Risks Assessment of One-Storey Building - Example

FV3103 Risks Assessment Methods Table of Contents Contents 1 Introduction 3 2 Fire Risks Assessment 3 2.1 Description of Sample Building for Assessment 3 2.2 Ticklist Method 4 2.3 SWOT ANALYSIS DIAGRAM 7 2.4 Risk Ranking and F-N Table 8 2.5 FMEA – Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 10 2.6 Fault Tree Analysis 11 2.7 Common Cause Analysis 12 2.8 Reliability block diagram 13 2.9 Event Tree 14 2.10 Cost Benefit Analysis 15 3 Reflective Comparison of Different Risks Assessment Methods 19 4 Allocating fixed budget for indentified risks 22 5 References 23 Risk Assessment Methods 1 Introduction In the United Kingdom, reliability and accuracy of risks assessment is required by law thus building owners and organisations must be aware and able to use appropriate risks assessment methods . The process of risk management according to requires a relevant and appropriate risk assessment method in order to determine the risks, its impact on the organisation, and identify effective treatment and control of a particular risks. There is therefore a need to identify the most appropriate and beneficial method and this can be achieved by evaluating each method in terms of ability and effectiveness in identifying risks, probability or likelihood, and impact. The following section is a risks assessment one-storey building using different fire risks assessment methods such as Ticklist, SWOT (Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats), Risk Ranking, FMEA, Fault Tree Analysis, Cost Benefit Analysis, Common Cause Analysis, and others. 2 Fire Risks Assessment 2.1 Description of Sample Building for Assessment The one-storey building for risks assessment is a mobile phone store/showroom with four in-house salesmen/women, a reception clerk, one manager, two utility workers, and one security personnel. The average occupancy of the store on business day around 25 people mostly customers shopping for mobile phones, accessories, and other electronic gadgets. Figure 1- Sample One-Storey Mobile Phone Store/ Showroom 2.2 Ticklist Method The Ticklist developed by Tony Graham (2012) is divided into five stages. These stages include identification of fire hazards, identification of people who could be at risks, adequacy of existing fire safety procedures and findings, and adequacy of existing fire safety procedures and recommended improvements. Table 1 – Ticklist Stage # 1 Stage 1 – Identification of Fire Hazards No. LIST FINDINGS 1 System for controlling combustible materials and flammable liquids None 2 System operation N/A 3 Safe storage for combustible materials and flammable liquids Materials stored near fire exit 4 Heater guards and location of heater Heater with guards /free from combustibles 5 Portable electrical equipment inspection and fuses Fuses correct specs with complete maintenance documents 6 Electrical wiring inspection Electrical services contractor inspect regularly 7 Extension leads and multi-point adapter Regularly used for customer battery charging 8 Flexes location Hidden away 9 Furniture upholstery Almost new/ excellent condition. 10 Rubbish and combustible waste materials Combustible waster very minimal 11 Smoking area with adequate ashtray No smoking policy implemented 12 Measures against arson 24 hours shifting in-house security 13 Measures to prevent smoke and flames spread Fire rated doors and walls Table 2 Ticklist Stage # 2 Stage 2- Identification of People Who Could Be at Risk No. LIST FINDINGS 14 Sufficient number of exits and width for the number of occupants One dedicated fire exit/ One exit to main door 15 Exits leading to place of safety Back of building / other to main road 16 Obstructions on escape routes and gangways Free of any obstruction 17 Tripping and Slipping Hazards in Escape Route Non-slip tiles installed 18 Steps and stairs No stairs /single-storey 19 Final exit Unlocked on business days 20 Devices securing final exit No key required from inside 21 Internal Fire Doors Automatic and Labelled 22 Self closers on Fire Doors Working efficiently 23 Door opening direction Final exit direction 24 Signs in Escape Routes Adequate and properly placed along route 25 Lighting in Escape Routes Emergency lighting available 26 Evacuation plan for assisting disabled staff and visitors None Table 3 – Ticklist Stage # 3 Stage 3 – Elimination. Control, & Avoidance of Fire Hazards No. LIST FINDINGS 27 Procedures and Practices for Use of Combustible Materials and Processes that use and produce heat None 28 Consideration of cost-effective measures in preventing arson 24 hours shifting in-house security 29 Staff Training in terms of fire safety No formal training / some knowledge with portable extinguishers and sounding alarm 30 Advice from insurer regarding fire safety Received by manager Table 4- Ticklist Stage # 