Brands Cannot Be Trusted - Essay Example

Brands Cannot Be Trusted Pleasant logos and friendly cartoon characters grace the letterheads and marketing strategies of numerous companies offering a great variety of products. In each case, the brand strives to portray itself as the friend of the consumer, offering just the solution for the greatest problems of the day and motivated by a sincere desire to help the community thrive. These portrayals are very convincing for many consumers who generally believe that brands, at least some brands, can be trusted implicitly. However, there is a much darker side to marketing that suggests this is not necessarily the case. Studies are utilized by advertising agencies to identify potential buying demographics. This information is then used to target specific markets and to learn about public attitudes, why they buy specific products and what sort of promotions would most appeal to their desires to purchase. To some companies, marketing is about generating sales, period. The tobacco industry has used such studies to target the young and uninformed. They have used deceptive advertising as a result of these findings in the form of marketing ‘low-tar’ cigarettes. They have also used cartoon-like characters to appeal to the youth consumer. To their delight, this strategy indeed generated sales as planned without an ethical thought as to the dishonesty of such practices or that this practice was particularly disgusting as it applies to youth smoking. The marketing of filtered and low-tar cigarettes were planned to comfort smokers worried about the health risks associated with the habit and to impart this new product as an alternative to not smoking. The marketing tactics adopted by the tobacco industry are not unique to this field, but instead provide an excellent example of why consumers cannot trust brands, particularly those that seem most appealing. Uncovered documents regarding the promotional efforts of tobacco companies in the 1960s and 70s show that the Joe Camel campaign was conceived from an advertising suggestion to use comic strip characters that appealed to younger potential smokers. This was after a study which revealed that first-time smokers generally preferred Marlboro, a trend aided by the highly successful ‘Marlboro Man’ campaign. The vast marketing success of Joe Camel fostered similar ad campaigns such as the Kool penguin. Sporting sunglasses, ‘Willie the Kool’s’ design and marketing focus addressed young teenagers’ need to fit in, or be ‘cool’. Tobacco advertising has been banned from television viewers since the late 1960’s but has found alternative means by which to market. By sponsoring an extensive variety of youth oriented events such as rock concerts and sporting events, tobacco companies have continued to gain wide-ranging exposure for their harmful product by associating them with positive youth experiences and covering them with catchy characters and other marketing ploys. This discussion will use documentation from the desks of tobacco companies themselves to highlight their deceptive practices in marketing and also illustrate an even darker side of this industry’s advertising techniques, the marketing of a deadly substance to children. The scientific community began to conduct research and subsequently published articles that made a direct connection between smoking and lung cancer during the early 1950s, potentially damaging the tobacco industry as a whole. The tobacco industry quickly answered by terming these findings a ‘health scare’ designed to deflect the allegations of the possible lethal health threat. Tobacco companies initially responded to the ‘health scare’ by launching filtered cigarettes alongside marketing schemes that responded to these health risk assertions. “In time, the industry became aware that explicit health claims risked the undesirable effect of reminding consumers about health allegations and issues. To avoid this, motivation researchers and other trade analysts advised the industry to shift from explicit verbal assertions of health to subtler tactics using visual imagery and ad copy that implied healthfulness” (Pollay 1989). Tobacco companies put much energy and money into molding the public’s perception that they were attempting to curb the harmful effects their product might offer to their customer, that they were the consumer’s friend (Whelan, 1984). The public wanted to smoke and the benevolent tobacco industry was making it safe to do so through the wonders of filters. The advantage of filtration was the perceived reduction, if not total eradication, of cancer and other health risks that were being publicized. Advertising jingles and slogans claimed or at least implied healthy smoking concepts such as “Viceroys ‘Double-Barreled Health Protection’, L&Ms ‘Just What the Dr. Ordered’, Embassys ‘Inhale to your Hearts Content’, Lifes ‘The Secret to Life is in the Filter’, and Parliaments ‘Extra Margin’ (of safety protection, implied by analogy to helmets, seat belts, and other safety gear). Other ad slogans, such as Viceroys ‘Thinking Mans Filter’ or ‘delivers more of what you smoke a filter for,’ were even more implicit yet still begged for health inferences by consumers” (Johnston 1966). This strategy had a marketing problem though. In a study conducted for Brown and Williamson (B&W), men who smoked low-tar cigarettes were suspect of being ‘weak’ in the viewpoint of many consumers. “This echoed their research finding in the 1960s that the men who smoke filters were apprehensive and depressive. They think about death, worry over possible troubles, are uneasy if inactive, dont trust others” (Oxtoby-Smith 1974). The 1974 advertising advisors to Lorillard, in an attempt to respond to this problem, launched an approach to advertising for the True brand that they felt had a more ‘masculine, macho tone. The cigarette Vantage was described by marketers as `laying it on the line in a bid for an aggressive and masculine image (DeGarmo 1974). As a result of utilizing low-tar advertising techniques, more people than ever before were changing brands, opting for a supposed healthy alternative. The reassurance of the deceptive lower tar claims led those who were health conscience to simply change brands rather than quit the deadly habit altogether. Trues advertising campaign in the 1970’s was directed towards the growing trends of consumers to stop smoking. The ad agency representing the company portrayed True as the equivalent alternative to quitting evidenced by their own words. “It is useful to consider lights (low-tar cigarettes) more as a third alternative to quitting and cutting down, a branded hybrid