FEMA. A Gap Analysis: Mandated Expectations vs. Reality - Research Paper Example

? FEMA A Gap Analysis: Man d Expectations vs. Reality This paper attempts to accomplish a thorough analysis of FEMA on the expectations from it on national level preparedness to safeguard peoples and property from natural calamities and man-made disasters. It strives to find out the gaps between expectations of all stakeholders on disaster management and reality, which is quite below expectations. Expectations from FEMA at organizational level have risen in the wake of random happenings of catastrophes, keeping the government on different levels on the run to find a solution to the problems of emerging risks from all kinds of hazards. Real issues are related to distribution of federal funding to state, local, and regional level organizations and insufficient capabilities for disaster operational planning that affect the performance level of preparedness. The article discusses the FEMA’s housing program, hurricane Katrina, and problems of drought-hit regions to get a perspective on the issues and their solutions but before that it discusses the organizational requirements and present status of FEMA in effectively performing the tasks at hand. The article offers comprehensive recommendations to resolve the conflicts so that FEMA becomes capable of managing the affairs of the varied functions systematically and successfully. FEMA A Gap Analysis: Mandated Expectations vs. Reality Background &Introduction FEMA has not been successful in realizing the mission and aims stipulated for it. FEMA regions have no budget power to help the states with their strengths and bring together various stakeholders for effective performance during and after the disasters of various categories. Considering FEMA’s role in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Post Katrina Emergency Reform Act 2006, the initial 18 months after the 9/11 the entire country was worried over the future security of the people from such attacks (Schrader, 2011). FEMA was nowhere on the prime scene during the time starting from post-9/11 till Katrina although back office cooperation with the state and local governments was going on to culminate in DHS restructuring called the Second Stage Review (2SR). The post-Katrina Emergency Reforms Act (PKEMRA) in October 2006 culminated in enlarging the role of FEMA for national preparedness by ordering a restructuring of FEMA. Fresh recruitments were made to fill in the vacant posts to buck up regional preparedness through the national operational planning system and bettering the nation wide exercise and training portfolio. Four major issues were attended to concerning information transfer via FEMA to arrange incorporation with DHS, recovery principle, preparedness-mitigation cooperation, and developing an easy-to-use formula and publication process and library. Consensus processes are critical for all issues to make them robust (Schrader, 2011). At state and local level attempts have been made to find out the resources to restructure a seamless public security and health system and integrate it with the national federal security mechanism. Happenings the like of 9/11, fear of anthrax attack, and smallpox risk has enhanced the urgency for state and local level preparedness, creating the need to transform some vertical activities into horizontal processes. Expectations of the people from the government have increased demanding integration in services outcomes in the light of globalization, 24X7 connections with the outside world and the internet. People expect every crucial issue planned in advance as he situation arrives (Schrader, 2011). People expect that disaster recovery is a federal issue; actually, state and local administration plays a critical role in disaster recovery. They want to make disaster victims compensated via public funding, which creates a difference between expectations and reality. FEMA was keen to provide the next response after Katrina wholesome. It was identified that FEMA can play a crucial part in short-term compensation but for that FEMA needs to be organized, capable and robust to initiate a long-term recovery effort (Schrader, 2011). Expectations of the media and the public after Katrina have raised for fast and well-structured recovery processes that satisfy public expectations. Peoples’ perceptions that federal government alone is responsible to manage are far away from the reality because in actuality it is the state, local, private endeavors that are important in recovery (Schrader, 2011). Organization Requirements FEMA is only statutory bound on the National Preparedness System but possesses no directive command over it. It needs to work together with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and numerous other stakeholders including Executive Branch units, Congress, state, tribal, territorial, and local governments, associations, non-profit organizations, and the private sector to formulate policy and principles of preparedness (PNSR, 2009). For operational needs, all stakeholders mentioned above need to work together to measure risks, brief roles and functions, create and preserve plans with related functions, find out capabilities and capability gaps, and decide on the resources needed to fulfill the missions, specifically related to natural disasters like urgencies (PNSR, 2009). FEMA has been efficient in handling the desired tasks, as is visible from the steadfast improvement in