History of Command and Control - Literature review Example

Literature Review 1. History of Command and Control According FEMA (2004), interagency response to incidents in the fire and rescue service was developed in the early 1970s after the United States suffered a number of wild land fires in Southern California. The total cost and loss from these fires was around $18 million per day mainly because there was no effective system to handle large catastrophic fires (p.1-4). According to Buck (2002), analysis of wild land fires emergency response reveal that there was no management mechanism for such emergency that can coordinate and acquire resources from federal, state, and local government (p.44). Command and Control System was first known as ICS or Interagency Command System developed by FIRESCOPE or Fire Resources of California for Potential Emergencies, a project funded by federal government in 1972 in response to devastating wild land fires. ICS is a command and control system intended for effective delegation of job responsibilities and enhancement of organisational structure of fire and rescue operations and other organisations responding to catastrophic incidents involving thousands of emergency responders (FEMA, 2004, p.1-4). The command and control system according to Builder et al, (1999), is about planning, directing, and controlling operations of facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel by an ”incident commander” whose responsibility is to accomplished a particular mission (p.13). Before the 1970s and FIRESCOPE, individual fire departments were usually working using their own method for managing and commanding incidents but this proven ineffective and confusing particularly in catastrophic incidents involving rapidly changing situations and thousands of responders who never work together before (International Association of Fire Chiefs, 2011, p.105). The 1980s saw the widespread use and success of Incident Command System in the fire and rescue service. It was also the time when fire departments began to consider some type of command and control system for everyday fire ground use such as the Fireground Command System developed by the Phoenix Fire Department. In 1991, NFPA or National Fire Protection Agency developed the Standard on Fire Department Incident Management Systems or NFPA 1561 (Buck, 2002, p.46) In the United Kingdom, command and control system in the fire and rescue was formalised under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 where police, fire services, ambulance, and health related services, coastguard and local authorities are considered Category One Responders working in the management structure of major incidents. Moreover, under the New Dimension project of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and the Chief Fire Officers’ Association, the UK fire and rescue services are obligated to make preparations for catastrophic incidents and should be ready to work in a multi-agency command structure or integrated emergency management (Arbuthnot, 2005, p.1). For instance, the New Dimension programme made some noticeable improvements in the command and control capability of fire and rescue during large scale emergencies such as deployment of equipment to Buncefield oil depot incident in December 2005, in the West England and Yorkshire floods in 2007, and Warwickshire warehouse collapse in the same year. Under the command and control system, high volume pumps were used to put out the fire in Buncefield oil depot in just five days rather than weeks using traditional emergency approaches (Public Accounts Committee, 2009, p.11). Although history of command and control in Singapore is not clear, analysis of Singapore Civil Defence Force or SCDF emergency response plan reveals the same unified command approach to major incidents but different terminologies. For instance, the Site Incident Controller is the overall in-charge in actual ground response operations similar to UK’s operational Bronze commander. Similarly, the Site Main Controller is the overall in-charge of the emergency response and liaises to senior officials of government which in essence is equivalent to Silver command in UK ICS command structure (SCDF, 2005, p.14). Examination of the operational concept suggest that SCDF’s “Command and Signal” system resembles the UK ICS as it include an incident organisation hierarchy, command centres, communication protocols, site incident commanders, and other similarities (SCDF, 2005, p.25). 2. The Need for Command and Control System As discussed in the previous section, the Incident Command System of the United States was developed in response to devastating wild land fires. Moreover, analysis of ICS suggests that this command and control system was developed mainly because uncoordinated response to large-scale incidents was not effective. There was no management mechanism according to Buck (2002, p.44) and effective delegation of job as suggested by FEMA (2004, p.1-4). According to the International Association of Fire Chiefs (), large-scale incidents can only be manage properly and effectively if there is both hierarchy of authority and responsibility, and formal channels of communication (p.105). In other words, unity of command and span of control which one of the features of ICS to prevent overlapping of responsibilities and ensure coordination (International Association of Fire Chiefs, 2011, p.106). The problem in responding to large-scale incident with an Incident Command Structure is the fact that various responding agencies involve are people that never work together before. For instance, fire fighters are historically consistent with incident command because they are often working as an organised unit but other agencies such as the police and related agencies often work independently and not trained to operate in large unified unit (Siljander, 2008, p.26). Consequently, when these agencies work together in a large-scale incident, their strategies will be different from each other resulting to chaos and eventual loss of control. According to Bullock et al, (2011), ICS eliminate communication problems among responding agencies and manage disaster events more systematically. This is because ICS has five management systems that include command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance that can give disaster response more advantage. For instance, the command management systems alone not only enable coordinated and collaborative efforts among agencies on site but establish connection to local officials, the public, and the local media at the same time. Similarly, logistic management enable