Kings Cross Underground Fire, Mont Blanc Tunnel Fire - Case Study Example

Running head: Compare the accidents Student’s name Institution Course Professor Date Kings Cross underground fire The kings cross underground fire happened on 18th November 1987. It occurred on wooden escalator trench in subway whereby 31 people perished and more than 60 were injured. The fire burnt for duration of 15 minutes and at that time, the size and its behavior were examined by the fire fighters and recommendation highlighted made that it was a significant one. There were two underground subway platforms connected by a tunnel with a world war two largely wooden escalator in it. The fire broke up under the escalator from dropped match. The platforms above and below the escalator ramp remained open and were crowded with travelers (Crossland, 1992). Before the fire department came, and without warning the entire escalator above the fire burst into flame. Tens tones of bone dry wood and varnish ignited at once. Furthermore nearly all the flammable matter within 40 feet of the tunnel top suddenly burst into flame from the intense with the people trapped inside. The fire showed both unexpected and hazardous behavior that caused huge injuries to commuters, general public transport workforce and the fire fighting team (Crossland, 1992). A distinct phenomenon called trench effect made the flames and burning materials to be locked up within the trench thereby increasing the growth of the fire as revealed by the investigation expertise. The availability of charred wood in various locations under the escalator 18 locations beneath up the escalator signified that several numbers of fires had started previously but had not taken hold (Atkinson & Drysdale, 1995). The fire took place on an area where the standing passengers are possible to light the cigarettes. The flashover took place immediately when many steps have been heated up so much. Thereafter size of the fire increased rapidly with sufficient jets of flames being discharged from the escalator tunnel into the ticket hall. A flame from a fully developed fire across the escalator trench stayed within the channel and spread upwards an escalating speed. Establishment of flame attachment boasted preheating and pyrolysis of fuel on top of the fire thus accelerating the spread of fire (Crossland, 1992). Escape way from the underground tunnels was planned via corresponding escalator to thicket wall over the burning escalator. Amalgamation of draughts rooted by an eastbound train that landed at the station and a westbound train that left the station created a 12mph wind which fanned the fire flames. Mont Blanc tunnel fire It occurred on 24th March 1999 in which 39 people succumbed to death. A Belgium transport trailer stacked with margarine and flour was on flame and ended in Mont Blanc tunnel at approximately seven kilometers in the France-Italy direction. The driver of the truck realized a mischief as cars in the different lane flashed on headlight at him after several distance in the tunnel. Immediately the tunnel employees triggered the fire alarms as they stopped any traffic from utilizing the tunnel. However 18 heavy goods vehicles, 9 cars, a van and motorcycle had entered the tunnel from France after the first heavy good vehicle and before the tunnel was closed. The ventilation system in the tunnel drove down hazardous smoke down the tunnel limiting the safety. The fire spread to other vehicles behind the transport trailer. The toxic fumes stalled vehicles engine because of insufficient oxygen for ignition. The extreme heat and smoke occupied the whole funnel apartment limiting emergency rescue and any fire fighting operation. In addition, it melted the wiring system plunging the tunnel into darkness. The fire took 53 hours and reached temperature of 1000°C due to margarine loads, 550 litres of diesel in the fuel tank and the shell of the refrigerated trailer was made of combustible isothermal foam. On top of intense loss of human lives, many automobiles were damaged. The fire fighting crew included Chamonix and Courmayeur entered both entrances of the tunnel to quench the raging fire. Due to the prevailing wind condition and varied ventilation regimes at both ends of the tunnel virtually all the smoke from the fire was carried towards France. Smoke was not able to be stratified hence there was no fresh air in the tunnel stream of fire. Investigation of the fire incident Kings Cross underground fire Secretary of State for Transport in England assigned Desmond Fennel, Queen’s Counsel and panel of four experts to investigate incident of fire. Investigation was opened at Central on 01st February 1988 and closed on 24th June. Investigation made by use of sophisticated computer program to simulate the fire (Crossland, 1992). They discovered a hitherto unknown effect called trench effect. In the right grade shaped tunnel with the right grade, smoke and flames from the fire in the right location will travel along the floor instead of rising to the ceiling. While the fire did seem not dangerous, it slowly heated up tones of wood and varnish above the fire. The highly flammable paint in the tunnel burst in to flame contributing to the fire. The scientist leant new ideas about fires in the tunnel (Crossland, 1992). Consequently the wooden escalators were removed and highly flammable paint was no longer used on tunnels to prevent reoccurrence. Poor maintenance and complacency on the part of management have been the proximate of the disaster. When the forensic expert visited the scene after the disaster, he discovered several matches from the running track