4 Stage 4 –Adequacy of Existing Fire Safety Procedures and Findings No. LIST FINDINGS 31 Escape lighting order and maintenance Working / Service contractor inspection and maintenance 32 Fire alarm condition Working / Service contractor inspection and maintenance 33 Fire alarm testing Monthly test by service contractor 34 Fire alarm raising safety No safety hazard observed 35 Fire Alarm Call Points Visibility and Location Free of obstruction / easily recognisable 36 Number of Fire Extinguishers 8 Fire extinguishers available 37 Fire Extinguisher and Fire Blankets Condition and Location Good condition / Easily accessible near Room 3 38 Fire Extinguisher Servicing Annual fire extinguisher company servicing 39 Fire Fighting Installation and Automatic Fire Detection System Smoke detector in kitchen but no sprinkler Table 5 – Ticklist Stage # 5 Stage 5 –Adequacy of Existing Fire Safety Procedures and Recommended Improvements No. LIST FINDINGS 40 Recording Findings of Fire Risk Assessment Record available 41 Informing staff or representatives about the findings of Risk Assessment Posted near reception area, main entrance, and Room 1 42 Preparation of Formal Report Distributed to all store staff 43 Informing others about the risk identified Posted near main entrance, reception, and Room 1 44 Informing the building owner about the findings of a fire risk assessment Building owner seems aware of his responsibility and interested in the risks assessment 45 Display of Fire Action Notices Posted in all rooms and lobby 46 Existence of Emergency Plan Major and minor fire 47 Safekeeping of Emergency Plan Store manager office Compared to the following methods below, Ticklist is the simplest but very informative in terms of identified fire hazards, adequacy of existing fire safety measures, and necessary improvement information. 2.3 SWOT ANALYSIS DIAGRAM STRENGHT WEAKNESS Smoking not allowed Smoke and Fire alarm installed, working, and maintained regularly Working and visible Call Points Two Fire Exits 8 Fire extinguishers available Self-closing fire doors Escape routes signed / lighted / free from obstruction Minimal combustible materials Extinguishers and blanket conveniently located Regularly serviced fire extinguisher Fire doors open towards final exit Risk assessment record maintained properly Lack of storage for combustible materials No formal fire safety training provided to staff OPPORTUNITIES THREATS There is enough space for additional room dedicated for storing combustible materials. Formal fire safety training is still possible Combustible materials near exit can ignite Lack of formal fire safety training can lead to injury or death Fire can led to enormous financial lossess SWOT Analysis is more popular in business organisations and not often used in other industry particularly those that involve complicated process such as electronics where Fault Tree method is more relevant. However, SWOT according to is a practical method for market or business competition analysis it is designed for business organisations’ who wants to know their position in the market. 2.4 Risk Ranking and F-N Table Table 6 –Risk Ranking (Cabinet Office, 2012) IMPACT PROBABILTY High (Likely to occur in the immediate/near future) Combustible materials without proper storage can lead to arson and more fuel for fire. Medium (Will likely occur in time if not prevented) Untrained staff’s failure to control fire, manage evacuation, and perform fire notification resulting to fire spread, injury, and loss of property Low (Remote or unlikely) Arsonist can take advantage of combustible materials near exit SMALL LOSS MEDIUM LOSS LARGE LOSS Table 7 –F-N Table Ranking Frequency Severity Safeguards 1 Never yet observed Negligible Invulnerability 2 Rare event Cosmetic Secure 3 Statistic exist Superficial Contained 4 Occasional Peripheral Compensative 5 Sporadic Significant Suppressive 6 Probable Structural Moderative 7 Periodic Serious Strategic 8 Regular Permanent effect Minimal 9 Likely Critical Superficial 10 Constant Catastrophic Prone Risk Ranking according to is useful in risk assessment requiring probability and impact determination Compared to compared to SWOT and Ticklist, Risk Ranking demonstrate the likelihood of occurrence as well as extent of damage or consequences to the organisation. 