The Managerial Decision Making Process - the Challenger and Columbia Disaster - Case Study Example

Executive Summary The Challenger and Columbia disaster highlighted the gaps which existed in the decision making process of NASA. The incidents clearly showed that the management was ineffective in taking correct decisions and even after one incident the organization didn’t learn and continued in a similar manner which resulted in another disaster. This was matched by the fact that the monitoring process was poor as level II process should have been used but instead level I monitoring was used. This was matched by the fact that NASA despite knowing the risk that was involved in the making of the shuttle didn’t look to bring the required changes in the schedule date of the launch which could have averted the incident. This requires that NASA brings a change in the decision making process and develops the entire process where decisions are taken after looking at all factors and look to develop the communication channel. This has to be matched by developing a code of practices and looking towards gaining efficiency so that such disasters are reduced in the future. Table of Contents Introduction 3 Comparison of both disasters 3 The manner in which decision making process failed 4 Lessons that were not learned by NASA 5 Changes made prior to Columbia Disaster 6 Appropriateness of the changes made by NASA 7 Strategic Decision failure for both disasters 7 Trull and Bay Area studies to find factors contributing towards disaster 8 Manner in which such disasters can be reduced 9 Conclusion 12 References 13 Introduction Decision making is an important aspect for any business as proper decision helps to ensure that the business is able to work on the correct path and is able to grow. Decisions which are correct help to provide the required framework which ensures best possible use of resources. The importance of decision making increases when human life is involved as taking incorrect decisions at that juncture would result in having an adverse impact on the overall growth of the organization. This report looks at examining the manner in which two disasters were witnessed in NASA and the manner the different aspect of decision making were ignored. This further looks at identifying the different things which were learnt from the disaster and will help to develop ways through which such disaster can be controlled. The report examines the manner in which the Challenger Disaster helped to learn different things which if implemented would have ensured that the Columbia disaster could have been controlled. This will finally look towards presenting the future strategies based on which useful and correct decisions can be taken so that overall productivity is maximized and the chances of such a disaster reduces in the future. Comparison of both disasters The Challenger Disaster and Columbia disaster highlights the lack of efficiency on the part of the management to manage the process which could have helped to reduce the impact of the disaster and the disaster could have been averted. The Challenger Disaster clearly highlights that NASA should have considered the entire disaster process as a level II disaster where they should have looked at checking the entire process and mechanism through which the entire process was better monitored. In case NASA could have considered the disaster as a level II disaster then it would have ensured that the monitoring would have been better and would have provided the framework through which the gaps which existed would have been reduced. The fact that human life was involved should have provided the required opportunity through which disaster could have been controlled. Further, both the disaster also showed that the checks which were done before the launch of the shuttle could have been avoided as the management and other working for the organization had doubt regarding the outer ring and the manner in which it would work on different temperature. Both the incident clearly highlights the lack of initiative and effort on the part of the management to bring about the required change in the decision process. The fact that decisions were not made on actual reality but was assumed to be correct led towards the incident and highlighted the gap which existed between both the process and presented before the management an crisis which could have been averted. The manner in which decision making process failed The decision making process which was implemented by NASA failed as they were unable to take the correct decisions at the correct moment. The management of NASA knew that the mission was risky as there were some smaller aspects regarding the outer ring which was ignored and which could have led towards fatal incident. The management had an option especially when the final check was done to ensure a check at level II but the check was done as level I highlighting that the decision making process was unclear. In addition to it the management could have rescheduled the mission to a later date or could have bought certain changes through which the entire risk could have been reduced as they could have developed a mechanism where through correct decisions better results cold have been achieved. Rescheduling the launch to a later date by taking the correct decision and rectifying the errors that were present in the shuttle craft could have helped to control the disaster and would have prevented human life (Harrison & Pelletier, 2000). The decision making process at NASA also shows ineffectiveness in the process of communication which is passed on from one level to the other. The fact that people within NASA knew that the shuttle was not in the best shape to be used and had certain areas which needed to be rectified was not informed to the management. This was done just for the objective that NASA is a successful organization and changing the date would mean that the brand name would be affected. This led towards a disaster which impacted human lives and has an impact on the overall manner in