Safety and Health Management at Piper Alpha - Case Study Example

Piper Alpha Case Study Name: Course Professor’s name University name City, State Date of submission Introduction Safety and health management are areas of critical concern in working environments. All organizations have the duty and the responsibility of promoting safe and healthy working environments. Investing in appropriate safety and health management systems ensures the ability of organizations to be able to control its health risk level. A healthy working environment of an in organization helps in the growth and continuous improvement. Any health management system adopted by an organization should be able to integrate with the structure of the organization, practices, procedures, and resources. In doing so, an organization will be able to prevent recurrences of healthy factors and also ensure there is a continuous improvement of the organization. There are numerous benefits associated with the availability of an effective health management system in an organization. An effective health management system in an organization will ensure that an organization maintains a healthy workforce free of illness. It will also ensure safety of employee at all times in the organization. It will lead to a reduction in cost that is used in treating and taking care of workers. In order to understand the importance of a safety and health management system, this paper will be a case study of the Piper Alpha disaster Background of Piper Alpha Piper Alpha was a structure constructed by McDermott engineering. This structure was operated and maintained by Occidental group. This structure was located close to 120 miles northeast of the Aberdeen in Scotland (Macalister, 2013: offshore-technology, 2013). This structure started to be used for oil exploration in 1976[NAS13]. This structure had four main operating areas. Each area was separated by a firewall that was designed to withstand any oil fire exposed to it. The operating areas were designed to be far from where personnel lived and also away from the command unit areas. The structure design to accommodate two diesels propelled sea water pumps. These pumps provided an automatic fighting system that would be used in case of fire[Fis04]. When oil is extracted from the floor of the ocean, it is usually a combination of oil, salt water, and natural gas. This mixture is usually pumped into the Piper Alpha to separate them. Once in the structure, water and gas is separated from the oil. Then gas is separated from water by cooling gas to gas condensate liquid. The condensate of gas obtained is then mixed with oil and pumped to the onshore refinery where it is refined into various products[LLO08]. The excess gas that is obtained during the process was initially being burned off. The practice of burning gas came to an end in 1978 when the United Kingdom government decided to be processing this gas in Piper Alpha. Piper Alpha was then modified in order to comply with the new set policies[NAS13]. After the modification, the structure could be able to process gas and also act as a hub whereby lines of gas from other Piper structures would be connected and sent to a processing unit[Ala98]. While complying with the new policies, the modifications of Piper Alpha to be processing gas ignored the safe design concept. The engineers of the platform placed Hazardous Gas Compression Module next to the control room of the structure[Key09]. Chain of events to the disaster While carrying out a routine maintenance in the structure in July 4, a worker removed the pressure safety valve that was being used for the regulation of pressure Pump A. This pump was one of the two pumps in the structure that were used to pump the mixture of oil and condensate gas to the onshore refinery. Pump A also had a pending overhaul procedure that was delayed for two weeks. After the worker had removed the pressure valve, he used a round metal plate to seal the open pipe. Since the maintenance of the pump could not be completed by the end of the worker’s shift, the worker decided that he would fill in a permit note. The permit note stated that the maintenance of Pump A was incomplete, and it should not be activated. During the second shift, at around 9.45, the gas compression system was blocked by hydrates that were ice-like structures. This led to the failure of Pump B. This meant that production onshore would be halted since there was no supply of the mixture unless Pump A was to be restarted to resume pumping the mix The crew on shift decided to check the maintenance records in order to establish if Pump A was cleared to be activated for pumping. What the workers found was the permit indicating that the pump had a pending overhaul. They did not retrieve the permit that showed incomplete maintenance of the pump and that the safety valve had been removed. The worker who had removed the safety valve placed the permit he had filled in a box that was near the valve in accordance with the location based permit system that had been adopted in the structure. In addition, that box with the most recent permit was behind other equipment limiting its visibility. Since the workers did not find the permit preventing Pump A to be activated, they went ahead and activated the Pump with the belief that it was safe for usage. After the activation of the pump, gas under high pressure started to leak t through the hand tightened blind flange[Pip15]. The leakage triggered the emergency alarms and also exploding a moment later. The firewalls that were designed as a safety procedure collapsed due to pressure that was arising from the exploding gas. Due to the explosions, emergency stop systems were