the PKEMRA and other regional entities such as Federal Preparedness Coordinators (FPCs), the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 (CPG 101), Integrated Planning System, and attempts like the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) and the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program (RCPGP). FEMA’s mission partners have increasingly felt that until all parts of the National Preparedness System are involved in collective disaster planning at the local, state, and national levels, with a focus on regional cooperation, functions cannot be accomplished. Regions are the converging platforms of the planning procedures of federal and local bodies (PNSR, 2009). At the center of the National Preparedness System is the disaster operational planning. Need of the hour is the collective action of all the stakeholders and mission partners of FEMA to initiate a consistent, dependable, and streamlined planning effort. Investment decisions of the homeland security should be determined by the national level planning process in stead of working on generic list of capabilities that have not been tested and advocated for risk or geography. Consensus is that federal regions need to come forward to work constructively by arranging shared working between co-equal independents to lead y formulating their particular disaster planning and reach at targeted needs collectively through cooperation (PNSR, 2009). Current Performance Effectiveness FEMA is the only lead organization to lead and integrate federal relief measures. There is need to enlarge the scope of FEMA in view of other catastrophes recurring after irregular intervals such as droughts. Stakeholders to any natural or made-man calamity other than FEMA are numerous, which makes the integration process and cooperation among them a difficult task. Droughts had a huge economical, environmental impact on the affected populations in 1996. FEMA was called-in to lead a multi-state task force to overlook situation in the Southwest and southern Great Plains states. The aim of the dedicated force was to accomplish federal response on issues in the drought-stricken areas by locating needs, applicable programs and program hurdles. Short-term and long-term actions were sought to mitigate the drought management. The task-force under FEMA also offered recommendations (Wilhite, 2001). A number of measures suggested inclusion of formation of a nation-wide policy on drought working on the principle of cooperation with the state and local bodies. The policy was to accommodate a national climate and drought management system to timely alert the combined forces of stakeholders to get ready with the action plan (Wilhite, 2001). Another recommendation of the task force was to organize regional structures to measure area needs and resources, find out crucial fields and interests, issue dependable and well-in-time information, and align it with state functions. Till then the management of drought recovery processes was not part of the agenda awarded to FEMA. The task force asked FEMA to include drought as one of the responsibility of the National Mitigation Strategy (Wilhite, 2001). Drought -- Cloudy Future Drought relief has been a cloudy affair under a varied, complicated, poor, and perplexingly run ensemble of federal programs. Need is to mitigate the risks of future droughts. Viewing the concurrent land and water-supply maintenance practices from the long term perspective are not durable in view of the changing climate and insufficient natural resources. At federal level, there has been no change in its perception on the issue of drought. Till 2000, after the National Drought Policy Act of 1998 it has been based on short-term measure taking and forgetting to evolve a long term strategy. States have come forward to fill the void by progressively managing drought. Irrespective of the management level being followed, the need is to integrate various agencies’ efforts at government level. Whatever appealing statements and phrases used by federal agencies on disaster management such as “improved coordination and cooperation,” increased emphasis on mitigation,” and “building non-federal /federal partnerships” the attitude of a number of state and federal agencies has been response-oriented (Wilhite, 2001). The gap between the expectations of the people and the response of the various government stake holding agencies needs to be filled by not letting the drought management program in a reactive crisis-management style. The scope of changes needs to be comprehended by these various agencies to evoke the new perspective on risk management. All government sponsored stakeholders need to apply the recommendations of the National Drought Policy Commission. Funding needs to be transferred from managing crisis to managing risks, as based on the new perspective. There is no dearth in political initiative but some continuous periods of wet seasons. Policy makers need to give ears to the public demand for a paradigm shift in finding risk management solutions than investing in crisis management (Wilhite, 2001). FEMA’s Housing Program Taking for example the short-timed housing assistance provided by FEMA to affected victims of natural disasters, it has answered calls to more than thousand disaster and emergency situations in the previous more than three decades, opting out many alternatives to fulfill peoples’ needs whose housing facility became a victim of such disasters, as