which decisions were taken within the organization. Lessons that were not learned by NASA The Challenger Disaster didn’t provide the required dimensions through which NASA could have learnt the required lesson and could have prevented the Columbia disaster. The fact that NASA didn’t learn anything and though that it was a rare mistake which had taken place resulted in another such incident and had an impact on the life of people. NASA didn’t look towards improving the process of decision making which should have looked at including different things which could have prevented the incident. NASA could have ensured that decision were taken after looking at the ground realities and after the conditions were totally favorable then only the launch of shuttle should have been permitted but it wasn’t the case as the level II monitoring was still absent. In addition to it the process of decision making was flawed as people who worked at the actual site were rarely contacted and decisions were taken without much confrontation with all people who were involved. The management was further unwilling to change the dates and showed inflexibility as they wanted the launch to be carried out at the selected date and were not willing to bring the required transformation through which better things could have been learnt and adopted and would have helped to reduce the impact of a disaster which was looming over NASA. Changes made prior to Columbia Disaster NASA has made some changes prior to the Columbia disaster as they had become more aware and wanted that no steps were taken which would have maligned the name of the organization. This made the organization ensure that strategies were developed which looked at monitoring the manner in which things were controlled and decisions were taken. There was overall development but the efficiency which was required to look at the different aspect so that risk could have been reduced was not present (Simon, 1979). NASA had ensured that after the disaster the management stayed in constant touch with people who were working on the shuttle craft and were continuously updated on the developments that were taking place. This helped to ensure that the management was completely aware of the entire development but better decisions by the management which could have shaped the performance of NASA was lacking which was clearly evident in the manner decisions were taken. This didn’t help to fill the required gaps and dimensions which could have ensured better decisions and results (Harrison & Pelletier, 1997). Appropriateness of the changes made by NASA The changes that NASA made were not appropriate as it the changes were good then the Columbia disaster would not have happened. The fact that NASA was unable to control the NASA disaster clearly highlights that NASA was inefficient in making the required changes through which better decisions could have been taken and disaster could have been avoided. The fact that NASA didn’t develop the decision making process by looking at aspect which could have provided better insights and could have averted the incident clearly depicts that NASA was not working in the correct direction. It is true that the Challenger Disaster had made NASA bring some changes but the changes which were required were more than they had actually done. The fact that NASA was not able to bring the required changes in the decision making process increased the risk and made a second disaster take place which involved human life. Strategic Decision failure for both disasters Both the disaster clearly highlights the failure of strategic decisions which were taken by NASA. To deal with the issues NASA has to understand the seriousness of the issue and have to look towards developing steps in this direction. NASA needs to look towards developing an organizational chart which will fix the different roles and responsibilities of the organization (Trull, 2013). This will ensure that the different person within the organization is able to understand their role and carry out their duties according to it. This will also help to ensure that the organization will be able to make the employees understand the manner in which their future will be guided. This will help to pacify the employees as they will understand their future roles and the manner they will be able to contribute and their roles within the organization (Ackers, 2002). This will provide the required framework and provide the required direction based on which decisions will be taken. In addition to it NASA will also have to look towards ensuring that steps are taken through which communication improves and looks towards two way communication so that all doubts of the employees gets solved. This will help to improve productiveness and will thereby multiply the manner in which decisions are taken and will thereby ensure that the business is able to ensure maximum effectiveness (William & Stella, 2001). This will clearly see in case of both the disaster which highlights that the management didn’t look at the safety aspect but only looked at launch and ignored the risk which was present. This was clearly a failure of strategic decisions as the decisions were not taken based on correct fundamentals and were taken in haste were all the different aspect of safety were not considered. Trull and Bay Area studies to find factors contributing towards disaster Both the disaster showed that the lack of proper decisions by the management at all level resulted in the disaster. To ensure that such incidents don’t take place again NASA has to aim at developing the communication channel so that any problems which the organization is facing are quickly passed and the same is being replied by the management. This will require the development of both formal and informal form of communication so that the business is able to develop channels through which the business is able to gain the required efficiency and will help to pass on the message both ways and ensure better decisions. This has to be matched by the fact that NASA has to ensure