Organizational Risk Management: Small Chemical Company - Case Study Example

Don’t worry I will change this when I receive feedback from teacher. Thanks! MANAGING STRATEGIC RISK Risk Assessment for Small Chemical Company Table of Contents Contents MANAGING STRATEGIC RISK 1 Table of Contents 1 Contents 1 1 Overview of Scenario 3 2 Important Scenario Considerations 3 3 Identification of Project Risks 7 4 Risk Evaluation Procedure (Probability and Severity Ranking) 20 5 Treatment and Control of Risks 22 6 Risks Communication Procedure 24 7 Risk Rating Matrix 28 8 REFERENCE 30 1 Overview of Scenario The Chemical Company producing and supplying Formaldehyde to its industrial customers in UK and Europe has been in its current location for over 40 years. Adjacent to a road and rail network, the plant is located outside the Industrial Centre of the City and near three housing estates and a small village, which has a population of 3000 people. It is also near River Ure, which is a habitat for salmon and other species of wildlife. The Formaldehyde process is the central and most profitable part of the Chemical Company’s business. The local community expressed objection over the company’s operation, as the leak was contained within the tank storage bund, the small formaldehyde leak incident from an on-site storage tank three years ago often remind the community of the danger of formaldehyde. However, there is a general tolerance to the Chemical Company’s existence because majority of its employees are members of the community; the site carries immunity under planning laws, and the fact that the company is a major job and income generator in the area. 2 Important Scenario Considerations 2.1 Area and Vulnerable Population - Plant is outside industrial and near population of 3000 people - Plant is employing 1250 people - Plant is near River Ure, a river sanctuary for wild life - Community is aware of the risk of Formaldehyde - There has been an incident of on-site storage leak three years ago. - Plant is operating for more than 40 years in the same location. - Formaldehyde processing is the most profitable part of the business. 2.2 Formaldehyde and associated risks 2.2.1 Substance Identification Chemical Name: Formaldehyde Chemical Family: Aldehyde Chemical Formula: HCHO Molecular Weight: 30.03 Chemical Abstracts Service Number (CAS Number): 50-00-0 2.2.2 Synonyms Formalin; Formic Aldehyde; Paraform; Formol; Formalin (Methanol-free); Fyde; Formalith; Methanal; Methyl Aldehyde; Methylene Glycol; Methylene Oxide; Tetraoxymethalene; Oxomethane; Oxymethylene 2.2.3 Components and Contaminants Percent: 37.0 Formaldehyde Percent: 63.0 Water (Note.—Inhibited solutions contain methanol.) 2.2.4 Other Contaminants: Formic acid (alcohol free) Exposure Limits: OSHA TWA-1 ppm OSHA STEL-2 ppm 2.2.5 Physical Data Description: Colourless liquid, pungent odor Boiling point: 214 °F (101 °C) Specific Gravity: 1.08 (H2O=1 at 20 °C) pH: 2.8-4.0 Solubility in Water: Miscible Solvent Solubility: Soluble in alcohol and acetone Vapor Density: 1.04 (Air=1 at 20 °C) Odor Threshold: 0.8-1 ppm 2.2.6 Fire and Explosion Hazard Moderate fire and explosion hazard when exposed to heat or flame. The flash point of 37 percent formaldehyde solutions is above normal room temperature, but the explosion range is very wide, from 7 to 73 percent by volume in air. Reaction of formaldehyde with nitrogen dioxide, nitromethane, perchloric acid and aniline, or peroxyformic acid yields explosive compounds. Flash Point: 185 °F (85 °C) closed cup Lower Explosion Limit: 7 percent Upper Explosion Limit: 73 percent Autoignition Temperature: 806 °F (430 °C) Flammability (OSHA): Category 4 flammable liquid Extinguishing Media: Use dry chemical, “alcohol foam”, carbon dioxide, or water in flooding amounts as fog. Solid streams may not be effective. Cool fire-exposed containers with water from side until well after fire is out. Use of water spray to flush spills can also dilute the spill to produce nonflammable mixtures. Water runoff, however, should be contained for treatment. 2.2.7 Other information Formaldehyde chemical elements include carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen in it structure. It is commonly known as formalin that contains 37 to 50 percent formaldehyde weight. It has a pungent odour and very soluble in water. It is a highly reactive gas that readily combines with other chemical compounds under normal conditions. Formaldehyde is a highly reactive reagent which produces protein-DNA and protein-protein crosslink between macromolecules in close contact . Sources of formaldehyde include aqueous solutions such a formalin (37 to 42% formaldehyde), trioxane, paraformadehyde, polyoxymethylene, and heamethylenetramine . It is a known cause of leukaemia in experimental animals and nasal cancer in humans . It is released into the atmosphere through fumes from automobile and truck exhaust and by manufacturing facilities that burn fossil fuels. 