2.5 FMEA – Failure Mode and Effect Analysis Item Description Function Failure Mode Failure Cause Failure Effect on Failure detection method Building People Business Storage for combustible materials Prevent fire Lack of safe storage for combustibles Business management failure Fire damage Injuries /Death Store reputation damaged, decreased patronage, unprofitability Room for combustible materials allocated Formal fire safety training for staff Prevent fire spread & allow safe evacuation of occupants Failure to suppress fire, untimely sounding of alarm, mismanagement of evacuation Office management neglect Fire damage Injuries /Deaths Store reputation damaged, decreased patronage, unprofitability Formal fire safety training conducted Arson detection & prevention Prevent incendiary fire & unnecessary fire losses Detection failure/ easily accessible combustibles Security neglect / accessible fuel for fire Fire damage Injuries/ Deaths Store reputation damaged, decreased patronage, unprofitability Regular security training for arson detection FMEA or Failure Mode and Effect Analysis are a useful method as it demonstrate critical failure modes, causes, and solutions to avoid or reduce the risks but no probability measure is available . However compared to Risk Ranking, Ticklist, Faul Tree, SWOT, and others this method may be more complex and difficult to apply without expertise and in large areas with multiple risks. 2.6 Fault Tree Analysis Table 8 – Codes and Description for Fault Tree Codes Description IM Inadequate maintenance COFE Cannot operate fire extinguisher DN Delayed fire notification FFF Fuel for Fire in Fire Path FRD Faulty fire rated doors NEP No emergency plan in place As shown above, Fault Tree is somewhat complex, detailed, and time consuming compared to FMEA, SWOT, Risk Ranking, and others mainly because it is intended for people with experience such engineers and those trained in this technique . 2.7 Common Cause Analysis Common Cause Analysis is a method for checking the possible failures in the system by compiling different assessment results. In Figure 3 for instance, the commonalities between assessment results are considered in order to identify the critical and generic cause of failures. The benefit of this method is the opportunity to build scenarios out of common system defect and determine the most appropriate solution. However, CCA is laborious and time consuming as it involves performing different risk assessment methods . 2.8 Reliability block diagram According to RBD or Reliability Block Diagram is simpler than Fault Tree but it can demonstrate the effect of system components’ failures on the overall performance of the system. As shown in Figure 4, “Fire Safety” is the system and is dependent on the reliability of different components. The first block consists of warning devices, fire suppression equipment, and evacuation plan. The second block consists of fire safety awareness, fire safety training, and equipment inspection and maintenance. Since each block consist of critical components required to attain fire safety then their failure can significantly affect fire safety performance. 2.9 Event Tree Figure 5 Event Tree for Accidental or Incendiary Fire Ignition Event Tree or ET is a logic diagram and as shown in Figure 5 is similar to RBD but for focus on each events impact on fire safety . However, ET as demonstrated can only show one initiating event (Ignition) thus more work is required if you for instance 10 initiating events to present. Figure 5 shows that if the fire is detected by a warning devices such as smoke or fire alarm, there is a strong possibility the fire suppression will follow and therefore minimal property damage is caused by fire. However, this is not always the case in the real world as sometimes fire is detected by not suppress and therefore continue to grow and spread causing severe damage. Similarly, if the fire was not detected by warning devices but noticed by one occupants who immediately sound the alarm then occupants can evacuate soon enough for them to reach a place of absolute safety. 2.10 Cost Benefit Analysis Table 9 – Mobile Phone Store Data Cost if room unavailable (£/day) Premises no. rooms typ. area (sq.m) mean inaccuracy (%) Rangimarie 3 100 £100 50% Angus 2 20 £50 50% Corridor 1 10 £1,000 50% Comfort Room 1 240 £1,000 50% Store Room 0 0 £50 50% Kitchen 1 10 £100 50% Office 1 16 £100 50% Total area (sq.m) 616 £2,600 Other data value No. Customer 25 whole for this type of business No. Staff 6 No. other staff 3 Location Northside Rel. no. of fires 1.0 compared to National average Table 10 – Sample Fire Risks Summary for Mobile Phone Store Baseline Risks (per year) Reduced Risks (per year) Net Benefit (per year) cost (£) fraction cost (£) fraction cost (£) fraction Total Risks (£, per year) £3,543 100% £518 100% £3,025 100% deaths £4 0% £2 0% £3 0% injuries £54 2% £19 4% £34 1% building damage £1,018 29% £63 12% £954 32% contents damage £454 13% £31 6% £423 14% building unavailability £1,810 51% £398 77% £1,412 47% room unavailability £0 0% £0 0% £0 0% environmental damage £204 6% £6 1% £198 7% other Total no. of fires (1/yr) 2.87E-02 100% 1.18E-02 41% Table 11 – Cost Benefit Analysis for Sprinkler Installation Reliability mean inaccuracy(%) uncertainty System reliability 95% 3% 3% System lifetime (years) 40 5% 2 Costs mean inaccuracy(%) uncertainty