist for many years. The usefulness of the control did not extend to aircrafts until Sperry developed a comparatively light gyroscopic device, which was operated by a simple switch, and its only function was to stabilize the aircraft three switches-Pitch, yaw, and roll. Ever since, autopilots have increased in complexity however they have remained standard equipment on military aircrafts as well as commercial aircrafts. The design of the autopilot as well as their operation has been of interest to human factors research and engineers; however, the methods developed to make the control automation perfect have been used to try to model the human pilot. The autopilot is a fairly example of a development, which predated the setbacks that called for its use. Aircraft were considered generally easy and stable to fly for well trained pilots (Warner, 1922a) and researchers and pilots did not have any significant desire or need for an automatic pilot even almost ten years later (Warner, 1922b). Nonetheless, similar to driving a car, flying an aircraft requires regular vigilance; save for the fact that aircraft necessitate that tracking is done on the horizontal and vertical axis and with respect to speed. Aircrafts are also normally subjected to significant disruptions because their motion is easily disturbed by wind changes. Because of this, it was evident that from the very early days that fatigue was a noteworthy setback in controlling an aircraft on flights of even modest duration (Devaluez, 1924). As flights grew in duration and as aircraft became more complex, the autopilot filled this need. Together with the development of the propulsion and aerodynamics aspects of the aircraft, the development of instrumentation was deemed important. Several early studies were commission for the taxonomy and naming of instrumentation. The various human factors problems, which were considered or addressed by early instrumentation include ease of reading, spatial disorientation, use of vertical-scale instruments, errors in reading multiple-pointer round dials for altitude and limits on the workload required to read instruments. The problems also included trade-offs between space and usability, continuous versus motion of instrument indicators, arrangement of instruments including Gestalt effects, need for stall warning devices, physical forces needed to run controls and importance and measurement of visual field. Aviation was set up in England near the start of World War II; Sir Frederick Bartlett led it. The National Research Council started a Committee on aviation psychology in the U.S. at the same time; Jack Jenkins (Roscoe, 1997a) led it. The efforts of these units mostly focused on pilot selection and training. The units also were the first to deal with the problem of pilot error as a design problem rather than a training or personnel problem. Human Factors after World War II The World War II occurrence as well as the two inherent needs that it had generated had created the catalyst for developing this human factors and ergonomics discipline. Largely, the need for mobilizing and employing large numbers of both men and women made it impractical to choose persons for particular jobs. As a result, there was a shift in the focus to design for people abilities whilst reducing the negative upshots of their limitations (Meister, 1999). Secondly, World War II experienced the tipping point whereby advanced in technology had outpaced the capability of the people to be accustomed and compensate to poor designs. This was very evident in airplane crashes, which were causes by pilots who were high, trained because of setbacks with instrument displays (Fitts & Jones, 1947) and control configurations. According to Fitts (1951), Lieutenant Colonel Paul edited a report on the primary human factor challenges to aviation, which was commissioned by the Aviation Psychology Committee at the conclusion of the Second World War. Fitts was the leader of a new research unit at Wright Filed in Ohio on aviation psychology, which later produced various important results in aviation human factors. The report by Fitts offered a great insight into aviation problems at the start of the 1950s. The report by Fitts solved most of the issues that had been identified before 1940 and which were not adequately addressed. The Fitts (1951) report opened with a quote, which argued that engineering of systems largely focused on tools and machine and ignored the operator, in spite of the operator being the most important part of the human-machine system. The Chairman of the Committee, Morris Viteles, then stated that during the last ten years, mostly in response to military needs, there was an increasing withdrawal from the classical psychological perspective, and the ever increasing acceptance of the principle that “machines should be made for men; not men forcibly adapted to machines”. Viteles argued that the basic principle of human engineering is not new, especially to industrial psychologists, though it had been continuously neglected, mostly because scientists concerned with the individuals and the engineers concerned with the development of the machine have worked in almost absolute insulation from each other. The resulting ignored of sensory and physiological handicaps: of essential perception principles; of basic motor coordination patterns; of human limitations in the incorporation of complex responses. According to Viteles, these factors have sometimes led to mechanical monstrosities production, which tax the abilities of human operators and hamper the integration of machine and man into a system designed for maximum accomplishment of assigned tasks. The Fitts report then summarized the findings of the last several years and identified a long-range research program for addressing issues related to aircraft navigation in the air traffic system. The report was considered unique in its authority and scope. The report identified various factors issues that require to be solved: the issues identified were: What is the appropriate role of human beings in the air traffic system? How do we measure human behavior and performance in the air traffic system? What tasks appear to surpass human abilities either untrained or trained How do we measure human the information-handling ability of controller and pilots and are these measures reliable? What is the information-handling ability of controllers and pilot What redundancy is required while presenting information What information is required by controllers and pilots, what is the needed accurateness of that information, how much time to controllers and pilots use this information and what decisions and actions do controllers and pilots make based on this information What are the relative advantage of multifunction versus single instrument What is the best method of encoding and presenting information on those instruments including spatial, quantitative, control and status information What ways can be used to improve communication including encoding, intelligibility and