2.3 Routes of Exposure and Permissible Exposure Limit Considered exposure to formaldehyde is in air at a concentration in excess of 0.6 mg/cu m (0.5 ppm), based on a 30-minute sampling period or by contact with formaldehyde in liquid or solid form . Exposure to formaldehyde gas greater than 0.1 percent is considered dangerous. Exposure to airbone concentration of formaldehyde that exceeds 0.75 parts of formaldehyde per million parts of air (0.755 ppm ) as an eight-hour time-weighted average. Short-term exposure limit (STEL) is about two parts formaldehyde per million parts of air (2 ppm) as a 15-minute STEL. 2.4 Harmful Effects of Formaldehyde Harmful in inhales or swallowed Causes irritation of skin, eyes, nose and throat Formaldehyde is genotoxic and showing properties of both cancer initiator and promoted Human exposure to formaldehyde has been associated with cancers of the lung, nasopharynx and oropharynx, and nasal passages. Formaldehyde can enter the body by ingestion, inhalation, skin absorption, and eye contact. 3 Identification of Project Risks 3.1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Procedure 3.1.1 Risk Identification with Cause and Effect Diagram (CE) According to Lancashire Resilience Forum Community Risk Register June 2010 the risks in this type of business are below. These selected risks are the most likely for the Chemical Plant and will form the basis of the following risk assessment. Table 3‑A Community Risk Register CODE Risk Events Consequences Likelihood Impact Rating H8 Very large toxic chemical release Up to 10km from site causing up to 2000 fatalities and 10,000 casualties. Toxic release could be due to loss of containment of chlorine or of a number of other chemicals e.g. anhydrous hydrofluoric acid, refrigerated ammonia, sulphur dioxide (or trioxide) gas. Outcome assumes a chlorine release and is based on a large industrial complex or bulk storage of chemicals near to a populated (i.e. urban) area. Low Catastrophic (5) Medium H46 Biological substance release during an unrelated work activity or industrial process (e.g. Legionella release due to improperly maintained building environmental control systems) Up to 10 fatalities and serious injuries or offsite impact requiring up to 1000 casualties. Outcome specifically related to Legionella release during an unrelated work activity or industrial process.; Inadvertent Legionella contaminant of wet cooling systems such as cooling towers and evaporative condensers, and air conditioning systems such as humidifiers and industrial air scrubbers. High (5) Catastrophic (5) Very High HL3 Localised industrial accident involving small toxic release Up to 1km from site of toxic chemical release causing up to 10 fatalities and up to 100 casualties. Medium (3) Moderate (3) High HL4 Major Pollution of Controlled Waters Pollution incident impacting upon controlled waters (for example, could be caused by chemical spillage or release of untreated sewage) leading to persistent and/or extensive effect on water quality, major damage to aquatic ecosystems, closure of potable abstraction point(s), major impact on amenity (i.e. tourism) value, serious impact on human health. High (5) Moderate (3) High HL28 Localised fire or explosion at a fuel distribution site or tank storage of flammable and/or toxic liquids Up to 1km around site, causing up to 15 fatalities and 200 casualties. Impact on the environment, including persistent / widespread impact on air quality. Medium Low (2) Significant (4) High HL12 Local accident involving transport of hazardous chemicals Up to 50 fatalities and up to 500 casualties (direct injuries from the accident would be similar to road or rail accidents; indirect casualties are possible if substance covers wide area). The extent of the impact would depend on substance involved, quantity, nature and location of accident. The assumption is based on phosgene / chlorine. Medium Low (2) Significant (4) High The table below are real-life incidents that occur from 2001-2008 that form the basis for the likelihood of risk that were identified in the following sections. Table 3‑B- Reported Incidents from 2001-2008 The table below are common handling and storage requirements for Formaldehyde processing which is