One-off costs (eg. installation) (£) £11,060 2% £221 Capital Recovery Factor 4.7% 2% Annual discounted costs (£) £518 3% £16 Annual costs (eg. maintenance) (£) £2,390 0% £0 Total annual costs (£) £2,908 1% £16 Benefits mean inaccuracy(%) uncertainty One-off benefits (besides risk reduction) (£) £0 0% £0 Capital Recovery Factor 4.7% 2% Annual discounted benefit (besides risk reduction) (£) £0 2% £0 Annual additional benefit (besides risk reduction) (£) £22,000 10% £2,200 Total annual benefit (besides risk reduction) (£) £22,000 10% £2,200 Table 12 Cost Benefit Analysis for CCTV Installation Reliability mean inaccuracy(%) uncertainty System reliability 98% 3% 3% System lifetime (years) 15 20% 3 Costs mean inaccuracy(%) uncertainty One-off costs (eg. installation) (£) £130,000 10% £13,000 Capital Recovery Factor 8.7% 15% Annual discounted costs (£) £11,287 18% £2,061 Annual costs (eg. maintenance) (£) £0 0% £0 Total annual costs (£) £11,287 18% £2,061 Benefits mean inaccuracy(%) uncertainty One-off benefits (besides risk reduction) (£) £0 0% £0 Capital Recovery Factor 8.7% 15% Annual discounted benefit (besides risk reduction) (£) £0 15% £0 Annual additional benefit (besides risk reduction) (£) £10,000 10% £1,000 Total annual benefit (besides risk reduction) (£) £10,000 10% £1,000 Table 13 – Cost Benefit Analysis for Warning Devices Reliability mean inaccuracy(%) uncertainty System reliability 95% 3% 3% System lifetime (years) 10 10% 1         Costs mean inaccuracy(%) uncertainty One-off costs (eg. installation) (£) £63,000 10% £6,300 Capital Recovery Factor 12.0% 8%   Annual discounted costs (£) £7,575 13% £988 Annual costs (eg. maintenance) (£) £512 10% £50 Total annual costs (£) £8,087 12% £990         Benefits mean inaccuracy(%) uncertainty One-off benefits (besides risk reduction) (£) £0 0% £0 Capital Recovery Factor 12.0% 8% Annual discounted benefit (besides risk reduction) (£) £0 8% £0 Annual additional benefit (besides risk reduction) (£) £0 0% £0 Total annual benefit (besides risk reduction) (£) £0 0% £0 More complex the other methods, Cost Benefit Analysis as shown in the above figures can justify the cost of fire safety systems. It can provide data for decision-making or whether or not a certain fire safety measure can benefit the mobile store based on cost and benefit. According to , the purpose of cost-benefit analysis is to inform rational decision-making and it is commonly applied to justify organisational policy which in this case is the mobile store fire safety policy. 3 Reflective Comparison of Different Risks Assessment Methods The methods presented earlier are commonly used risks assessment methods. Reflecting on these methods in terms of fire safety, they are all comparatively useful and beneficial in their own way. However, it terms of use, the Ticklist method is more simple, informative, and helpful particularly in detailing fire hazards and solutions. However, this does guarantee reliability for all system and compared to SWOT that appears more useful in business organisations,Ticklist is designed for specific application. SWOT is a logical method but cannot be use for manufacturing that is often after identification of fault in the system. SWOT is for business because it is useful in determining an organisations competitiveness in the market while Fault Tree helps determine faults in the manufacturing process . Risk Ranking on the hand is commonly used in indentifying risks probability and severity rating and ranking of system components . The Risk Ranking Matrix presented earlier demonstrate the level of probability and severity of damage of fire to the mobile phone store if the identified risks are not reduced. Compared to Ticklist, SWOT, and others Risk Ranking will benefit those seeking information about the likelihood of risks and the estimated extent on its impact if actually occurs..FMEA method appear similarly informative like the Ticklist but designed to show the function, failure, causes of failure, effect, the most likely treatment and control, and the potential victims of the fire. However, FMEA requires more work than SWOT, Risk Rank, Event Tree, and others. Moreover, filling the items in FMEA seems difficult and require expertise and experience of the system . Although looks simple, Fault Tree Analysis is a complex process and requires engineering background. According to , Fault Tree requires detailed understanding of the process and relationship between elements of the system and therefore not suitable for beginners.. As shown in Section 2.10, Common Cause Analysis is capable of evaluating several risks at the same time including failures, similarities, and common solutions . As demonstrated in Figure 3 commonalities between assessment results are gathered together in a pool of knowledge where similarities and differences will be examined. As