Analysis of the Tenerife Air Disaster - Case Study Example

Accident and Catastrophe Your name Course name Course Instructor Date of Submission The Tenerife Air Disaster With normal flights operating from all over Europe and the Atlantic, 27 March, 1977 could have been similar to other spring days at La Palmas Airport. However, that afternoon at 1:15, the commuter terminal was thrown into bewilderment after explosion of a bomb planted in a florist’s shop in the terminal concourse (Watchnluv, 2010). The government was cautioned about these 15 minutes before, hence, no one was killed though many buildings were damaged, and eight people harmed, one critically. Later, administrator of the Spanish airport was telephoned by a spokesperson for a Militant Canary Islands Independence Group from Algeria in north Africa, claiming accountability for the bombing and hinted that a second bomb was planted somewhere in the airport (Watchnluv, 2010). The airport was closed by the local police after hearing this and did not take any more chances, awaiting thorough look for the second alleged device. Consequently, all intercontinental arriving flights were sidetracked to Los Rodeo Airport in Tenerife. KLM Boeing 747-206B PH-BUF Rijn One of the flights that were supposed to be sidetracked was a licensed trip flown by KLM’s Boeing 747, PH-BUF. It had left Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam, that morning at 9:31 a.m. local time controlled by KLM as Flight KL4805 representing the Holland International Travel Group carrying 234 passengers running away from unfavorable weather in Northern Europe for the sun-drenched weather of the Canary Islands (Watchnluv, 2010). Captain Jacob Veldhuyzen van Zanten, KLM’s chief training Captain for Boeing 747s was in command of 4805. Nonetheless, most of his time was spent in simulators teaching other pilots. PH-BUF landed at Los Rodeos Airport at 1340 hrs GMT after its four-hour trip from Amsterdam, across Belgium, France, and Spain. Watchnluv (2010) stipulates that the enchanted Canary Islands was unsuccessful to maintain its good weather since passengers in the KLM 747 were welcomed with the presence of low cloud sand light rain, and light fog threatening over the airport in the distance. Diverted aircraft had already occupied apron area, and a section of the taxiway hence; the 747 was directed by the controller to leave the runway through the very last crossing taxiway and to park their plane on the holding region subsequently to a Norwegian Boeing 747 (Watchnluv, 2010). A DanAir 727 and a Sata DC-8 touched on the ground shortly afterwards and the two were directed to park in the similar region. Pan American Boeing 747-121 N736PA The Pan American 747 landed at 1:45 pm local time and parked in the same holding region, parking straight at the back of KLM 747. N736PA had come from Los Angeles, where 364 commuters had boarded Pan American Boeing for the first stage of a licensed flight to Gran Canaria (Watchnluv, 2010). They had flown direct from New York to Kennedy Airport after departing LAX late the previous afternoon. The aircraft was refueled, more 14 passengers boarded and there was a change of crews. The aircraft left for Las Palmas after 90 minutes on the ground. The crews were informed of the temporary closure of the airport on approaching the Canaries six hours later and diverted to Tenerife’s Los Rodeos airport (Welsh, 1981, p.1027). Victor Grubbs, a Captain of Pan Am, noted from the Spanish air traffic controller’s instructions that Las Palmas was anticipating to be reopened in a short period of time and asked to possibly be placed in a holding pattern until it open knowing that his aircraft had more than enough fuel reserves. His demands were rejected and thus, N736PA had to land and unite with the rest of the waiting airplane on the ground at Los Rodeos (Watchnluv, 2010). According to Watchnluv (2010), the weather had worsened somewhat because there was a thick fog downward on to the airport by the time the two aircrafts were ready to depart. All the passengers except the H.I.N.T. Company guide- who remained in Tenerife- boarded KLM 4805 later (Shultz & Sloan, 1980, p.19). The Pan Am commuters remained on their craft the entire time it had landed; the doors alone were opened for them to get some fresh air and to take some photographs of what scenery they could observe from their craft. The PA1736 crew geared up to proceed to Las Palmas when Las Palmas Airport was opened to traffic once again. The crew discovered that KLM Boeing 747 had blocked the taxiway, Flight 4805, which was situated amid PA 1736 and the entry to the lively landing strip when they tried to taxi on the taxiway heading to runway 12, where they were parking with four other planes due to the overcrowding caused by the number of flights diverted to Tenerife (Watchnluv, 2010). First Engineer and the Flight Officer left the airplane and calculated the permission left by the KLM airplane, and concluded that it was inadequate to permit PA 1736 to go by, thus, they asked them to hang around until the earlier one had began to taxi and clear the way. At 16:56, KLM 