the basis of risks initiative events that are likely to trigger the political, economic, social, and environmental risks associated with the operation of the chemical plant. Table 3‑C Transport, Handling and Storage Risks Handling and Storage Risks Handling and Storage Requirements Initiating Risk Events Initiative Event Codes 01 Formaldehyde solutions must be stored in well-ventilated locations, away from sunlight, and away from all ignition sources, flammable materials, oxidants and bases. Under ventilation, exposure to sunlight, ignition sources IE1 02 The minimum storage temperature for a formaldehyde solution to limit its polymerization depends on its concentration and the presence of an inhibitor such as methanol. Storage temperature setting error IE2 03 50% solution of formaldehyde without an inhibitor must be stored at 60ºC while a 37% solution with an inhibitor can be stored at 15ºC. Temperature above 60 degrees and below 37 degrees centigrade IE3 04 Respiratory protective equipment, a source of water at a high flow rate, safety showers and eye showers be available nearby, outside the storage area Lack of protective measures IE4 05 For chemical incompatibilities, formaldehyde, a strong reducing compound, will react violently (explode, catch fire, etc.) with strong oxidants Explosion due to lack of knowledge about formaldehyde IE5 06 Formaldehyde is also incompatible with strong acids, amines, ammonia, aniline, disulfides, gelatine, iodine, magnesite, phenol, tannins, and copper, iron and silver salts. Also, formaldehyde solutions attack ordinary steel Introduction of incompatible chemicals and solutions IE6 07 Formaldehyde and its solutions must be used in a closed circuit to avoid any exposure through skin contact or inhalation. Drums and barrels of formaldehyde solution shall be stored with the bungs up and tightly placed. All containers must be securely closed or sealed while being transported Improper handling IE7 Handling and Storage Tank (Continuation) Storage Tanks Requirements Risks Initiative Event Codes 01 Shall have vents to permit pressure and vacuum relief. Manholes for cleaning of storage tanks Tanks should have positive sealing connections for filling and draining tank Error in tank design IE8 02 Vents must be cleared and regularly inspected and cleaned Inadequate maintenance/monitoring IE9 03 Tanks must be grounded to discharge static electricity Improper installation IE10 Table Figure 3‑A – Risk Initiating Events ID Risk Initiating Events ID Risk Initiating Events IE1 Under ventilation, exposure to sunlight, ignition sources IE8 Error in tank design IE2 Storage temperature setting error IE9 Poor maintenance and monitoring IE3 Temperature above 60 degrees and below 37 degrees centigrade IE10 Improper installation IE4 Lack of protective measures IE5 Explosion due to lack of knowledge about formaldehyde IE6 Introduction of incompatible chemicals and solutions IE7 Improper handling 3.1.2 Establishing Risk Initiating Events by Cause and Effect Diagram The cause and effect diagram or CE shows the roots of the problem and their likely effect on a particular system . As show below, fish-bone like representation of root causes starts from different initiating events . Table 3.1.2-A contains 14 events with their assigned ID and codes that could initiate the risks. Figure 3‑B CE Diagram of Risk Initiating Events by Category The cause and effect diagram shows how the initiating events can contribute to risks that can negatively affect the outcome of the chemical plant operation. These negative effects or consequences are listed in the table below along with their likely trigger and reduction approach. For instance, lack of good safety management, appropriate handling and storage, inadequate operational knowledge and skills, and so on can lead to leakage and disaster. These can also lead to delays in product delivery, cost overruns, damaged reputation, legal disputes, lost opportunities, and business closure in extreme cases. According to , the CE diagram can provide useful information in determining root causes, their likely consequences , triggers, and potential risk reduction technique as shown below. Table 3‑D – Risk Initiating Events Register for Chemical Plant Functions ID Initiating Events Effect Trigger Reduction Process / Management / People IE1 Under ventilation, exposure to sunlight, ignition sources Leakage /Explosion /Environmental and Health Effects Inadequate maintenance / monitoring /safety management Detailed planning, training, regular inspection / close supervision, improved safety management Process IE2 Storage