mentioned earlier, CCA is beneficial for those seeking opportunity to build scenarios out of commonalities and differences in system failure causes and ready to face the difficult task of performing multiple assessment techniques . RBD or Reliability Block Diagram can help identify the effect of system components’ failures on the overall performance of the system . As shown in Figure 4, RBD is less complex than Fault Tree Analysis. For instance, it is easier to understand that the goal of the system is “Fire Safety” and this goal is reliant on the reliability or continuous presence or operation of block 1 and 2. For this reason, if the first block consisting of warning devices, fire suppression equipment, and evacuation plan completely fails then system performance will be 50%. Similarly, failure of the second block that is consists of fire safety awareness, fire safety training, and equipment inspection and maintenance will result to reduced system performance failure. Finally, since two blocks is required for 100% system performance then failure of both blocks result to failure of the fire safety system and subsequent fire. As mentioned earlier, the Event Tree is a logic diagram capable of identifying events that can cause fire safety breach and property damane. Figure 5 demonstrate RBD’s similarity with other methods but limited to one event at a time . It is somewhat easy to understand the when combustible materials ignites, the following events will be detection of the fire, suppression if detected and fire spread if not, and minimal or severe damage respectively. Since fire occurred in the real world, event trees should consider the possibility of devices failure and human errors in order to be useful and realistic. In summary, since CBA is definitely not for beginners and requires accounting knowledge in most part, Ticklist is more appropriate for fire safety risks assessment. The reason is that aside from being simple and in comes with predefined activities, Ticklist is more convenient, it does not require too much expertise or understanding of the system, and not prone to error compared to other risks assessment methods. 4 Allocating fixed budget for indentified risks Since the main consideration of the risk assessment initiative is to reduce the risks and its impact, the most relevant method or methods are those that consider reliability, accuracy, and economics. The result therefore of this ideal method is reliable and therefore can justify the need for additional fire safety measures along with their respective budget. Aside from the convincing result, the budget that may allocated to fire safety may be justified through cost-benefit analysis. For instance, management decisions may be made on the benefits of the fire safety measures or the extent of potential damage to business against the cost of warning and monitoring devices and fire safety training. With clear and better understanding of cause and effect, probability and severity of each risks, cost and benefits of proposed measures, it is very likely that the management of the mobile phone store will immediately decide and allocate a fixed budget for these identified risks. 5 References Abran, A., Braungarten, R., Dumke, R. R., Cuadrado-Gallego, J. J. & Brunekreef, J. (2009). Software Process and Product Measurement: International Conferences IWSM 2009 and Mensura 2009 Amsterdam, The Netherlands, November 4-6, 2009. Proceedings, Springer Andersen, B., Fagerhaug, T. & Beltz, M. (2009). Root Cause Analysis and Improvement in the Healthcare Sector: A Step-by-step Guide, ASQ Quality Press Antony, A. & Binghamton, S. U. o. N. Y. a. (2006). 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Fault-Diagnosis Systems: An Introduction from Fault Detection to Fault Tolerance, Springer Jonassen, D. H., Tessmer, M. & Hannum, W. H. (1999). Task Analysis Methods for Instructional Design, L. Erlbaum Associates Livermore, M. A. & Revesz, R. L. (2013). The Globalization of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Policy, Oxford University Press, USA Melnick, E. L. & Everitt, B. S. (2008). Encyclopedia of Quantitative Risk Analysis and Assessment, Wiley Mikulak, R. J., McDermott, R. & Beauregard, M. (2011). The Basics of FMEA, 2nd Edition, Taylor & Francis Morrow, R. (2012). Utilizing the 3Ms of Process Improvement: A Step-by-Step Guide to Better Outcomes Leading to Performance Excellence, Taylor & Francis Perry, P. (2003). Fire Safety Questions and Answers: A Practical Approach, Thomas Telford Stamatis, D. H. (2003). Failure Mode and Effect Analysis: Fmea from Theory to Execution, American Society for Quality Vanden Heuvel, L. N., Lorenzo, D. K., Consulting, A. & Hanson, W. E. (2008). Root Cause Analysis Handbook: A Guide to Efficient and Effective Incident Investigation, Rothstein Associates Incorporated  Read More