activated leading to sealing and blockage of the incoming oil and gas from the sea. Since the safety model of the structure was ignored during the modification of the structure, the emergency systems would have been able to contain the fire and isolate where personnel were staying and the control room. However as a result of the modifications and failure to observe safety procedures and requirements, the fire spread through the firewalls into the unit where gas and water were being separated. This resulted in a further explosion in this unit. Since the operating company had not issued orders for shut down for Tartan or Claymore, the operators did not stop the system. By 10.05 pm, workers who were stationed in the control room started to evacuate for their safety. This meant that the system did not have anyone to manage the disaster. Further, the rig manager during the day had instructed that all firefighting systems be placed under manual control from the control room. Unfortunately, they were not switched back to the automatic system[Ste101].This meant that the firefighting pumps were deactivated making the containment of the fire more difficult. In addition, there were no emergency communication systems hence evacuation orders could not be transmitted to the workers[Haz01]. Due to the fire flames, workers could also not be able to access life-saving boats. This made them wait in the fire proof leaving quarters for further instructions on the evacuation procedure. Further, the fire would not be brought down due to the continuous production of Tartan and Claymore more fuel was being added to the blaze. This made it harder for rescue operations to take place. A gas line busted which lead a further ignition of the fire. After a short while, Tartan was shut down but Claymore was ordered to continue with production. The temperatures and smoke around Piper Alpha prevented helicopters to access the area for rescue purposes. Metals that were holding the crew unit started to melt due to the high temperature leading to the unit sliding into the ocean resulting in losses of lives[Sim12]. Critical evaluation of the disaster The root of this catastrophe can be traced to the systems that were adopted by Piper Alpha. To start with the permit system and lock out systems that were being used were inadequate and inefficient in managing safety. The permit system which was decentralized allowed information not to be accessed from a central point. This lead to the workers who activated the pump not obtain all information regarding the pump. If information is centralized in a safety and health management system, then individuals can be able to get the latest updates on what is happening and place them in a position where they can be able to make informed and safe decisions[Pie00]. In this case, the information systems were not centralized hence there was no effective communication. This resulted led to the second shift worker activating the pump in trusting that all documents were accounted for. Further, the boxes that contained the permit seem to have not been strategically placed with the facility where they were visible and could be clearly be seen by all. The box was hidden by other equipment affecting its visibility[Eli92]. According to PatC-Cornell (1993, p. 230) the Piper Alpha lacked a backup process or procedures that could be activated in case the control room broke down or could not be accessed. After the workers evacuated from the control room, there no other point they could be able to access controls of the structure and help in managing the fire[VNa11]. Most research carried of safety and health management systems recommend presence of the backup procedure that can be used to control the systems of an organization in case of an emergency. Through this, organizations can be able to manage any emergency sufficiently[Mat11]. During the modification of the structure, the inclusion of the hazardous Gas Compression Module next to the control room of the structure. This was against the laid down policies of safety at the time[Mat11]. Therefore, ignoring safety measures contributed to the failure by the crew to be able to manage the fire effectively[Sco09]. In the working environment of Piper Alpha, there was the lack of safety culture. Safety culture can be referred to as the clear understanding of the systems within an organization, all the features associated with the system and having confidence in the safety measure put in place[Ian11]. If an organization operates in a very demanding market, then most organizations push their production to the maxim limit to gain the highest reward possible in terms of monetary value. However, Mannan (2012, p. 66) argues that there are dangers associated with pushing production to the maximum limit. This calls for such organization to implement safety cultures within their system and be ready in case of any eventuality according to Graham, et al.