temperature setting error Leakage /Explosion /Environmental and Health Effects Lack of knowledge / inadequate monitoring and control / safety management Detailed planning, training, regular inspection / close supervision, improved safety management Equipment/Process IE3 Temperature above 60 degrees and below 37 degrees centigrade Leakage /Explosion /Environmental and Health Effects Human error / Lack of knowledge / inadequate monitoring & control / inadequate safety management Detailed planning, training, regular inspection / close supervision, improved safety management Materials / Management IE4 Lack of protective measures Leakage /Explosion /Environmental and Health Effects Inadequate safety management Detailed planning, training, regular inspection / close supervision, improved safety management People / Environment IE5 Explosion due to lack of knowledge about formaldehyde Leakage /Explosion /Environmental and Health Effects Human error / Lack of knowledge & skills / inadequate monitoring & control / inadequate safety management Detailed planning, training, regular inspection / close supervision, improved safety management Process / People / Materials IE6 Introduction of incompatible chemicals and solutions Leakage /Explosion /Environmental and Health Effects Human error / Lack of knowledge & skills / inadequate monitoring & control / inadequate safety management Detailed planning, training, regular inspection / close supervision, improved safety management People / Environment IE7 Improper handling Leakage /Explosion /Environmental and Health Effects Human error / Lack of knowledge & skills / inadequate monitoring & control / inadequate safety management Detailed planning, training, regular inspection / close supervision, improved safety management People / Environment/ Management IE8 Error in tank design Leakage /Explosion /Environmental and Health Effects Human error / Lack of knowledge & skills / inadequate monitoring & control / inadequate safety management Detailed planning, training, regular inspection / close supervision, improved safety management Equipment / People/Management IE9 Poor maintenance and monitoring Leakage /Explosion /Environmental and Health Effects Lack of knowledge & skills / planning & control / inadequate safety and work management Detailed planning, training, regular inspection / close supervision, improved safety management People / Process/ Management IE10 Improper installation Leakage /Explosion /Environmental and Health Effects Human error / Lack of knowledge & skills / inadequate monitoring & control / inadequate safety management Detailed planning, training, regular inspection / close supervision, improved safety management 3.2 Risk Identification Analysis Procedure Probabilistic risk analysis or PRA procedure include establishing the objectives and methodology required to identify the risk and estimate the probability of their occurrences and effects . The diagram below contains the suggested steps for PRA but slightly modified for this particular purpose. The PRA Procedure (Modarres, 2006) 3.2.1 Objectives and Methodology Definition The main objective is to reduce the risks associated with the chemical plant operation. The strategy is to identify past failures associated with identified risks and analyse its effects. Determine events that likely trigger the risks and assess the performance of associated risk reduction mechanism. 3.2.2 Familiarisation & Information assembly Table 3‑E – Compilation of information associated with identified risks Functions ID Initiating Events Past Failures / Abnormal Events Effect Trigger Process / Management / People IE1 Under ventilation, exposure to sunlight, ignition sources None / occurrence in similar plant (see Table 3.1.1-A & B) Up to 1km around site, causing up to 15 fatalities and 200 casualties. Impact on the environment, including persistent / widespread impact on air quality. Inadequate maintenance / monitoring /safety management Process IE2 Storage temperature setting error None / occurrence in similar plant (see Table 3.1.1 Up to 1km around site, causing up to 15 fatalities and 200 casualties. Impact on the environment, including persistent / widespread impact on air quality. Lack of knowledge / inadequate monitoring and control / safety management Equipment/Process IE3 Temperature above 60 degrees and below 37 degrees centigrade None / occurrence in similar plant (see Table 3.1.1 Up to 1km around site, causing up to 15 fatalities and 200 casualties. Impact on the environment, including persistent / widespread impact on air quality. Human error / Lack of