underneath the lower part of the escalator. When the skirting board of the escalator was examined it revealed from the burn marks that fires had started on many previous occasions (Dold & Zinoview, 2009). Detailed surveys of damages were taken at the site of the fire and samples of varied substances were analyzed after collection. Many ignitions and flame spread tests were performed. Later fire growth studies were carried out on a full-size section of escalator, on scale models of the escalator shaft and numerical modeling. Scientific characteristic of the examination engaged experimental and theoretical research on spread of fire under trench-like configuration. Continuous jets of flames on top of channel suggested existence of a mechanism that accelerates the spread of fire within the confines of an escalator trench (Dold & Zinoview, 2009). Mont Blanc tunnel fire During Mont Blanc tunnel fire, a technical investigation chosen by the French government aimed at analyzing the circumstances and the reasons for fire incidence in the tunnel. Ventilation system in the tunnel aided in spread of fire and inhibited interventions from rescue teams. During the event, an air-steam of an average speed of 1.5km/hr from Italy to France was felt (Riess & Bettelini, 1999). Poorly organized collaboration between two control centres in view of adjustment of the ventilation in order to improve conditions and facilitate an invention contributed to spread of fire. Three pool fire experiments were investigated on the Mount Blanc tunnel fire where data produced formed a body of evidence that directed and supported fire and legal investigation. (Alan &, Carvel, 2005). Technical report outlined that the nearest smoke detector was not functioning well and radio frequencies used inside the tunnel differ from those used in French emergency service (Riess & Bettelini, 1999). The Fennel investigation proposed introduction of provisions on fire precautions and regulations Act, 1989 that resulted to replacement of all wooden escalators on the underground, installation of automatic sprinklers and heat detectors in escalators, fire safety training for station staff and enhancement of emergency services liaison (Crossland, 1992). Moreover strict restrictions on type of paint allowed for use on the underground tunnel. Modern tunnels should incorporate sophisticated fire detectors, suppression systems and ventilation systems to control and restrict fire spread. Reducing smoking would limit huge impact on fire injury, fire control costs and the many deaths that occur from non-fire related smoking disease (Dold & Zinoview, 2009). Factors that influenced the spread of smoke were geometry of the tunnel, ventilation rate, fire location and size. A one directional compressible flow model of the tunnel and ventilation systems was established and used to simulate the configuration and adjustments used during the fire (Dold & Zinoview, 2009). Minister of the interior and the minister of equipment, transportation and housing allocated a technical analysis to Mr. Pierre, Inspector General of the Administration and Mr. Michael, State Engineer of bridges and highways. They investigated, examined and determined the reasons why the tragedy happened and examined the tunnel safety with their functionality Causes of fire Shortcoming in physical and human state of affairs had been identified before by internal investigation on escalator fires. Recommendations were not sufficiently taken into consideration. The proposal resulted from the previous fires had not been taken thus led to fire disaster at King’s Cross (Atkinson & Drysdale, 1995). Whereas many minor escalator fires had occurred previously and had been investigated, however no one in the organization considered the fact that a major escalator fire was likelihood. Generally the causes of the Kings Cross fire can be categorized Accumulation of rubbish Discarded cigarette Poor cleaning regime Wooden escalator Failure of the firefighting equipment Lack of emergency training Poor safety culture Similarities The two accidents were similar in regard to speed of fire spread, powerful heat and information of persons influenced by two accidents. Fires spread rapidly because of petrol spillage hence severe impacts. The rapid spread of the fire in the Mount Blanc tunnel was influenced by effect on the ventilation system and load of the trailer. Inter-communication between the workforces plays an important role during an intervention. For example, a break down may lead to important delays and endangers life and rescue teams. In both large numbers of people were trapped in the inferno and many lives were lost. The ventilation system contributed to the spread of fire at a faster rate (Alan &, Carvel, 2005). Differences In Mont Blanc fire, the emergency services had no information of the size or the number of vehicles involved and failed their plea to access the burning trailer. The shelters did not resist the heat of the fire and the service funnel was unavailable therefore cars continue to entre after the fire was detected (Books Llc, 2010). Also it is controlled by two different companies. However, the firm and equipment of the rescue teams vary. Kings Cross fire took place on the escalator trench on a rail station due to lighted cigarettes. Whereas in Mont Blanc fire it took place in the tunnel due to a Belgium trailer carrying margarine and flour. Contributing factors to the fire The fire in the Mont Blanc tunnel became a tragedy due to combination of factors such as weather conditions, the different ventilation systems at either end of the tunnel and highly inflammable