4805 telephoned the tower asking consent to taxi. It was permitted taxi and asked to backtrack on runway 12 for takeoff on runway 30 at 16:58. KLM flight was cleared first by the controller tower to taxi the holding point for landing strip 30 by taxiing downward the major landing strip and depart it by the (third) taxiway to its left. KLM approved reception of this note from the tower, asserting that it was taxiing on the runway at that moment, which it would depart by the first taxiway in order to go on to the reach end of runway 30 (Makhviladze & Yakush, 2002, p.23). The tower controller granted an emended permission immediately telling it to carry on taxiing to the last part of the landing strip, where it should continue to backtrack. The KLM trip established that it had received the message, that it would backtrack, and that it was taxiing down the main runway. The tower signaled its endorsement, upon which KLM 4805 repeated immediately to ask the tower if what they had requested it to do was to turn left on the taxiway one. The tower responded in the negative and repeated that it should carry on to the end of the landing strip and then backtrack. Lastly, KLM 4805 issued O.K. at 16:59 (Watchnluv, 2010). PA aircraft telephoned the tower at 17:02 to ask for verification that it should taxi down the runway. This was established by the tower controller and also added that they also ought to go away the landing strip by the third taxiway to their left. The latter confirmed at 17:03:00 in response to the inquiry of tower controller to KLM 4805 about the number of runway exits they had passed, that they were passing by taxiway C-4 by then. The tower controller issued O.K. to KLM 4805 at the end of the landing strip make 180 and account prepared for ATC authorization. The tower controller advised both aircraft in answer to a query from KLM 4805 that the lights of runway centerline were not functioning. The controller also repeated to PA 1736 that they were to depart the major runway via the third taxiway to their left and that they should report when leaving the runway (Makhviladze & Yakush, 2002, p.28). The First Officer saw the hallway lights of the KLM aircraft looming via the fog as the Pan American aircraft reached its turnoff in the thick fog. They seemed stationary at first but it became apparent that they were shaking as several seconds passed (Watchnluv, 2010). First Officer shouted to the Captain twice to depart, the full power was applied and the Captain turned the plane left away from the runway. Van Zanten attempted very much to turn and go up ahead of the Pan Am aircraft (Watchnluv, 2010). The KLM airplane smashed together with the Pan Am airplane immediately after liftoff, and continued to climb to approximately 100 feet prior to losing control and crashing. The Pan Am airplane burst right away into flames and smashed into several pieces. Nobody witnessed this collision. Investigation of the Accident There were numerous queries about the origin of this disaster including: i) Why Van Zenten had started to take off without the ATC permission to take off. ii) Why Captain Grubbs was asked to leave the runway at taxiway 3, that would have led him back towards the major apron, and not T4 that should have placed him on the hold spot for landing strip 30. iii) Why crew in KLM didn’t understand the importance of Pan Am aircraft’s confirmation that it had not yet empty the runway, and would confirm once more to the tower when it had cleared. It was concluded in the last report that Jacob Zanten was exclusively accountable for the disaster. The essential issues in the occurrence of the disaster were the issues that Zanten: Took off with no permission to takeoff. Didn’t pay attention to the air traffic controllers’ directions to stand by for takeoff. Did not leave when he was aware that the Pan Am aircraft was still taxiing (Watchnluv, 2010). Concorde Crash, Air France The Concorde registered F-BTSC left Paris Charles de Gaulle on Tuesday 25 July 2000 to commence licensed flight AFR 4590 to New York with nine members of crew and 100 commuters on board. Captain was the Pilot Flying (PF) while First Officer was the Pilot Not Flying (PNF). Flight Engineer (FE) asserted at the time aircraft began out that the sum of weights of the airplane and the fuel on board were 186.9 t and 95 t respectively while V1: 150 kt, VR: 198 kt, V2: 220 kt were speeds selected by the crew (AircarftFanatic, 2008). According to AircarftFanatic (2008), the crew contacted ATC at 13 h 15 min 27 s, on the Flight data frequency and asked for the entire distance end to end of the landing strip 26 right for a takeoff at 14 h 30min. The controller permitted and verified runway 26 right at 14 h 07 min 22 s for takeoff. The aircraft was cleared by the Ground controller to taxi heading to the runway 26 right holding point through the Romeo taxiway at 14 hours 34 minutes 38 seconds. the Loc Sud controller cleared 4590 to line up at 14 h 40 min 02 s. She gave it a takeoff clearance at 14 h 42 min 17 s, and proclaimed a wind from 090¡ at 8kt. The crew confirmed the takeoff clearance (AircarftFanatic, 