knowledge / inadequate monitoring & control / inadequate safety management Materials / Management IE4 Lack of protective measures None / occurrence in similar plant (see Table 3.1.1 Up to 1km around site, causing up to 15 fatalities and 200 casualties. Impact on the environment, including persistent / widespread impact on air quality. Inadequate safety management People / Environment IE5 Explosion due to lack of knowledge about formaldehyde None / occurrence in similar plant (see Table 3.1.1 Up to 1km around site, causing up to 15 fatalities and 200 casualties. Impact on the environment, including persistent / widespread impact on air quality. Human error / Lack of knowledge & skills / inadequate monitoring & control / inadequate safety management Process / People / Materials IE6 Introduction of incompatible chemicals and solutions None / occurrence in similar plant (see Table 3.1.1 Up to 1km around site, causing up to 15 fatalities and 200 casualties. Impact on the environment, including persistent / widespread impact on air quality. Human error / Lack of knowledge & skills / inadequate monitoring & control / inadequate safety management People / Environment IE7 Improper handling None / occurrence in similar plant (see Table 3.1.1 Up to 1km around site, causing up to 15 fatalities and 200 casualties. Impact on the environment, including persistent / widespread impact on air quality. Human error / Lack of knowledge & skills / inadequate monitoring & control / inadequate safety management People / Environment/ Management IE8 Error in tank design Leakage 3 years ago Exposure / Protest / Pollution / Health effects Human error / Lack of knowledge & skills / inadequate monitoring & control / inadequate safety management Equipment / People/Management IE9 Poor maintenance and monitoring Leakage 3 years ago Exposure / Protest / Pollution / Health effects Lack of knowledge & skills / planning & control / inadequate safety and work management People / Process/ Management IE10 Improper installation None Human error / Lack of knowledge & skills / inadequate monitoring & control / inadequate safety management 3.2.3 Identification of Initiating Events (Functional Block Diagram Technique) Initiating events threatens the integrity of protective measures thus events that are potentially hazardous to the functionality of the system should be identified . Figure 3‑C Block Diagram of Initiating Events for Chemical Plant Operation 3.2.4 Sequence or Scenario Development The purpose of scenario development is to determine the appropriate mitigating functions for each initiating events in the chemical plant operation. These include site conditions, effectiveness of planning, environmental effects, and conditions required to achieve success. The event tress below shows the associated functional events for each initiating event, their progression, required condition to succeed, and potential effect . This technique is applicable to all initiating events. Figure 3‑D Event Tree of Scenario Developed for Chemical Plant Operation’s Initiating 3.3 Logic Modelling (Fault Tree Analysis) Probability and failure points are not available in Event Tree analysis method thus recommended Fault Tree analysis is applied in this logic modelling. Fault Tree is a logic-based analysis method that can calculate subsystems’ probability using quantifiable causes such as initiating events as shown below . Figure 3‑E - Fault Tree Failure Probability for IE1 to IE6 4 Risk Evaluation Procedure (Probability and Severity Ranking) According to “Severity Rating” is the rank associated with the possible consequences of a hazard while probability rating is the likely occurrence of this hazard. The rating scales are 1 to 5 or 1 to 10 but it can be modified according to assessment needs as shown in corresponding table. 4.1 Risk by Probability Rating/Ranking Table 4‑F Risk Probability Ranking Criteria & Values 4.2 Combined Risk Probability & Severity Rating/Ranking Table 4‑G Basis for Probability and Severity Ranking Matrix (see Table 3.1.1-A) 4.3 Calculating Average Probability and Severity Average probability and average severity ranking are calculated for each risk category. Their average values are added and compared to given thresholds. Table 4‑H Average Probability and Severity Calculation Table 4‑I Severity Threshold THRESHOLD SEVERITY SUGGESTED ACTION 6-8 High Risk Detailed mitigation action/ modification of goals and objectives 4-5 Medium Risk Clearly defined mitigation action 1-3 Low Risk Minimal or No mitigation action required 5 Treatment and Control of Risks Figure 5‑F Risk Treatment & Control Criteria Risk Treatment & Control Criteria Criteria Code Treatment Code Control The risk is acceptable to the organisation if there is a contingency plan in case it occurs. 