agreed in the list of declared disasters. Housing assistance was offered by local bodies from sheltering soon after the catastrophe leading to final reconstruction, repair or changing of individual homes and rented accommodations (McCarthy, 2010). The magnitude of hurricane Katrina was such that appraisal of FEMA’s functions has been made on the actions taken by it on that disaster. Katrina was not among the list of agreed disasters defined and eligible for government grant for happening on weekly recurrence since the previous thirty years. Katrina widened the not-so-visible gaps in FEMA’s housing management, raised queries on the organization’s credibility in using administration, and initiated an evaluation of the missing or underemployed flexibility in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act and its promulgated regulations (McCarthy, 2010). Authority and capability of FEMA has heighted in the wake of congressional reaction on housing problems after the disaster Katrina. An afterward analysis of Katrina has also drawn interest in the working of FEMA by the federal agencies given the job of looking after housing problems of the affected people (McCarthy, 2010). FEMA was given the responsibility of devising a National Disaster Housing Strategy under the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, P.L. 109-295, promulgated in October of 2006. It was given a time period of nine months but it presented the final copy of the draft to Congress in 2009. It included the past disaster housing policy in summary form besides dynamic approaches made by the sate and local bodies represented by various government and non-government stakeholders on disaster housing requirements (McCarthy, 2010). The present government under Obama and the 111th Congress can suggest changes in the strategy and suggest other options while conducting an evaluation of the said report. Congress can also conduct a review to guide FEMA on its strategy implementation by legislation to provide its insight and roadmap on the federal disaster housing goals. The report focuses on examining the processes and alternatives taken to improve disaster housing including better FEMA/HUD understanding by making use of the case management control, the repair and refurbishing of individual rental housing accommodations, and the use of optional manufactured housing (McCarthy, 2010). Gaps Analysis Problem areas demand immediate attention of FEMA, as identified, which are (1) tussle over all-hazard risks in nation-wide preparedness; and (2) insufficient capabilities for state and local level disaster handling operation planning. 1. Unsettled Issue over All-Hazards Risk Preparedness capabilities and gaps within can not be worked out until risks are zeroed-in and measured. More urgent is to find out the deficiencies in capabilities to face the risks for making investment decisions after detecting the gaps. The major tussle is related to reaching on an agreement between all stakeholders and mission partners of FEMA to zero-in on the risks. It pertains to how and where that consensus will materialize and who should lead the path of consensus-making (PNSR, 2009). Although some inroads have been made in reaching a consensus but the three tiers of the government have not been successful in restructuring effectively the procedure to robustly partnering the agreement on what risks are critical and what are secondary. The incapability on the part of the National Preparedness System is a big handicap. Other stakeholder bodies such as state, tribal, territorial, and local administrations do not generally work on gaining strengths on resource finding other than the high-possibility risks zeroed-in. The administrative mechanism at the jurisdictional level finds it hard to political leadership the urgency of funding effort because of low-possibility, high-happening circumstances although there is a process of reporting the funding needs to the federal government. This not-unanimous approach incapacitates dependable intergovernmental disaster operational planning, which is a mandatory condition for deciding roles and duties, aptly measuring capabilities, and fixing resource needs that help in processing fund applications and in taking final decisions (PNSR, 2009). Federal funding or other forms of help should be kept for planning and operational steps that need federal intervention. Federal law advocates the concept that the federal government will offer help when catastrophes in the United States are hugely harsh and of immense loss of life and property and states and local governments are not capable enough to manage effectively the healing and rebuilding process. Therefore, it becomes the shared responsibility of the whole nation. As states carry different parameters of rebuilding and risk taking, the federal government should fund that state first, which is not capable of facing the disaster. It can start a competition to the lowest level culminating in undue burden of both the states and local bodies on the federal government. A process starts with both the stakeholders on their expectations from the federal government, what will be offered and type of readiness is not desired for such catastrophes to involve the federal government (PNSR, 2009). 