the use of numerous modalities What delay, variability and error can be attributed to the human operators in the air traffic system Over the next twenty years, Fitts and Stan Roscoe, a member of the review team, among others were involved in developing methods for assessing air-traffic controller performance and workload and flight deck. These efforts had a direct and important impact on aircraft development during the 1960s. The Fitts report also questioned controllers regarding the equipments that they would like to be applied in the “air traffic control (ATC)” system. Regarding the issue of radar, which was developed during World War II in England and was being considered to be used in air traffic system, just 34% wanted such equipment while travelling. In 1951, aircrafts were monitored using flight status board where current as well as estimated or future positions of aircraft, as reported by radio, were updated. The aircrafts were separated founded on the projected positions; however, with increasing air traffic, this method became progressively more difficult to apply in an effective manner. This was followed by a collision between two commercial aircrafts in 1956 between a “United Airlines DC-7 and TWA Super Constellation” over the Grand Canyon. The two aircrafts were initially under the air traffic authorities’ control however, because of the need to fly around thunderstorms, the TWA flight requested and was given, visual flight rules, which denoted that the pilot would be responsible for avoiding other aircrafts. The TWA flight got struck by the DC-7 at 21,000 ft, and disabled both aircraft and led to the death of all the crew and passengers. This accident, together with a number of other collisions or near collisions, assisted to catalyze a fundamental change in the air-traffic control system. The introduction of the radar was among the several innovations mandated to determine the positions of the aircraft. The introduction of the radar is one of the single most fundamental changes, which occurred in the air-traffic control system up to now. It essentially changed the controllers’ tasks as well as the nature of his job and allowed the introduction of various improved technologies over the following decades. The other problem was the best method to encode and present information on instrument, the altimeter reading problem was quite evident-difficulty in reading altimeters. Altimeters had many pointers on one dial to point to hundreds, thousands and at time ten thousands of feet. The difficulties in reading the altimeters caused two accidents in 1958 and were most likely a main cause of two accidents of two accidents between 1965 and 1967. The two crashes in 1958 involved aircrafts, which were carrying only the crew. The 1965 accident involved a flight from LaGuardia Airport in New York to O’Hare Airport in Chicago; this accident caused the death of 30 people when the Boeing 727 crashed into Lake Michigan while on descent. There was also another accident in 1967 when a Caravelle descended slowly into trees in West Sussex, England and killed all the 37 occupants; the Caravelle was en route to London Heathrow from Malaga, Spain. The accident report showed the easiness with which a pilot could mistake an indication of 6000ft for one of 16,000ft because of lack of salience of the 10,000-ft pointer. The solution to this issue, eventually involving, partly, the vertical scale, which had been under consideration from 1932, involved various other various problems. Specifically, the salience of indications of problems led to the introduction of a number of alerting systems, which then led to their own set of problems. In spite of the various advances made during this period, the impetus for developing the human factors discipline was not met because there was lack of important mass of personnel and technology. Experimental psychologists adapted various laboratory techniques for solving applied problems. As a result, the human factors and ergonomics discipline was born, however at the time, people did not realize it (Meister, 1999). After World War II, the army continued military sponsored research. The military research laboratories, which had been established during the war, were developed and additional ones added. There were also research laboratories that were set up with the government funding assistance especially in the 1940s (Wiener & Nagel, 1989). The private sector led to the establishment of the human factors and ergonomics groups in aviation companies such as Grumman Company, Boeing, McDonnell Douglas as well as communication and electronics such as Bell laboratories. The main professional organization for ergonomics and human factors professionals, the Human Factors Society, was established with about 90 persons present at the first yearly meeting. In 1992, the name of this organization was later changed to Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. Currently, the society has over 4500 members, most of who take part in local and student chapters, 23 technical groups, and attend the annual meeting. Conclusion Over the years, there have been a steady theme, which has emerged over the years, an ever-growing sphere of influence which human factors, and ergonomics seeks to encompass as technology grows and advances. What began as a narrowly defined detachment of experimental psychology, which focused on the interaction of workers with machine controls in the aviation industry, has expanded to include almost all interactions of people with their immediate surroundings. Currently, human factors are a broad field, which examines the interaction of people, the environment, and the machines for the aims of reducing errors and improving performance. As aircrafts become less prone to mechanical failure and as they become more reliable, the percentages of accidents related to human factors decrease. Pilots with a better understanding of human factors are usually well equipped in planning and executing a safe flight. Human factor professionals are currently working with pilots, mechanics and engineers to apply the latest knowledge regarding the interface between aircrafts and human performance to assist operators improve efficiency and safety in their daily operations. References Cameron, C. (1985). Tribute to David Ferguson. Ergonomics Australia. 2, (3), 1-2. Devaluez, F. (1924). Investigations of Aviation Accidents and lessons to be drawn from them. Technical Memorandum No. 245. NACA. Ferguson, D. (1969) Ergonomics in Australia. The Medical Journal of Australia 1(30), 30-33. Fitts, P. & Jones, R. (1947). Analysis of factors contributing to 460 'pilot error' experiences in operating aircraft controls. Memorandum Report TSEAA-694-12, Aero Medical Laboratory, Air Material Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, July 1, 1947. Fitts. P. (1951). Human Engineering for an Effective Air Navigation and Traffic Control System. Washington, DC: National Research Council. Hacker, E. (1984). 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