1 Retain/accept A Contingency Planning Organisation see the need to apply control measures 2 Reduce the Likelihood of the risk B Apply control measures, detailed planning, train staff, improve management & supervision, open communication, etc. Organisation decided to undertake contingency planning, disaster recovery & business planning, 3 Reduce the consequences of the risk C Plan and prepare, allocate funds, train staff in safe working procedures Organisation decided to share some part of the risk to another party 4 Transfer the risk D Contract provisions, outsourcing, insurance coverage, and so on Organisation decided to cancel activities that are likely to generate the risk whenever possible 5 Avoid the risk E Cancel risk generating activities Table 5‑J - Risk Treatment and Control for Chemical Plant Operation Chemical Plant Operation Risk Severity, Treatment, & Control Function ID Initiating Events Severity Threshold Treatment Control Process / Management / People IE1 Under ventilation, exposure to sunlight, ignition sources High 1, 2, & 3 (from Table 3.2.4-A) A, B, C Process IE2 Storage temperature setting error Equipment/Process IE3 Temperature above 60 degrees and below 37 degrees centigrade High 1, 2, & 3 (from Table 3.2.4-A) A, B, C Materials / Management IE4 Lack of protective measures High 1, 2, & 3 (from Table 3.2.4-A) A, B, C People / Environment IE5 Explosion due to lack of knowledge about formaldehyde High 1, 2, & 3 (from Table 3.2.4-A) A, B, C Process / People / Materials IE6 Introduction of incompatible chemicals and solutions High 1, 2, & 3 (from Table 3.2.4-A) A, B, C People / Environment IE7 Improper handling High 1, 2, & 3 (from Table 3.2.4-A) A, B, C People / Environment/ Management IE8 Error in tank design High 1, 2, & 3 (from Table 3.2.4-A) A, B, C Equipment / People/Management IE9 Poor maintenance and monitoring High 1, 2, & 3 (from Table 3.2.4-A) A, B, C People / Process/ Management IE10 Improper installation High 1, 2, & 3 (from Table 3.2.4-A) A, B, C 6 Risks Communication Procedure 6.1 Goals of risk communication procedure for RDCM a. Promote awareness of specific risk issues in chemical plant operation project. b. Make risk management decision and implementation consistent and transparent to all stakeholders.. c. Improve stakeholders’ understanding of risks and associated consequences. d. Encourage use of risk analysis process and mitigating procedures. e. Ensure effectiveness of information in improving stakeholders’ safety culture and perception. f. Promote cooperation among stakeholders in risk reduction efforts. 6.2 Communication Procedure 6.2.1 Stage 1: Identification of the Audience The purpose of identifying relevant stakeholders is to establish the basis for communication such as individual audience characteristics (Managers, Engineers, IT Professional, and others) . In terms of risk communication, the Project may be divided in 3 groups of stakeholders: a. Decision-maker Those who will make the decision for risk reduction and communication (i.e. owner, general manager) b. Risk Reduction Beneficiaries Stakeholders that will benefit from risk reduction program (i.e. Head of departments). c. Risk Recipients Stakeholders that are directly affected by the risks (i.e operation manager suffering low production rate, late delivery, problems in construction site, and so on). Table 6‑K- Chemical Plant‘s Stakeholder Group Type & Percentage STAKEHOLDERS GROUP IN PROJECT GROUP ID GROUP TYPE DESIGNATION No. % G1 BENEFICIARIES Nearby communities 3000 70.55 G2 DECISION MAKER Management 2 0.06 G3 RISK RECIPIENTS Employees / Managers / Supervisors/Utilities 1250 29.39 Total 4252 100 6.2.2 Stage 2: The Message As recommended by , messages for effective communication requires specific audience target thus three type of reports will be generated and distributed. a. Type 1 - (RT1) Full and detailed report of this Risk Assessment results b. Type 2 – (RT2) Executive Summary of Risk Assessment results c. Type 3 – (RT3) A report for specific audience containing risk assessment result relevant to their work or activities. Note: The type of report to for each audience is determined by their interest factor or conditions that arouse their greater concern . Table 6‑L Risk Messages Distribution by Audience Interest Factor REPORT TYPE DISTRIBUTION BY AUDIENCE INTEREST FACTORS GROUP ID GROUP TYPE STAKEHOLDERS Report Type Interest Factors G1 BENEFICIARIES RT3 Risks will affect