2008). The FE asserted that the aircraft had used 800 kilos of fuel in the course of taxiing. Thus, the PF started takeoff at 14 h 42 min 31 s. AircarftFanatic (2008) stipulates that the PNF called 100 knots at 14 hours 12 minutes 54.6 seconds then V1 later. Tyre number 2 (right front) on the left main landing gear was damaged a few second after that after it ran over a metal lost by the initial airplane that had left five minutes before. It is probable that the destruction of the tyre led to throwing of large pieces of rubber against the base of the left wing and bursting of the part of tank 5 due to deformation of the tank wall and the spread of the shock wave via kerosene. Stern flames broke out beneath the left wing (AircarftFanatic, 2008). There is probability that this fuel fire was ignited from arching on the 115V AC distribution to break cooling fans that were already damaged in all probability. Engines one and two suffered a loss of force, harsh for engine 2, slight for engine 1 at around the same time. The controller notified the crew the existence of fire at the back the craft by 14 h 43 min 13 s as the PF commenced the rotation. The PNF acknowledged this transmission and the FE declared breakdown of engine 2. A temporary loss of control on the engine 1 that was not declared by the crew was shown on the recorded parameters (Davis, 2002, p.15). The engine fire alarm resonance at approximately 14 h 43 min 22 s and the FE proclaimed that engine 2 should be shut down then the Captain demanded for “fire engine” process. The engine 2 fire handle was pulled and the fire alarm stopped a few seconds later. PF’s attention was drawn by the PNF to the airspeed, which was 200kt (Skinner & Mersham, 2002). The PF called for a landing gear retraction at 14 h 43 min 30 s. The existence of large fire at the back of the airplane was confirmed by the controller. Engine fire alarm sounded again for approximately 12 seconds at around 14 h 43 min 30 s. It jingled at around 14 h 43 min 58 s for the third time and went on till the end of the flight (Davis, 2002, p.19). The PNF commented at 14 h 43 min 56 s that the landing cog had not retracted and made quite a few summonses relative to the airspeed. The GPWS alarm sounded several times at 14 h 43 min 59s. The FO informed ATC that they were attempting for Le Bourget aerodrome. A failure of power on the first engine was then pointed out as shown on the recorded parameters. The aircraft crashed a few seconds later onto a hotel at Gonesse (AircarftFanatic, 2008). Eye Witnesses Even though there was no eyewitness in the airport when the Concorde was taking off, there were many eyewitnesses who saw the Concorde burning as it flied slowly through the air including Martin Mbonaey- she was in the office in the western age of the airport at 4:44 when she saw a terrified sight. She was sitting in her office looking at the window when she saw a Concorde taking off very slowly with the back of the plane on fire. She was very scared that the craft was going to crash just in front of the office. She ran quickly from the office all the way outside. There was also another witness, a taxi driver, who was the only person who taken a photograph of the burning Concorde (AircarftFanatic, 2008). He said that he felt the heat while standing on the ground. The other eyewitness said that he was in a room in the hotel when she heard a sound. When she opened the door, she saw the fire coming towards her; she closed the door and jumped through the window, fortunately there was a man just down the window who grabbed her in his arms thus, saving her life. There are also many other eyewitnesses who saw the burning Concorde. Poster information Bibliography AircarftFanatic, 2008, Concorde crash, Air France (online), (Jun 2, 2008) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hLYbdFUbiv8 [Retrieved on March 9, 2012]. Cotterill, SJ, Pearce, MS and Parker, L 2001, Thyroid cancer in children and young adults in the North of England, Is increasing incidence related to the Chernobyl accident? European Journal of Cancer, v. 37, 1020-1026. Davis, L 2002, Natural disasters. revised ed., New York, Facts on File, Inc. Evan, WM and Manion, M 2002, Minding the machines: preventing technological disasters, New York, Prentice Hall. Makhviladze, G M and Yakush, SE 2002, Large-scale unconfined fires and explosions. Invited Topical Review for a special memorial session devoted to the September 11th fire at the 29th Symposium (Int.) on Combustion, Proceedings of the Combust. Institute, v. 29, part 1, pp. 195-210. Quintiere, JG 2006, Fundamentals of fire phenomena, Wiley, Chichester. Shultz, RH and Sloan, S 1980, Responding to the terrorist threat, New York, Pergamon Press. Skinner, S and Mersham, G 2002, Disaster management, Oxford University, Oxford University Press. Watchnluv, 2010, Tenerife disaster 1977 (online), (Feb 17, 2010) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ChEuaDVnObE [retrieved on March 9, 2012]. Welsh, I 1981, Nuclear power and political control, The 1957 Windscale fire as a case study, European Journal of Cancer, v. 37, 1020-1026. Read More