of smokers’ unsuccessful attempts to modify their habit on their own. In point of fact, smoking an ultra low tar cigarette seems to relieve some of the guilt of smoking and provide an excuse not to quit” (Goldstein 1979). B&W expressed the two main goals of effective advertising, providing assurance about their product’s healthfulness without doing so forcefully and to provide a publicly appealing brand image. “Good cigarette advertising in the past has given the average smoker a means of justification. For some smokers reduction in physical performance risk is paramount, for others reduction in ‘ego/status’ risk comes first. All good cigarette advertising has either directly addressed the anti-smoking arguments prevalent at the time or has created a strong, attractive image into which the besieged smoker could withdraw” (Latimer 1976). Despite the efforts to portray tobacco products, particularly the individual brand, as being a more healthful approach to smoking for those who already engage in the practice, many corporate documents from tobacco manufacturers make reference to the fact that success of a brand is with young smokers. A 1984 RJ Reynolds document attributed the success of Marlboro to its strong imagery that “was in tune with younger adult smokers’ enduring want to express their maturity and independence through smoking” (Burrows 1984). Winston attributes its success to the effective marketing to young people appealing to their sense of “‘peer pressure’, the ‘bandwagon effect.’ A 1973 RJR document outlined the advertising elements of a brand that would attract young smokers as including ‘participation, togetherness and membership in a group, a mechanism for relieving stress, tension, awkwardness, boredom adventurous, different, adult, something arousing, some curiosity and some challenge and must become the proprietary in thing.” (Teague 1973). Studies that were requested by tobacco companies revealed that teens aged 16 and 17 have especially strong social bonds to friends. It concluded advertising which emphasizes how the brand supplies added acceptance by one’s peers would be especially successful with teenagers. A 1984 marketing research report by RJ Reynolds commented; “given younger adult smokers’ keen interest in peer acceptance/approval, it is likely that younger adult smokers would be interested in a brand which effectively addresses social acceptability and also provides the other smoking benefits they want” (Burrows 1984). The report went on to suggest that RJ Reynolds “make resources available to develop/improve its capabilities to thoroughly identify and track demographics, values/wants, media effectiveness, and brand performance within sectors of the younger adult smoker population” (Burrows 1984). Marketing research on perceptions of Camel cigarettes in the mid-1980’s referred to studies on young adult smoker. A 1984 memo analyzed young adult perceptions of Camel recommended that advertising for Camel “be positioned against young adult smokers who would like to be non-conformist” (Martin 1984). This memorandum includes a table of differing teenage social groups, including such labels as “Goodies’, ‘Preps’, ‘Rockers’ and ‘Punkers.’ Camel redefined itself by appealing to the ‘Rockers’, ‘Partiers’, and “Punkers.’” (Martin 1984). A 1986 memo recommended that Camel advertising be directed toward “using peer acceptance/influence to provide the motivation for target smokers (defined as 18–24 male smokers) to select Camel” (Caufield 1981). The memo goes on to suggest that the intention of the advertising be to convince “target smokers that by selecting Camel as their usual brand they will project an image that will enhance their acceptance among their peers” (Caufield 1981). The memo also notes that, “advertising will rely on clearly aspiration appeals, the me I want to be versus the me I am, and to provide the motivation for target smokers to select Camel” (Caufield 1981). Tobacco companies have routinely researched the smoking habits of teenagers and competed vigorously with each other to design products and their accompanying marketing strategies to ensnare a segment of the youth smoking market. When young persons see cigarette logos linked with their heroes, excitement, speed and triumph, they are likely to lose sight of the grim realities of smoking; death, disease and addiction. An addictive product doesn’t take much to hook a new customer. For the tobacco companies, the expense of giving away free samples is negligible compared to the potential for long-term gains, especially from new young customers. These tactics may make sense from a purely commercial standpoint but ethically and morally, the tobacco industry demonstrates the dark side of marketing, the willingness of brands to do whatever it takes to sell the product, including researching the inner psychological needs of its target audience as a means of manipulating them. Understanding the motive helps to reveal the degree to which brands, regardless of their marketing pitch, cannot be trusted. References Burrows D. (February 29, 1984). Younger Adult Smoker: Strategies and Opportunities. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. Caufield, R.T. (March 12 1986). Camel New Advertising Campaign Development. [memorandum to D.N. Iauco]. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. DeGarmo, Inc. Research Department. (August 1974). Conclusion and Implications of True Portfolio Research. Report prepared for Lorillard: Bates no. 03374671. Goldstein/Krall Marketing Resources, Inc. (January 1979). A Qualitative Exploration of Smoker Potential for a New Entry in the Ultra Low Tar Market Category. [two focused group interviews]. Prepared for Philip Morris. p. 12. Johnston, M.E. Jr. (June 1966). “Market Potential of a Health Cigarette.” Special Report No. 248. Philip Morris document, p. 16. Latimer, F.E. (November 29 1976). Cigarette Advertising History. Brown & Williamson document, pp. 1-2. Martin C.A. (October 18 1984). Younger Adult Smoker Perception of Camel. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. Oxtoby-Smith, Inc. (August 1967). A Psychological Map of the Cigarette World. Report prepared for Ted Bates and Brown & Williamson, pp. 24-25. Pollay, R.W. (1989). “Promotion and Policy for a Pandemic Product: Notes of the History of Cigarette Advertising (US).” Tobacco Litigator’s Bookshelf. Teague C.E. (February 2 1973). Research Planning Memorandum on Some Thoughts About New Brands of Cigarettes for the Youth Market. R J Reynolds Tobacco Company, Inc. Whelan, E.M. (1984). A Smoking Gun: How the Tobacco Industry Gets Away with Murder. Philadelphia: Geo. Stickley, p. 90. Read More