not only effective distribution of personnel and equipment on site but locating equipment, coordination of all services, and arranging responses from volunteer organisations such as the Salvation Army and the Red Cross. More importantly, the unified command structure within ICS can cross multiple political jurisdictions as well as integration of large number of personnel whenever necessary (p.418). Scalability of the Incident Command System is one its important feature and according to Molino (), this feature benefits both large and small incidents along with communication and integrated planning response. With ICS, incident responders benefit from better teamwork and efficient execution of work. Another benefit is reduced operational disruptions leading to early recovery and resumption of normal operations (p.198). Major incidents often require resource but this does not necessarily mean that these resources can be use or applied unsystematically by responding agencies. According to Balog (2005), the best approach to an incident is to apply the best resources to a given task thus staged or levelled incident response is advantageous. For instance, if the incident command system organisation is structured to enable manageable span of control, the incident commander can track only response activities and personnel but resources being use. Similarly, the incident commander in-charge can control the acquisition and delivery of resources to the site and minimise wastage (p.3). For instance, the NIMS or National Incident Management System being implemented by FEMA in the United States is not only intended to facilitate proactive and systematic response to major incidents but resource management (McMains & Mullins, p.104). 3. The Three Command and Control Management Structure 3.1 Levels of Command of Control The description provided to the levels of management structure of a multi-agency incident response is Bronze, Silver, and Gold (HM Government, p.15). According to the fire service manual, Bronze and Silver are two incident management structures commonly found on the incident ground and applied in most incidents that only require operational and tactical levels of command. However, if the decision making and scale of resources requirements goes beyond the capacity of the operational structure, a Gold command or strategic structure will be created. Unlike Bronze and Silver, the Gold command management does not deal directly to the incident as it is commonly at a distance and involves higher political and policy level decisions (HM Government, 2008, p.17). 3.2 Bronze Level Command and Control Management Structure The Bronze incident management structure is commonly known as the operational level where the Incident Commander or IC assesses the nature of the incident and the risks involved. For instance, assess the extent of the incident, resources required, hazards and risks involved, and the appropriate level of command that must be created. The Bronze command structure requires the IC to identify priorities, develop and implement a plan, communicate and control this plan, and assess its effectiveness. Note that the Bronze level is not yet multi-agency but normal fire and rescue response to incidents (HM Government, 2008, p.16). According to Jones et al (2002), bronze is the first level of the three tier command and control dealing directly to the incident site itself or the “coal face” (p.160). In this level, ‘bronze officers’ are those with specific operational roles with the incident site such as ambulance service officers responsible for loading and patients and sending them to hospitals. Similarly, fire fighters working in the bronze command structure are directly fighting fire or rescuing casualties of the particular incident. However, those that are tasked with ‘bronze’ management roles do not directly get involved as they need to carry out their duties such as making correct and timely decisions (O’Shea, 2005, p.94). In the United Kingdom, the command and control system used in incidents is based on a medallion structure where the core or centre of the system is the bronze command structure as shown below (Smith et al, 2010, p.552). Figure 1- Medallion-based command and control structure (Smith et al, 2010) According to Gray (2004), the bronze command is the first level of the command hierarchy and is mainly concern with direct management and control of the incident, and systematic saving of lives and properties. Moreover, their command and control of the incident will remain until silver and gold command is established (p.276). 3.3 Silver Level Command and Control Management Structure The silver command and control structure according to the fire service manual is created when the bronze Incident Commander’s assessment of the incident necessitate additional resources and attendance of other agencies that will operate their command structure at similar levels. This will elevate the bronze commander to silver commander role and manage the incident and determine of the situation require higher level of command. In this tactical level, consequence management and recovery are the main priorities and decisions are made just outside the scene of operations (HM Government, 2008, p.15). Silver control is mainly a tactical approach to the incident and the role of those involved in this command and control level is to be aware of the implications, communicate and establish coordination with other emergency services (Burtles, 2007, p.92). According to the Advanced Life Support Group (2012), communication between and within services is critical to the success of command and control system and this is done through the silver command level (p.69). This is the reason why the core of the command and control system should be based on Silver command structure where the flow of information to senior levels is possible (Whalley, 2007, p.45). Silver command is usually consists of senior officers working just outside the scene of the incident receiving directives from the gold command. These directives are then translated to functional strategies that often include planning, resources allocation, and coordination. In this command level, the Incident Commander assume a general management role, translate and implement gold command’s theoretical strategy to practical application by the bronze operation command (Gray, 2004, p.276). According to Adriaan & Buma (2009), since the success of command and control infrastructure is dependent on the effective communication, the role of silver command is the most difficult and challenging because during the initial stages of the incident in particular, most frontline staff are still assuming their command roles and may be difficult to control if no silver liaison officers are immediately available (p.146). 