nature of the trailer and its cargo (Alan &, Carvel, 2005). Italian authorities erroneously pumped fresh air into the fire zone thus escalating strength of the smoke. Trench effect is known to be a well established mechanism for fire propagation on enclosed slopes such as escalators or stairwells in building structures. This effect produced extreme fire behaviour and rapid fire spread. The likely causes of fire in Mont Blanc tunnel were:- 1) The speed and intensity of development of fire in the tanker 2) Limited extraction of smoke in the tunnel 3) Poor coordination of information between the two companies in management 4) Insufficient tool and equipment being used in the tunnel Significance of the fire occurrence Kings Cross fire case, smoke inhalation was the major immediate cause of morbidity and mortality in victims of the underground fire. Most of the survivors had skin burns and effect of smoke inhalation. The flammable paint and varnish on the escalators and advertising panels of the station contained a polyurethane base that generated cyanide gas and other toxic products of combustion. Victims of accidental and occupational smoke exposure developed acute airflow obstruction and bronchial reactivity increased immediately after smoke inhalation. The concept of absolute safety, need to extend across the whole workforce and vital in the minds of the management. Huge numbers of the casualties during the fire incident was due to an indirect impact of combustion occurrence called trench effect. Insufficient visible flames and rather clean wood smoke emitted calmed emergency services into a false sense of security. The most costly of these accidents are in terms of human and economic losses such as physical damage of the tunnel. Operating companies of the Mont Blanc tunnel lacked a complete overview of the status of ventilation in the tunnel on either side. Alternatively, Mont Blanc fire lead to loss of human life and damage to tunnel structures. The tunnel structures damaged were: - tunnel roof of over 900M long, ceramic tiles, safety refuges and asphalt road pavement. In both case, fire showed the dangers of smoke in an enclosed area with insufficient smoke extraction system in place. Obscurity prevented affected persons from fleeing the fire bound area due to lack of visibility. The spilling of roof concrete lining was due to the dehydration of the concrete. It was the greatest loss of life in any road tunnel fire. Running tracks should be cleaned and lubricated properly because accumulation of greases and detritus on the tracks constitute a seed bed for fire. Catastrophic five in the Mont Blanc tunnel has changed a number of views on the safety of road tunnels. Various steps have been set up towards ensuring safety in the tunnels. The concrete pavement must be reinforced to improve tunnel’s resistance to fire. The human factor The error at the sharp end was not seen in the wider context of the organization and supervision in which they were commended. The human error was associated to the latent errors such as design of plant and equipment is poor, training inefficiency, supervision inadequacy, ineffective communication and uncertainties in roles and responsibilities in workplace (Crossland, 1992). The inquiry highlighted that there were severe flows in the management and organizational tasks and accountability for protection with virtually all aspects of the organization reflecting that passenger safety was someone else’s role (Crossland, 1992). The design latent failure was composited by the attitude of the senior management in regard to a request for an on-bridge warning device. Limitation in the standard of ergonomics applied to the design of plant increased risk of human error (Atkinson & Drysdale, 1995). The design of the escalators was discovered to be of central importance in channeling the explosive ignition at the train station. Lessons learnt Commitment, positive safety attitudes and motivation together with constant vigilance throughout the organization, are essential to achieve high standards. As a result of these fires some suggestions can be put forward to increase safety. These are; Information about the right way to behave in emergency situations Have adequate ventilation system and safety facilities Quick intervention of fire brigades Adequate equipment for the fire brigades References Alan Beard, Richard Carvel, 2005.The handbook of tunnel fire safety, Thomas Telford. Atkinson, G.T., Drysdale, 1995. Five driven flow in an inclined trench. Fire safety Journal 25 141-158 Books Llc, 2010.Fires in France: Mont Blanc Tunnel, 1996 Channel Tunnel Fire, 2008 Channel Tunnel Fire, Paris Métro Train Fire, Club Cinq-Sept Fire, General Books LLC. Crossland, B. 1992.The Kings Cross Underground fire and the setting up of the investigation. Fire safety Journal 18, 3-11 Dold, J.W., Zinoview, A, 2009. Fire eruption through intensity and spread-rate interaction mediated by flow attachment. Combustion Theory and modeling, 13(5), 763-793 Minister of the Interior, and Ministry of Equipment, Transportation and Housing, 1999. "Task Force for Technical Investigation of The 24 March 1999 Fire in The Mont Blanc Vehicular Tunnel - Report of 30 June 1999" (English translation). Riess, I & Bettelini, M., 1999. The prediction of smoke propagation due to tunnel fires, 1st International Conference Tunnel fires and escape from Tunnels, 1999. United States. Federal Transit Administration, Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade & Douglas, 2007. Transportation security: Making transportation tunnels safe and secure, Volume 12, Transportation Research Board. Read More