(2014, p. 220). In most cases, organizations will keep on modifying their systems in order to satisfy the markets they operate in and also to obtain more rewards for pushing their production limit. In doing so, most organizations use the bottleneck concept of eliminating processes that cause congestion in their systems. However, in the act of modification, there is also the need for modifying the safety culture to match the changes made[Gre11]. A reflection of the safety culture of Piper Alpha was not adequate in dealing with emergency issues due to the following reasons The engineers, operators, designer of the structure and crew members seemed not to be fully aware of all the safety measures put in place in the compound. The chain of events indicated that human errors were to blame for the fire. Workers who operated the system might not have been experienced enough to deal and understood the systems. They failed to remember the existence of a box for permits near the pressure valve of pump A. the rig manager left the water pumps under manual control instead of automatic control. The crew members decided to stick in their units and to wait for instructions rather than finding ways in which they could have helped in managing the fire. All the above factors indicate that they were not fully experienced and trained to deal with any calamities in Piper Alpha. Therefore, at Piper Alpha the system might not have been working at its full potential but it was under high-pressure operations that required a more detailed safety culture in case of any emergency. The government plays a critical role in ensuring that security measures are implemented in any business environment[Eve00]. The role of the government is to come up with policies that will help in managing any eventuality that may occur. Developing of policies alone is not enough to guarantee that all environments are safe for operations. The government should do proper follow up through inspection activities to ensure every institution has implemented safety measures[Phi11]. The British government supported oil production in the country for both political and economic activities. However, the government adopted a hands-off approach attitude in a bid to encourage the production of oil in the country. Various institutions were set for drafting and implementing safety policies. These agencies focused on ensuring that security requirements were met rather than focusing the level of the safety measures. This afforded the operators of Piper Alpha an opportunity to exploit by showing that they had complied with the safety regulations and not focusing on the level of the safety[Nor95]. This resulted in the operators of Piper Alpha adopting modifications to structure and not observing the high level of safety measures for their employees. All they were concerned with is economic benefits. The institutions on the other hand tasked with maintaining safety in working environment adopted a go-slow attitude. This is because if they were effective in their job, while conducting inspections in the structure, they could have noted that Piper Alpha was not safe in case there was an emergency. Production platforms usually evolve in their life cycle. This calls for modification of these platforms from the original designs. The modifications are most times aimed at reducing bottleneck activities or as an act of correcting a mistake that occurred during its designing. Other modifications can be proposed in reducing maintenance cost or even upgrading the safety measures of the platform[Mic04]. This means that during the designing stage of a platform, there is need to leave room for future modification of the structure. Therefore, an increase in production capacity of a platform, there is the expectation that the system will experience mechanical pressure. There will be a need for modification of the safety measures for the platform[Ian06]. In regard to Piper Alpha, there was no allocation for future change for the production of gas within the structure. This resulted to skipping of safety requirements in order to accommodate a modification within the structure. Conclusion The Piper Alpha accident can be contributed to many factors. However, the main factors can be as a result of the design of the structure, the systems of the structure, government implementation and inspection of safety policies and the culture that existed within the facility. The modification of the facility can be regarded as the root of the accident. The chain of events to the accident indicates that this modification contributed to the fire. Organizations that fail to invest in their health and safety systems might save money in the short term but will lose a significant amount if a disaster occurs. Recommendations 1. One of the primary causes of the Piper Alpha was lack of effective communication system. The communication systems adopted should be centralized in that a worker can access all information about the systems from a central point 2. Workers working in the Piper Alpha or similar structures should undergo proper training on disaster management and also trained in the usage of the current safety and health management systems. 3. The government should revise its security and health policies to ensure that they sufficiently help in preventing of disasters at workstations. The government should also ensure that organizations fully implement the set policies without any biases. 4. Experienced workers should be given responsibilities of managing safety and health management systems in an organization. This will help to make the adopted systems are implemented effectively for the security of all workers. Reference NAS13: , (NASA, 2013, p. 1), Fis04: , (Fisheries Research Services, 2004, p. 2), LLO08: , (LLOYD, 2008), NAS13: , (NASA, 2013, p. 2), Ala98: , (Waring & Glendon, 1998, p. 188), Key09: , (Key Programme 3, 2009), Pip15: , (oilrigdisasters, 2015), Ste101: , (McGinty, 2010, p. 45), Haz01: , (Hartley, 2001, p. 18), Sim12: , (Bennett, 2012, p. 66), Pie00: , (Drenth, et al., 2000, p. 73), Eli92: , (PatC-Cornell, 1993, p. 230), VNa11: , (Narayan, 2011, p. 241), Mat11: , (Matsen, 2011, p. 67), Sco09: , (Jackson, 2009, p. 61), Ian11: , (Sutton, 2011, p. 61), Gre11: , (Smith, 2011, p. 86), Eve00: , (Coles, et al., 2000, p. 263), Phi11: , (Hughes & Ferrett, 2011, p. 59), Nor95: , (Gibson, 1995, p. 39), Mic04: , (Karmis, 2004, p. 35), Ian06: , (Glendon, et al., 2006, p. 459), Read More