2. Insufficient Capabilities for Disaster Operational Planning Gaps exist between capabilities and planning. To provide speedier operational support for natural calamities and given conditions, all ranks of governments need to organize in-depth planning. First, it is obligatory on state and local bodies to plan but due to insufficient resources, they aim at only such preparations that are on the higher ends of possible happenings that might occur in their jurisdiction, preparation for which comes under the state and local government planning. On the contrary, the federal government has resource capabilities to plan for catastrophes and concurrently has spared resources to accomplish the effort but it can not all alone fulfill the task in the absence of the collaboration with the state and local government. Planning effort, capabilities, and governance of the local and state governments is critical for the federal government. Viewing the scenario from the state and local government perspective, the importance given by the federal government on high outcome and low possibility scenarios, which are not on the priority list of state and local governments, as they lack in financial capabilities, create a gap in perceptions. This tussle over varied capabilities among different levels of government creates a basic hurdle in National Preparedness System. In the absence of scenario based disaster management and planning at lower tiers of government, it becomes doubtful whether they will attain the preparedness levels agreed at federal level. It is expected of all the state governments to perform catastrophic operational planning but the gap between these stakeholders’ approach on disaster planning become apparent, as a number of states lack resource capability (PNSR, 2009). Actually, difference in problem perception is the key reason that different tiers of government view the issues at stake variously because expectations of the governments create stress over rules for government donation and funding. The government follows the principle of “equal justice under the law”. The best to-the-point answer to disaster response in any way is to attend to instant needs by the government irrespective of the fact that states have independent resources (Boris and Steuerle, 2006). Learning from the example of the response to Katrina, there were noticed severe capability and resource shortage at local level. Providing a range of various services to thousands of people without sufficient infrastructure without any collaboration among the government agencies impacted on the performance effectiveness (Boris and Steuerle, 2006). Katrina starkly exhibited the fiscal deficiencies of the state and federal governments. Before the hurricane, the state of Louisiana on non-health social services was far below the rich states, and was actually relatively lower than other poor states like Arizona and Mississippi. In the late 1990s, actually spending of the state of Louisiana on non-health social services decreased while it was going upward in many states getting federal aid in child care and welfare-to-work services. The demand for welfare work due to the urgency of the situation has brought together the state and the federal government to work on case management programs. Individually, the state of Louisiana created the Louisiana Family Recovery Corps (LFRC) with the aim to “coordinate and mobilize a network of providers, organizations, and government agencies to deliver aid and services to displaced Louisiana families in transitional housing throughout the state” (Boris and Steuerle, 2006). Recommendations As evidenced from the Katrina experience, the capability gaps identified by the Disaster Operations Directorate by using the Gap Analysis Tool, these gaps can not be eradicated without government assistance. The Gap Analysis Tool has been tested for future use in other environments in different fields. It is obligatory on various FEMA fields, as included in PKEMRA to reconcile with the capability gaps by using the techniques of the tool. FEMA has not reconciled this capability analysis with the National Preparedness Guidelines’ Target Capabilities List (TCL) needs for the funding programs. Other than that, the parts of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) principle attend to greatly issues related with preparedness, resource control, and understanding based help. NIMS parts attach straightway to capabilities needed at the time of the happening. Nevertheless, still FEMA has also not accommodated the NIMS measurement needs with these capability gaps. It can be stated clear-cut ways that FEMA has not totally integrated the measurement of functional capability gaps, TCL capability gaps, and NIMS adherence needs (PNSR, 2009). Federal Direct Help for Baseline Resourcing of Catastrophic National Preparedness As mandated, FEMA areas need to provide a decentralized platform to enhance the dissemination capability of the DHS for incorporating preparedness programs and involving states. Reason behind this suggestion is that FEMA areas are in close proximity to states and localities than the head offices of FEMA, thus, functioning as transformers of capacities and needs (PNSR, 2009). FEMA should fully exploit the powers given to it by the federal government; so far the agency has not been capable of fully leveraging from the rights given to it. Although this functionality was to be exercised by the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), and other ministry level departments do not attribute to FEMA the gravitas to run the mission. FEMA is the face of the DHS for national level readiness. It needs to administrate stricter abidance by