3.4 Gold Level Command and Control Management Structure The gold level is the highest and the most senior of the three tier command and control system and according to the fire service manual, is the strategic level where decisions beyond the capacity of tactical commander are made. For instance, if the scale of resources required for the incident is beyond tactical (silver) commander’s authority or there is a need to coordinate two or more incident at the same time (HM Government, 2008, p.16). Gold level command directly support the Silver commander particularly in tactics and implications that may arise from the incident. It does not directly deal with the incident and often not required unless a large-scale incident or civil disorder occur such as wide area flooding, large-scale fires such as Buncefield, and others. Moreover, gold command often involves political considerations and decisions that can only be made the policy level that extend beyond first responders authority (HM Government, 2008, p.17). The duties and responsibilities of the Gold Commander include establishing a framework and policy for the overall management of a particular incident where the silver command can work. The gold command also determines the priority and the level of resources that may be provided including communication facilities and expertise that may be required to solve the problem. Moreover, in cases where gold command is required, the Gold Commander is responsible for recovery and returning everything to normality (HM Government, 2008, p.16). The gold command level is also known as the “unified command” because it is often accompanied by multi-service operations and decisions involving different organizations (Grimwood, 2008, p.25). The structure is usually consists of chief officers from various agencies interpreting and implementing established policies and plans including media relations and delivery of labour and equipment necessary to bring the incident under control (Gray, 2004, p.275). 4. Current Management Structure in the United Arab Emirates In evaluating the response capability of the United Arab Emirates against the impact of natural hazards, Dhanhani (2010), found the UAE Civil Defence sets out the role and structure in managing disasters but in practice, it appears that these roles were not clear as there are confusions about supporting agencies individual role in the overall plan. The study found no sufficient evidence to suggest the presence of an integrated approach towards emergencies (p.2). In the later part of Dhanhani (2010) study, he mentioned existence of coordination in the UAE Civil Defence Strategy where participation and cooperation between government and non-government agencies are sought in handling public disasters but this is not exactly an incident command system (p.133). Further analysis of the study reveals that it is NCEMA or National Emergency Crisis and Disaster Management Authority, an organization under the National Security Council and founded in 2007 through a federal law and now located in Abu Dhabi, governing disaster management in the United Arab Emirates. It is the “Gold Command” coordinating and managing all efforts related to crisis and emergency in the region. Primarily, NCEMA is responsible for establishing a national crisis and emergency command and control and management of all organizations involved (Dhanhani, 2010, p.154). Acting on UAE National Response Plan or NRP, NCEMA’s incident command structure is different from the standard command and control system. For instance, there is no clear level of command such as operational and tactical. Moreover, the strategic command appears the only level of command and will be automatically invoked during crisis. Analysis of NCEMA’s Preparedness Cycle of Disasters as shown below suggest that “tactical” or “silver” command is not officially included in the hierarchy of command. Note that in this cycle tactical command will be only invoke on the last part which in essence is the actual response that is already managed or commanded by the “Gold” command (Dhanhani, 2010, p.160). Figure 1- NCEMA's Preparedness Cycle of Disaster (Dhanhani, 2010) The Incident Command System or Command and Control in UAE is automatically a regional affair rather than incident escalation-based command and control similar to US, UK, and Singapore. For instance, instead of starting from lower level incident management, the response is immediately elevated to “Gold” where senior officers and higher political decisions are already involved. This is contrary to US, UK, and Singapore’s used of command levels starting from initial operational response to elevated or intensified operation involving allocation of additional personnel, equipment, and other resources through senior decision-makers. However, although not clear in the study NCEMA’s command and control system seems influential as there are actual initiatives establishing the presence of low level command and control structure. For instance, HAAD or Health Authority Abu Dhabi encouraged the adoption of ICS for all HAAD healthcare facilities particularly during major incident and disaster. According to HAAD (2012), its Incident Command Structure is a combination of FEMA’s ICS and MIMMS or Major Incident Medical Management System of the United Kingdom (p.3) and therefore following three levels of command. The highest level of command of this modified ICS according to HAAD (2012) is activated on declaration of major incident by HAAD’s most senior officers (p.4). Similarly, there is an indication that DMCA or Dubai Maritime City Authority had already adopted a modified Incident Command System as according to the World Maritime News (2012), it has implemented key measures on maritime incident command system such as stakeholders’ awareness, coordination with ports police, civil defence, Dubai Ports security, ship agencies, and others. Moreover, it has conducted evacuation exercises and following international standards in safety and disaster preparedness (p.1). In summary, although UAE’s version of incident command system is somewhat different from US and UK, it aims and objectives are the same. For instance, it may not be clear in the reports mentioned earlier but analysis of initiatives and actions taken suggest that UAE is well-aware of the importance of coordinate incident response and doing its best to follow established and internationally accepted safety systems. 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