that the decisions which are taken are correct and are taken based on the different factors which would have an impact on the overall performance. It is imperative that the management looks at the issues from all angles and based on it look towards taking decisions so that it reflects efficiency and reduces the chances of error (Tannenbaum, 1950). Taking decisions from different aspect will help to improve the validity of decisions taken by NASA and will help to reduce the impact of a disaster. Developing the process and making the required changes will help NASA to bring the required changes and will help to multiply the effectiveness through which decisions are taken and will have a positive impact on the overall growth potential of the organization. Manner in which such disasters can be reduced NASA needs to develop and bring some changes and modifications in the process the entire working is carried out so that better decisions are taken and the chances of an incident is reduced Development of Communication Channel: NASA has to aim at developing the communication channel so that any problems which the organization is facing are quickly passed and the same is being replied by the management (Ibbs, Lee and Li, 2008). This will require the development of both formal and informal form of communication so that the business is able to develop channels through which the business is able to gain the required efficiency and will help to pass on the message both ways and ensure better decisions. Through this method NASA can look at developing a channel which will look towards looking at all aspect associated with safety and other aspects so that the disasters can be controlled. This will also help to ensure that continuous check is done and if there exist any risk the same can be communicated and the mission can be rescheduled to a different date. This will help to deal with the issues which the situation is providing and will help to develop a mechanism through which risk will be reduced. Development of Critical Thinking Process: NASA has to facilitate a mechanism through which critical thinking process is developed so that it helps to deal with the complex issues as and when they are present. This will ensure that the employees will be able to handle several issues by themselves. This will thereby reduce the dependence on the top management and will facilitate a process through which the different issues will be sorted out quickly (Andersen, Grude & Haug, 2004). This will ensure that the safety requirement of level II becomes operational and will look at looking at all the smaller issues minutely so that they can be solved. This will help to reduce the risk level for the different people who are part of the shuttle and will be able to develop the required fundamentals through which better response will be provided. Developing Information Competency: NASA has to look forward towards developing the required information competency system which will be focused on using different tools to communicate. This will require that the employees and others within the organization are provided the required training regarding the manner in which it has to be used. This will thereby provide the required development and will ensure that the employees will be in a place through which the use of technology facilitates decision making and ensures that the overall decisions are better (Andersen, Grude & Haug, 2004). The process will help to ensure that the shuttle and the different objects are checked again and again so that there is no hurdle in the path. This will help to ensure that the shuttle launch becomes successful and will look at different smaller aspect through which better decisions will be taken. Develop a code of ethical practices: NASA has to further ensure that an ethical code of conduct is developed which will be applicable for all within the organization. This will help to ensure that if any employee or an executive don’t carry out their duties than they will be monitored through this mechanism and will help to work according the guidelines (Yardley, 2002). The process will also ensure that the motivation of employees will increase as they will know that they won’t be removed from their role if they are contributing positively. This will help to fix responsibility and will ensure that all people being a part of NASA carry out their duties and responsibilities in the most desired manner. This will help to ensure easy fixation of responsibility and will ensure that no gaps remain which could lead towards disaster and will help to develop a process through which better resource will be used. Improved decision making: NASA has to ensure that the decisions which are taken are correct and are taken based on the different factors which would have an impact on the overall performance. It is imperative that the management looks at the issues from all angles and based on it look towards taking decisions so that it reflects efficiency and reduces the chances of error (Harrison & Pelletier, 1998). Taking decisions from different aspect will help to improve the validity of decisions taken by NASA and will help to reduce the impact of a disaster. NASA thereby can use the above mentioned alternatives to bring a change in the process of communication so that the decisions which are taken helps to improve the overall effectiveness and will multiply the opportunities for the business. This will involve better decision making and ensuring appropriateness in the use of resources Conclusion The report presents the manner in which the Challenger and Columbia disaster highlighted the gaps which existed in the decision making process of NASA. The disasters throws light on the lack of efficiency by the management where taking better decisions could have averted the incident. This requires that NASA brings a change in the decision making process and develops the entire process where decisions are taken after looking at all factors and look to develop the communication channel. 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