the quality of their work Production will be low Dissatisfied will likely increase Uncontrolled risk can result to business closure and unemployment       G2 DECISION MAKER RT2 Risks will affect business stability Operational cost will increase Number of protesting community members will increase   Decreasing competitive advantage   Large-scale losses if uncontrolled G3 RISK RECIPIENTS RT1 Risks attributed to their inactions and failings Risks are controllable and can be reduced by appropriate work practices Risks affecting job security     6.2.3 Stage 3: Communication Source The project consists of significant number of people and in view of risk, communication, assessment, the most relevant and likely effective communication source are the HRD or Human Resources Department in cooperation with Chemical Plant’s Public Relation Office. The relationship between information source and those who received it important thus this communication strategy will take advantage of HRD’s credibility and diplomatic ability of the Public Relations Office. 6.2.4 Stage 4: Communication Channel A good communication strategy ensures that all messages reached their intended recipients thus direct delivery will be use main channel of communication. The Public Relation Office will hand over the package to representatives of the community while HRD distribute the internal messages in the each department. The supervisor in turn will distributed the message to his workers before the work begin. 7 Risk Rating Matrix RISK RATING MATRIX for Chemical Plant IMPACT Likelihood RATING Remote Unlikely Likely Almost Certain         Catastrophic         Very High Major    IE1, IE2, IE4, IE5, IE6, IE7, IE8, IE9, IE10     High    IE3               Moderate         Medium                         Minor         Low                                   Low Medium High Very High           Probability Severity Threshold Rank Rating Likelihood Rank Rating Severity Threshold 1 Low Remote (10%) 1-3 Low Minor 2 Medium Unlikely (30%) 4-5 Medium Moderate 3 High Likely (50%) 6-8 High Major 4 Very High Almost Certain (90%) 6-8 Very High Catastrophic Risk Matrix 7‑A- Risk Probability and Severity Rating Matrix for Chemical Plant Note: Treatment and Control Criteria and Table7-A below data of the above matrix Table 7‑M Treatment & Control/ Severity and Probability Data Risk Initiating Events, Risk Severity, Treatment, & Control Function ID Initiating Events Probability Severity Threshold Treatment Control Process / Management / People IE1 Under ventilation, exposure to sunlight, ignition sources 2 High 1, 2, & 3 (from Table 3.2.4-A) A, B, C Process IE2 Storage temperature setting error 2 Equipment/Process IE3 Temperature above 60 degrees and below 37 degrees centigrade 3 High 1, 2, & 3 (from Table 3.2.4-A) A, B, C Materials / Management IE4 Lack of protective measures 2 High 1, 2, & 3 (from Table 3.2.4-A) A, B, C People / Environment IE5 Explosion due to lack of knowledge about formaldehyde 2 High 1, 2, & 3 (from Table 3.2.4-A) A, B, C Process / People / Materials IE6 Introduction of incompatible chemicals and solutions 2 High 1, 2, & 3 (from Table 3.2.4-A) A, B, C People / Environment IE7 Improper handling 2 High 1, 2, & 3 (from Table 3.2.4-A) A, B, C People / Environment/ Management IE8 Error in tank design 2 High 1, 2, & 3 (from Table 3.2.4-A) A, B, C Equipment / People/Management IE9 Poor maintenance and monitoring 2 High 1, 2, & 3 (from Table 3.2.4-A) A, B, C People / Process/ Management IE10 Improper installation 2 High 1, 2, & 3 (from Table 3.2.4-A) A, B, C 8 REFERENCE Brown, C. L. T. (2010). Principles of Software Development Leadership: Applying Project Management Principles to Agile Software Development, Course Technology El-Haik, B. S. & Shaout, A. (2011). Software Design for Six Sigma: A Roadmap for Excellence, Wiley Epstein, S. S. (2013). Avoidable Causes of Childhood Cancer, Xlibris Corporation Modarres, M. (2006). Risk Analysis in Engineering: Techniques, Tools, and Trends, Taylor & Francis NIOSH (2014). Recommendations for a Formaldehyde Standard, The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health UK Oleske, D. M. (2009). Epidemiology and the Delivery of Health Care Services: Methods and Applications, Springer Sanghera, P. (2008). Fundamentals of Effective Program Management: A Process Approach Based on the Global Standard, J. Ross Pub. Travers, A. A. & Buckle, M. (2000). DNA-protein Interactions: A Practical Approach, Oxford University Press Zepeda, C. Risk Communication. Animal Disease Surveillance Systems, 2005 Spain. 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