mandating that functions to such organizations as the NRCC, as they are career building. On their part, senior government functionaries should ensure to use the agency platform to offer their valuable guidance so that people with matching capabilities are appointed to serve the cause through the system. In the case of Emergency Support Functions, the Leadership Group has been demoted from a “senior group” to a “junior group”, which should not be the case. FEMA needs robust mechanism to perform the overall duties as a spokesperson for other agencies such as Justice, HHS, the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Transportation (DoT), and other federal departments and agencies collaborating in the homeland security goals (PNSR, 2009). So far there has been uneven progress on the regional DHS and authority of FEMA. Some areas have lagged behind others. FEMA needs to use its powers as the action taking agency of the DHS and fulfill its functions by collaborating with other bodies at the government and region level by entering into agreements with states of the regions. The FEMA Regional Administrator (RA) should fulfill these duties via the Federal Preparedness Coordinator (FPC) who should be deemed as a DHS functionary. The FPC is the RA’s spokesperson to the states for preparedness issues in that area. The FPC should take on its shoulders the duty to perform PKEMRA goals by enforcing the yearly planning guidance drafted by FEMA head offices and needed by the regional preparedness CONOPS. Staff strength of the FPC should be strengthened by the government to initiate collaborative disaster functional planning. Evaluation of the business accomplished by FEMA appropriation on the yearly basis on various government and agency platforms (PNSR, 2009). Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Staffs (RCPSs) The purpose of the RCPSs is to strengthen the current mechanism by building, empowering and aligning them to accomplish legally stated goals rather than adding another responsibility to the manpower. The current regional level organizations to be included could be the FEMA Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) and Regional Interagency Steering Committees (RISCs), DHS Protective Security Advisors (PSAs) and Sector Coordinating Councils (SCCs), Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSCs), and HHS Regional Emergency Coordinators (RECs), state integration units and Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) with their ESFs, and, where desired, Regional Catastrophic Planning Teams (RCPTs) under the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program (RCPGP). In its planning and appraisal task, the RCPS can support the RCPGP aims with direct federal help and effectively align RCPGP planning efforts with UASI and State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) planning and appraisal aims where needed (PNSR, 2009). State and local jurisdictions need to role play robustly for efficient and dedicated output. The RCPSs need to ensure that functional plans are intact for disastrous happenings for which states and local organizations may not be equipped with sufficient resources, supposing the low-possibility high impact of such a happening. Catastrophic happenings are a functional and planning blind spot, which only the federal government has the capacity to plan and continue for the long term (PNSR, 2009). The currently effective RCPSs need to work with current planning, training, and action units at various levels to organize: · Disaster risk measurement · Disaster functional planning and action validation · Disaster capability stock items through bargaining processes via which gaps are zeroed-in for realizing funds and other resources · Regional appraisals and self-appraisals on the basis of regionally decided performance indicators. RCPs should develop guiding tips along with other stakeholders to do a HIRA for preferences of the federal government in the context of risk measurement. No planners should be deputed for states by FEMA to replace for creating organic capacity with regional planners. RCPSs should maintain an organic functional planning capacity which can avail and benefit from regional assets like universities, national labs, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), and third parties, etc (PNSR, 2009). Some states might need grants to initiate capacities, which may not be same for the whole state, as depending upon the risk initiatives of local jurisdictions. Grant for such states should be decided mutually at the regional level (PNSR, 2009). Private sector and NGOs help should be taken for better and strong regional help system. Small and medium businesses can play a crucial part in contributing towards fruitful involvement of some sort in developing functional mechanism. States should cooperate with one another on mutual understanding to integrate out-of-region states with their strengths and gaps in their strengths to be made part of the planning process (PNSR, 2009). All identified regional and national catastrophic capability gaps should be briefed to regional and state applications for getting grants to fill-in the gaps. This procedure should be used for all preparedness grants of various departments for their associated regions. Only those gaps should be aimed at for providing funds that are of low probability and high-outcome happenings related to land and water based search and rescue, medical upsurge, or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE). The RCPS needs to assist in aiming yearly grant preferences to create and maintain functional disaster capabilities, indicating potential needs other than the federal direct help to the area for that mission, or for low-probability, high-consequence happenings or as a reaction to state preferences (PNSR, 2009). Preference all platforms should be given to such programs that increase and maintain comprehensive collaboration, i.e., those that are crucial to disaster preparedness. While such programs may need infrastructure related to communications interoperability, supply-chain, and cooperation but the most significant programs are those which pay attention to human force, e.g., certification, education, training, exercising, and planning. Various jurisdictions indulging in developing bonding would create a positive environment. Grants that aim at equipment purchasing should be determined at regional level as based on a jurisdiction’s requirements. Grants should be distributed o particular functions such as CBRNE detection, not depending on the criteria of population based grant tips. Results based criteria such as grants sanctioned on particular capability gaps won’t create any issue as the regions fight for preferential state treatment. FEMA’s Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REPP) for nuclear power plants offers such a model (PNSR, 2009). Grant programs can be made more robust and effectively controlled through federal direct help to the regions and their on the lookout Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Staff. It has been tested on federal direct help to the JTTFs. It is recommends that the Government Accountability Office (GAO), undergoes a relative cost analysis to measure present program maintenance costs at all three tiers of the government in comparison to the costs of the proposed RCPSs (PNSR, 2009). A Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Staff should engage manpower for TDY for three years from federal departments and agencies, with the consideration that state and local administration won’t be able to supply taskforce for one-year TDY turns. The RCPS should employ nonfederal staff for Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) mobility notes and their compensation should be sent to their parent agencies and organizations, thus capacitating them to preserve their own full-time employee (FTE) status. It would help the state and local jurisdictions, as rotational jobs would incessantly refresh and increase collaborative experience. Other than that, FEMA and other USG taskforce can refill IPA Mobility notes during turns to support a two-sided street trend of collaboration. Nonetheless attained, the RCPS structure would agree to a common framework applied by regional partners. Each region would accommodate and structure its RCPS as per the particular regional values and needs (PNSR, 2009). Conclusion In conclusion, the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Staff notion offers an intergovernmental solution for throughout, systems-controlled, regional collaboration. The RCPS will supply the RA and FPC with a ready taskforce for the states in the area. It won’t take decisions: states will make decisions on problems affecting the states; the federal government will make decisions on problems affecting the federal government (PNSR, 2009). The federal, state, and local governments need to find creative means to help in the restructuring, particularly given its high cost. Government can back social welfare agencies through a range of open funding and contract programs and take a number of indirect routes, including offering tax credits and write-offs, government-supported loans, and tax-saving bonds. In this context, Congress passed the Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act in late 2005, to provide tax benefits and breaks, including new schemes for charitable donations, to help in recovery. Tax-saving bonds can play a significant part in restructuring material infrastructure such as housing and assist nonprofit social welfare bodies to restructure their own operations. In sum, FEMA cannot alone fill the gaps in the peoples’ expectations from FEMA, as in reality a lot of coordination at various levels within the federal government and the state and local administration is desired. Regional forums can help in catastrophe preparedness. References Boris, Elizabeth T., Steuerle, C. Eugene. (2006). After Katrina: public expectation and charities’ response. The Urban Institute. Retrieved from http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/311331_after_katrina.pdf McCarthy, Francis S. (2010). FEMA disaster housing: from sheltering to permanent housing. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40810.pdf PNSR. (2009). Recalibrating the system: toward efficient and effective resourcing of national preparedness. Project on National Security Reform. Retrieved from http://www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr_national_preparedness_system.pdf Schrader, Dennis R. (2009). Unfinished business at FEMA: a national preparedness perspective. Heritage Lectures. Retrieved from http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/unfinished-business-at-fema-a-national-preparedness-perspective Wilhite, Donald. A. (2001). Moving beyond crisis management. Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy. Retrieved from http://go.galegroup.com Read More